



RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CABO DELGADO **From a *Triple Nexus* Perspective: Humanitarian, Development and Peace**

December 2022





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1. Introduction

The attacks carried out by violent extremist groups in northern Mozambique have caused several crises, in particular the security crisis, the humanitarian crisis and the delay in socio-economic development.

While the security and humanitarian crises are the most visible, manifesting themselves through thousands of deaths, injuries, of which about a third are civilians (ACLED, 2021)¹ and about a million internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2022)², the crisis of delayed development is of medium and long-term impact. Indeed, the delay to development is a consequence of the paralysis of economic activities and services in education, health, infrastructure construction and maintenance, in a region historically with the lowest socio-economic indicators in the country (Shinkai, 2016:09)³.

Since the emergence of the attacks, there have been efforts by the Government to respond to the conflict. In the early years (2017 to 2019), the Government's response was predominantly military, deploying police and military contingents on the ground to contain or attempt to stop the attacks (Nhamirre, 2021)⁴. In this phase, the government provided little or no humanitarian and

development response, leading to criticism from various civil society (Bande, 2021)⁵ and religious bodies (VOA, 2020)⁶.

From 2020 and 2021, there was greater commitment from the Government, cooperation and development partners, civil society and religious organisations to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the attacks, opening the first accommodation centres for displaced people from the conflict and providing emergency assistance to the victims⁷. The first initiatives structured by the Government for the development sector also emerged, such as the creation of the *Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte* - ADIN (Northern Integrated Development Agency) and the approval of the *Plano de Reconstrução de Cabo Delgado* (Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan) - PRCD (Radio Mozambique, 2021)⁸.

The situation in Cabo Delgado is one of protracted conflict in the context of a fragile state whose government is unable to provide basic services to the majority of its population, including rights to basic services, justice and security. However, this is not a reality unique to Cabo Delgado: it is currently estimated that around one

¹ Records from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) show that by mid-August attacks by violent extremists in Cabo Delgado had caused 4,188 deaths, of which 1,818 are civilian victims. The data is available at <https://www.cabodelgado.com/reports/cabo-delgado-weekly-8-14-august-2022> [Accessed on 3 September 2022].

² UNHCR (2022). Internal Displacement Response - July 2022. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/unhcr-mozambique-cabo-delgado-external-update-internal-displacement-response-july-2022-enpt> [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

³ Naoko, S. (2016). Examination of Poverty in Northern Mozambique: A Comparison of Social and Economic Dimensions. JICA Research Institute. Available at https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/workingpaper/wp_133.html [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

⁴ ISS (2021). Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado? Policy Brief. Available at <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado> [Accessed on 3 September]

⁵ Bande, A. et al (2021). Managing Cabo Delgado's war displaced: Government failed to support conflict victims. CIP. Available at <https://www.cipmoz.org/pt/2020/10/25/gestao-dos-deslocados-de-guerra-de-cabo-delgado-governo-falhou-no-apoio-as-vitimas-do-conflito-2/> [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

⁶ Voice of America (2020). Dom Luiz Fernando Lisboa: A feeling of powerlessness plagues the population of Cabo Delgado. Available at <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/dom-luiz-fernando-lisboa-a-populacao-de-cabo-delgado-e-assolada-por-um-sentimento-de-impotencia/5365417.html> [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

⁷ Deutsche Welle (2020). Cabo Delgado: Government creates village for displaced people in Metuge. Available at <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/cabo-delgado-governo-cria-aldeia-para-deslocados-em-metuge/av-54851041> [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

⁸ Radio Mozambique (2021). Government approves Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado province. Available at <https://www.rm.co.mz/governo-aprova-plano-de-reconstrucao-da-provincia-de-cabo-delgado/> [Accessed on 9 November 2022]



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third of the world's poorest, most vulnerable and marginalised people live in fragile and conflict-affected countries or regions (OXFAM, 2016)⁹. For these contexts, a coordinated response from the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) sectors is recommended, an approach known as *triple nexus*. However, in Cabo Delgado there is a lack of institutional coordination between these sectors (HDP).

Since the 1980s, it has been on the international agenda to link humanitarian aid to development cooperation. This, mainly, in contexts such as Cabo Delgado, where conflicts coexist with fragility. Better known under the English acronym LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation and development), this is a model developed as a response to the funding gap identified between emergency relief operations and long-term development projects following disasters (Ramet, 2012)¹⁰.

The LRRD approach evolved, integrating also the peace and security component, humanitarian assistance and development aid, becoming known as the *Triple Nexus*, also known as HDP - Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding. HDP specifically refers to efforts to work together across these sectors to more effectively meet people's needs, mitigate risks and vulnerabilities and move towards sustainable peace (Nguya, 2020)¹¹.

Nguya (2020:02) maintains that the *triple nexus* approach requires a New Way of Working - NWoW that transcends the humanitarian-de-

velopment-peace divide, strengthens rather than replaces national and local systems and anticipates crises by working towards collective outcomes. The UN Secretary-General and UN Agencies agreed the *triple nexus* approach and the respective NWoW at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, and gradually national governments and donors have committed to progress in its adoption and implementation (UN, 2016)¹². Therefore, the response to the Cabo Delgado conflict comes in a context in which the main actors, whether governmental, UN and NGO, have committed themselves to work on the *triple nexus* and NWoW approach.

The study aims to, critically, analyse the harmonisation, coherence and complementarity between the Humanitarian, Development and Peace sectors, in the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. More specifically, the study identifies the main actors engaged in the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, working in the humanitarian, development and peace sectors. It maps the challenges faced in coordination, coherence and complementarity across the three sectors (HDP) and makes recommendations for the main actors operating in these sectors.

Methodologically, the study is the result of field research conducted in Cabo Delgado province in September and October 2022. The research adopted a qualitative approach, with open and semi-structured interviews addressed to representatives of 20 national and international organizations, with knowledge of

⁹ OXFAM (2016). Oxfam's work in Fragile and Conflict Affected Contexts. *Discussion Paper*. Available at <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/oxfams-work-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-contexts-learning-event-bangkok-fe-617241/> [Accessed on 9 November 2022]

¹⁰ Ramet, V. (2012). Linking relief, rehabilitation and development: Towards more effective aid. Policy Briefing. European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies. Available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491435/EXPO-DEVE_SP\(2012\)491435_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491435/EXPO-DEVE_SP(2012)491435_EN.pdf) [Accessed on 9 November 2022]

¹¹ Nguya, G. (2020). The Triple Nexus (H-D-P) and Implications for Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement. *International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam*. Available at https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/sites/www.un.org.internal-displacement-panel/files/idrp_hlp_submission_ws3_triple_nexus.pdf [Accessed on 9 November 2022]

¹² ONU (2016). Transcending humanitarian-development divides Changing People's Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need. *COMMITMENT TO ACTION*. Available at http://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/WHs%20Commitment%20to%20action%20-%20transcending%20humanitarian-development%20divides_0.pdf [Accessed on 9 November 2022]



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humanitarian, development and security issues, including workers from United Nations agencies operating in Cabo Delgado and whose actions focus on at least one of the development, humanitarian and peace pillars. The technique of non-participant direct observation was also used, based on which a script was made to capture the activities carried out by the different institutions, particularly the humanitarian support actions. Documentary research methods were also used to review existing literature on the response to the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

The main argument of the study is that despite the efforts of various actors involved in the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, from government, civil society, humanitarian organisations, cooperation and development partners, there is still a lack of coordination between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, which compromises the achievement of the intended results.

