# Zitamar News > Intelligent news from Mozambique Public Ghost content for AI and LLM tooling. This file includes a bounded export of public pages first, then recent public posts. Append `.md` to any post or page URL to get the content in Markdown (for example, `/example-post.md`). ## Pages ### Your Profile URL: https://www.zitamar.com/your-profile/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[theme-my-login\] ### Reset Password URL: https://www.zitamar.com/resetpass/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[theme-my-login\] ### Lost Password URL: https://www.zitamar.com/lostpassword/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[theme-my-login\] ### Log Out URL: https://www.zitamar.com/logout/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[theme-my-login\] ### Log In URL: https://www.zitamar.com/login/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[theme-my-login\] ### Test URL: https://www.zitamar.com/test/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[simpay id=”6343″\]… This content is for our free membership “Register to be able to buy individual articles” Already have an account? Login Now » New to this site? Register Now »... This content is for our free membership "Register to be able to buy individual articles" Already have an account? [Login Now »](https://www.zitamar.com/login?redirect%5Fto=%2Fwp-json%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fpages%3F%5Fembed%3Dtrue%26page%3D1%26per%5Fpage%3D100) New to this site? [Register Now »](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-subscription-page/) ### Zitamar News – Account Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-account-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z ### My Subscriptions | Level | Billing | Expiration | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------- | ---------- | | You do not have an active subscription. [Choose a level.](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-subscription-page/) | | | [View all Subscription Options](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-subscription-page/) ### My Account - **Username:** - **Email:** [Edit Profile](https://zitamar.com/wp-admin/profile.php?ref=zitamar.com) | [Change Password](https://zitamar.com/wp-admin/profile.php?ref=zitamar.com) | [Log Out](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-invoice-page/) ### Member Links ### Zitamar News – Billing Information Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-billing-information-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[pmpro\_billing\] ### Zitamar News – Cancel Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-cancel-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[pmpro\_cancel\] ### Zitamar News – Checkout Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[pmpro\_checkout\] ### Zitamar Confirmation Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-confirmation-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z Your payment has been received – thank you! ### Zitamar News – Invoice Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-invoice-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z \[pmpro\_invoice\] ### Zitamar News – Subscription Page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-subscription-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:38.000Z *Zitamar News* is the leading English-language publication on Mozambique, providing daily news and analysis on the country’s economy, politics, and energy sectors. *Zitamar* sends subscribers a [Daily Briefing](https://zitamarnews.substack.com/) with the biggest news from Mozambique every morning, and publishes exclusive news on its website, [www.zitamar.com](https://www.zitamar.com/). **To download our multi-user corporate price list, [click here.](https://www.zitamar.com/content/files/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/zitamar-news-price-list-2021.pdf)** For more information, contact [subscriptions@zitamar.com](mailto:subscriptions@zitamar.com) | Level | Zitamar Website Monthly Subscription | Zitamar Website Annual Subscription | Register to be able to buy individual articles | | ---------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | | Price | £80.00. | £790.00. | **Free** | | | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | | Access to news and archives on www.zitamar.com | | | | | Zitamar Daily Briefing email | | | | | Purchase individual articles | | | | | | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) | ## Zitamar Website Monthly Subscription £80.00. A month's access to all of Zitamar News' exclusive breaking news on Mozambique, and archives dating back to November 2015 **Access to news and archives on www.zitamar.com** **Zitamar Daily Briefing email** [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) ## Zitamar Website Annual Subscription £790.00. A year's access to all of Zitamar News’ exclusive breaking news on Mozambique, and archives dating back to November 2015 **Access to news and archives on www.zitamar.com** **Zitamar Daily Briefing email** [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) ## Register to be able to buy individual articles **Free** **Purchase individual articles** [Select](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-checkout-page/) [← Return to Home](https://www.zitamar.com/home-test/) ### Daily mail registration page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/daily-mail-registration-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z _No content available._ ### Payment Failed URL: https://www.zitamar.com/payment-failed/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z \[simpay\_error show\_to=”admin”\] We’re sorry, but your transaction failed to process. Please try again or contact site support. ### Payment Confirmation URL: https://www.zitamar.com/payment-confirmation/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z \[simpay\_payment\_receipt\] ### Zitamar News presents: Mozambique economic and political outlook, with Roberto Tibana – 17 October 2017 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-presents-mozambique-economic-political-outlook-roberto-tibana/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z ![Roberto Tibana. Photo © Analitica-RJT](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/roberto-tibana.jpg) Roberto Tibana. Photo © Analitica-RJT [**NOW AVAILABLE AS A VIDEOCONFERENCE – SIGN UP HERE**](https://www.eventbee.com/v/zitamar/event?eid=130964405&ref=zitamar.com#/tickets) Join Zitamar News for an exclusive briefing on Mozambique’s medium term economic and political prospects, with economist [Dr. Roberto Tibana](http://www.linkedin.com/in/roberto-j-tibana-39763137?ref=zitamar.com) and Zitamar News editor Tom Bowker – followed by networking and sundowners at Maputo’s legendary Hotel Cardoso.**Join us at 16:30 on 17 October 2017, for expert analysis on:** - Mozambique’s medium-term macroeconomic outlook - The fiscal outlook – including analysis of the government’s new budget proposal for FY2018 - How the government budget has been impacted by the ‘aid freeze’ – and the prospects for the return of donor funding - Scenarios for the resolution of the remaining $1.7 billion ‘hidden debt’ **[THIS EVENT IS NOW ALSO AVAILABLE AS A VIDEOCONFERENCE – SIGN UP HERE](https://www.eventbee.com/v/zitamar/event?eid=130964405&ref=zitamar.com#/tickets)** **Tickets are priced at $60 each – but [*Zitamar*](http://www.zitamar.com/) subscribers can log in below to access the special price of $40.** \[eventbeeticketwidget frameid=”1″ eid=”159353432″ width=”100%”\] \[eventbeeticketwidget frameid=”1″ eid=”159053633″ width=”100%”\] ![Hotel Cardoso, Maputo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/hotel-cardoso.jpg) Hotel Cardoso, Maputo Tibana, a lifelong student of the Mozambican economy with decades of experience working at multilateral organisations – including the World Bank and the IMF – brings his unparalleled experience and expertise into his latest quarterly forecast for the Mozambican economy.The event – conducted in English – will see the launch of Dr Tibana’s new series of Quarterly outlooks for the Mozambican economy, and will also see him discuss the government’s latest budget proposal, expected to be tabled to parliament in early October.He will explain and quantify the impact of the aid freeze that resulted from the revelations of the ProIndicus, EMATUM and MAM ‘hidden debts’, and how Mozambique might restructure those outstanding debts, having now defaulted on all three.In a Q&A session after the briefing, held under the Chatham House rule, Tibana and Zitamar News Editor Tom Bowker will discuss with participants this pivotal moment in Mozambique’s history. **About Dr Roberto Tibana** Educated at Oxford University, with a D Phil from St Anthony’s College, Tibana now runs his own economics consultancy, Analitica-RJT, and travels with the IMF on staff missions to other African countries – giving him an invaluable perspective on what the IMF is looking for in Mozambique.Decades of work with the World Bank, DfID, and the UNDP among others has included stints developing a macroeconomic forecasting tools for Ghana and advising the finance ministry of Liberia.In 2003, he created the Composite Indicator of Economic Activity in Mozambique (ICAE), in partnership with the OECD, the Government of Mozambique, and Mozambican business association the CTA. The ICAE, whose candid assessments of the economy eventually saw it fall foul of the government, was “motivated by the need to enhance constructive dialogue between domestic private and public sector agents in Mozambique, by providing them with a common tool of knowledge about the long-term and short- to medium-term performance and prospects of the economy, and how this relates to policy.” ### Newsletter subscribe page URL: https://www.zitamar.com/newsletter-subscribe-page/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z \[convertkit form=5054315\] ### Check for the email URL: https://www.zitamar.com/check-for-the-email/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z #### Hello subscriber, You must confirm your Email Account before logging in. Please check your inbox for a confirmation email (and if it’s not there, please check your spam!) Best regards, #### Zitamar team ### Database URL: https://www.zitamar.com/database/ Last updated: 2023-04-11T07:44:39.000Z … This content is for our free membership “Register to be able to buy individual articles” Already have an account? Login Now » New to this site? Register Now »... This content is for our free membership "Register to be able to buy individual articles" Already have an account? [Login Now »](https://www.zitamar.com/login?redirect%5Fto=%2Fwp-json%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fpages%3F%5Fembed%3Dtrue%26page%3D1%26per%5Fpage%3D100) New to this site? [Register Now »](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-news-subscription-page/) ## Posts ### Licensing the plant, policing the farmer URL: https://www.zitamar.com/licensing-the-plant-policing-the-farmer/ Last updated: 2026-10-21T20:36:18.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique is beginning to discuss the commercial possibilities of a plant it still treats as a police matter. The national drugs conference organised by the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) in Maputo last week considered the possible legalisation of controlled cannabis production, sale and consumption. Its closing declaration acknowledges the plant’s medicinal and scientific potential and its place in other countries’ formal economies. Commercial applications include pharmaceutical products and hemp fibre for textiles, giving the debate relevance beyond drug policy. That opens a useful discussion, but leaves unresolved the position of the farmer growing a few plants for himself. The declaration records discussion of legalisation without setting out a proposed licensing system or explaining what would happen to personal consumption. It also refers to recommendations in a separate final document. There is consequently no basis yet for announcing a change in government policy. There is, however, enough to expose the choice ahead. Mozambique could create a legal business for investors while leaving small growers subject to the criminal law. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2089758e-9e47-4336-93de-d248fa4e0c14/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That would be a familiar way of distributing opportunity. A company with capital, lawyers and access to officials could obtain permission to cultivate cannabis. A farmer growing the same plant behind his house could remain liable to prosecution. Commercial production needs controls that personal cultivation does not, but those differences cannot by themselves justify treating the farmer as a criminal. The political argument is already on the table. In June last year, Nova Democracia proposed a public consultation on decriminalising consumption and legalising cultivation. Across the border, South Africa’s Constitutional Court decriminalised private adult use, possession and cultivation for personal consumption in 2018\. It did not authorise unrestricted commercial sales. The distinction allows a country to stop prosecuting private behaviour without abandoning control over the market. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: MPLA shuts Carneiro out, refers case to prosecutors, and FNLA leadership battle deepens URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-mpla-shuts-carneiro-out-refers-case-to-prosecutors-and-fnla-leadership-battle-deepens/ Last updated: 2026-10-21T20:19:57.000Z The MPLA has definitively excluded Higino Carneiro from its December leadership ballot and referred alleged document irregularities to prosecutors, closing his challenge inside the party but potentially opening another legal front. Elsewhere, the FNLA is fighting over its own leadership, civil society is pressing parliament to act on local elections, and Angola is betting that a wave of oil-block awards can counter declining production. ## TODAY'S BRIEFING - **MPLA** — Central Committee excludes Higino Carneiro and sends alleged document forgery to prosecutors - **FNLA** — Rival faction says it has removed Nimi a Simbi and calls an extraordinary congress - **LOCAL GOVERNMENT** — Civil society demands immediate action on the remaining autarquias legislation - **OIL** — Angola says 72 blocks have been awarded as it battles declining production - **ELECTIONS** — PRA-JA builds nationwide structures to monitor the 2027 vote ## MPLA shuts Carneiro out - and refers case to prosecutors The MPLA has definitively excluded Higino Carneiro from the ballot for the party leadership, ending his internal appeal against the rejection of his candidacy for the party's ninth congress on 9–10 December. Meeting on Wednesday under President João Lourenço, the Central Committee upheld Carneiro's exclusion and also referred to disciplinary proceedings against him. According to the party communiqué reported by Novo Jornal, the Central Committee concluded that Carneiro had “knowingly violated” MPLA statutes and its ethics code. The dispute is also moving beyond the party. The Central Committee decided to send its findings to the Prosecutor-General's Office (PGR), saying it had found “strong indications” of the crime of document forgery. That is an allegation arising from the MPLA's internal process; Carneiro has not been convicted of any offence. **Sources**: [Novo Jornal](https://novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-comite-central-fecha-a-porta-a-higino-carneiro-em-actualizacao-75512.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [O País](https://opais.ao/politica/mpla-recomenda-envio-do-recurso-de-higino-carneiro-ao-comite-central/?ref=zitamar.com) ·[ Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-10-20/47975423/comit%C3%A9-central-mpla-vai-analisar-parecer-sobre-recurso-de-higino-carneiro?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 This is more consequential than simply rejecting an unsuccessful leadership bid. Carneiro has been prevented from challenging Lourenço at the congress, faces an internal disciplinary process, and could now face scrutiny from prosecutors. At the same time, exhausting the MPLA's internal appeals may reopen a judicial route: the Constitutional Court previously declined to intervene while internal remedies remained available. With Lourenço now close to being the only candidate for the party presidency, the immediate question is less whether December produces a competitive leadership election than what the congress tells us about how the MPLA intends to manage its eventual presidential succession ahead of 2027. #### WHAT TO WATCH Carneiro's response - particularly whether he returns to the Constitutional Court and how he responds to the referral to prosecutors. Also watch whether another candidacy survives the MPLA's validation process before December's congress. --- ## FNLA leadership battle deepens A group claiming authority as the FNLA's Central Committee says it has removed party president Nimi a Simbi and called an extraordinary congress for 30–31 October, deepening the crisis inside one of Angola's historic liberation movements. The meeting in Luanda reportedly operated with a 52% quorum and was chaired by Samuel Mavungo Massiala. Its communiqué also raised objections to alleged changes involving FNLA-linked representatives in electoral bodies. But Nimi a Simbi's leadership disputes the validity of the meeting and its decisions, meaning this should not yet be treated as a settled transfer of power. **Sources**: [O País](https://opais.ao/politica/nimi-a-simbi-destituido-da-fnla/?ref=zitamar.com) · [Reporter Angola](https://www.reporterangola.net/pagina%5Fpolitica/comite-central-da-fnla-destitui-nimi-a-simbi-da-presidencia-e-convoca-congresso-extraordinario/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The FNLA is a much smaller electoral force than the MPLA or UNITA, so its internal battle will not by itself determine the shape of the 2027 contest. But the dispute still matters institutionally. Rival claims over who controls a legally recognised party can spill into questions about congresses, electoral representation and ultimately which leadership the courts and electoral authorities recognise. With an extraordinary congress supposedly only days away, the conflict may soon move back into the Constitutional Court. #### WHAT TO WATCH Whether the 30-31 October congress goes ahead, who participates, and whether either side seeks another judicial ruling over control of the party. _This post is for subscribers on the Angola Briefing, Angola and Mozambique Pro bundle and Institutional Angola + Mozambique tiers only._ ### The state must do its share URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-state-must-do-its-share/ Last updated: 2026-10-20T18:08:39.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s government wants mining and energy investors to process more resources locally and buy more from Mozambican businesses. At this week’s CAVAME-d conference in Nacala, investors have been reminding it that factories also need reliable electricity and usable roads. The ambition is reasonable. Its credibility depends partly on what the government itself is prepared to deliver. The complaint from Syrah Resources, which operates the Balama graphite mine, was concrete. Its representative described deteriorating road connections to Pemba and Nacala, and continued reliance on diesel generators. Further graphite processing would require dependable electricity. A company facing those constraints in its existing operation has good reason to question the economics of adding another stage of production. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/13d00d1c-7caa-40f7-9a6a-ceaa9626aafd/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Nampula governor Eduardo Abdula identified roads and reliable energy among the priorities for industrial development. His intervention brought the discussion back to the conditions investors need before committing capital. These are responsibilities that public authorities must help fulfil, through investment, planning and coordination. Listing them at a conference is useful only if it leads to work that companies and communities can see. Local content is meant to run both ways. The government has become more explicit about what Mozambique should receive from investors, including jobs, domestic purchases and a greater share of processing. It must be equally explicit about the services and infrastructure its own institutions will provide. Investors’ obligations can be written into contracts and legislation. The state’s commitments also need budgets, deadlines and institutions responsible for delivery. There is a sound economic argument for retaining more value from Mozambique’s resources. Processing can create employment, expand the tax base and generate business for local suppliers. But those benefits depend on operations that can compete and find buyers. Requiring a mineral to be processed domestically does not remove the cost of unreliable power or difficult transport. Where those costs make production uncompetitive, an obligation on paper may produce little investment. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: Namibia offered Lobito refinery stake, MPLA loses court battle, and UNITA warns on presidential terms URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-namibia-offered-lobito-refinery-stake-mpla-loses-court-battle-and-unita-warns-on-presidential-terms/ Last updated: 2026-10-20T09:22:19.000Z Angola and Namibia have turned a presidential visit into a broader economic push, signing eight cooperation instruments as João Lourenço invited Namibia to invest in the Lobito refinery. At home, the Constitutional Court has overturned the MPLA's expulsion of a former Central Committee member, while UNITA is putting constitutional reform — and presidential term limits — back into the political debate ahead of 2027. ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **REGIONAL ECONOMY** — Angola and Namibia sign eight agreements as Lourenço offers Namibia a stake in the Lobito refinery - **POLITICS** — Constitutional Court overturns MPLA's expulsion of Valdir Cónego - **POLITICS** — UNITA rejects any constitutional revision extending presidential terms - **INFRASTRUCTURE** — Angola borrows €212.5m for 155km of the EN250 in Moxico - **HEALTH** — Seven new mpox cases reported in Cabinda ## Angola and Namibia push for deeper economic integration Angola and Namibia signed **eight cooperation instruments** during President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah's state visit to Luanda, including agreements covering fisheries and aquaculture, tourism and the creation of a one-stop border post at **Santa Clara/Oshikango**. The visit also produced a potentially more consequential proposal. President João Lourenço said Angola has invited Namibia to become a **shareholder in the Lobito refinery**, the 200,000-barrel-a-day project under construction in Benguela. Lourenço said the refinery should eventually allow Angola to meet its own demand for refined fuels while supplying neighbouring countries, with shareholder countries receiving priority. **Sources:** [O País](https://opais.ao/politica/angola-e-namibia-elevam-cooperacao-e-assinam-oito-instrumentos-para-reforcar-parcerias/?ref=zitamar.com) · [Jornal de Angola](https://jornaldeangola.ao/noticias/1/pol%C3%ADtica/687762/angola-e-nam%C3%ADbia-assinam-oito-novos-acordos-de-coopera%C3%A7%C3%A3o?ref=zitamar.com) · [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-10-19/47969145/angola-convida-nam%C3%ADbia-a-ser-acionista-da-refinaria-do-lobito?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The most interesting angle is the economic architecture Angola and Namibia are trying to build around their border. A one-stop crossing could make everyday trade easier; the long-discussed Baynes hydropower project and electricity interconnection could link Angola more closely to the Southern African power market; and a Namibian stake in Lobito would give the refinery a neighbouring market as well as another investor. The ambition is substantial, but the test will be in implementation: Angola and Namibia already have a long history of cooperation agreements, but actual projects such as Baynes have spent years moving more slowly than originally envisaged. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether Namibia takes up the refinery offer — and whether this week's agreements produce concrete timetables for the Santa Clara/Oshikango border post, Baynes and electricity interconnection rather than another layer of bilateral commitments. --- ## Constitutional Court overturns MPLA expulsion Angola's Constitutional Court has annulled the MPLA's expulsion of **Valdir de Jesus do Sacramento Cónego**, according to a ruling reported by *Novo Jornal*. The MPLA Central Committee expelled Cónego from the party and the committee in October 2025 over alleged serious violations of its ethics and disciplinary rules. Cónego challenged the decision, alleging procedural violations including restrictions on his legal representation, problems with deadlines and competence in the disciplinary proceedings, and failure to consider his written defence. The Constitutional Court upheld his appeal and annulled the sanction. **Source:** [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-perde-batalha-no-constitucional-que-anulou-expulsao-de-valdir-conego-do-comite-central-e-das-fileiras-do-partido-75446.html?ref=zitamar.com) _This post is for subscribers on the Angola Briefing, Angola and Mozambique Pro bundle, Institutional Angola and Institutional Angola + Mozambique tiers only._ ### Accountability cannot wait for peace URL: https://www.zitamar.com/accountability-cannot-wait-for-peace/ Last updated: 2026-10-19T16:46:53.000Z Good afternoon. The government says protecting people in Cabo Delgado is urgent. Speaking on 16 October, justice ministry permanent secretary Tuarique Abdala pointed to displaced families and children suffering the consequences of the insurgency. He was answering a question about human rights priorities after Mozambique accepted 284 of the 292 recommendations from its fourth Universal Periodic Review. His answer recognised the suffering, but he shared no specific commitment or mechanism to turn those words into action. Since 2017, the conflict has claimed more than 6,600 lives and forced over 1.2 million people from their homes. Between September and October alone, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded at least 4,445 newly displaced people. Overcoming the insurgent threat is a formidable task, and the state did not choose this conflict. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/96f144d9-8bc0-4062-8fec-f291b6f53704/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Nevertheless, the state’s own conduct in the province remains opaque, and it is failing its people on two distinct fronts. First, state forces themselves face allegations of wrongdoing. The killing of fishermen in March provides a concrete test of accountability. Zitamar reported that at least 13 people were killed on 15 March this year after the Navy allegedly opened fire on their boats off the coast of Mocímboa da Praia. Human Rights Watch subsequently gathered accounts implicating naval personnel. The armed forces denied responsibility, attributing the killings to insurgents wearing military uniforms. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: Fuel subsidies surge, MPLA wants Luanda back, and Angola tackles hidden company ownership URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-fuel-subsidies-surge-mpla-wants-luanda-back-and-angola-tackles-hidden-company-ownership/ Last updated: 2026-10-19T13:36:12.000Z Angola faces an unusual oil-price equation: crude is trading far above the level assumed in the state budget, but the cost of keeping domestic fuel prices down has more than doubled. Meanwhile, the government is building a register to identify who really owns Angolan companies, and the MPLA is openly talking about winning Luanda back in 2027. ## TODAY'S BRIEFING - **ECONOMY** — Fuel subsidies more than double their budgeted cost as oil trades near $110 - **GOVERNANCE** — Angola has 180 days to get its beneficial-ownership register running - **POLITICS** — MPLA vows to “win back” Luanda in 2027 - **ENERGY** — Caculo Cabaça approaches 60% completion, with first power targeted for June - **GAS** — Sonangol looks at domestic use and exports from its Benguela discovery ## Fuel subsidies more than double their budgeted cost Angola now expects to spend **Kz3.7–3.8 trillion ($4bn) on fuel subsidies this year**, more than twice the Kz1.7 trillion originally budgeted, Secretary of State for Finance and Treasury Ottoniel dos Santos said during the IMF and World Bank annual meetings. The government nevertheless intends to continue gradually reducing the subsidies. Dos Santos said replacing broad price support with more targeted assistance for vulnerable households — an approach advocated by the IMF — is also under study. **Sources:** [DW](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/angola-quer-reduzir-peso-dos-subs%C3%ADdios-aos-combust%C3%ADveis/a-79679358?ref=zitamar.com) · [AngoNotícias](https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/82764/angola-quer-reduzir-peso-dos-subsidios-aos-combustiveis?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The numbers expose an awkward feature of Angola's current oil windfall. Brent ended last week around ****$110 a barrel**, almost $50 above the $61 reference price used in the 2026 budget. That should bolster oil revenues, but higher international prices can also increase the cost of selling fuel domestically below market prices. The government therefore has more oil income while simultaneously facing a much larger bill for cushioning consumers from the price of that same commodity. And with the 2027 election approaching, accelerating the subsidy phase-out carries obvious political risks. #### WHAT TO WATCH The next domestic fuel-price adjustment — and whether targeted support moves from something the government is studying to an actual mechanism capable of protecting poorer households as subsidies are withdrawn. --- ## Angola has 180 days to get its beneficial-ownership register running The government has created a technical group tasked with making Angola's new **Central Register of Beneficial Ownership (CRBE)** operational within 180 days, as the country tries to strengthen its defences against money laundering and other illicit finance. The register is intended to identify the **natural people who ultimately own or control companies and other covered entities**, including where control is obscured by layers of corporate ownership. The initiative follows the beneficial-ownership regime enacted in August. The Financial Intelligence Unit will serve as deputy coordinator of the ten-body technical group, which is also expected to develop the electronic platform behind the register. **Sources:** [AngoNotícias](https://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/82765/governo-cria-equipa-multidisciplinar-e-da-180-dias-para-mapear-donos-de-empresas-fantasma?ref=zitamar.com) · [Law 7/26](https://lex.ao/docs/assembleia-nacional/2026/lei-n-o-7-26-de-19-de-agosto/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 This matters beyond identifying so-called “shell companies”. Angola has been on the ****Financial Action Task Force grey list since October 2024**, increasing pressure to demonstrate that financial-transparency reforms work in practice. A beneficial-ownership database could also make it harder to hide conflicts of interest or politically connected ownership behind corporate structures. But the real test isn't creating another register: it's whether the information is accurate, kept current, cross-checked against other records and actually used by regulators and investigators. #### WHAT TO WATCH Implementation. The 180-day timetable gives this reform a measurable deadline — and international scrutiny gives Angola an incentive to demonstrate more than formal compliance. --- ## MPLA vows to “win back” Luanda in 2027 The MPLA's first secretary in Luanda, **Luís Nunes**, says the ruling party is mobilising to “politically win back” the capital in the 2027 general election. Speaking in Viana at an event linked to preparations for the MPLA's ninth congress and its 70th anniversary, Nunes stressed party unity, discipline and preparations for updating voter registration. Asked about the electoral objective, he said: **“We will have to win back. Luanda has always been MPLA's.”** _This post is for subscribers on the Angola Briefing, Angola and Mozambique Pro bundle, Institutional Angola and Institutional Angola + Mozambique tiers only._ ### Protected until minerals are found URL: https://www.zitamar.com/protected-until-minerals-are-found-2/ Last updated: 2026-10-19T08:46:13.000Z Hello and welcome to Zitamar's Daily Briefing for Friday, 15 October 2026. Mozambique's government has instructed conservation managers to map mineral deposits while a state commission considers redrawing protected areas. Prospecting rights have already been issued in the buffer zone adjoining the Niassa Special Reserve and close to Gorongosa National Park. This is not simply a contest between mining and conservation. Mineral rights can be allocated to politically influential Mozambicans with little capital or mining capacity, who then bring in Chinese, South African or other foreign partners to finance extraction. Their principal contribution is access: to licences, officials and land that would otherwise be unavailable. *The rest of Friday's Daily Briefing continues below for paying subscribers* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): Who or what is Zitamar News? Our editor in chief gives a brief history and introduction at the start of the latest edition of our new Angola Briefing; watch it here: [Lourenço’s State of the Nation: better numbers, unresolved questionsAfter nine years of João Lourenço, what did yesterday's State of the Nation tell us about where Angola actually stands — and the year leading to the 2027 election?![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-0de800f3-656d-4e6c-89e8-6d41d9555a5a.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-10-16_165445206-e958765f-5861-4f12-927c-d680c2eac3d7.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/lourencos-state-of-the-nation-better-numbers-unresolved-questions/) --- Montepuez Ruby Mining provides the established model. Gemfields owns 75% of the company, while 25% belongs to Mwiriti, whose shareholders include senior Frelimo figure and liberation-war veteran Raimundo Pachinuapa. A locally connected company secured a position in what became one of the world’s most valuable ruby deposits; foreign capital and technical capacity followed. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Angola Today: $20.2bn in direct awards, the $13bn asset hunt, and the autarquias deadlock URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-20-2bn-in-direct-awards-the-13bn-asset-hunt-and-the-autarquias-deadlock/ Last updated: 2026-10-16T15:08:02.000Z President João Lourenço spent almost four hours this week setting out his assessment of Angola. Today, **Angola Briefing** put some of that assessment to the test — while the day's news raises its own questions about how the Angolan state spends money, recovers it and distributes power. ### Today's Angola Briefing: the numbers — and the reality behind them Our latest **Angola Briefing** is out today, with Fernando Lima and Claudio Silva examining Lourenço's State of the Nation address and what it tells us about Angola heading towards the 2027 elections. The programme begins with a short introduction from Zitamar founder Tom Bowker to **Zitamar News** — what we do, the subscription-funded model we've built over the past decade and why we're now expanding our Angola coverage — as well as an introduction to Claudio, who has joined Zitamar as a contributing editor in Luanda. Fernando and Claudio then get into the harder questions behind Lourenço's speech: whether improving economic indicators are translating into better lives; the interpretation and credibility of employment statistics; emigration; the long delay to elected local government; UNITA's alternative; speculation about Lourenço's political future; and what comes next for the MPLA. **Read our analysis and watch the full Angola Briefing →** [Lourenço’s State of the Nation: better numbers, unresolved questionsAfter nine years of João Lourenço, what did yesterday's State of the Nation tell us about where Angola actually stands — and the year leading to the 2027 election?![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-f74801a4-1169-4d52-8fd2-ca9110d4bdf1.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-10-16_165445206-df6eccfa-2d7c-415c-a855-a8bd3b83fa0b.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/lourencos-state-of-the-nation-better-numbers-unresolved-questions/) --- ## TODAY'S BRIEFING - **GOVERNANCE** — Direct awards authorised by Lourenço reach $20.2bn - **ANTI-CORRUPTION** — Nearly $13bn has been seized or frozen, but recovery is another matter - **POLITICS** — Lourenço calls for consensus to break the autarquias deadlock - **MARKETS** — BODIVA shares have risen 684% since privatisation ### Direct awards authorised by Lourenço reach $20.2bn The value of public contracts authorised by President João Lourenço through simplified procurement reached an estimated **$20.2bn in the first nine months of 2026**, according to *Expansão*, up around 240% from $5.9bn. The ten largest contracts account for nearly half the total. Angola's Court of Auditors has reiterated that simplified procurement should be an exceptional procedure. **Sources:** [Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/presidente-ja-assinou-202-mil-milhoes-usd-em-ajustes-directos-este-ano-75383.html?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Direct awards are not inherently evidence of corruption: there are legitimate circumstances in which competition may be impractical, and contractor financing or specialist capacity can affect how projects are awarded. ****The question is the scale.** A 240% increase in a procedure intended to be exceptional raises questions about competition, value for money and how much Lourenço's governance reforms have changed the way the state actually buys things. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether the government explains what is driving the increase — and whether simplified procurement continues accelerating as Angola enters the election year. --- _This post is for subscribers on the Angola Briefing, Angola and Mozambique Pro bundle, Institutional Angola and Institutional Angola + Mozambique tiers only._ ### Lourenço’s State of the Nation: better numbers, unresolved questions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/lourencos-state-of-the-nation-better-numbers-unresolved-questions/ Last updated: 2026-10-16T14:57:53.000Z President João Lourenço used yesterday’s State of the Nation address to present an Angola making measurable progress: faster economic growth, falling inflation and public debt, stronger non-oil activity, new infrastructure and an expanding state presence in sectors from healthcare to transport. But what do those indicators tell us about the state of the country as Angola approaches the 2027 elections? In the latest **Angola Briefing**, Zitamar editor-at-large **Fernando Lima** discusses Lourenço’s record with **Claudio Silva**, Zitamar’s new contributing editor in Luanda. The programme begins with a short introduction from Zitamar founder **Tom Bowker** to our work, the subscription-funded journalism Zitamar has built over the past decade, and why we are now expanding our coverage of Angola. ## Growth is real. Is it enough? Lourenço had some striking numbers to present. Angola’s economy grew 5.3% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, according to figures cited by the president, with the non-oil economy expanding 6.2%. Inflation, he said, had fallen from 27.5% in 2024 to 10.8% in June 2026, while public debt had declined from 115.9% of GDP in 2020 to 51.2% this year. He also cited a fall in unemployment from 31.5% in 2024 to 21.3% in the first quarter of 2026\. [Governo de Angola](https://www.governo.gov.ao/noticias/3216/governo/estado-da-nacao-2026/integra-da-mensagem-do-presidente-da-republica?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) The argument in the Briefing is not simply that these improvements are fictitious. Silva is sharply critical of some official statistics — particularly unemployment figures — but also acknowledges that non-oil growth is real and that the broad direction of some economic indicators is supported by international institutions. That produces a more important question: **is Angola’s economy improving quickly enough to improve the lives of a young and rapidly growing population?** Silva argues that population growth changes the significance of headline GDP growth. Angola has to create employment, schools, healthcare and economic opportunities quickly enough not merely to expand the economy, but to accommodate millions of young people entering adulthood. That helps explain how positive macroeconomic indicators can coexist with considerable economic frustration. It also changes the test for diversification. Growth outside oil matters, but so do the sectors generating it, the jobs they create and the extent to which rising output reaches households. ## What should count as a job? That tension becomes particularly sharp over unemployment. Silva questions the official figures and argues that changes in the treatment of informal economic activity make comparisons over time difficult. His criticism goes further at points, questioning the credibility of INE statistics themselves. That should be treated as **Silva’s contention, not an established finding that Angola’s statistics are deliberately manipulated**. But the argument raises a substantive issue regardless of whether one accepts his stronger criticism. In a country where informal employment is extensive, a person can technically be economically active while remaining poor, insecure and without anything resembling a salaried job. A falling unemployment rate therefore does not by itself answer the question Lourenço’s speech ultimately poses: whether economic conditions for Angolans are materially improving. Silva also points to migration as another possible measure of confidence in Angola’s trajectory, highlighting the rapid increase in Angolans moving to Portugal. His argument is that migration by people with the means and skills to leave should be considered alongside conventional economic indicators: **when Angolans have choices, where do they see their future?** ## The political legacy of 2017 The discussion also looks backwards. Lourenço did not come to office in 2017 merely as another MPLA president. His early moves against figures associated with José Eduardo dos Santos, his anti-corruption campaign and the greater sense of political openness surrounding his first years created expectations that Angola might be entering a substantially different era. Silva argues that much of that goodwill has since disappeared. That is his political assessment rather than something demonstrated by the State of the Nation address itself. But it identifies an important benchmark for Lourenço’s final stretch before the 2027 election: he will be judged not only against the Angola he inherited, but against the expectations his own presidency created. Fernando Lima presses Silva on the alternative. Is UNITA leader **Adalberto Costa Júnior** offering a sufficiently convincing programme of government, or does opposition simply give him the easier task of attacking the MPLA’s record? Silva argues that Costa Júnior has become more concrete in his policy proposals and that his style is better suited to communicating with Angola’s young electorate. The question becomes increasingly important as 2027 approaches. Dissatisfaction with an incumbent government does not automatically translate into confidence in the opposition. ## Autarquias expose the bigger problem The most revealing exchange in the programme comes over **autarquias** — the elected local governments that Angola has debated for years but has still not introduced. Lourenço returned to the issue in his State of the Nation address. Thirteen pieces of legislation were originally proposed and most have been approved, but disagreement remains, including over whether the first local elections should take place simultaneously across the country or be phased in. Although the MPLA has the parliamentary numbers to proceed, Lourenço said it would be inadvisable to settle such a sensitive issue through the ruling party’s majority alone, and called for greater political consensus. [Home](https://www.giranoticias.com/politica/2026/10/amp/32002-pr-exorta-ao-consenso-parlamentar-para-desbloquear-legislacao-das-autarquias.