The report is divided into five parts: the first is this introduction, which outlines the purpose and objectives of the study, provides the conceptual and contextual framework of the *triple nexus* approach, and presents the methodology used. The second part presents the evolution of the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado in the humanitarian, development and peace sectors. The third part identifies the main actors in Cabo Delgado in each of these sectors (humanitarian, development and peace). The fourth part describes the challenges faced by the HDP sectors in responding to violent extremism. The fifth part critically analyses the application of the *triple nexus* in Cabo Delgado in terms of harmonisation, coherence and complementarity between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors in Cabo Delgado. Attention is given to what the identified actors are doing, what they are not doing and what they should be doing. Finally, it presents the main conclusions and recommendations.

2. Response to Violent Extremism in Cabo Delgado

Since violent extremist attacks began in Cabo Delgado, the Government of Mozambique has been taking a number of steps to contain the extremists' actions. However, the focus of the government's response has evidently been on military operations, despite warnings that viewing the Cabo Delgado crisis only through a counter-terrorism lens is insufficient as it may lead Mozambique's partners to focus too much of their resources on military operations (Ero, 2021)¹³.

Despite being the predominant option, the Government's military actions proved incapable of containing the expansion of attacks and of protecting the civilian populations. Even on

several occasions, government forces were referred to as being themselves involved in acts of violence against civilian populations (Amnesty International, 2021)¹⁴.

Also in the military response, the government used forces from private military companies (PMCs) and foreign military forces from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to contain the attacks. However, attacks continued and spread to more districts south of Cabo Delgado and in neighbouring Niassa and Nampula provinces, showing "resilience of violent extremist groups" (The Economist, 2022)¹⁵.

¹³ Ero, C. (2021). Mozambique's Insurgency Requires a Multi-Pronged Response. *International Crisis Group*. Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/mozambiques-insurgency-requires-multi-pronged-response> [Consultado a 3 de Setembro de 2022]

¹⁴ Amnesty International (2021) "What I saw was death" - war crimes in Mozambique's "forgotten cape", https://www.amnistia.pt/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Relatorio_O-que-vi-foi-a-morte_Mocambique.pdf [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

¹⁵ The Economist (2022). Mozambique's resilient jihadists, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/09/01/mozambiques-resilient-jihadists>. [Accessed on 3 September 2022]



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With support from cooperation and development partners, the government has launched some formal measures for the development of Cabo Delgado. These measures include the creation of the *Agência do Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte* (Northern Integrated Development Agency) – ADIN; the approval and start of implementation of the *Plano de Reconstrução de Cabo Delgado* (Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan) – PRCD; and *Plano de Resiliência e Desenvolvimento do Norte* (Northern Resilience and Development Plan) – PREDIN. To provide emergency relief, dozens of international humanitarian

agencies, including but not limited to the United Nations, have established themselves in Cabo Delgado, assisting hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Thus, this section examines the evolution of the governmental and other actors' response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado across the aforementioned pillars.

The analysis is done in the framework of the *triple nexus*¹⁶ of complementarity and coherence between humanitarian aid, development and peace-seeking actions, assessing the relationship and coordination between actors from the different sectors.

2.1 Peace and Security sector response

The onset of violent extremist attacks in October 2017 was a test of the Mozambican government's ability to deal with threats to state security in general and social, economic and human security in particular. In the process, the government Defence and Security Forces (FDS) soon proved unprepared to deal with the type of threat in question, allowing extremists to occupy some district headquarters villages, namely Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Namacande, Muidumbe, and Quissanga.

The military response of the Mozambican state to violent extremism failed both in time and space, as well as in the means employed to counter the attacks (Rogero, 2020:103)¹⁷. Consequently, the attacks spread from a single district (Mocímboa da Praia), where they started, to all districts in Cabo Delgado, with the exception of the capital Pemba.

The Government tried to address the Defence and Security Forces' (DSF) inability to respond to violent extremism by hiring foreign military companies to fight in Cabo Delgado, namely

Russia's Wagner Group (2019) and later the Dyck Advisory Group - DAG (2020-2021). The use of private military forces to help the Government to counter internal military threats may be understood as the Government's assumption of the Defence and Security Forces' incapacity to face violent extremism and resorted to the outsourcing of services which are par excellence the responsibility of the State.

Meanwhile, Mozambique's decision to rely on private security companies proved inadequate as attacks by violent extremist groups continued to spread. The government in Maputo sought to solve two main problems by contracting out private security services. First, it wanted to ensure enforced peace in Cabo Delgado province. Secondly, it wanted to guarantee the protection and security of the interests of the multinationals and ensure that they continued to exploit the hydrocarbons, which would serve as a major source of revenue for the state, estimated at around US\$100 billion (Kimani, 2022)¹⁸.

¹⁶ The Triple Nexus: Questions and Answers on Integrating Humanitarian, Development and Peace Actions in Protracted Crises, relief-web, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/triple-nexus-questions-and-answers-integrating-humanitarian-development-and-peace>. [Accessed on 3 September 2022]

¹⁷ Rogero, N. (2020), *O Cabo do Medo - o Daesh em Moçambique*, 1.a Edição. Brochado: Lisboa

¹⁸ Kimani, A. (2022). Mozambique Eyes \$100 Billion LNG Windfall As It Prepares To Ship Its First Cargo. *Yahoo Finance*. Available at <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mozambique-eyes-100-billion-lng-190000258.html> (Accessed on 7 September 2022)



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Although the Government never revealed the purpose of the contracting of the military companies, the recourse to them was based on the need to support government troops in combating complex threats, including the collection of military intelligence information and support in aerial combat means¹⁹. However, the private military enterprises failed. Contrary to expectations, the unfolding events in the theatre of operations allowed the insurgents' military power to increase significantly. In other words, the option of hiring private military companies was counterproductive.

The attacks by insurgents on the headquarters of the districts of Quissanga (March 2020), Mocímboa da Praia (March, June and August 2020), Macomia (May 2020) Namacande, Muidumbe (April and November 2020), Palma (March 2021) took place after the Government hired the services of private military companies.

After a long period of Government reluctance regarding external military intervention to combat violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, the superior military strategy of violent extremist groups which allowed them to attack, occupy, destroy and loot some district headquarters villages in Cabo Delgado Province, forced the Government of Maputo to take a new approach. The first act of the Government that demonstrated the change of paradigm in the fight against terrorism was to request the intervention of the Rwandan Defence Forces in this conflict. Later, the SADC Military Mission in Mozambique, known as SAMIM, joined these forces.

As with the contracting of private military services, the intervention of Rwandan troops was not consensual, since the Mozambican Parliament did not approve this action. Despite

criticism of the unclear agreements between the Maputo and Kigali governments, as well as Rwanda's compensation for its intervention in the conflict in Cabo Delgado, the arrival of Rwandan forces substantially altered the balance of forces in Cabo Delgado Province²⁰.

In just over two months of their presence in Mozambique, Rwandan troops helped consolidate government control in Palma district and dislodge insurgents from their main bases in Mocímboa da Praia district, including retaking the town of Mocímboa da Praia, which had been occupied by insurgents for about a year. Rwanda's rapid gains were due to the country's better combat experience, but also better equipment, which allowed it a great superiority over the insurgents. Although they had already identified the insurgents' bases, the Mozambican armed forces did not have the capacity to dislodge the insurgents. Past attempts had resulted in failure and, in some cases, tragedy (ISS, 2021:07)²¹.

SAMIM troops entered the field about a month after the Rwandan contingent. The SADC forces have been allocated a greater number of districts than the Rwandans. SAMIM troops are in Nangade, Macomia and Mueda and have a presence in the Indian Ocean, where South African naval forces patrol the Mozambique Channel. SAMIM has helped destroy rebel bases, seize equipment and rescue abducted civilians. In total, more than 20 countries from Africa, Europe - through EUTM/Mozambique - and North America are directly involved, or indirectly, in fighting insurgency in Cabo Delgado, both in terms of military operations and in terms of training Mozambican military personnel and providing equipment²².

¹⁹ DSF member interviewed in Pemba in September 2022.

²⁰ Cheatham, A. et al (2022). Regional Security Support: A Vital First Step for Peace in Mozambique. *United States Institute of Peace*. Available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique>. [Accessed on 4 October 2022]

²¹ ISS (2021). Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado? Policy Brief. Available at <https://issafrika.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-168-por.pdf> [Accessed on 04 October 2022]

²² ISS (2021) Ibid



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2.2 Humanitarian sector response

Violent extremism in Cabo Delgado forced the population to leave their areas of origin in search of safer places, in other districts and most prominently in the city of Pemba and in other neighbouring provinces, which created a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Throughout 2021, the crisis in Cabo Delgado deepened the needs of both displaced people - many of whom were forced to flee several times - and host communities, who continued to show solidarity in the face of dwindling resources and services.

Data from the United Nations (2022)²³ indicates that at least 1.5 million people in northern Mozambique need life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance and protection by 2022 because of the continued impact of armed conflict, violence and insecurity in Cabo Delgado province.

As the state is the guarantor of the social well-being of its citizens, it is primarily responsible for ensuring humanitarian assistance to the victims of violent extremism. However, neither the state nor the various humanitarian aid organisations have been able to provide adequate humanitarian assistance as required, raising crit-

icisms from national (CDD, 2021)²⁴ and international human rights organisations²⁵.

As a result of the intervention of foreign troops, some districts, namely Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia and Quissanga, were stabilised and some displaced people returned, mainly to the district headquarters villages. Meanwhile, attacks by violent extremists expanded geographically to the south of Cabo Delgado and north of Nampula, generating further displacement, some of it of people who had already been displaced from other regions (IOM, 2022)²⁶.

To address the humanitarian crisis, the Government is intervening through the National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (INGD) and the National Institute for Social Action of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action. In addition, the Government has been relying on support from various external actors, both state and non-state. In addition to support from state partners, Mozambique has received humanitarian assistance from international financial institutions and non-governmental organisations, both national and foreign, working in thematic clusters such as protection, shelter and health, among others.

2.3 Development sector response

Although the northern region of Mozambique is rich in natural resources with high value on the international market, including gas, graphite, rubies, heavy sands, to name but a few, the flow of foreign investment into resource exploitation contrasts with the poverty that plagues commu-

nities living in the districts of the region.

With a great flow of investments, it was expected that the province of Cabo Delgado would experience positive and rapid transformations, improving the quality of life of local communities. However, big capital has contributed to the

²³ United Nations (2022). Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan 2022. Available at <https://mozambique.un.org/pt/184563-plano-de-resposta-humanitaria-de-mocambique-para-2022>. [Accessed on 26 October 2022].

²⁴ CDD (2021). Situação humanitária em Cabo Delgado: milhares de deslocados continuam sem assistência e apoio do Governo e das agências internacionais. *Política Moçambicana*. Available at <https://cddmoz.org/situacao-humanitaria-em-cabo-delgado-milhares-de-deslocados-continuam-sem-assistencia-e-apoio-do-governo-e-das-agencias-internacionais/>. (Accessed on 23 October 2022)

²⁵ Deutsche Welle (2022). "A situação humanitária piorou em Cabo Delgado". Available at <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/a-situacao-humanitaria-piorou-em-cabo-delgado/a-60406446> (Accessed on 23 October 2022)

²⁶ IOM (2022). Emergency Tracking Tool Movement Alert 70 - Displacement Tracking Matrix, Mozambique Cabo Delgado - Chiure district Update 26 October 2022. Available at <https://displacement.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11461/files/reports/Mozambique%20-%20Movement%20Alert%20Report%2070%20%2826%20October%202022%29.pdf>. (Accessed on 23 October 2022)



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accentuation of poverty and misery of the communities, to the extent that they are forced to abandon their land to make room for the implementation of mining projects, hydrocarbon exploration and associated real estate investments (Valoi, 2022)²⁷.

Forced displacement of communities has profound implications at different levels. Beyond the obvious socio-economic consequences due to restricted access to means of survival, the land carries with it symbolic, spiritual and cultural values of the local communities.

The fact that most local communities do not have the necessary skills to work on large projects, but see people coming from other regions of the country and the world to occupy important positions in mining and hydrocarbon explo-

ration projects, can contribute to the creation and consolidation of a sense of relative deprivation. This, in turn, can lead to conflictual relationships between communities and the government/foreign capitals.

In Cabo Delgado, there appears to be a link between local communities' sense of relative deprivation and violent extremism. That is, these feelings may be the basis for the instrumentalisation of local communities, making them more easily amenable to agendas that run counter to the interests of the Mozambican state (Barroso 2019)²⁸. It is therefore right that the response to violent extremism should include development initiatives to benefit communities in regions affected by violence. Little has been done in this regard to date.

²⁷ Valoi, E. (2022). Mozambique | A troubling pattern of land grabbing, pollution and death. ZAM. Available at <https://www.zamagazine.com/investigations/1462-mozambique-a-troubling-pattern-of-land-grabbing-pollution-and-death> (Accessed on 23 October 2022)

²⁸ Barroso, Edgar (2019), Violence in Cabo Delgado: Islamic Extremism or dynamics of (lack of) Local Development. Alternative-Alice News.