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) Silva’s interpretation is much more political. He argues that the failure to introduce autarquias reflects reluctance within the MPLA to surrender municipal power in places where it might lose elections. That claim about the ruling party’s motives is his analysis. But Fernando’s response exposes another problem: **what would political decentralisation actually mean economically?** If municipalities were elected tomorrow, he asks, how many would possess a sufficient tax base to sustain themselves rather than continuing to depend on Luanda? Silva concedes that many would not. His counterargument is that this dependence is partly a product of the system that decentralisation is intended to change. Provincial governors are presidential appointees, municipal authority flows down through the central state, and economic and fiscal decision-making remains heavily concentrated in Luanda. In that reading, requiring municipalities to demonstrate economic independence before giving them greater political and fiscal authority risks creating a circular argument: they cannot become more autonomous because the centralised system has left them dependent on the centre. The result is a much bigger question than when Angola will finally hold municipal elections. **How much political authority, revenue and responsibility is the central state actually prepared to give up?** That also connects directly to a subject discussed in last week’s [Angola Briefing on Angola beyond Luanda](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/): the enormous concentration of political and economic decision-making in the capital and the difficulty of turning resource wealth and large infrastructure investments into locally driven development. ## And what happens to Lourenço? The final phase of Lourenço’s presidency also hangs over the discussion. Silva notes that Lourenço did not explicitly describe Thursday’s address as his final State of the Nation and says the omission has contributed to speculation in Angola about whether the president might seek to remain in office beyond the expected end of his second term. The programme presents **no evidence that Lourenço intends to seek a third presidential term**, and the speculation should not be mistaken for such evidence. But it reflects a wider uncertainty that is becoming harder to separate from Angolan politics: who will lead the MPLA into the next election, what role Lourenço himself intends to retain, and how the ruling party manages its succession. The discussion ultimately goes further still, questioning the constitutional structure under which Angolans elect a party list whose head becomes president, rather than voting separately for the head of state. Silva argues that constitutional reform should form part of the post-Lourenço debate. Whether that happens is another matter. But as Angola moves towards 2027, the State of the Nation is increasingly difficult to separate from a different question: **what kind of political system will Lourenço leave behind?** ### Watch the full Angola Briefing The programme also discusses the credibility of official statistics, Angola’s informal economy, migration to Portugal, public spending on education and health, Adalberto Costa Júnior and UNITA, speculation about Lourenço’s political future, the MPLA succession and the case for constitutional reform. ### New minister, old debts URL: https://www.zitamar.com/new-minister-old-debts/ Last updated: 2026-10-15T16:07:40.000Z Good afternoon. Samaria Tovela gave teachers reason to resent her when she linked their financial difficulties to poor management of their salaries. With teachers demanding overtime payments dating back to 2022, advice about household budgeting was bound to sound dismissive. President Daniel Chapo dismissed her yesterday, hours after the remarks, and appointed Edson Macuácua in her place. The Presidency did not explain, so the connection remains an inference. Politically, the change lets Chapo distance himself from an unpopular minister while the government’s debts stay unpaid. The contrast with Chapo’s own approach was awkward. He had marked Teacher’s Day on Monday by receiving union representatives, acknowledging their grievances over overtime, careers and conditions, and calling for dialogue and joint solutions. Tovela’s remarks about personal finances weakened that conciliatory message. Her earlier allegation that some teachers had inflated overtime claims had already added friction. Fraud should be investigated, but individual abuses cannot justify treating a profession’s grievances as evidence of its own misconduct. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6d8c52a9-25d4-4f87-bef1-9e08be36e68b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Insurgents abduct civilians in Mocímboa da Praia, wound three in ChaiThe abductees were reportedly freed after a ransom payment, while a family seeks answers over a young man’s detention by the navy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-9283f304-3825-42bb-882f-4aeb9c16dd6b.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-10-15-09.05.09-587c6126-580f-4c43-b8ea-e42027520b65.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-civilians-in-mocimboa-da-praia-wound-three-in-chai/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Removing Tovela does not establish that she alone caused the breakdown. An education minister must make sure overtime records are accurate, and claims are properly processed. The government must then find the money to settle legitimate debts. Administrative failures need correcting; funding shortages need decisions from the finance ministry and the President. Neither responsibility disappears with a change of personnel. Macuácua’s appointment offers little basis for assuming that relations with teachers will improve. A former spokesman for Armando Guebuza, he was identified by the Mozambican press as one of the organisers of G40, the group of pro-Frelimo commentators associated with Guebuza’s presidency. His chairmanship of the technical commission implementing Chapo’s national dialogue does not establish a record of independent mediation. His continued presence in government under Nyusi and Chapo can also be read as accommodating Guebuza’s political camp within Frelimo. Those credentials help explain his political durability; they offer no assurance that he can resolve the ministry’s administrative failures or secure the funding teachers are owed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: UNITA calls Lourenço's rule a 'lost decade', BAI Europa searched in Portugal, and Angola blocks Namibian livestock URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-unita-calls-lourencos-rule-a-lost-decade-bai-europa-searched-in-portugal-and-angola-blocks-namibian-livestock/ Last updated: 2026-10-15T08:58:04.000Z João Lourenço delivers his final State of the Nation address before Angola's 2027 elections today, facing an opposition verdict that his years in power amount to a “lost decade”. Elsewhere, the Portuguese authorities have searched BAI Europa in a €66 million tax-fraud investigation, Angola is trying to keep a Namibian foot-and-mouth outbreak from crossing the border, and a new memorial has reopened questions about how the country remembers its political conflicts. ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **POLITICS** — UNITA calls Lourenço's record a “lost decade” hours before his State of the Nation address. - **FINANCE** — BAI Europa's Lisbon headquarters is searched in a Portuguese tax-fraud investigation. - **RECONCILIATION** — A new memorial to victims of political conflicts prompts debate over Angola's historical memory. - **AGRICULTURE** — Angola restricts livestock and animal products from Namibia after a foot-and-mouth outbreak. - **ELECTIONS** — UNITA calls for separate presidential and parliamentary elections. - **HUMANITARIAN** — Disease outbreaks and climate risks threaten to worsen conditions across Southern Africa. --- ## UNITA calls Lourenço's rule a 'lost decade' ahead of State of the Nation UNITA leader Adalberto Costa Júnior has described João Lourenço's years in power as a **“lost decade” for Angola**, setting out the opposition's verdict on his record ahead of the President's State of the Nation address today. In an address on Wednesday, Costa Júnior argued that improvements presented in official statistics have not translated into better lives for many Angolans. He illustrated his argument with examples including an unemployed graduate selling goods on the street, a farmer unable to get part of his maize crop to market because of poor roads, and a pregnant woman forced to travel a long distance for medical care. The intervention comes against a difficult social backdrop. As we reported yesterday, the 2026 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index estimates that **49.3% of Angolans are multidimensionally poor**. Separately, the 2026 Global Hunger Index gives Angola a score of 24.3 — classified as “serious” — little changed from 24.0 in 2018, although some individual indicators have improved. Pasted markdown Lourenço addresses the National Assembly today in his final State of the Nation speech before the August 2027 general elections. He is expected to defend his government's economic and social record as Angola enters the final year of his second term. **Sources:** [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-10-14/47942433/unita-considera-governa%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-jo%C3%A3o-louren%C3%A7o-d%C3%A9cada-perdida-para-angola?ref=zitamar.com) · [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/estado-da-nacao-nao-podemos-continuar-a-pedir-vos-que-esperem-o-futuro-enquanto-vos-negamos-oportunidades-no-presente-adalberto-costa-junior--75366.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [Economia & Mercado](https://www.economiaemercado.com/artigo/angola-nao-regista-progressos-no-combate-a-fome-ha-oito-anos-e-continua-entre-os-piores-no-indice-global-?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Costa Júnior's attack establishes the opposition's benchmark against which today's speech will be judged: not simply whether macroeconomic indicators have improved, but whether people feel those improvements. Falling inflation and other headline indicators give Lourenço achievements to point to, but poverty, unemployment and weak public services leave UNITA ample room to argue that the benefits have not reached enough households. With the succession to Lourenço also unresolved inside the MPLA, today's speech is both an account of his record and part of the political inheritance he will leave his party. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** What Lourenço says about poverty, jobs and living standards — and whether he announces new measures rather than restating existing programmes. This afternoon's ****Angola Briefing** will analyse the speech and what it tells us about the government's record and the political and economic outlook ahead of 2027. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Insurgents abduct civilians in Mocímboa da Praia, wound three in Chai URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-civilians-in-mocimboa-da-praia-wound-three-in-chai/ Last updated: 2026-10-15T07:15:29.000Z - 7 Oct: Suspected insurgent boat seen off Mocímboa da Praia - 8 Oct: Seven kidnapped for ransom in Mocímboa village - 10 Oct: Three shot in insurgent raid on Chai - 12 Oct: Insurgents loot and burn another Mocímboa village Three people suffered minor gunshot wounds when insurgents raided Chai, in Macomia district, Cabo Delgado, on the evening of 10 October, sources told *Zitamar*. The attackers entered the village at around 18:00 and remained for about half an hour, looting goods, mainly food. Rwandan forces maintain an outpost roughly three kilometres north of Chai, but no clashes with the insurgents were reported during the raid. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A toll gate on the food supply URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-toll-gate-on-the-food-supply/ Last updated: 2026-10-14T18:52:19.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s Cereals Institute, ICM, has suspended three major rice and wheat importers and says 34,300 tonnes of their grain have been seized. The immediate dispute concerns whether Companhia Industrial da Matola, África Indústrias and Pembe Mozambique imported without the institute’s approval. The larger issue is why ICM now has so much power over the supply and price of two basic foods. The government ended the previous liberalised system after alleging that importers used inflated or duplicated invoices to transfer foreign currency illegally out of Mozambique. Under the replacement introduced this year, ICM registers importers, approves their orders, decides whether proposed quantities are justified, identifies acceptable suppliers and monitors payments and shipments. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e6d9732f-8868-4483-a208-e83e8317cb05/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Those are legitimate public concerns. Mozambique should know how much rice and wheat it needs, prevent fraudulent foreign-exchange transactions and avoid shortages caused by poorly coordinated imports. A strategic reserve could also protect consumers when international prices or supply chains are disrupted. The companies concerned do not automatically make sympathetic opponents of the new regime. África Indústrias is linked to Royal Group, whose conduct in the pigeon-pea dispute with ETG is now part of an international arbitration case against Mozambique. The same company has already faced questions over rice imports declared partly as seed, including 25,000 tonnes seized by Customs in March. The three companies should comply with the law and answer the allegations against them. Their conduct does not, however, resolve whether the system itself is proportionate. The new arrangement concentrates regulatory and commercial powers in the same institution. ICM controls access to the market while retaining the right to import grain itself, negotiate government-to-government purchases, contract procurement and logistics services, and appoint partners to acquire cereals at source. It can therefore regulate private importers while potentially competing with them or selecting companies to perform parts of the trade. The private importer nevertheless retains the financial risk. Companies must arrange bank financing, pay suppliers and cover freight, insurance, customs and storage. ICM does not replace them in those obligations. It stands between them and the transaction, granting permission and charging for doing so. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: MPLA succession speculation grows, half of Angolans in poverty, and TAAG strike escalates URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-mpla-succession-speculation-grows-half-of-angolans-in-poverty-and-taag-strike-escalates/ Last updated: 2026-10-14T12:20:51.000Z ### TODAY'S BRIEFING Angola's 2027 political transition is coming into sharper focus, but the signals remain ambiguous. A candid speech by senior MPLA figure Carlos Feijó has fuelled speculation about the ruling party's succession plans, while new UN figures show nearly half of Angolans living in multidimensional poverty. Meanwhile, TAAG's maintenance strike is escalating, access to more than 1,000 flood-affected families in Benguela is being restricted, and regulators have identified serious money-laundering risks in the gambling sector. - **POLITICS** — Feijó speech fuels MPLA succession speculation - **POVERTY** — Nearly half of Angolans face multiple forms of deprivation, according to UN estimates. - **AVIATION** — TAAG turns to retired technicians as its maintenance strike continues. - **HUMAN RIGHTS** — Benguela restricts access to a centre housing more than 1,000 flood-affected families. - **FINANCIAL REGULATION** — Gambling regulator identifies high money-laundering risks across much of the industry. - **ELECTIONS** — Two new parties gain legal recognition as voter-registration efforts intensify. --- ## Feijó speech fuels MPLA succession speculation A speech by senior MPLA figure Carlos Feijó has prompted fresh speculation about the ruling party's succession ahead of its December congress and Angola's 2027 elections. Speaking at the MPLA's provincial conference in Cunene last week, Feijó argued that the party could no longer expect its historical record alone to guarantee electoral victory. He called for the MPLA to reconnect with voters, strengthen its organisation and confront corruption — unusually candid language from within the ruling party. The intervention has subsequently been interpreted by some media as positioning Feijó for a more prominent role in the MPLA's succession. Portugal's *Jornal de Negócios*, in an analysis published this week, went further, portraying Feijó as taking a step forward as a potential protagonist in the party's transition. But **Feijó has not formally declared himself a candidate for the MPLA leadership or to head its 2027 electoral list**, on the evidence we currently have. The significance of the speech lies less in a declared candidacy than in the rarity of a senior MPLA figure publicly acknowledging weaknesses that could threaten the party's electoral position. **Sources:** [Jornal de Negócios — Feijó takes a step forward](https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/mundo/africa/angola/detalhe/radar-africa-feijo-da-um-passo-em-frente-como-protagonista-do-mpla?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) · [Novo Jornal — MPLA congress preparations](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/9-congresso-do-mpla-comissoes-organizadoras-entram-na-fase-de-consolidacao-e-validacao-das-listas-dos-delegados-eleitos-75319.html?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Feijó's remarks are notable precisely because such public criticism from senior MPLA figures is unusual. Even UNITA veteran Lukamba Gato reportedly praised the intervention. But that makes the speech evidence of an increasingly open debate about the MPLA's problems — ****not necessarily evidence that Feijó has launched a succession bid**. With the party congress approaching, there will be a temptation to interpret every intervention by a senior figure through the succession lens. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether Feijó himself clarifies his ambitions, or other senior MPLA figures begin making similarly candid interventions before the 9–10 December congress. --- ## Nearly half of Angolans live in multidimensional poverty, UN estimates Almost **half of Angola's population — 49.3%, or approximately 18.7 million people — lives in multidimensional poverty**, according to the 2026 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Oxford University's Poverty and Human Development Initiative. The index measures deprivation across health, education and living standards, rather than income alone. It captures problems such as inadequate sanitation, poor housing, limited access to electricity, interrupted schooling and child malnutrition. The findings are particularly concerning at the more severe end of the scale. An estimated **29.6% of Angolans — approximately 11 million people — experience severe multidimensional poverty**, while another 14.8% are classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. The report also indicates that the absolute number of Angolans living in multidimensional poverty increased from approximately **15.1 million in 2015–16 to 17.2 million in 2023–24**. These figures refer to different survey periods and should not be interpreted as a direct measurement of changes during 2026. Living-standard deprivations account for 46.2% of Angola's multidimensional poverty index, followed by education at 29.9% and health at 23.9%. The publication comes immediately before President João Lourenço's State of the Nation address on Thursday. Opposition parties have called on him to address food insecurity, medicine shortages and deteriorating living conditions, according to *Correio da Kianda*. **Sources:** [Economia & Mercado — UNDP poverty findings](https://www.economiaemercado.com/artigo/metade-dos-angolanos-vive-em-pobreza-revela-pnud?ref=zitamar.com) · [SAPO — UN global poverty report](https://sapo.pt/artigo/onu-alerta-que-1-2-mil-milhoes-de-pessoas-vivem-em-pobreza-multidimensional-e-destaca-angola-entre-os-paises-lusofonos-mais-afectados-6ace4947ded6b2a5e362a5a1?ref=zitamar.com) _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Freedom, privately arranged URL: https://www.zitamar.com/freedom-privately-arranged/ Last updated: 2026-10-13T16:20:31.000Z Good afternoon. The release of three workers abducted from a Niassa hunting camp has left other families asking why their children are still missing. Their anger exposes a failure of public protection. Private actors could arrange a negotiated release and fly the freed men to safety, while the families of seven others seized in the same attack have no clear account of their fate. The three Mozambique Wildlife Adventures (MWA) employees were released on 4 October after a payment of about $53,000 (MZN3.4m), sources told *Zitamar.* They spent the night at a handover point in Montepuez district, its coordinates supplied by the insurgents, before a South-African-registered helicopter and an armed private team collected them the next morning. That team did not fight anyone out of captivity. The insurgents had already let the men go, and the operation was an evacuation of hostages they had released, not an assault to free them. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/71e4c962-5758-420e-84c9-7e36b53495f0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) *Zitamar* understands that on Monday, 5 October, villagers gathered at MWA’s premises over the fate of their children. Carta de Moçambique reports that the families believe the state secured the workers’ freedom and left their children behind; our own sources describe an entirely private arrangement, with no government involvement. The distinction changes where responsibility lies, and it offers the parents nothing. Niassa’s secretary of state, Silva Livone, says the authorities are working to free the children and has asked the families not to demonstrate. Pressure on MWA is understandable. Its workers came back, which shows that contact with the captors and an agreement were possible. But we don’t know whether the others could have been included, whether the insurgents would have freed them on the same terms, or what the company knew about where they’re held. The state bears primary responsibility for protecting citizens and recovering them when it fails. A safari operator can’t be made to stand in for it. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: Lourenço's final pre-election address, Kz3.8tn budget overruns, and Sequele demolitions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-lourencos-final-pre-election-address-kz3-8tn-budget-overruns-and-sequele-demolitions/ Last updated: 2026-10-13T10:07:37.000Z As President João Lourenço prepares to deliver his final State of the Nation address before the 2027 elections, new scrutiny of his government's record is raising questions about public spending and promises of reform. Today, we examine a Kz3.8 trillion gap between approved budgets and actual expenditure, revisit the demolitions that have left hundreds of families seeking answers in Sequele, and look at developments in the MPLA, aviation and offshore oil. ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **POLITICS** — Lourenço prepares his final pre-election State of the Nation address amid scrutiny of his government's record. - **PUBLIC FINANCES** — Government bodies exceeded their original 2025 budgets by a combined Kz3.8 trillion. - **HUMAN RIGHTS** — Calls grow for an investigation and rehousing after demolitions in Sequele. - **MPLA** — Senior party figure Carlos Feijó warns that historical achievements alone will not secure voters' support. - **AVIATION** — TAAG says nearly 95% of flights will operate despite a maintenance technicians' strike. - **OIL & GAS** — Yinson prices $1.458bn in bonds to refinance Angola's Agogo offshore production vessel. --- ## Lourenço's final State of the Nation: what happened to the promises? President João Lourenço is due to deliver his tenth and final State of the Nation address on **Thursday, 15 October**, as Angola's parliament opens its 2026–27 legislative year. It will be his last such address before the general elections expected in August 2027, when his second presidential term comes to an end. The occasion has prompted *Novo Jornal*, working with the Angola Open Policy Initiative (AOPI), to examine Lourenço's previous nine addresses and assess his record against the commitments made since he took office in 2017. The investigation revisits promises to combat corruption, diversify the oil-dependent economy, reduce poverty and introduce elected local government. It also examines public procurement, presidential commissions and the allocation of state resources. The newspaper's accompanying editorial, *Adeus à hora da largada*, frames Thursday's speech as an opportunity to compare the administration's ambitions with what has been delivered. There are achievements for Lourenço to highlight, including Angola's international diplomatic profile and efforts to attract investment into infrastructure and non-oil sectors. But the absence of municipal elections, continuing pressure on household incomes and questions over the effectiveness of public expenditure remain significant tests of his reform agenda. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal — State of the Nation investigation](https://stg24.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/estado-da-nacao-2017-2026-analise-dos-discursos-promessas-e-governacao-do-presidente-joao-lourenco-75240.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) · [Novo Jornal — Editorial](https://stg24.novojornal.co.ao/opiniao/editorial/detalhe/adeus-a-hora-da-largada-75238.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) 💡 The central question is no longer simply what Lourenço intends to do, but how his government accounts for nine years of policy decisions. With the 2027 elections approaching, Thursday's speech will also help establish the record on which the MPLA asks voters to judge its administration. ### **ANGOLA BRIEFING — LIVE ON THURSDAY** > Our expert panel will analyse Lourenço's State of the Nation address shortly after he delivers it, in **Thursday afternoon's live Angola Briefing**. We'll examine the economic and political messages, what the President says about his record, and what the speech signals for Angola's final year before the elections. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Listen for concrete commitments on local elections, economic diversification and public services — and for how Lourenço addresses the gap between policy announcements and implementation. --- ## Angola's 2025 budget overruns reach Kz3.8 trillion Twenty-four of Angola's 65 central government bodies spent a combined **Kz3.8 trillion more than their original 2025 budget allocations**, according to calculations by *Expansão* based on the government's General State Account. The newspaper reports that the total value of these overruns increased by 58% compared with 2024, despite fewer government bodies exceeding their initial allocations. The Ministry of Energy and Water recorded the largest discrepancy. Against an original budget of approximately **Kz814.2 billion**, it executed spending approaching **Kz2 trillion** — roughly 2.4 times the initial allocation. The ministries of Defence and the Interior also featured prominently among the bodies exceeding their original budgets. Such discrepancies do not necessarily indicate unlawful expenditure. Governments can authorise supplementary appropriations, budget transfers and additional spending during the financial year. Nevertheless, the figures reveal how substantially actual expenditure can diverge from the spending plans originally presented to parliament. **Source:** [Expansão — Ministries lead 2025 budget overruns](https://www.expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/ministerios-da-energia-e-aguas-da-defesa-e-do-interior-sao-os-campeoes-da-derrapagem-orcamental-75293.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) 💡 The figures raise an important question about budget transparency: how effectively can parliament, businesses and citizens assess spending priorities when allocations change so significantly during the year? They also provide timely context for Thursday's State of the Nation address, when the President will be presenting his government's economic record. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether the government provides a detailed explanation of the largest adjustments, including which projects received additional funding and how that spending was financed. --- The rest of today's edition is reserved for paying subscribers. Join them! And stay ahead on the issues that matter in Angola today. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) _This post is for subscribers on the Angola Briefing, Angola and Mozambique Pro bundle, Institutional Angola and Institutional Angola + Mozambique tiers only._ ### Who pays for the ride URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-pays-for-the-ride/ Last updated: 2026-10-12T16:49:31.000Z Good afternoon. The government has told public-transport operators it cannot guarantee when it will pay the compensation they are already owed. At the same time it will accept only a five-metical rise in fares, against the twenty that some operators are demanding. The two positions, held together, expose the weakness at the centre of urban transport in Mozambique. The state cannot control the service, and it cannot pay for it either. The money it is behind on is real and recent. In May the Metropolitan Transport Agency paid out around 110.2m meticais (about $1.7m) to hold fares down after diesel rose 45.5%. In July, the transport ministry announced a further 128.8m meticais (about $2m) in a first phase, and admitted several operators were still waiting. The pattern goes back years. In 2022 the state fell four months behind and promised to clear the debt in January; by April it still had not. Operators and the government meet again on 26 October, and fares could rise on 1 November, but neither the date of payment nor the total owed is known. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/549a45e6-df98-43a0-9b5a-dc4a92454a8d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Public transport cannot run for long on a promise with no figure and no date. Operators buy fuel, tyres and spare parts and pay drivers whether or not the state meets its share. Moving people around a city is a social service. Hundreds of thousands of poor Mozambicans depend on it to reach work, and that work feeds families. A service priced to stay affordable does not earn enough to cover its own costs, let alone a profit. Someone has to make up the difference, and public ownership does not repeal that arithmetic. A state bus company held to low fares without a reliable subsidy ends up where the private operators already are, short of money for batteries and tyres; its managers then called incompetent for failing to make an omelette without eggs. The operators' hold over the government comes from one fact: the state cannot replace them. The public companies carry only part of the demand, and carry it badly. So when private operators threaten to stop, the government faces thousands of people unable to reach jobs, schools and markets, and it gives way. In a small, weakly regulated market, that is an invitation to capture and to plain blackmail. Whoever controls the chapas controls the capital's mobility, and threatens to switch it off whenever the terms stop suiting him. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: Tax authority's €8,000 candyfloss machines, inflation eases, and Angola's FAO bid URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-tax-authoritys-eur8-000-candyfloss-machines-inflation-eases-and-angolas-fao-bid/ Last updated: 2026-10-12T12:22:14.000Z [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/10/image_2026-10-12_141955025.png)](#/portal/signup) This is the last completely free edition of Angola Today. From tomorrow, our insights and analysis will increasingly be subscriber-only. Please subscribe to support our reliable, unbiased and independent coverage of Angola, and keep abreast of developments at this pivotal point in the country's development. [Subscribe ](#/portal/signup) ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **GOVERNANCE** — A Maka Angola investigation raises new questions about Finance Ministry appointments, procurement contracts and the handling of a criminal case. - **ECONOMY** — Inflation falls to 8.43%, its lowest level in more than a decade, but food and education costs are still climbing. - **DIPLOMACY** — João Lourenço is in Rome as Angola launches Josefa Sacko's campaign to lead the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization. - **EDUCATION** — More than 20,000 teachers are set to enter a promotion process following September's strike settlement. - **LAND RIGHTS** — A year after its introduction, Angola's new land-administration platform is still operating only in Luanda. --- ## AGT's children's fairs: Maka Angola traces questionable invoices and transfers to Portugal A new two-part investigation by **Maka Angola** has raised detailed questions about contracts between Angola's General Tax Administration (AGT) and In Pressionante Kianda, a company hired to organise children's fairs and publicity campaigns. The investigation describes invoices for **three candyfloss (cotton candy) machines costing more than €8,000**, although Kianda's former manager João dos Santos says he received only one. Maka Angola also reports that five invoices from associated Portuguese companies, totalling **€662,231.82**, were recorded by the company's former accountant without accompanying customs-clearance documentation. The reporting follows a **€352,618.84 bank transfer to Portugal** in September 2024\. According to documents examined by Maka Angola, the transfer was confirmed after dos Santos had asked Banco Caixa Angola to disregard previously signed authorisations for overseas payments. The beneficiary named in the bank confirmation was also different from the company identified on the supporting invoice. The investigation further alleges that Kianda's Portuguese business associates were discussing opportunities with AGT before the Angolan company was incorporated in June 2023\. Maka Angola says correspondence shows that Carla Castelo Trindade, a former university lecturer of then-AGT chairman José Leiria, helped prepare proposals and maintained contact with officials involved in awarding contracts. Leiria was appointed secretary of state for tax affairs in September 2026\. Bráulio Assis, another official named in Maka Angola's reporting, subsequently became head of his office. Carla has denied any connection with Kianda, while Maka Angola says Leiria, Finance Minister Vera Daves and several others did not respond to its questions. The alleged irregularities have not been established in court. **Sources:** [Maka Angola — Part I](https://www.makaangola.org/2026/10/cotton-candy-at-angolas-tax-authority-part-i/?ref=zitamar.com) · [Maka Angola — Part II](https://www.makaangola.org/2026/10/cotton-candy-at-angolas-tax-authority-part-ii/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The most troubling questions concern the systems meant to protect public money. If goods were overbilled, not delivered or paid for without adequate checks, the issue extends beyond individual procurement decisions to the effectiveness of financial oversight. Maka Angola's reporting also describes an AGT board member seeking an itemised accounting of materials already purchased, suggesting that questions were raised internally. The appointment of officials named in the investigation to more senior positions makes a clear institutional response especially important. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether AGT, the Finance Ministry, Banco Caixa Angola or prosecutorial authorities address the specific invoices and transfer records, and whether any independent investigation establishes what goods and services were actually delivered. --- ## Angola's inflation falls to 8.43% — but the cost of living keeps rising Angola's annual inflation rate fell to **8.43% in September**, down from 8.79% in August, according to figures from the National Statistics Institute (INE). The latest reading is the lowest in more than a decade. A year earlier, annual inflation stood at 18.16%, meaning the pace of price increases has slowed substantially. But lower inflation does not mean lower prices. Food and non-alcoholic beverages were **9.54% more expensive** than a year earlier, while education costs rose **18.53%**. Health, housing and utilities also recorded significant annual increases. The distinction matters for households whose purchasing power has been eroded by years of high inflation. Prices are still increasing, just more slowly than before. **Sources:** [Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/inflacao-homologa-volta-cair-e-fixa-se-em-843-em-setembro-75251.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-10-09/47913703/infla%C3%A7%C3%A3o-continua-a-descer-em-angola-fixando-se-em-8-43-em-setembro-ine?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The disinflation is an important improvement in Angola's economic outlook, particularly for businesses trying to plan costs and investment. But it also exposes the gap between macroeconomic indicators and household experience. The more politically and economically consequential question is whether wages, employment and access to essential services can improve quickly enough for people to feel the benefits. Falling inflation creates better conditions for recovery; it does not, by itself, restore lost purchasing power. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Whether inflation continues to ease through the final quarter of 2026, and whether slower price growth translates into changes in monetary policy, wage negotiations or household spending. --- ## Lourenço backs Josefa Sacko's campaign to lead the FAO President João Lourenço has arrived in Rome for the World Food Forum, where Angola is formally launching **Josefa Sacko's candidacy for director-general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)**. The campaign launch is scheduled for today, 12 October, at FAO headquarters, during an official reception organised by Angola. Foreign Minister Téte António is expected to present the candidacy, which Angola says has the endorsement of both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union. Sacko, Angola's ambassador to Italy, previously served as the African Union's commissioner responsible for agriculture, rural development, the blue economy and the environment. Her campaign priorities include strengthening family farming, improving food security, supporting women and young people, modernising agricultural production and mobilising climate-resilient investment. The election for the next FAO director-general is expected in July 2027\. Lourenço's visit also provides opportunities for bilateral diplomatic meetings alongside the food forum. **Sources:** [Jornal de Angola](https://jornaldeangola.ao/noticias/1/pol%C3%ADtica/687249/candidatura-de-josefa-sacko-%C3%A0-directora-da-fao-lan%C3%A7ada-segunda-feira-na-it%C3%A1lia-?ref=zitamar.com) · [Angolan government information service](https://ciam.gov.ao/public/ao/noticia/5547?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Sacko's candidacy gives Angola an opportunity to translate its African diplomatic relationships into influence within a major multilateral institution. It also brings agriculture and food security into focus at a time when Angola is seeking to diversify its own economy beyond oil. A successful campaign would be a diplomatic achievement, but the domestic test remains whether Angola can improve agricultural productivity, rural infrastructure and the links between producers and markets — themes explored in last week's [**Angola Briefing: Angola Beyond Luanda*](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/). #### Which governments publicly endorse Sacko following the Rome launch, whether other candidacies emerge, and how Angola builds support ahead of the July 2027 election. --- ## More than 20,000 teachers move towards promotion after strike settlement Angola's Ministry of Education has announced that registration and document screening for the promotion of **more than 20,000 teachers** will take place between **19 October and 6 November**. The process implements a commitment made to the National Teachers' Union, SINPROF, under the agreement that brought September's teachers' strike to an end. Provincial education offices have been instructed to establish technical committees to check applicants' documentation. Each committee is to include a SINPROF representative, giving the union a role in monitoring implementation. The initial phase covers teachers and administrative staff recruited in 2017 and 2018\. Those recruited in 2019 and 2020 are expected to have their categories updated in the first quarter of 2027\. Applicants must have spent at least five uninterrupted years in their current category and received a positive performance assessment over that period. The announcement begins an administrative process; it does not mean all the promotions have already been approved or implemented. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/med-marca-para-19-de-outubro-inicio-do-processo-de-inscricao-e-triagem-para-promocao-de-categorias-de-mais-de-20-mil-professores-75267.html?ref=zitamar.com) ### The battle for Nacala URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-battle-for-nacala/ Last updated: 2026-10-09T15:43:26.000Z Good afternoon. The government expects to select a private operator for the Port of Nacala by March next year. The international tender is presented as a way to attract investment, improve efficiency and increase cargo traffic. But the central problem at Nacala is not simply who operates the cranes. It is who controls the commercial and political system surrounding the port. Nacala should be one of Mozambique’s greatest economic advantages. Its deep natural harbour serves northern Mozambique and provides access to the sea for neighbouring countries. A strong international operator could bring equipment, customers and better management, while state-owned CFM retains a strategic stake. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/66061fad-7441-4cff-b427-ded1045d36b0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Yet the port’s development has been constrained by more than infrastructure. Allegations arising from the long-running pigeon-pea dispute involving ETG and Royal Group describe customs decisions, prosecutorial interventions and court orders that allowed agricultural commodities worth approximately $150m to be transferred and exported. The dispute is now before an arbitration tribunal in Mauritius, where ETG is pursuing Mozambique over alleged denial of justice. Those allegations have not yet been finally determined. But they describe a system in which commercial advantage could depend upon decisions made across customs, the prosecution service and the courts. Replacing the port operator would not by itself change any of those institutions. The Terminal Especial de Exportação de Nacala, or TEEN, adds another layer. Its operator describes it as a public-private partnership with Customs providing a single location for packing, inspection and clearance. Traders have instead complained that it functions as a compulsory toll gate outside the port, adding charges to containers without improving their passage through Nacala. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Parties in the dock URL: https://www.zitamar.com/parties-in-the-dock/ Last updated: 2026-10-09T14:33:56.000Z Good afternoon and welcome to yesterday’s daily. Mozambique’s political parties demand accountability from their opponents, but struggle to accept it from their own members. The court action against the leadership of Podemos exposes that contradiction, as members take their disputes outside the party when internal rules cannot constrain those in charge. The Maputo City Judicial Court has intervened following an application by Hélder Mendonça, a former secretary-general, challenging the continued tenure of the party's central bodies on the ground that their mandates have expired. Reporting on the interim order says those bodies have been barred from acting, which puts Albino Forquilha's leadership in question, though an interim measure should not be mistaken for a final settlement of the dispute. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/67d7fdd9-ccf1-468e-aceb-0f5304d122d7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Podemos already faced a separate financial dispute. In September the same court ordered its accounts frozen, and opened a qualified-disobedience case against the leadership, after it failed to honour a 2024 memorandum with the Associação Solidariedade Cívica de Moçambique on the sharing of electoral funds. The cases concern different obligations, but together they describe a party whose leadership, finances and agreements have all become matters for a judge. Renamo tells a similar story. António Muchanga went to court over his suspension, arguing that the disciplinary process broke the party's own statutes, after he had criticised Ossufo Momade's leadership; a Maputo court found the party had denied him a hearing. Whatever the merits of each case, the lesson is the same. It is hard to hold leaders to account through institutions those leaders control. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola Today: UNITA's youth wealth fund, press freedom under pressure, and a $570m dam URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-unitas-youth-wealth-fund-press-freedom-under-pressure-and-a-570m-dam/ Last updated: 2026-10-09T08:52:59.000Z ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **POLITICS** — UNITA proposes sovereign accounts for young Angolans, funded by natural-resource revenues. - **PRESS FREEDOM** — CPJ documents the use of criminal defamation proceedings against journalists. - **INFRASTRUCTURE** — Angola authorises $569.9m in financing for the Jamba la Oma hydropower project. - **PUBLIC FINANCES** — Just 7% of the budget allocated to a major anti-poverty programme was executed in 2025. - **AVIATION** — TAAG prepares for a maintenance technicians' strike beginning on Sunday. --- ****DON'T MISS: Angola beyond Luanda** In yesterday's [****Angola Briefing**](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/), economist Francisco Paulo and Friends of Angola founder Florindo Chivucute join Fernando Lima to discuss the divide between Luanda and the provinces, the case for decentralisation, local procurement and whether projects such as the Lobito Corridor can create lasting economic growth outside the capital. [Read it here ](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/) [Angola beyond Luanda: can the provinces keep more of the wealth they create?Economic activity, political power and public spending remain heavily concentrated in the capital. Francisco Paulo and Florindo Chivucute joined Fernando Lima to discuss what genuine decentralisation would require — and whether the Lobito Corridor could help create new centres of economic growth.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-85156277-69b2-438c-91c5-080a4b1c6073.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1647199309996-4c032c052830-119b9fd1-b873-4dde-8133-39e921ad7aca.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/) --- ## UNITA proposes sovereign youth accounts funded by Angola's resource wealth UNITA leader Adalberto Costa Júnior has proposed creating a *Conta Jovem Soberana* — a sovereign youth account that would give Angolans aged 18 to 35 access to funding for education, housing, healthcare and entrepreneurship, financed by a share of revenues from oil, gas and strategic minerals. Costa Júnior suggested that, for example, 10% of those revenues could be allocated annually to a dedicated fund and divided among eligible young people. The money would not be available for unrestricted spending. Instead, beneficiaries could use digital accounts to pay university or vocational training fees, buy equipment for small businesses, establish agricultural cooperatives or contribute towards buying a home. The proposal also envisages interest-free microcredit for approved business plans, with a two-year grace period. The fund would guarantee loans, allowing repayments to be recycled into financing for other young entrepreneurs. Costa Júnior said the fund should be independently managed, with representation from civil society, universities, trade unions and young people themselves. The proposal was outlined publicly on 8 October; it is not an enacted policy, and a detailed financial model has yet to be presented. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/presidente-da-unita-quer-lei-que-crie-uma-conta-jovem-soberana-no-pais-75219.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [Correio da Kianda](https://correiokianda.info/unita-propoe-fundo-soberano-para-financiar-educacao-e-habitacao-dos-jovens/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 UNITA's proposal speaks directly to a question raised in [yesterday's Angola Briefing, ](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/)[**Angola Beyond Luanda*](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/): who actually benefits from Angola's natural-resource wealth? Economist Francisco Paulo noted that Luanda accounts for around 30% of national GDP but approximately 94% of non-oil tax revenue collection, reflecting the concentration of company headquarters and economic administration in the capital. Fellow panellist Florindo Chivucute argued that this centralisation has failed to spread prosperity across the country. Against that backdrop, a sovereign youth account offers an alternative approach to distributing resource revenues. But its effectiveness would depend not just on how much money was allocated, but on whether young people outside Luanda could genuinely access and use it. The proposal also raises questions about fiscal affordability and its relationship to Angola's existing sovereign wealth fund. #### WHAT TO WATCH Whether UNITA turns the proposal into draft legislation, publishes a costing and clarifies how the fund would operate alongside the existing Fundo Soberano de Angola. The response from the MPLA — and from young voters — will also be worth following. --- Would your colleagues or friends find Angola Today useful? Please feel free to forward them this edition! --- ## CPJ documents more than 200 defamation investigations involving Angolan journalists The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) says Angola is among Africa's worst offenders in using criminal defamation proceedings against journalists, following an investigation into cases dating back to 2015. CPJ interviewed 38 Angolan journalists who had collectively faced more than 200 criminal defamation investigations. According to the organisation, one of those journalists has served a prison sentence during the past decade, six have been acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and 31 still have proceedings pending. Some investigations have continued for years. The investigation also describes the case of Daniel Frederico, editor of the Reporter Angola website, who fled Angola in 2025\. CPJ reports that he was sentenced in his absence to 14 months in prison on 2 October over a 2022 article written and published by another outlet. Frederico disputes the basis of the prosecution. Under Angolan law, criminal defamation can carry prison sentences of up to 18 months. Journalists interviewed by CPJ said the threat of investigation and prosecution discouraged scrutiny of powerful individuals and imposed substantial legal and financial costs. Angolan authorities rejected the suggestion that the proceedings were inherently improper. The Interior Ministry told CPJ that individuals who believe they have been wronged are entitled to pursue legal remedies, while the Prosecutor General's Office said prosecutors must investigate potential offences under existing legislation. **Sources:** [Committee to Protect Journalists](https://cpj.org/2026/10/criminal-defamation-threat-hangs-over-dozens-of-angolan-journalists-ahead-of-2027-vote/?ref=zitamar.com) · [Notícias ao Minuto](https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/mundo/3063808/cpj-acusa-angola-de-usar-a-justica-para-intimidar-jornalistas?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The timing matters. With the 2027 elections approaching, the legal environment for journalists affects the public's ability to scrutinise candidates, government decisions and allegations of wrongdoing. The distinction between protecting reputations and deterring legitimate reporting is especially important when criminal proceedings can remain unresolved for years. Our [Angola Briefing on the security apparatus](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-security-apparatus/) examined the wider relationship between state institutions, political power and the electoral environment. CPJ's findings add a concrete dimension to that discussion: the potential chilling effect of criminal law on public-interest journalism, even where cases do not result in convictions. #### WHAT TO WATCH Whether the government or National Assembly considers changes to criminal defamation legislation, and whether any of the longstanding cases identified by CPJ move towards resolution. The treatment of independent media as the election campaign approaches will be an important indicator. --- [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) --- ## Angola authorises $569.9m loan for Jamba la Oma hydropower project President João Lourenço has authorised financing of **$569.9 million** for construction of the Jamba la Oma hydropower development in Huíla province, with borrowing arranged through Standard Bank South Africa and Standard Bank Angola. The presidential authorisation provides for a simplified direct procurement procedure for the project, which is located in the Cunene river basin. The government argues that the development is needed to support irrigation, livestock production and electricity supply, while improving water-flow management and the resilience of the national power system. The Minister of Energy and Water has been delegated responsibility for approving procurement documents and overseeing the legality of the contracting process, including signing the construction contract. The project is also to be incorporated into the state budget and public investment programme. The announcement is a significant financing and procurement decision, rather than evidence that construction is already under way or that the project's expected benefits have been secured. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/governo-vai-avancar-com-aproveitamento-hidroelectrico-da-jamba-la-oma-na-huila-com-recurso-a-emprestimo-de-5699-milhoes-usd-75216.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [Economia & Mercado](https://www.economiaemercado.com/artigo/angola-recorre-a-financiamento-do-standard-bank-para-construir-barragem-da-jamba-la-oma-por-569-9-milhoes-usd?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The financing decision raises a question that featured prominently in [yesterday's Angola Briefing](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/): how can major infrastructure investment generate lasting development outside Luanda? Discussing the Lobito Corridor, Florindo Chivucute argued that projects should create opportunities for surrounding communities, rather than function primarily as channels for extracting and exporting resources. Economist Francisco Paulo stressed that inadequate infrastructure remains a barrier to provincial investment, even where tax incentives exist. The Jamba la Oma project could address some of those constraints in Huíla, particularly for agriculture and electricity supply. Its economic value, however, will depend on delivery, local access and whether the benefits extend beyond the construction contract. #### WHAT TO WATCH The announcement of the construction contractor, the loan's interest rate and repayment terms, the implementation timetable, and any updated estimates of generation capacity and irrigation benefits. Those details will determine how the project should be assessed economically. --- ## Angola executes just 7% of its anti-poverty programme budget Angola's Local Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (PIDLCP) executed only **Kz16.3 billion** of the **Kz231.8 billion** allocated to it in 2025, according to calculations by *Economia & Mercado* based on the government's General State Account. That represents an execution rate of approximately 7%, leaving **Kz215.6 billion** of the programme's budget unexecuted. The contrast with the previous year is striking. In 2024, the programme executed Kz102.9 billion out of a budget of Kz140.8 billion, equivalent to 73%. Despite a substantially larger allocation in 2025, reported execution fell by around 84% in nominal terms. The figures concern budget execution, not necessarily cash physically held in an account. They nevertheless point to a large gap between the resources authorised for a programme intended to support local development and poverty reduction and the spending recorded against that programme. **Source:** [Economia & Mercado — analysis of the General State Account](https://www.economiaemercado.com/artigo/governo-deixa-por-executar-215-6-mil-milhoes-kz-destinados-ao-combate-a-pobreza?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The figures underline a problem raised in [yesterday's Angola Briefing](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/): the distance between government policy and delivery. Florindo Chivucute argued that Angola has no shortage of development plans, but that implementation frequently fails to improve people's lives. Economist Francisco Paulo identified the concentration of administrative and procurement decisions in Luanda as part of the problem, advocating greater authority for municipalities to commission services and support local businesses. The 7% execution rate does not, by itself, establish why the programme underperformed. But it makes the question of administrative capacity and decentralisation impossible to ignore — particularly when the programme is intended to reduce poverty at local level. #### WHAT TO WATCH An explanation from the government for the sharp decline in execution, including whether procurement delays, administrative changes or funding constraints were responsible. It will also be important to establish which planned projects and beneficiaries were affected, and whether the programme's 2026 performance has improved. --- ## TAAG prepares for maintenance strike beginning Sunday Angola's national airline TAAG has activated an operational continuity plan ahead of a planned strike by aircraft maintenance technicians, with the first stoppage scheduled for **11–15 October**. The Aircraft Maintenance Technicians' Union (STMA) has announced four periods of industrial action: 11–15 October, 6–10 November, 5–10 December and 19–23 December. The union and airline remain divided over pay. TAAG says it has offered a 20% salary increase, while the union is seeking cumulative increases of 100% by December 2027\. According to the airline, negotiations cover 146 maintenance technicians working in production-related roles, representing around 5% of its workforce. The company says its continuity plan is intended to preserve as much of its flight schedule as possible. It has promised to notify affected passengers of changes and insists that no flight will operate without meeting applicable technical and safety requirements. There is no basis at present to conclude that the continuity arrangements breach aviation safety rules. The immediate question is whether the airline can maintain its schedule while the dispute continues. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/tecnicos-de-manutencao-avancam-para-a-greve-a-11-deste-mes-e-taag-activa-plano-de-continuidade-operacional-75215.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-10-08/47904410/angolana-taag-aciona-plano-de-continuidade-perante-novo-pr%C3%A9-aviso-de-greve?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 TAAG is an important part of Angola's international connectivity and its ambition to develop Luanda as a regional aviation hub. That makes a maintenance dispute more than an internal labour issue: prolonged disruption could affect business travel, tourism and confidence in the airline's operational reliability. The dispute also echoes the debate over wages at the Lobito refinery in [yesterday's Angola Briefing](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/), where Francisco Paulo argued that remuneration should reflect the demands and productivity of specialised work, while Florindo Chivucute emphasised the pressure of living costs on Angolan workers. The substantial gap between TAAG's offer and the union's demands suggests that negotiations may prove difficult. #### WHAT TO WATCH Whether negotiations produce a last-minute agreement before 11 October, and whether TAAG announces cancellations, delays or changes to its schedule. The response of the civil aviation regulator to the continuity arrangements will also merit attention. ### Angola Today: Carneiro's MPLA challenge, stronger growth, and a $3bn asset hunt URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-today-carneiros-mpla-challenge-stronger-growth-and-a-3bn-asset-hunt/ Last updated: 2026-10-08T08:31:01.000Z Welcome to a pilot edition of Angola Today, bringing summaries and analysis from the Angola Briefing team on the biggest headlines coming out of Angola today. The weekly Angola Briefing webinar will take place this afternoon, asking the question of whether economic development reaches beyond the capital, Luanda, or whether the provinces are fated to be left behind. Watch live from 3pm, or catch up with the recording, here: [Angola beyond LuandaCan Benguela, Huambo, Lubango and other cities develop genuinely independent economic ecosystems?![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-7a8ae1bb-b992-48b8-9676-8d7979aa675a.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1647199309996-4c032c052830-b347d7e7-a1a3-4d69-b302-a7937100c7f3.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/) ### TODAY'S BRIEFING - **MPLA** — Party leaves leadership contest open as Higino Carneiro challenges his exclusion - **ECONOMY** — World Bank raises Angola's growth forecast to 4.5% - **ANTI-CORRUPTION** — Prosecutors pursue $3bn abroad as authorities report 3,200 inspections - **PRIVATISATION** — State auctions its 59% stake in Aldeia Nova - **COURTS** — Chikoti case expands to include further government witnesses - **DIGITAL ECONOMY** — Government gets 90 days to legislate on electronic signatures --- ## MPLA leaves leadership contest open as Carneiro challenges exclusion The MPLA says it is too early to determine whether its December congress will feature more than one candidate for the party presidency, despite the rejection of former general **Higino Carneiro's attempt to challenge João Lourenço**. Party spokesman Esteves Hilário said the position should become clearer by the end of October. Provincial conferences to renew party structures are due to conclude on **10 October**, ahead of the **9–10 December congress**, which will bring together around 3,000 delegates. Candidates for the MPLA presidency must obtain at least **5,000 supporting signatures** from party members across the country. Carneiro's application was invalidated after the party alleged serious irregularities in his supporting documentation. He disputes his exclusion and has continued pursuing internal and legal remedies. The Constitutional Court declined to suspend the party's decision in September. **Sources:** [Novo Jornal — MPLA leadership contest](https://novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/duplas-candidaturas-a-presidencia-do-mpla-para-9-congresso-ainda-em-aberto-diz-porta-voz-do-mpla-75191.html?ref=zitamar.com) · [DW — Carneiro's challenge](https://amp.dw.com/pt-002/higino-carneiro-admite-pedir-impugna%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-elei%C3%A7%C3%B5es-no-mpla/a-79378767?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The real question is not whether the MPLA's rules permit multiple candidates, but whether its internal structures will allow a genuine contest. In our [24 July Angola Briefing](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/mpla-succession-rising-debt-lobito/), political analysts Cláudio Silva and Inês Silva were already sceptical that Carneiro would be allowed to challenge Lourenço. The dispute has since become a test of those predictions. More recently, Paula Cristina Roque argued in our [discussion of Angola's security apparatus](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-security-apparatus/) that succession is taking place within a ruling party marked by internal divisions. With Lourenço constitutionally barred from a third presidential term, control of the MPLA leadership will also shape the selection of its candidate for the 2027 election. #### WHAT TO WATCH The completion of provincial conferences on ****10 October**, further decisions on Carneiro's appeals, and the party's announcement on whether multiple candidacies will be accepted. A formally open process would not necessarily mean a competitive one. --- ## World Bank upgrades Angola's growth forecast to 4.5% The World Bank has raised its forecast for Angola's economic growth in 2026 to **4.5%**, up from the **3.1%** recorded in 2025, citing stronger economic activity and favourable conditions for the oil sector. The economy expanded by **8.74% year on year in the second quarter**, with activity outside the oil sector contributing to the improvement. The Bank expects growth to moderate to **3.3% in 2027** and **3.1% in 2028**. Inflation is forecast to fall from **20.2% in 2025 to 10.3% this year**, helped by stronger external revenues and easing price pressures. **Sources:** [World Bank — Angola overview](https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/angola?ref=zitamar.com) · [Lusa — revised growth forecast](https://www.aman-alliance.org/Home/ContentDetail/107434?