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2.3.1 Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) and Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Programme (PREDIN)

To respond to the perception that relative deprivation is at the root of violent extremism in Northern Mozambique, the Government designed a project called *Programa de Resiliência e Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte* (Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Program - PREDIN). The initial version of PREDIN, then called the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN), recognized poverty and social and economic exclusion of local communities as one of the causes of violent extremism (ISS, 2022)²⁹. Nevertheless, after long months without approval of the ERDIN by the Council of Ministers, in the final version approved, the Government does not recognise political exclusion and poverty as causes of violent extremism (CDD, 2022a)³⁰.

With PREDIN, the government aims to reduce regional asymmetric development, with the northern region being characterised by weak economic development, despite being a major holder of natural resources. This government-approved instrument is one of the largest initiatives to curb violent extremism in northern Mozambique and aims to restore and consolidate peace and promote sustainable socio-economic development in the northern region of Mozambique. In addition, the program intends to promote well-being, strengthen the provision of basic services, promote inclusion and equitable human capital development, in order to reduce the vulnerability factors of communities and violent extremism and con-

tribute to the progress of the three provinces of the northern region (Republic of Mozambique, 2022)³¹.

For the implementation of PREDIN, the Government created the *Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte* (Northern Integrated Development Agency - ADIN), a public institution to promote multiform actions for the socio-economic development of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. ADIN's mission in this context is to mobilise resources for community-driven development, establishing a development mechanism that is responsive to communities affected by instability³².

Thus, ADIN appears as a response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, on the one hand. On the other, it can be inferred that there is an understanding that the current situation could have been avoided through the creation of policies promoting inclusive and sustainable development. In other words, the absence of regional economic asymmetries and greater inclusion of young people in the economic structure would have prevented a considerable number of young people from joining the violent extremist groups, which terrorize the northern region, in general, and Cabo Delgado in particular.

PREDIN and ADIN were designed by the Government, but their funding is expected to come from cooperation partners including the World Bank, the European Union, the African Development Bank in addition to bilateral partners.

In addition to these Government initiatives,

²⁹ ISS (2022). Mozambique shifts gear with its new strategy for the north. *ISS Today*. Available at <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambique-shifts-gear-with-its-new-strategy-for-the-north> (Accessed on 29 October 2022).

³⁰ CDD (2022). PREDIN: Governo não reconhece pobreza generalizada como causa do extremismo violento e diz que exclusão política é uma percepção entre jovens. *Política Moçambicana*. Available at <https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/PREDIN-Governo-nao-reconhece-pobreza-generalizada-como-causa-do-extremismo-violento-e-diz-que-exclusao-politica-e-uma-percepcao-entre-jovens.pdf> (Accessed on 29 October 2022).

³¹ Republic of Mozambique (2022). Resolution n. 31/2022, of August 2022, which Approves the Programme for Resilience and Integrated Development of Northern Mozambique (PREDIN).

³² <https://adin.gov.mz/quem-somos/> - (Accessed on 29 October 2022)



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several development partners support development initiatives in Northern Mozambique that directly or indirectly end up being a response to violent extremism through development ac-

tions. The following section presents the main humanitarian and development organizations and initiatives in response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.

3. Actors in the Response to Violent Extremism in Cabo Delgado

As evident in the previous section, responding to violent extremism across the humanitarian, development, and peace dimensions involves initiatives led by different state and non-state

actors. This section presents some of the main actors engaged in the three sectors in Cabo Delgado in a matrix that illustrates what they do and how they do it³³.

3.1 Peace Sector Actors

The actors working towards peace in Cabo Delgado include military and non-military as presented in the table below.

Table 1: Organisations that are engaged in the peace pillar (military and non-military)

Organisation	Area	Activities/Actions
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)	Social Cohesion and Human Rights	It implements the COESÃO Programme - Civil Society Action for Social Cohesion in Northern Mozambique, empowering young people through Youth Hubs, equipping them with 21st century skills to catalyse policy changes in their communities; Defence of human rights defenders in Cabo Delgado province, enabling informed participation in the civic space and in the defence of the rights of populations affected by violent extremism.
Civil Society Support Mechanism Foundation (MASC Foundation)	Social Cohesion	Empowerment of women through Savings Groups aimed at creating an environment of social cohesion in the districts of Montepuez and Chiúre.
Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE)	Social Cohesion	It studies and monitors the evolution of Social Cohesion in the northern region, providing approaches to learning and change.
Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)	Social Cohesion	It finances the Social Cohesion programme in Northern Mozambique implemented by the consortium: CDD, MASC and IESE.
Embassy of the Netherlands	Human Rights and Democracy	It funds the IGUAL - Rights and Democracy programme, implemented by CESC, which aims to support civil society organisations in Cabo Delgado and the Zambezi Valley region to protect human rights. It focus on human rights defenders, sexual minorities, women and children in conflict zones; to promote citizen participation and representation, with a focus on women's and youth priorities, in governance and political spaces and processes.

³³ Despite the effort made to list the most relevant actors in response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, it is acknowledged that many other actors involved in the response to violent extremism in Mozambique may not feature in the table, and thus the data presented in this study should be taken as exemplary and not exhaustive.



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Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre (CESC)	Human Rights and Democracy	It implements the IGUAL - Rights and Democracy programme, which aims to support civil society organisations in Cabo Delgado and the Zambezi Valley region to protect human rights. It focus on human rights defenders, sexual minorities, women and children in conflict zones; to promote citizen participation and representation, with a focus on women's and youth priorities, in governance and political spaces and processes.
SADC Standby Force in Mozambique (SAMIM)	Countering violent extremism and peacebuilding	Deployed in 2021, SAMIM aims to combat violent extremists in Cabo Delgado and create mechanisms for a process of dialogue for pacification in the province.
Rwanda Defence Forces	Countering violent extremism and peacebuilding	Fight against violent extremists in Cabo Delgado while ensuring Mozambique's territorial integrity.
Mozambique Defence and Security Forces (FDS)	Countering violent extremism and peacebuilding	Combat and coordinate actions against violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Mozambique.
Academy	Studies	Develop studies and debates on the motivations for extremism, offering hypotheses for its management or resolution through evidence-informed debate.
Religious institutions	<i>Peacebuilding</i>	Disseminate messages of peace and reconciliation, participating in intra- and inter-community and inter-religious dialogue to end extremism in the province, pointing to dialogue as the main alternative.
Local Civil Society Organisations	<i>Peacebuilding</i>	Through peace caravans, they implement projects to disseminate information about peace within the affected communities, especially in the reception centres for internally displaced victims of violent extremism.
European Union	Training and Funding the deployed forces	It trains Mozambican military personnel to counter violent extremism in Cabo Delgado and funds logistics for SAMIM and Mozambican troops. It is preparing funding for Rwandan forces.
Global Affairs Canada	Funding	It funds the Community Peace Building programme in Northern Mozambique, implemented by MASC in Metuge (Cabo Delgado) and Memba District (Nampula).

Source: Compiled by CDD



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3.2 Actors in the Humanitarian Sector

Humanitarian aid in Cabo Delgado is led by specialised international NGOs and other civil society organisations working in specific areas. Foreign government agencies are the main donors to the humanitarian sector. Table 2 below lists some of the main organisations and their areas of activity.