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The upgrade is encouraging, but the distinction between economic growth and broadly shared prosperity remains important. In our September [Briefing on Angola's business climate](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-business-climate-confidence/), economist Francisco Paulo noted that the country's impressive second-quarter growth raised a more difficult question: was it creating employment and improving living standards? The World Bank's own assessment points to persistent informality and unemployment. Meanwhile, our earlier [discussion of election-year spending](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-election-year-spending-dilemma/) highlighted the competing pressures of public debt, fuel subsidies and political demands ahead of 2027\. Better growth gives the government more room to manoeuvre, but does not eliminate those trade-offs. #### WHAT TO WATCH Whether stronger growth translates into private-sector hiring, investment and household purchasing power — and whether the government uses improved revenues to reduce fiscal vulnerabilities or expand spending before the election. --- ## Angola pursues $3bn abroad as anti-corruption inspections top 3,200 Angola's Attorney General's Office says assets and funds worth up to **$3bn** are under discussion in foreign jurisdictions as part of efforts to recover property allegedly linked to economic and financial crimes. Deputy attorney general Africano dos Santos Gamboa said authorities were expanding cooperation with foreign counterparts, including in **Cyprus and Luxembourg**, alongside proceedings involving countries such as Portugal and Switzerland. The figure represents assets being pursued, not money already returned to Angola. Separately, authorities say they conducted more than **3,200 inspections** of public administration bodies between June 2024 and June 2026, alongside approximately **111 audits**, under the National Strategy for the Prevention and Repression of Corruption (ENAPREC). Officials report that implementation of the strategy's planned measures has exceeded **90%**. **Sources:** [O País — asset recovery](https://opais.ao/sem-categoria/pgr-garante-que-estado-quer-recuperar-todos-activos-que-resultam-de-crimes/?ref=zitamar.com) · [O País — anti-corruption inspections](https://opais.ao/politica/igae-realiza-mais-de-tres-mil-accoes-inspectivas-aos-orgaos-da-administracao-publica-em-dois-anos/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Together, the announcements illustrate the scale of Angola's anti-corruption efforts — but also the difficulty of measuring their effectiveness. Assets identified or frozen abroad are not necessarily recovered, just as inspections and audits do not automatically translate into sanctions or institutional reform. Our recent [Who owns Angola? Briefing](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/who-owns-angola/) explored whether the government's reforms are changing the underlying concentration of economic power or simply redistributing assets. The stronger test of the anti-corruption campaign will be how much money is actually recovered, what happens to it afterwards, and whether enforcement becomes more transparent and consistent. #### ****WHAT TO WATCH** Confirmed asset repatriations, published inspection findings, prosecutions and disciplinary measures — and greater transparency over how recovered funds are used. --- ## State puts its 59% stake in Aldeia Nova up for auction The Angolan state is offering its **59% shareholding in Aldeia Nova** through an electronic auction, with a reference value of approximately **Kz11.3bn**. The agribusiness project combines agricultural production, livestock and food processing, and works with **15 villages**, including families of former military personnel. Its activities include the production of poultry, dairy products and crops. The sale forms part of the government's continuing programme to transfer state-owned assets into private hands. **Source:** [Correio da Kianda — Aldeia Nova privatisation](https://correiokianda.info/privatizacao-da-aldeia-nova-estado-aliena-59-das-accoes-por-via-de-leilao-electronico/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 Aldeia Nova is an interesting test of privatisation because it is more than a commercial asset: it also has a social and rural-development role. In [Who owns Angola?](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/who-owns-angola/), our panellists questioned whether the privatisation programme was creating genuinely broader ownership or concentrating assets among a relatively small group of buyers. The relevant questions here are who acquires the stake, whether the sale attracts competitive bidding, and how the new ownership structure will protect the project's productive capacity and relationships with surrounding communities. The auction price alone will not establish whether the transaction represents good value for the state. #### WHAT TO WATCH The identity of the winning bidder, the final sale price, any investment commitments and the treatment of workers and participating farming communities. --- ## Chikoti case expands as Supreme Court calls more witnesses Angola's Supreme Court has heard former foreign minister **Georges Chikoti** and businessman **Bartolomeu Dias** in pretrial proceedings concerning an alleged **€15m** property transaction linked to Angola's diplomatic premises in Portugal. The court also heard existing witnesses, including former ambassador Marcos Barrica and former consul-general Cecília Baptista, and decided to summon additional officials from the finance and foreign affairs ministries. Prosecutors accuse Chikoti of embezzlement and Dias of fraud. These remain allegations, and the current proceedings are intended to determine whether the case should proceed to trial. **Source:** [Novo Jornal — Supreme Court proceedings](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/supremo-ouviu-georges-chikoti-e-bartolomeu-dias-em-instrucao-contraditoria-e-arrolou-novas-testemunhas-75198.html?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 The decision to call additional government witnesses suggests that the court wants a fuller account of how the transaction was authorised, paid for and handled across different state institutions. Beyond the outcome for the defendants, the case raises questions about financial controls over major government purchases and the division of responsibility between ministries and diplomatic missions. It also provides a concrete test of whether Angola's anti-corruption efforts can establish accountability through a complete judicial process, rather than through allegations or announcements alone. #### WHAT TO WATCH The testimony of the newly summoned officials and the judge's decision on whether the case proceeds to trial. --- ## Angola moves towards a legal framework for electronic signatures Angola's National Assembly has authorised the executive to establish a legal framework for **electronic signatures, electronic documents and digital certification**, giving it **90 days** to legislate. Legislative Authorisation Law **12/26**, published on **2 October**, covers the legal validity and evidential status of electronic documents, digital identity verification and the country's public-key infrastructure, known as **ICP-AO**. The planned framework may also establish rules for recognising digital certificates issued abroad, potentially improving the legal basis for cross-border electronic transactions. **Source:** [O País — digital certification legislation](https://opais.ao/politica/assembleia-nacional-da-90-dias-ao-executivo-para-regulamentar-certificacao-digital-e-documentos-electronicos/?ref=zitamar.com) 💡 For businesses, this is potentially more consequential than it first appears. Reliable electronic signatures and certificates could reduce paperwork, simplify contracting and make some transactions with government and commercial partners easier. But legal recognition is only one part of the challenge: companies also need functioning digital infrastructure, interoperable systems and institutions willing to adopt them. Our [briefing on Investing in Angola](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/investing-in-angola-opportunity-reform-and-the-reality-on-the-ground/) examined the gap between formal reforms and the practical experience of operating in the country. The measure's commercial significance will depend on whether implementation closes that gap. #### WHAT TO WATCH The detailed regulations, the treatment of foreign digital certificates and the speed at which public agencies and businesses begin accepting electronic documents in practice. ### Angola beyond Luanda: can the provinces keep more of the wealth they create? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angola-beyond-luanda/ Last updated: 2026-10-09T15:07:20.000Z --- Angola has been at peace for more than two decades, universities have expanded across the country and billions of dollars are being committed to infrastructure outside the capital. Yet Luanda remains the country's overwhelming political and economic centre, continuing to draw people, businesses and investment from across Angola. That imbalance was the focus of this week's Angola Briefing, hosted by Zitamar editor-at-large Fernando Lima with economist **Francisco Paulo** and **Florindo Chivucute**, founder of Friends of Angola. For Paulo, the concentration is visible in the numbers. He cited National Statistics Institute data showing Luanda accounting for roughly **30% of national GDP**, compared with around 17% for oil-producing Zaire and 7% for Benguela. But the disparity becomes more striking when tax receipts are considered: Paulo said **94% of Angola's non-oil tax revenue is recorded in Luanda**. Part of the explanation is corporate structure rather than where economic activity physically takes place. Oil companies may operate in Zaire or Cabinda, mining companies elsewhere, but their headquarters and tax registration are generally in Luanda. The result is a reinforcing cycle. Companies establish themselves in the capital because ministries, banks and decision-makers are there. Public institutions remain concentrated there because the country's economic activity is organised around Luanda. Skilled workers then have another reason to migrate to the city. "All the ministries are in Luanda," Paulo said, questioning why institutions overseeing sectors concentrated elsewhere could not themselves move closer to those industries. Angola's expansion of public universities provides one example of how decentralisation can change behaviour: students who once had to move to Luanda for higher education can increasingly study in their home provinces. ### Investment is not enough The government has long tried to encourage investment outside the main economic centres through tax incentives. Paulo argued that these measures have limited effect when companies face more fundamental problems. Businesses do not choose a province simply because the tax treatment is attractive if electricity, transport, skilled labour or other essential infrastructure is missing. Public procurement could be just as important. Paulo argued that hospitals, schools and municipal administrations should be able to buy more services from companies based in their own areas instead of relying on contractors headquartered in Luanda. If a hospital in Benguela needs cleaning, catering or another service, he argued, procurement should provide opportunities for Benguela businesses. Repeated across the country, relatively ordinary government contracts could help provincial SMEs accumulate revenue, employ local workers and build capacity. Chivucute made a similar argument from a political perspective. Angola may have policies intended to promote development elsewhere, he said, but the benefits are often weakened by poor implementation and by the concentration of major contracts among a relatively small number of larger companies. For both panelists, decentralising spending without decentralising decision-making would therefore achieve only so much. ### Could Lobito create another centre of gravity? The Lobito Corridor offers perhaps the most ambitious current test of whether major investment can generate economic activity beyond Luanda. Angola says the broader corridor programme now contains **144 potential projects associated with more than $12 billion of investment**. During the discussion, however, both panelists stressed that the important question is not the headline value but what emerges around the railway. Paulo noted that the corridor is competing with other routes serving mineral-rich Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its success will ultimately depend on whether freight actually moves through Lobito efficiently and competitively. Chivucute argued that its value to Angola will depend on going considerably further than carrying copper and other minerals from neighbouring countries to the Atlantic. He pointed to plans for agricultural storage facilities in places such as Caála, Huambo, as an example of the infrastructure that could connect Angolan producers to the railway. Local processing and manufacturing would deepen the impact further. "If it carries only minerals, then people along the line won't benefit," Chivucute argued. The distinction is important. A successful railway can generate transit revenue without creating broad prosperity along its route. A genuine economic corridor would instead create demand for farmers, warehouses, manufacturers, logistics companies and workers in Benguela, Huambo and Moxico. Chivucute said he was optimistic about the corridor, but warned against reproducing an economic model based largely on extraction. Investment, he argued, needs to include skills transfer, local processing and stronger links to the communities through which the corridor passes. ### The wage question The dispute at the Lobito Refinery brought the question of local benefits into sharper focus. Workers involved in construction of the multi-billion-dollar project have gone on strike over pay. The discussion centred on reports of employees earning around **Kz100,000 a month**, with workers seeking a much larger increase. Paulo argued that applying something close to a national minimum wage to specialised workers building a refinery misunderstands the economics of the project. Pay, he said, should reflect the productivity and profitability of the sector rather than treating all employment as interchangeable. He also raised the gap between Angolan and expatriate remuneration on major projects, arguing that persistently low local wages reduce the ability of investment to generate wider economic demand. Chivucute went further, linking wages to Angola's weak domestic purchasing power. Large infrastructure projects can add to GDP, he argued, without producing the kind of household income growth that creates a stronger consumer economy. That same question applies to the Lobito Corridor: the number of dollars invested is less important for households than the quantity and quality of jobs and businesses ultimately created. ### Decentralising power The conversation ultimately returned to politics. Chivucute argued that the dominance of Luanda cannot be separated from Angola's highly centralised political system. Local administrations remain dependent on decisions and resources from above, while long-discussed elected local authorities — **autarquias** — have still not been introduced. Paulo reached a similar conclusion from an economic direction. Municipalities, he said, need the administrative and financial authority to decide which schools or other infrastructure they require and which local companies should supply public services. Officials in Luanda cannot be expected to understand every local priority. The objective, then, is not simply to redirect more central government money towards the provinces. It is to build local institutions capable of deciding how some of that money is spent, while giving provincial businesses a realistic chance to benefit from the resulting economic activity. Angola already has major investment under way outside the capital. The harder task is ensuring that the next railway, refinery, hospital or agricultural project leaves behind businesses, skills, incomes and institutions that remain rooted there. That will be the real test of whether Angola can develop beyond Luanda. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) ### Credit for some, arrears for others URL: https://www.zitamar.com/credit-for-some-arrears-for-others/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T18:40:19.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s government says it will allocate MZN6bn ($94m) a year to repay small businesses supplying the state. It also plans to put approximately MZN6.4bn ($100m) a year into its new Development Bank. The similarity between those figures exposes a strange ordering of priorities. The Development Bank is intended to provide companies with affordable, long-term finance. Yet the state is already depriving businesses of working capital by failing to pay for goods and services it has received. Suppliers waiting for overdue invoices must borrow, postpone investment, dismiss employees or close. Some are effectively financing the government without choosing to do so. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2bf83d70-927d-40de-8e02-516cd67fbc42/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Finance Minister Carla Loveira has put the state’s accumulated obligations to suppliers at MZN81.3bn ($1.27bn). The precise composition of that figure needs clarification: the MZN38.9bn in recorded arrears and approximately MZN33bn in potential liabilities identified in reporting add up to slightly less, at MZN71.9bn. Whichever total is correct, annual payments of MZN6bn would address only a small part of it. Companies have complained about unpaid invoices for years, while the “pay to get paid” corruption investigation has exposed allegations that officials demanded bribes to move legitimate payments through the system. When the state cannot pay everyone, administrative discretion determines who is paid first—and that discretion acquires a market value. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A $500m claim on the budget URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-500m-claim-on-the-budget/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T09:39:10.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique needs more affordable, long-term credit. Commercial interest rates put investment beyond the reach of many businesses, banks prefer lending to the government and agriculture receives little of the finance required to become more productive. A development bank could help address that failure. The government’s proposed method of financing it nevertheless demands scrutiny. The state intends to allocate $100m - approximately MZN6.4bn - to the Development Bank of Mozambique every year for five years. Those contributions would provide the bank’s entire stated capital of MZN32bn, or about $500m. That is a substantial new claim on a budget already struggling to pay suppliers, service public debt and maintain essential services. Revenue reached only 95% of the government’s target during the first half of this year. Public-sector salaries and debt payments are expected to consume almost all tax revenue in 2027\. Every metical transferred to the bank must therefore come from additional revenue, reduced spending elsewhere or more borrowing. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/a-500m-claim-on-the-budget-2/)*.* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (October Update)Over August and September, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has increasingly targeted civilians in Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Macomia districts![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-a357bce1-65d2-4023-9ddd-b5beb952e138.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/MCM-Dashboard-b92bc1e5-e8d0-4fac-8160-48f0dedb7627.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-october-update/) --- President Daniel Chapo has said that income from the extractive sector will help finance the institution. Unless particular revenues are legally reserved for it, however, “mining-funded” and “budget-funded” describe the same money in different ways. Mining taxes and royalties enter the Treasury and already have competing uses, from public services and infrastructure to transfers for producing communities and the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Assigning them to the bank does not remove the cost; it decides which other demand will go unmet. The proposed involvement of the National Social Security Institute raises a separate concern. Technical coordinator João Macaringue has said that INSS will not be a shareholder in the bank, but that deposits from the institute will be subject to a ceiling of 25% of its investment portfolio. His explanation also appeared to describe such deposits as compulsory. The government should clarify the precise requirement, along with the interest, maturity, withdrawal conditions and guarantees attached to the money. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### A $500m claim on the budget URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-500m-claim-on-the-budget-2/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T09:38:21.000Z The Development Bank may attract additional finance, but its capital must first come from public money already under severe pressure _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (October Update) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-october-update/ Last updated: 2026-10-07T09:35:19.000Z # Overview Over August and September, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has increasingly targeted civilians in Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Macomia districts. In September, the group returned to threaten communities in Nangade. The response in Mocímboa da Praia town has been to tighten security measures, which has constrained commercial and humanitarian activity. As a result, the town is likely to become more tense. That tension may be directed toward the state, either through protests or increased collaboration with ISM. Evidence suggests that ISM’s return to Nangade is to draw on support from neighboring Tanzania, a development likely to lead to tightened security measures on both sides of the border. Meanwhile, the early October release of hostages taken by ISM in Niassa province last month in return for ransom is likely to embolden the group to target foreigners for abduction in the future. This will concern humanitarian organizations across Cabo Delgado, mining companies active around the Montepuez district, and Niassa province’s tourism sector. # Key developments **9 September |** Six miners die in a [mining pit collapse](https://sol.iol.pt/internacional/noticias/desabamento-em-mina-no-centro-de-mocambique-faz-pelo-menos-seis-mortos/20260910/6aa2c3370cf22b9f8904b642?utm%5Fcampaign=ed-sol&utm%5Fmedium=social&utm%5Fsource=facebook&utm%5Fcontent=comment&fbclid=IwY2xjawUqAoNleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMWxIdnlHWnBUeVBhaWdxOWRzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe3yOdrOn4YETMSDhy2FJ8bc-EXw6RC6RRQejqf-u7Q8cApQcp-RA8vGCunjw%5Faem%5FSr8s4RDaKYbHd%5FYLNscr8w) at the Seis Carros site in Manica province despite a moratorium on mining in the area, demonstrating the weakness of governance in the mining sector. **14 September |** AnAnamola party organizer is [found dead](https://aimnews.org/2026/09/14/one-of-mondlanes-witnesses-in-upcoming-trial-murdered-in-morrumbene/?ref=zitamar.com) after being kidnapped in Inhambane province. The victim was scheduled to appear as a defense witness in the trial of Anamola leader Venancio Mondlane, now postponed to 17 November. **15 September |** Residents [invade a Chinese-owned mining site](https://www.tvm.co.mz/index.php/component/k2/item/15723-tumultos-no-gile-individuos-invadem-e-vandalizam-concessao-mineira-de-cidadaos-chineses?ref=zitamar.com) in Zambezia’s Gile district, destroying equipment and assaulting a manager. **16 September |** RENAMO member and former combatant Pensado Alfinete is [shot dead](https://evidencias.co.mz/2026/09/18/renamo-exige-esclarecimentos-sobre-assassinato-de-brigadeiro-em-inhaminga-e-alerta-para-possivel-tensao/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) at his residence in Inhaminga, Cheringoma district, Sofala province. RENAMO called for an investigation into the killing and warned that a lack of clarification could increase tensions among former combatants. **18 September |** The International Monetary Fund [concludes its Mozambique mission](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/09/18/pr26295-mozambique-imf-staff-mission-to-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com) with no financing agreement in sight. Public investment will remain strained in the absence of a funding agreement with the IMF, which could unlock investment from donors and the private sector. **30 September |** TotalEnergies is [considering accelerated expansion](https://stockanalysis.com/quote/epa/TTE/transcripts/637108-strategy-outlook-2026/?ref=zitamar.com) of Mozambique LNG in the Palma district. With 10,000 workers on site, TotalEnergies’ commitment to the project ensures a continued international security presence in the province for some years to come. ## ISM releases hostages in a Montepuez standoff On 4 October, three hostages whom ISM had abducted during the [3 September raid on a hunting camp](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-september-2026?ref=zitamar.com) in Niassa were released. This was in return for a ransom of 3.2 million meticais (roughly $53,000 at the time), according to a local source. The three, [a South African, a Zimbabwean](https://www.netwerk24.com/nuus/aktueel/aanval-in-mosambiek-oproep-om-losprys-kom-uit-weermag-se-hoofkwartier-20260926-1076?ref=zitamar.com), and a Mozambican, had been held since early September in the Shamba Kubwa mining area of Nairoto in the north of Montepuez district. The release followed a standoff of over three weeks between ISM in the Shamba Kubwa area and the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) based in Ntola village, approximately 45 kilometers south. FADM did not attempt an assault on Shamba Kubwa, likely due to the presence of hostages. ISM may have also deployed IEDs on approach to Shamba Kubwa from Ntola, according to a local source. The group’s continued presence in the area suggests that they have a means of resupplying arms and ammunition. The group has likely developed a support network to facilitate this in Nairoto, having visited the area six months last year, and now three months in 2026\. A local source also reports that the group has engaged in extortion at the mining site and also seized forestry equipment. Their ability to resupply suggests that the group may consider staying in the area, rather than dispersing and returning to Macomia via the Meluco district, as past behavior suggests. This would stretch FADM’s capacity and present a continuing threat to civilians in Niassa, and tourism in particular. Their ability to extract a significant ransom will likely encourage ISM in targeting high-value kidnap victims in the future, likely foreigners associated with businesses that have an international profile. ## ISM’s increased civilian targeting supports multiple objectives In September, ISM continued a trend of increasingly targeting civilians in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Nangade districts, carrying out 19 attacks on civilians, up from 11 in August and nine in July. ISM targets civilians for three main purposes: to foment civilian displacement, generate income, and engage in retribution. First, displacement can overwhelm civic and military authorities. Over August and September, attacks in Litandacua on the N380, and at Pangane on the coast, prompted over 700 people to flee, according to the[ International Organization for Migration](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-movement-alert-report-167-16-september-2026?close=true&ref=zitamar.com). This creates opportunities for freedom of movement. September’s attacks on rural communities in Nangade are likely to have provided cover for ISM to maintain a connection to support networks in Tanzania for recruits and supplies. On 20 September, Tanzanian troops stationed in Nangade killed two suspected insurgents who had crossed from Tanzania, and arrested a third. A group of ISM fighters was later seen making its way to the Namatil area of Nangade, likely to receive the group intercepted by the Tanzanian military or others. Second, income can be generated from ransom. Eleven attacks on civilian communities involved abductions, and ransoms were reported in five incidents, ranging from 1,500 to 70,000 meticais. The third reason is retribution. ISM carried out at least three attacks in September on civilians on Macomia’s coast, an area in which ISM has established an [area of influence](https://acleddata.com/report/preaching-coercion-and-sectarianism-how-islamic-state-building-stronghold-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com), and in which attacks on civilians are rare. These act as a warning to communities suspected of collaborating with FADM and the Rwanda Defence Force, which have been conducting sporadic operations against ISM in Quiterajo, about 35 km to the north, including marine operations. In the coming weeks, there is a risk that such actions will escalate in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts. In late September, ISM fighters in Quissanga were seen moving south toward the Ancuabe district. As in districts to the north, the group will pose a significant threat to isolated rural communities and artisanal and small-scale mining sites, and less so to commercial gemstone mining projects. ## Security tightened in Mocímboa da Praia town In September, ISM carried out attacks to the south, north, and west of Mocímboa da Praia town (*see map below*), in ways that continue to restrict humanitarian and commercial access to the town and allow ISM to maintain supply networks there. These attacks come as heightened security measures in September have raised tensions in the town, according to local sources. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/10/data-src-image-78e5db02-490d-4f5c-b9ff-ef5005111717.png) With the airport closed and the N380 at risk, humanitarian access to the town is via Palma to the north. However, ISM attacks on the R762 illustrate the heightened risk faced on that route. Attacks to the west, likely carried out by a group operating from the Nkonga area of neighboring Nangade district, maintain pressure on the N380 and force rural communities back to Mocímboa da Praia town. To the south, Islamic State media claimed that ISM successfully deployed an IED against an RDF patrol on the road linking Chinda village on the N380 to an RDF base at Mbau village, 30 km southwest of Mocímboa da Praia town, on 16 September. The combination of a poor road running through heavily forested land makes the road [susceptible to such attacks](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-17-june-2026?ref=zitamar.com), hindering state forces’ movement and allowing ISM to maintain its presence in the area. Authorities in the town are concerned that ISM’s nearby presence allows suppliers operating in the town to easily reach ISM forces to supply them with cash, food, and other necessities. Authorities have responded to ISM activities in the area by restricting access from the town to surrounding areas and establishing checkpoints to prevent movement in or out of the town after 15:00, according to a source in the town. Within the town, there is a heightened security presence. FADM permanently guards the Administrator’s office, and the State Security and Intelligence Service has increased its presence, according to a local source. If the situation persists, straitened humanitarian services and commercial activity will lead to worsening conditions in the town, risking community unrest. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/10/data-src-image-83035f3c-bce5-4a08-9c92-f19ca4366b5d.png) ### Three Niassa hunting camp workers freed after ransom paid to insurgents URL: https://www.zitamar.com/three-niassa-hunting-camp-workers-freed-after-ransom-paid-to-insurgents/ Last updated: 2026-10-06T14:05:09.000Z Three employees of Mozambique Wildlife Adventures (MWA) [abducted](https://www.zitamar.com/workers-reported-killed-at-niassa-hunting-camp-are-alive-in-insurgent-hands-sources-say/) during the 3 September attack on a hunting camp in Niassa have been released following a ransom payment, while seven others seized in the raid remain unaccounted for. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Freeze first, ask later URL: https://www.zitamar.com/freeze-first-ask-later/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T17:53:16.000Z Good afternoon. The Bank of Mozambique reminded lenders this week that they can freeze an account when they have reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, money laundering or terrorist financing. They do not need to wait for a court order. The power is not new. It comes from laws passed in 2022 and 2024\. But the central bank’s decision to publicise it may encourage banks to use it more often. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9d37e500-0832-45af-9670-994b29d6b9ac/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies eyes Mozambique LNG expansion as campaigners target shipping partnersCompany considers retaining construction teams for Phase 2, while civil society groups target Japanese shipowners in latest bid to halt LNG development![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-08e1baba-5000-40bf-b418-62cdbb9eee27.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1775580279270-574c001be3a5-50db075d-995b-4bab-930b-5428b66f4357.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-eyes-mozambique-lng-expansion-as-campaigners-target-shipping-partners/) [Insurgents kill one and abduct 12 in overnight raid on Nangade villageAttack on Mualela follows a week of insurgent movements and raids across Nangade district![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-9592b201-8adb-485a-8caa-b4842faa9b71.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-10-02_123132025-5a846cdd-f46c-4432-9ccd-11c08b9458cd.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-one-and-abduct-12-in-overnight-raid-on-nangade-village/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) There are good reasons for allowing them to act quickly. Money stolen through bank fraud can pass through several accounts within minutes. Waiting for investigators or a court may give criminals enough time to move it beyond reach. A temporary freeze can protect both the victim and the banking system. The problem is that the customer loses access to the money before anyone has established that a crime occurred. A bank has 48 hours to explain its decision to the central bank, which then has another 48 hours to decide whether the restriction should continue. Other safeguards apply when prosecutors order a freeze during a criminal investigation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The Lobito Corridor: Whose line is it anyway? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/the-lobito-corridor-whose-line-is-it-anyway/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T13:08:47.000Z The Lobito Corridor has become central to Angola’s international economic pitch: a rehabilitated railway linking the Atlantic coast with the Democratic Republic of Congo and, eventually, Zambia, backed by Western governments eager to develop an alternative route for critical minerals. That commercial proposition is increasingly well funded. The harder part is building the infrastructure and economic activity around the railway that would allow Angolan businesses, farmers and communities to benefit from it. That was the focus of this week’s **Angola Briefing**, Zitamar News’ regular discussion of the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola. Hosted by Angolan entrepreneur and commentator **Cláudio Silva**, the briefing brought together political risk analyst **Marisa Lourenço** and **Dr Ana Duarte**, a development economist based in Benguela whose research has focused on transport and the Lobito Corridor. [Subscribe to the Angola Briefing to receive our regular briefings, expert discussions and analysis of what developments in Angola mean — and what to watch next.](#/portal/signup) ## Lobito has the money. Now it has to deliver The numbers surrounding Lobito are becoming substantial. The Africa Finance Corporation announced financial close in July on a **$753m financing package**, including $553m from the US International Development Finance Corporation and $200m from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. Cláudio noted that Lobito Atlantic Railway had subsequently received approximately **$300m**, with spending directed towards wagons, containers and track rehabilitation. LAR is targeting around **400,000 tonnes of international cargo in 2026**, split between copper and cobalt moving towards the Atlantic and freight travelling in the opposite direction. It reported 27,000 tonnes of international cargo in July. Marisa argued that these numbers need to be judged against the enormous volumes of minerals already moving out of the DRC through other routes. Lobito’s commercial opportunity lies in offering producers a shorter alternative to trucking heavy mineral cargo through southern Africa, where poor roads, border delays and congested ports add time and cost. But its competitiveness will depend partly on infrastructure outside Angola. The DRC side still requires substantial rehabilitation, while the planned connection with Zambia requires new railway construction. Effective operation also depends on coordination between three governments whose priorities are not necessarily aligned. For investors, the important indicators now are therefore operational: equipment arriving, track reliability improving, cargo volumes rising and construction and rehabilitation elsewhere along the route progressing. ## Building an economy around the railway The Benguela Railway was originally developed to move commodities from the African interior to the Atlantic. Today’s project carries much broader ambitions, encompassing agriculture, passenger transport, electrification and local economic development. Realising those ambitions requires more than railway investment. Marisa pointed to feeder roads, warehouses, functioning stations and other infrastructure needed for farmers and businesses to get their goods onto trains. Ana illustrated the problem from **Balombo, Benguela province**, where she was travelling during the programme. She described poor road conditions, limited internet connectivity and a lack of electricity during the day — precisely the sort of constraints that can prevent communities from taking advantage of a major transport corridor passing through their region. And indeed the limited internet connectivity sadly cut short her participation in the Briefing. Agricultural cooperatives could provide a useful measure of progress. If farmers along the route begin moving more produce, reaching markets faster or reducing transport costs, that would provide tangible evidence that the corridor is generating activity beyond its core mineral business. Passenger services offer another test. Cláudio, who has travelled the railway, described difficulties buying tickets, poor conditions at stations and outdated passenger information. Track rehabilitation can improve the underlying railway, but its usefulness to passengers also depends on the quality of the service built around it. **This is what the Angola Briefing is designed to do:** go beyond the headline investment figures and announcements to identify the practical questions that matter to businesses, investors, diplomats and others with an interest in Angola. Subscribers receive our analysis alongside access to discussions with people who know the country and its industries firsthand. ## Northern Corridor: another big infrastructure test The discussion then turned to Angola’s proposed **Northern Corridor**, connecting the Port of Luanda with Malanje. The government has announced a partnership with the International Finance Corporation to work towards structuring the project as a public-private partnership. Marisa cautioned that this does not mean a PPP already exists. Important questions — including the concession structure, financing, traffic forecasts, anchor customers and allocation of risk — remain unanswered. The railway would also require supporting roads, warehouses and sufficient cargo moving in both directions to make the project commercially viable. Ana’s experience in Balombo raised a related question about infrastructure priorities: how major new projects should be balanced against maintaining and improving the roads, electricity and communications infrastructure businesses already use. Marisa noted that large railway projects have an obvious political attraction. They attract international attention, signal ambition to lenders and investors and support Angola’s effort to position itself as a regional logistics hub. The next milestones for the Northern Corridor will show whether that ambition can be translated into a credible commercial structure capable of attracting private capital. ## Standard Bank sale raises cash for the state, not the bank The briefing also examined the partial sale of **Standard Bank Angola**, which raised **Kz208.5bn** for the Angolan state. Standard Bank Group increased its stake from 51% to **75%**, while 10% was sold to public investors, bringing thousands of new shareholders into the bank. Marisa stressed an important distinction: because existing shares were sold, the transaction does **not** inject new capital into Standard Bank Angola. Customers should therefore not expect the transaction itself to produce more lending or cheaper credit. For Standard Bank Group, greater ownership could make it easier to align the Angolan subsidiary with its wider African operations and governance standards. For the government, meanwhile, the transaction delivers cash and advances the privatisation programme. The broader question is whether transactions like this can help deepen Angola’s still-small capital market and encourage greater competition in banking. Marisa pointed to the arrival of other African banking groups as a potentially important development, while cautioning that the practical test will be whether newer entrants can operate effectively over time. ## $70m airport contract raises procurement questions Finally, the programme examined the government’s five-year contract worth around **$70m** with Chinese companies AVIC/CATIC for maintenance at 21 Angolan airports. Marisa welcomed recognition that airport infrastructure requires substantial maintenance, but questioned the use of direct procurement and the lack of publicly available information on performance benchmarks and the eventual transfer of capabilities to Angolan technicians. That transfer will be particularly important when the five-year agreement ends. The programme’s longer-term value will depend partly on whether Angola develops domestic maintenance capacity rather than remaining dependent on external contractors. The discussion also raised questions about Angola’s domestic aviation model. Many provincial airports handle very small numbers of flights, while domestic connections remain heavily centred on Luanda. Better maintenance may improve reliability, but it does not by itself address the commercial constraints facing domestic aviation. ## What to watch For Lobito, the next phase should provide increasingly measurable evidence of what the investment is producing. Marisa suggested following agricultural cooperatives in provinces such as Huambo: are they moving more produce, more quickly and more cheaply because of the railway? At the regional level, progress in the DRC and towards Zambia will indicate whether Lobito is becoming a functioning cross-border logistics system rather than an upgraded Angolan railway. Cargo volumes will tell us whether the corridor works commercially. Developments along the route — in agriculture, local business, passenger transport and employment — will tell us how much of its economic impact stays in Angola. **The Angola Briefing will continue following these developments and the other political, economic and business stories shaping the country. Subscribe to get the Briefing directly in your inbox, with our latest analysis and conversations with journalists, analysts and specialists who follow Angola closely.