Table 2: Organisations working in the humanitarian pillar in Cabo Delgado

Organisation	Object	Activities
LOCAL LEVEL ORGANISATIONS/CONSORTIA		
AGRICOA COOPERATIVE in Partnership with CVM - Cabo Delgado and INGD	Social protection	Family Protection.
AIFO in collaboration with FAMOD	Social protection	Promotion of women's autonomy and self-care for an inclusive society in Cabo Delgado.
AMODEFA	Social Protection (GBV-Gender Based Violence)	Lives, protection and action.
AVSI	Shelter and Non-Food Items; Child Protection; Education; WASH; Nutrition.	Shelter intervention for IDPs and host communities affected in Cabo Delgado; Strengthening access to protection for insecure people needs; Strengthening the education system in response to insecurity in Cabo Delgado; WASH intervention in response to insecurity in Cabo Delgado; Nutrition intervention for children.
Ayuda en Accion	Shelter and Non-Food Items; WASH.	Emergency Shelter/Non Food Items, for response to IDPs in Metuge; Response to IDPs through WASH in affected Communities. Districts covered are Pemba and Metuge.
CARE	WASH	Emergency Response in Cabo Delgado
CARITAS	Shelter and non-food items	Emergency Response in Shelter and Non-Food Items to IDPs in Cabo Delgado
CARITAS Pemba Diocese	WASH; Nutrition.	Ensure availability and accessibility of life-saving SSR response and prevention services for all, including women and girls in more vulnerable situations due to violence and displacement in Cabo Delgado and Nampula Provinces; Provide nutritional support to victims of the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado.
CARITAS Pemba	Social Protection	Strengthening the Rights of Displaced Persons in Cabo Delgado.
Centre for the Promotion of Citizenship - CEPCI	Child Protection	Improvement of living conditions for refugees affected by the armed conflicts in Cabo Delgado.



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Consortium Bom Samaritano Association (ABS) and Mozambican Association for Community Development (AMODEC)	Protection (GBV - Gender Based Violence); Nutrition.	Together Against Gender-Based Violence, Nutrition, Health Conscious Community.
FH Association (FH)	WASH	Protect and support people internally displaced by the conflict in Cabo Delgado Province.
Ibo Foundation	Child Protection; WASH; Nutrition.	Strengthen the protection of children, youth and women at risk through community cohesion, creation of recreational activities and provision of PSS services for girls and boys affected by crises; Water and Sanitation system in Ibo health centre; Nutrition Identification, monitoring and prevention of the nutritional status of IDPs.
Helpo	Education; Nutrition.	Post-COVID-19 School Return Programme; Support to the emergency nutritional response to IDPs in 5 rural communities in Metuge district.
HELVETAS	WASH	WASH response to IDPs in Ancuabe, Chiúre and Montepuez.
Oikos Institute	WASH Nutrition.	WASH response to the emergency; Improving the Nutrition of the Displaced.
Joint Aid Management (JAM)	WASH	Displaced Population Emergency WASH Project (DP-WASH)
Medicus Mundi Mozambique	Health	Contributing to universal health coverage through the revitalisation of PHC in Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique.
Street Child	Child Protection Education.	Strengthening Protection Mechanisms through Community Networks for children and women; Education for All.
Street Child	Child Protection Education.	Strengthening Protection Mechanisms through Community Networks for children and women; Education for All.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

UNFPA	Protection (GBV - Gender Based Violence); Health.	Ensure that life-saving GBV prevention response services are available and accessible to all, including women and girls in situations of vulnerability due to violence and displacement in Cabo Delgado and Nampula Provinces. Provide sexual and reproductive health and GBV services for women and girls affected by floods and insecurity in Cabo Delgado. Ensure availability and accessibility of life-saving SRH response and prevention services for all, including women and girls most at risk from violence and displacement.
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UNHCR	Social Protection	Provision of protection services to internally displaced people in Cabo Delgado; Protection Response to Vulnerable Populations in Cabo Delgado
UNICEF	Child Protection; Education; WASH; Nutrition; Health.	Support to children internally displaced due to armed conflict. Education rapid response in Cabo Delgado. WASH response to IDPs in Cabo Delgado. Nutritional support to IDPs and affected populations in Cabo Delgado. Improving access to life saving interventions to populations affected by floods and insecurity in Cabo Delgado Province (CERF funded programme). Provision of primary health care services for IDPs in Cabo Delgado Province.
WFP	Logistics; Food Safety and Livelihoods; Nutrition.	Increased logistical capacity and direct logistical support to humanitarian organisations in response to vulnerable populations affected by multiple shocks in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa provinces in Mozambique. Emergency Food Assistance to vulnerable populations affected by multiple shocks in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa provinces in Mozambique. WFP Nutrition Response in Cabo Delgado Support to populations displaced by climate related events (torrential rains and floods) and insecurity (CERF funded programme)
WHO	Health	Strengthening Response to disease outbreaks (Measles, Malaria and Cholera)
WW-GVC	Shelter and non-food items	To provide urgent life-saving humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people affected by insecurity in Pemba.
IOM	Shelter and Non-Food Items; Social Protection; Health; Camp Coordination & Management (CCCM); Coordination and Common Services (including DTM)	Emergency shelter/Non-Food items for IDPs in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa provinces. Strengthening access to protection services. Provision of primary health care saving services and integrated Health/ MHPSS referrals to vulnerable IDPs in Cabo Delgado. Improve and expand CCCM support to displacement sites in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa. Strengthening and Expansion of the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DMS) in Cabo Delgado and other affected neighbouring provinces.
FAO	Food Security and Livelihoods	Emergency Agricultural Assistance to the vulnerable population affected by multiple shocks in Cabo Delgado and Nampula Provinces in Mozambique.
Save the Children International	Child Protection	Providing quality vital and child protection services for girls and boys affected by the crisis in Cabo Delgado.



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USAID	Funding	Funding to various humanitarian agencies working in Cabo Delgado
Irish Aid	Funding	Funding to various humanitarian agencies working in Cabo Delgado
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office	Funding	Funding to various humanitarian agencies working in Cabo Delgado
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection	Funding	Funding to various humanitarian agencies working in Cabo Delgado
Global Affairs Canada	Funding	Funding to various humanitarian agencies working in Cabo Delgado

Source: Compiled by CDD

3.3 Development Sector Actors

In the development component, the following stand out: the government institution created to dynamize development in the northern region, the provincial government, the multina-

tional that started gas exploration in Cabo Delgado and regional and international institutions whose traditional role is to support development. The table below is illustrative.

Table 3: Organisations working in the development pillar in Cabo Delgado

Organisation	Area	Activities/Actions
Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN)	Reconstruction and development of the northern region	Design and implementation of plans and programmes, such as: Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Programme (PRCD - US\$ 300 million) and Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Programme (PREDIN US\$ 2.2 billion).
World Bank	Funding	Finance development programmes designed and approved by the government and other connected institutions.
African Development Bank (AfDB)	Funding	Finance development programmes designed and approved by the government and other connected institutions.
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	Reconstruction	Implement through World Bank methodologies the reconstruction programmes approved by the government in interaction with ADIN. It was notable for the implementation of the US\$100 million Northern Crisis Recovery Project funded by the World Bank.
Aga Khan Foundation	Health	Implementation of the Advancement of Sexual and Reproductive Health Programme in Cabo Delgado. This programme includes construction of maternity clinics and rehabilitation of health centres among various community health initiatives.



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Cabo Delgado Provincial Government	Reconstruction	Reconstruction of infrastructure, support and mobilisation for the return of populations affected by violent extremism in Cabo Delgado to their areas of origin.
TotalEnergies	Funding	Financing under the Mozambique LNG Project of 4 trucks for transporting food products for the associations of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, implemented jointly with MASC Foundation.
European Union	Funding	Finance development programmes designed and approved by the government and other connected institutions.
Global Affairs Canada	Funding	Funding for various short and long-term development projects. It includes the following programmes: Education for Community Resilience, implemented by Progresso; Building Tomorrow Today Programme: strengthening services and systems for responding to gender-based violence in Cabo Delgado through a triple nexus approach, implemented by UNFPA; Sustainable and Gender Sensitive Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Pemba through the Implementation of Durable Urban Solutions, implemented by UN-Habitat; Advancing Sexual and Reproductive Health in Cabo Delgado, implemented by the Aga Khan Foundation.

4. Challenges of responding to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado in the HDP sectors

Initially, the response to the conflict in Cabo Delgado was focused on the military component, and humanitarian support emerged naturally as a function of the growing demand with the number of internally displaced people. The response did not focus, however, on the development and peace components. Later, the

need to look concurrently at the three sectors became apparent, but there was a lack of an effective and efficient institutional coordination between them. This part of the report explores the main constraints to a response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado from a *triple nexus* perspective.

4.1 Challenges of the Peace and Security Sector

- In the context of peacebuilding, there are the following challenges that constrain the response to the conflict in Cabo Delgado:
- Lack of resources and professionalization of Mozambican troops to combat violent extremism in the province;
- Poor understanding of the motivations of extremists for a subsequent approach to resolving the conflict;
- A focus on the military route without a frank search for other mechanisms such as dialogue to put an end to terrorism;
- Insecurity in the affected districts that limits the movement of organisations to implement peace and social cohesion programmes;



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- Shyness in the authorities' openness to dialogue with communities so that they actively participate in denouncing extremists;
- Abuse of the population's human rights by

the defence and security forces, which calls into question the support that should be given by the population in the fight against terrorism.

4.2 Challenges of the Humanitarian Sector

Logistical and access constraints are the main challenges in responding to humanitarian needs, with a focus on assisting victims, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs), of the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

Due to escalating violence, humanitarian access in Cabo Delgado has reduced by 2020, and humanitarian organisations working in the province are facing significant challenges in reaching people in need. Recent attacks on district capitals in Mocimboa da Praia, Quissanga, Muidumbe and Macomia districts have forced many actors to temporarily withdraw from vital locations and move to Pemba and Maputo, reducing their capacity to assess and respond to increasing needs.

Access and security in more remote areas remains a challenge for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado. The current situation has limited the delivery of aid to some of the most vulnerable populations. At the same time, road transport has proved a challenge throughout the province as roads and infrastructure are in poor condition and remain susceptible to weather conditions.

Within this complex and difficult context, humanitarian partners in Cabo Delgado need access to common logistics services (such as air/road/sea/river transport and humanitarian cargo storage) to ensure movement of personnel and delivery of crucial humanitarian goods to Pemba and other accessible districts.

4.3 Challenges of the Development Sector

The response to the conflict in Cabo Delgado, from a development perspective, faces limitations due to, among other things, the following:

- Cabo Delgado is one of the poorest provinces in the country and has the least adequate infrastructure. This factor is aggravated by the fact that development aid or funding does not reach Cabo Delgado due to the strong centralisation of the reconstruction and development process in the country, and that organisations that should be involved in this process, such as ADIN, do not have the resources and are therefore limited in their ability to implement actions;
- Corruption, nepotism and other factors that contribute to the diversion of the resources that finance development in the province;
- Lack of realistic policies that are adapted to local realities and that think locally in terms of endogenous development, so that the population is receptive, feels involved and contributes to the process;
- The violent extremism that has disgraced the province since 2017 participates in the destruction of state and population infrastructure, slows down the economy, contributes to the acceleration of poverty, makes people currently dependent on humanitarian aid, and delays the reconstruction process and the return of displaced people to their areas of origin.



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5. The (in)applicability of the triple nexus in responding to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado

The causes of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado can be traced back to a fragile state unable to guarantee the most basic needs of its citizens, in a context of a young population, impoverished and neglected public policies (Habibe et al, 2020)³⁴, and the discovery and poor management of natural resources (Ewi et al, 2022: 19)³⁵. In this context, jihadist radicalisation has found fertile ground to mobilise young people to revolt (Morier-Genoud, 2020)³⁶. In these terms, the response to violent extremism must address the root causes and seek to resolve them. In other words, success in countering violent extremism will only be possible by combining efforts between the Government, partners and NGOs working in various areas.

The *triple nexus* approach is the most current version on how to achieve coherence between hu-

manitarian, development and security and peace (HDP) interventions, the first approach being LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development), a model developed as a response to the identified funding gap between emergency relief operations and long-term development projects after disasters, as indicated earlier in this study.

As argued here, the *triple nexus* approach calls for efforts to work together across HDP sectors to more effectively meet people's needs, reduce risks and vulnerabilities, and move towards sustainable peace. It also calls for a New Way of Working (NWoW) that transcends the humanitarian-development-peace divide, strengthens rather than replaces national and local systems, and anticipates crises by working towards collective outcomes.

5.1. Intrasectoral coordination deficit and lack of complementarity between HDP sectors

From a *triple nexus* perspective, the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado will only be successful if humanitarian, development and peace interventions are linked to strengthen coordination, coherence and complementarity, and to capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar. Linking the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, when well designed and implemented, helps to reduce vulnerability and unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address the root causes of conflict.

In practice in Cabo Delgado, there is no interconnection between the HDP sectors. Each sector acts in its own area, independently and sometimes in competition with other areas. There is also a lack of coordination within each sector.

³⁴ Habibe, S. et al (2019). Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique: O Caso de Mocimboa da Praia. Cadernos IESE. Available at https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/cadernos_17.pdf (Accessed on 8 September 2022).

³⁵ Ewi, M. et al (2022). Violent extremism in Mozambique Drivers and links to transnational organised crime. ISS. Available at https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-51_2.pdf (Accessed on 8 September 2022).

³⁶ Morier-Genoud, E. (2020) The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: origins, nature and beginning, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14:3, 396-412, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271 [Accessed on 3 September 2022]



5.1.1 The Case of the Humanitarian and Peace Sector Clusters

In the humanitarian sector, the various organisations assisting IDPs are organised into thematic clusters, each led by a specialised organisation. By October 2022, the following clusters exist:

- Food Security Cluster, coordinated by the World Food Programme (WFP);
- Shelter cluster, coordinated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM);
- Social Protection Cluster, coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- Health cluster, coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO);
- Nutrition cluster, coordinated by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
- Gender Based Violence sub-cluster, coordinated by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA);

The grouping of organisations working in the humanitarian sector into clusters is an effort initiated in the response to Cyclone Kenneth (2019) to act together and avoid dispersion of resources and overlapping of activities. Yet, while there is a formal mechanism for coordination through thematic clusters, it is noted that within the clusters many organisations that are formally members do not participate in the actual organisational meetings to discuss activities and do not report on their activities³⁷. As an example, in September 2022, the Health cluster had 19 member organisations, including United Nations organizations, international humanitarian organisations and local organisations. However, only 9 of the 19 member organisations, reported to the cluster coordination on their activities, which corresponds to 47% contribution³⁸.

The report to be submitted by the member organisations of the cluster must answer key questions for the humanitarian coordination indica-

tors in the field, known as the 5Ws (Who, What, Where, When, Whom). Once these questions have been answered, it will be possible to share information on who is doing what, where, when and for whom.

The lack of effective coordination between cluster members is widespread. The case of the health cluster is only illustrative of a reality common to all clusters. The main reason for the lack of coordination of activities between actors working on the same issue is the competition for resources between actors, which leads parties to hide their work strategies from potential competitors. This happens at all levels, from local organisations to UN agencies. Nevertheless, efforts to group humanitarian organisations by themes are positive.

There is also a lack of information sharing in the peace and security sector. There is no formal and regular mechanism for coordination between actors in the peace and security sector. There have been some informal initiatives aimed more at information sharing, but these have not resulted in effective coordination.

The military actors that are active in establishing peace by conducting military operations are divided into territories with administratively established boundaries. Rwandan forces are responsible for Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts; SADC forces are responsible for Nangade, Mueda and Macomia districts. The Mozambique Defence and Security Forces are responsible for the rest of the province.

This administrative division of forces by territory is rigid and does not allow a force to enter the territory assigned to another force, even if it is in pursuit of terrorists. For example, there are indications that terrorists expelled from bases in the districts of Mocímboa da Praia and Pal-

³⁷ Coordinator of a cluster interviewed in October 2022 in Pemba as part of this study.

³⁸ Humanitarian Response Cabo Delgado - Health Cluster Bulletin No. 9, September 2022. Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/health_cluster_bulletin_september_2022.pdf [Accessed on 24 October 2022]



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ma by the Rwandan forces have sought refuge in the forests of the districts of Macomia (south of Mocímboa da Praia) and Nangade (north of Palma), areas assigned to the SADC forces. There is no operational intelligence sharing between the two forces, Rwandan and SADC, to coordinate the pursuit of the terrorists. The situation is described as each force fighting to clear its own territory³⁹.

Another example of the lack of coordination in this area is the case of the European Union Mission for Military Training in Mozambique (EUTM-Mozambique), which trains special units of the Mozambican Armed Defence Forces (FADM) in counter-terrorism. However, there is no coordination between the mission and the forces once they have been trained, which makes it impossible to monitor the results of the training. There is a complete discontinuity in the training process and in the fight against terrorism as the trained forces move into the field. In practical terms, it was desirable that EUTM-Mozambique trainers continue to maintain contact with the trained forces in order to provide feedback or evaluation of training results, which is essential for the continuous improvement of the training process⁴⁰.

There is a coordination mechanism, promoted by EUTM-Mozambique, called the Extended 5P's Coordination Meeting, which is attended by the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique, SAMIM, Rwanda and military stakeholders who have training activities with the FADM (USA, France, Portugal and UK), which has already met five times since its establishment⁴¹. The purpose of this mechanism is to exchange experiences. However, these meetings have not been sufficiently open to allow the parties to exchange substantial information. It is noticeable that each party tries to prevent its military training strategies and doctrines from being known by the other parties, which is ultimately detrimental to the coordination of counter-terrorism actions on the ground⁴².

Outside of military actors, partners working in the Gender Based Violence (GBV) sub-cluster claim that they do not have access to victims of insurgent violence and the Defence and Security Forces to provide them with the assistance they need. The lack of coordination between the peace and humanitarian sectors means that the Defence and Security Forces deny access to victims of gender-based violence to receive humanitarian assistance⁴³.

5.2 Some coordination efforts in the Development Sector

In the development sector, there are some efforts aimed at coordination between actors, with notable results. The most notable initiative is the Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP), launched in 2019 by the Dutch Embassy, the African Development Bank, USAID and TotalEnergies to promote inclusive and sustainable development in northern Mozambique.

The platform is presented as a space for informa-

tion exchange and coordination, bringing together the Government of Mozambique, NGOs, donors, civil society organisations and private entities, which meet regularly in working groups to discuss the current situation and the efforts required for the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado and the development of the North⁴⁴. This initiative is in line with the requirements of the HDP and is a positive example that should be expanded and continued.

³⁹ SDF member interviewed in October 2022, in Pemba, as part of this study

⁴⁰ SDF member interviewed in October 2022, in Pemba, as part of this study

⁴¹ <https://twitter.com/EUTMMozambique/status/1590245235174494209?s=20&t=x-00Kcn3xT2oMH-qLy5jyFQ> [Accessed on 24 October 2022]

⁴² Member of the GBV sub-cluster interviewed in October 2022, as part of this study

⁴³ SDF member interviewed in October 2022, in Pemba, as part of this study

⁴⁴ <https://mspmoz.org/sobre-nós-%2F-about-us> [Accessed on 24 October 2022]



5.3 Resistance to a joint approach to the root causes of conflict

One of the objectives of triple nexus is to conduct joint, informed analysis seeking to identify the root causes and structural drivers of conflict, as well as positive resilience factors and the identification of collective outcomes incorporating humanitarian, development and peace actions.

In this respect, the response to the Cabo Delgado conflict has been a complete failure, with the government failing to recognise poverty and social exclusion as root causes of the conflict. There have been efforts to carry out joint analyses to identify the root causes and structural drivers of the conflict. In effect, the largest and most comprehensive initiative being the elaboration of the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN), which involved multilateral partners such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the European Union.

The document also included contributions from almost all embassies and government agencies in Mozambique. However, when the final version of ERDIN was drafted, emphasising poverty and social exclusion as causes of the

conflict, the government did not agree to approve the document as public policy. After delaying approval for about a year, the government made major changes to the document, removing poverty and social exclusion as causes of the conflict and changing the name and nature of the document from ERDIN to PREDIN - Programa de Resiliência e Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte (Programme for Resilience and Integrated Development in the North).

Thus, there is no common analysis of the root causes of the conflict. What does exist is that, on the one hand, the government insists that violent extremism in Cabo Delgado is the result of external aggression by an international terrorist group (Republic of Mozambique, 2020). While, on the other hand, independent research shows that the roots of the conflict are internal, linked to the discovery and mismanagement of natural resources (Ewi et al., 2022: 19; Ngoenha et al., 2020: 44), the Islamic radicalisation of local youth (Bonate, 2022; Morier-Genoud, 2020), poverty, unemployment and social exclusion of youth (Habibe et al., 2020). (Habibe et al., 2020; Faria, 2021: 5-6).

5.4 Limited humanitarian access to people in need

The *triple nexus* also aims to ensure that humanitarian access to people in need is safe, unimpeded and not compromised. In Cabo Delgado, however, humanitarian access to people in need was lacking. As noted above, GBV organisations found it difficult to maintain contact with victims of gender-based violence suspected of being perpetrated by both violent extremists and government forces.

On the other hand, the government does not allow humanitarian organisations to establish contact with violent extremists, which, if it were to happen, could allow for negotiations on the movement of aid workers into conflict areas to provide humanitarian assistance to victims. Because of these barriers, victims in areas deemed unsafe have no access to humanitarian assistance.



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5.5 Lack of political engagement for peacebuilding

The *triple nexus* approach allows for the use of political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace. In Cabo Delgado, there is no use of political engagement for peacebuilding. The government rejects existing proposals outright. For

example, the government does not allow independent peace-seeking organisations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and religious denominations, access to violent extremists to explore the possibility of political conflict resolution through dialogue and peacebuilding⁴⁵.

5.6 Other aspects that hinder the application of the *triple nexus* approach in Cabo Delgado

There is competition for resources among humanitarian organisations funded by government agencies, leading to duplication of activities between organisations, including the UN. This is partly reflected in the frequent situations where UN agencies carry out similar activities in the same geographical area, depending on the availability of funding.

In the humanitarian sector, there is evidence that certain influential groups, such as members of the Association of Combatants of the National Liberation Struggle and their relatives, benefit from the distribution of government humanitarian and social aid to the detriment of others⁴⁶.

The Government gives great priority to the military response, investing more time and resources in this area and ignoring the other areas, as well as the possibility of resolving the conflict through political mechanisms such as dialogue.

In the peace and security sector, the Defence and Security Forces continue to engage in acts of violence against civilians suspected of collaborating with violent extremist groups, undercutting the efforts of humanitarian organisations to protect civilians⁴⁷.

War IDPs have experienced violence in resettlement sites, with women and girls in particular experiencing gender-based violence, including rape and sexual abuse, which makes it difficult and problematic for humanitarian organisations to support vulnerable people in conflict contexts (UNHCR et al, 2022).

The overlapping responsibilities of the Provincial Executive Council and the Provincial State Secretariat increase the costs of humanitarian operations. For example, in the health sector, the Provincial Health Directorate and the Provincial Health Services compete for leadership. At the highest level of provincial leadership, this competition exists between the provincial governor and the provincial secretary of state, who compete for participation in health sector events organised by humanitarian organisations, with the costs of the health authorities' participation being borne by the implementing NGOs.

In the areas where new displaced people arrive, the displaced lack a little of everything: food, sanitary conditions, housing, utopias that maintain the hope of better days, healing from the traumas caused by the scenes of war they have experienced⁴⁸. Hence the need for intervention by the government and the various humanitarian actors.

⁴⁵ Senior staff from humanitarian organisations interviewed in October 2022 in Pemba.

⁴⁶ According to findings during fieldwork in centres for displaced people in Metuge district, the families of former combatants are privileged in receiving humanitarian aid, to the detriment of the other families of displaced people.

⁴⁷ Members of Gender Based Violence sub-cluster interviewed in Pemba in October 2022 as part of this research.

⁴⁸ Situations observed during fieldwork in the war displacement centres in the districts of Metuge and Montepuez



6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The study critically analysed the harmonisation, coherence and complementarity between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors in responding to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado and specifically identified the key actors involved in responding to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado working in the humanitarian, development and peace sectors. It has identified the challenges of coordination, coherence and complementarity between the three sectors (HDP). In addition, it makes recommendations to the key actors working in these sectors.

The main argument of the study is that there is still a lack of coordination, harmonisation and complementarity between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors in responding to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. This fact undermines the efforts undertaken by the actors involved in the response to violent extremism, from government entities, civil society, humanitarian organisations, and cooperation and development partners.

The lack of coordination, harmonisation and complementarity is evident in both inter-sectorial and intrasectoral interactions. Although each sector has its own specificities, there is a general lack of coordination, harmonisation and complementarity in all three HDP sectors. In the peace and security sector in particular, the lack of coordination is more pronounced, with actors working in isolation from each other. Military actors in the peace sector have not cooperated effectively in sharing information with each other and with non-military actors. In the humanitarian sector, meanwhile, actors tend to compete for access to resources rather than cooperate in implementing their programmes.

The lack of integration between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches is the main challenge to an effective response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. In order to reverse this scenario, the following recommendations are made to the various actors working in Cabo Delgado:

6.1 Recommendations to Government

- Create transparent and inclusive institutional mechanism for the coordination of HDP sectors in the response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.
- Create the necessary logistical means to ensure the security of all state and non-state actors that want to deliver their assistance to the populations that are victims of violent extremism. This can be done through the National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (INGD), but needs to be reformed to be more transparent in the management of aid received and improve accountability.
- Enable non-governmental and faith-based organisations operating in Mozambique to liaise with the leadership of extremist groups to explore the possibility of a political resolution to the conflict through dialogue.
- Mobilise funds to increase investments in the humanitarian and development response.
- Strengthen the combat capacity of the SDF through further training and acquisition of necessary military equipment.
- Train the SDF in advocacy and human rights protection for populations affected by violent extremism.
- Take the initiative to improve the coordination of operations to counter violent extremism and share information of operational value among troops on the ground, notably the FADM, SAMIM, and the Rwandan Defence Forces.
- Provide means to rescue and transport people from areas affected by attacks by violent extremist groups.



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6.2 Recommendations for Government Partners and International Non-Governmental Organisations

- Balance funding for the HDP sectors by allocating resources equitably and in a coordinated manner to avoid duplication of efforts.
- Make the thematic clusters in the humanitarian sector more effective mechanisms for coordinating activities from planning to implementation on the ground, and extend the cluster system to development and peace areas.
- Advise and supervise the Government in the implementation of projects carried out by ADIN.
- Mobilise further logistical and financial support to Northern Mozambique to support inclusive and sustainable development in the region.
- Support local civil society and community-based organizations with funding and technical capacity building to develop their activities in response to violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.

6.3 Recommendations for national CSOs

- Develop research to identify the roots of violent extremism as well as mechanisms for its prevention.
- Promote initiatives to strengthen community resilience to radicalisation and counter violent extremism (CVE);
- Conduct external oversight and social audit of Government actions to counter violent extremism.
- Defend and promote the human rights of people affected by attacks by violent extremist groups, with a greater focus on internally displaced persons, particularly women and children.
- Creating initiatives to denounce gender-based violence against people affected by violent extremism.
- Create projects to promote greater socio-political and economic inclusion of natural resource host communities by multinationals.



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