** [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) ### Austerity takes a back seat URL: https://www.zitamar.com/austerity-takes-a-back-seat/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T11:28:35.000Z Good afternoon and welcome to the delayed Zitamar Daily Briefing for 1 October, 2026. Mozambique’s Constitutional Council has awarded four vehicle contracts worth MZN49.5m (about $775,000). On 1 October, hours after the awards drew public criticism, the finance ministry suspended the procurement, citing “indications” of acts that breach the public contracting rules and three other regulations. The award notice, published in *Notícias*, allocates MZN27.8m (about $435,000) for a single Mercedes-Benz and MZN18m (about $281,000) for a Hyundai Palisade. Two smaller contracts cover a Toyota Hilux and a Toyota Hiace. The Council has not explained why it needed them. The Mercedes and the Hyundai make up almost 93% of the total. The notice gives no specifications or cost breakdown, so whether either car is armoured or otherwise modified cannot be judged from it. The Council still has to explain what it ordered, what justifies the cost and whether cheaper options were considered. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3eab53d8-cee4-4701-9195-250d04298432/)*.* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies eyes Mozambique LNG expansion as campaigners target shipping partnersCompany considers retaining construction teams for Phase 2, while civil society groups target Japanese shipowners in latest bid to halt LNG development![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-519141b4-98d3-4760-905e-1f147c109658.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1775580279270-574c001be3a5-1cb30f37-1b02-48de-aecc-ad62508acc62.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-eyes-mozambique-lng-expansion-as-campaigners-target-shipping-partners/) --- [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique’s financial difficulties make that explanation urgent. The IMF’s assessment published in February described increasingly difficult government financing conditions, debt service delays and cuts to spending on goods, services and capital projects. The Fund called for fiscal adjustment to restore debt sustainability. Restraint in this context means deciding which expenses can wait and which public needs cannot. The contrast with healthcare is uncomfortable. A recent shipment of medicines was financed through a $35m investment backed by the World Bank. Outside help for essential supplies does not make every vehicle indefensible, but it does make the government’s priorities a fair subject of scrutiny. Taxpayers should not have to guess why two costly cars deserve funding while basic services depend on help from abroad. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### TotalEnergies eyes Mozambique LNG expansion as campaigners target shipping partners URL: https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-eyes-mozambique-lng-expansion-as-campaigners-target-shipping-partners/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T10:54:05.000Z TotalEnergies is considering accelerating a second phase of Mozambique LNG, while environmental and human-rights groups are urging its prospective shipping partners to withhold orders for vessels intended to carry the project’s gas. Total chief executive Patrick Pouyanné said on Monday that the company could speed up expansion by retaining construction teams at Afungi and accessing additional gas resources through arrangements involving ExxonMobil’s neighbouring project. Meanwhile, Mozambican environmental campaign group Justiça Ambiental and 25 co-signatories have written to three Japanese shipping companies asking them not to finalise orders for 17 LNG carriers associated with Mozambique LNG. The letter, dated 24 September, seeks responses by 6 October from Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (K Line), and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK Line), and argues that unresolved human-rights allegations, community grievances and potential shipping overcapacity warrant withholding new commitments. Disruption to Gulf gas exports due to Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has strengthened the appeal of supplies outside the Middle East, Pouyanne said, but he acknowledged that the same disruption had also affected equipment flows for the Mozambique project. The company nevertheless continues to target first LNG production in 2029, he said. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Insurgents kill one and abduct 12 in overnight raid on Nangade village URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-one-and-abduct-12-in-overnight-raid-on-nangade-village/ Last updated: 2026-10-02T10:32:52.000Z Attack on Mualela follows a week of insurgent movements and raids across Nangade district _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### The price of entry URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-price-of-entry/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T09:17:16.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday’s newsletter. Frelimo's leadership has been clearer about where members may criticise the party than about how it will punish those who buy votes. In Nampula on Monday, secretary-general Chakil Aboobacar condemned payments to secure positions in internal elections. During the same visit, he confirmed that governor Eduardo Abdula had been reprimanded for taking his complaints about interference into the public arena. The contrast deserves attention ahead of next year's congress. Aboobacar called those who pay for votes infiltrators and demanded that candidate lists be published. Both the practice he described and the secrecy he criticised deserve scrutiny. But the account of his remarks identifies no alleged vote-buyers and sets out no specific investigation or sanction. Abdula, by comparison, has been publicly identified and reprimanded. The leadership has demonstrated how it responds to public dissent; members are still waiting to see comparable accountability for electoral misconduct. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e2d01f18-e84b-4226-b6f0-52c1a8d7fb7e/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [New Bank of Mozambique governor brings in export lending incentive, keeps rates unchangedFirst monetary policy decisions under new governor Navalha indicate willingness to support Chapo administration’s industrial policy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-3c95f15c-ad3c-4561-b898-dce4a03ff51e.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-11-14.50.50-2647ac1e-fc34-4791-9705-2adc7cd5efee.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/new-bank-of-mozambique-governor-brings-in-export-lending-incentive-keeps-rates-unchanged/) [Islamic State claims two killed as insurgents move across Cabo DelgadoInsurgents abducted civilians in Mocímboa da Praia and looted a village in Nangade during the last week of September![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-501cbba8-68f8-4d2f-b171-03ba8a21c4df.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-30-19.25.44-dd333e21-f780-4b8d-b590-b83b35147428.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claims-two-killed-as-insurgents-move-across-cabo-delgado/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is familiar territory. In October 2012, after Frelimo's congress in Pemba, Armando Guebuza urged members to denounce attempts to buy votes, describing the practice as alien to the party. Fourteen years later, another leadership is treating it as an intrusion. Calling offenders infiltrators avoids confronting the possibility that the incentives to buy support arise from the way the party itself distributes power. Aboobacar occupies a position from which he can influence that distribution. He heads the central office preparing the 13th congress, scheduled for Nampula in July 2027\. Its six commissions include one responsible for verifying and assessing candidacies, headed by Ana Comoana. He therefore leads the structure that scrutinises candidates while calling for fair competition among them. Members need to know how that scrutiny works and how exclusions can be challenged. They should also be able to distinguish legitimate campaign expenses from payments for votes. Without a clear definition of misconduct, enforcement risks depending on the identity of the candidate rather than the conduct. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### New Bank of Mozambique governor brings in export lending incentive, keeps rates unchanged URL: https://www.zitamar.com/new-bank-of-mozambique-governor-brings-in-export-lending-incentive-keeps-rates-unchanged/ Last updated: 2026-10-01T08:48:51.000Z The Bank of Mozambique today kept its benchmark MIMO interest rate at 9.25% at the first monetary policy committee (CPMO) meeting under new governor Felisberto Dinis Navalha, while announcing a lending incentive for companies that replace imports or increase exports. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Islamic State claims two killed as insurgents move across Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claims-two-killed-as-insurgents-move-across-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-09-30T17:31:18.000Z Islamist insurgents captured and killed two civilians near Maputo village, in Mocímboa da Praia district, on Monday 28 September, according to a claim issued by Islamic State yesterday. A local source confirmed to *Zitamar* that insurgents entered the village on the night of 28 September and abducted some people. The number of abductees remains unclear. Maputo village is about 25km north of Mocímboa da Praia town. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Frelimo at the fuel tap URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-at-the-fuel-tap/ Last updated: 2026-09-29T18:04:02.000Z Good afternoon. Waldemar de Sousa lasted less than 24 hours as governor-designate of the Bank of Mozambique. His inauguration was postponed after attention returned to a criminal case opened against him in 2020, and President Daniel Chapo rapidly replaced him. The accusation remained unresolved and Sousa had never been convicted. Vitor Luís Timóteo’s appointment as chairman of the National Petroleum Products Acquisition Company, ENAPP, has caused no comparable reaction. Prime Minister Benvinda Levi swore him into office last Thursday, after the Council of Ministers appointed him on 15 September. His previous role creates a governance problem more directly connected to his new responsibilities than the allegation that ended Sousa’s appointment. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/556114a3-99c2-4cc0-ab06-afe57c80c460/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Former Frelimo business chief appointed to lead state fuel importer despite party’s fuel-storage interestsVítor Timóteo spent years at the helm of Frelimo’s investment vehicle, SPI, which owns major fuel-storage terminals alongside Portugal’s Galp and Kuwait’s IPG![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-763453e2-b060-4305-af67-10e15a597950.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-29-10.46.33-382acc8d-9268-4a30-952e-d6924459b250.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/former-frelimo-business-chief-appointed-to-lead-state-fuel-importer-despite-partys-fuel-storage-interests/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Timóteo chaired SPI, Frelimo’s investment vehicle, for at least four years. During that period, the party’s business arm held shares in fuel-storage terminals at Matola and Beira. He is now taking charge of the state company with exclusive responsibility for procuring and managing Mozambique’s petroleum supplies. The connection is practical as well as institutional. Fuel-procurement tenders allocate volumes among Maputo-Matola, Beira, Nacala and Pemba. Imported products pass through terminals before distribution. ENAPP will assess national requirements, contract supplies and coordinate their delivery. Decisions about how much fuel enters through each port, when shipments arrive and which storage arrangements are used can affect the throughput and revenue of individual terminals. Frelimo’s investment vehicle is a shareholder in two of them. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Former Frelimo business chief appointed to lead state fuel importer despite party’s fuel-storage interests URL: https://www.zitamar.com/former-frelimo-business-chief-appointed-to-lead-state-fuel-importer-despite-partys-fuel-storage-interests/ Last updated: 2026-09-30T08:54:48.000Z The government has placed the former head of Frelimo’s investment company in charge of Mozambique’s new state fuel-procurement monopoly, despite the party company’s commercial interests in infrastructure used to store and distribute imported fuel. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The wrong shortage URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-wrong-shortage/ Last updated: 2026-09-28T18:21:47.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s government wants to triple annual cotton output from roughly 20,000 tonnes to 60,000 tonnes. A new financing scheme should help farmers obtain seed, other inputs and machinery, reportedly offering more than MZN50m ($780,000) in annual investment through 2029\. But the sector’s long decline cannot be explained by credit shortages alone. Farmers must also believe that growing cotton will pay better, and more reliably, than using the same land and labour for another crop. The government says seed cotton output reached about 180,000 tonnes in 2011–12 and stood near 40,000 tonnes last year. The collapse of Plexus, once a buyer and input provider to tens of thousands of smallholders, removed much of the system through which cotton was grown and sold in Cabo Delgado, but it is not the whole story. In 2024, Zitamar reported that producer numbers and cultivated area had dropped sharply, even though output had edged up from the preceding season. Replacing that commercial network requires more than an allocation in a budget. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bb27c21d-262e-4edd-b662-5a183a11e107/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The scheme is wider than cotton. The reported annual investment covers cotton and oilseeds, and is intended to support mechanisation, storage and local processing as well as inputs. Its goal of reaching 50,000 producers and mechanising more than 40,000 hectares by 2029 does not tell us how much money will reach an individual cotton grower, or in which season. Dividing MZN50m by 50,000 and calling the result a farmer’s loan would therefore misdescribe the plan. The government should publish the annual funding, eligibility rules, repayment terms and targets for each crop. Some design details are already public. Under the strategy presented this month, development finance institution Gapi is to manage input credit in 2026; equipment and processing finance would follow from 2027\. Reported terms include interest of zero for eligible producers within a promotion network and 5% outside it. Companies would distribute inputs, provide technical help and buy the harvest, while farmers would be expected to sell all their output to those companies. This may make lending workable, but it also puts the reliability and bargaining power of the buyer at the centre of the farmer’s decision. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Who owns Angola? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/who-owns-angola/ Last updated: 2026-09-29T08:51:38.000Z ### The 30-second briefing **THE ECONOMY:** Moody’s has changed Angola’s sovereign outlook from stable to positive, while keeping its B3 rating. But €745 million of a €1 billion German-backed credit line remains unused — a striking illustration of the gap between improving macroeconomic indicators and conditions facing businesses. **CARRINHO:** One of Angola’s fastest-growing business groups has agreed to buy BPI’s 33.35% stake in BFA for €388.5 million, subject to regulatory approvals. Its rapid expansion during João Lourenço’s presidency, major dealings with the state and access to state-backed finance have fuelled persistent suspicions of political favour — allegations Carrinho rejects and Lourenço has denied. Its growing presence in banking now raises another question: who controls access to capital? **PRIVATISATION:** Angola has sold scores of state assets and now has an operating stock market. But selling assets is not the same thing as spreading ownership — particularly when the state retains control of strategically important companies. **PUBLIC SECTOR:** Teachers are back at work, but their dispute with the government has exposed continuing questions about the state’s ability to implement agreements as well as pay for them. **THE BIG QUESTION:** Is Angola creating a broader capitalist class — or rearranging economic power among a relatively small number of groups? --- Angola received some welcome economic news last week, as Moody’s changed the outlook on the country’s sovereign rating from stable to positive, while reaffirming the rating itself at B3. For **Marisa Lourenço**, political and economic risk analyst and strategic adviser specialising in Southern Africa, the distinction matters. The improved outlook says something about the government’s ability to meet its obligations. It says much less about how easy it is to run a business in Angola. A €1 billion credit facility backed by Deutsche Bank provides a rather good illustration. Years after it was announced, €745 million remains unused. There is money available. The problem is getting it into the economy. Lourenço pointed to bureaucracy, weak financial markets, difficulties smaller companies face obtaining bank finance and continuing problems accessing foreign currency. That distinction — between what looks better from above and what works on the ground — ran through this week’s **Angola Briefing**. And eventually it led to a much bigger question. > **Who actually owns Angola’s economy?** --- ## The extraordinary rise of Carrinho Few companies make that question more interesting than **Grupo Carrinho**. The Benguela-based group has expanded dramatically across the Angolan economy and is now becoming an increasingly important player in finance. Earlier this month, its financial arm agreed to acquire BPI’s 33.35% holding in Banco de Fomento Angola for €388.5 million, excluding an additional variable component. The deal still requires regulatory approval. That extraordinary expansion has also attracted political scrutiny. Carrinho has become one of a small number of business groups repeatedly associated with major dealings with the Angolan state during João Lourenço’s presidency. Its growth has included state contracts, the acquisition of the formerly state-owned BCI and access to financing backed by sovereign guarantees. Critics and commentators have consequently questioned whether Carrinho’s rise reflects unusually close political connections. The company has strongly rejected suggestions that its success derives from improper favour from the presidency, while Lourenço has previously denied that his government favours Carrinho and several other large business groups. For **Florindo Chivucute**, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, Carrinho’s trajectory deserves much more scrutiny. Chivucute was careful about one point: he said he could not prove a direct connection between President João Lourenço and Carrinho’s owner. His question was instead how a relatively small company had expanded so rapidly and become such an important recipient of business involving the state. Lourenço approached the issue from another direction: **credit**. Angolan companies already operate in an economy in which access to finance is difficult and uneven. A large conglomerate expanding into banking therefore acquires influence not only through the businesses it owns, but potentially through its position within the system that determines where credit goes. As Lourenço put it during the discussion: > **“Where are the lines of credit going?”** That is a much bigger question than Carrinho. It goes to the heart of what Angola’s economic reforms were supposed to accomplish. --- #### ****Carrinho — from Benguela to BFA** Grupo Carrinho’s transformation is one of the most striking stories in Angola’s recent political economy. Its expansion has taken it from its base in Benguela into an increasingly wide range of sectors. In finance, it acquired the state-owned BCI in 2021 and has also been pursuing an interest in Banco Keve. That Keve transaction is itself an illustration of the complexity surrounding the group’s expansion. The Banco Nacional de Angola has acknowledged an effective participation by Carrinho while the formal approval process remains unresolved. Now comes BFA. BPI has agreed to sell its 33.35% holding to Carrinho’s financial arm. The fixed portion of the transaction is worth €388.5 million, with an additional variable component linked to BFA’s 2026 dividend. The acquisition remains subject to approvals in Angola and Portugal. Carrinho’s relationship with the state has been the subject of public scrutiny for years. Expansão has grouped it with a small number of companies that became increasingly prominent in state business during the Lourenço presidency, while other observers have questioned whether political connections helped explain its rapid ascent. Carrinho disputes that interpretation. Its representatives have argued that the group’s expansion reflects its own commercial performance and ability to meet the requirements of international lenders. President Lourenço has likewise rejected allegations that his government favours Carrinho. The significance of its banking expansion is therefore not simply that Carrinho is buying another asset. It is that one of Angola’s fastest-growing — and most politically scrutinised — industrial groups is establishing an increasingly consequential position inside the country’s financial system. --- ## Privatisation — but to whom? Angola’s **PROPRIV** programme was intended to reduce the enormous role of the state in the economy, attract investment and encourage a stronger private sector. There has unquestionably been movement. State assets have been sold. BODIVA has developed from an institution largely associated with debt instruments into an actual equities market. Major Angolan companies have begun listing shares. That would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago. But there is another question hidden inside the headline numbers: **Who bought the assets?** And then an even harder one: **Who ultimately owns the companies that bought them?** Chivucute’s concern is that counting the companies buying state assets does not necessarily tell us how widely ownership has spread. A privatisation programme could produce dozens of nominally different buyers while economic control remains concentrated among a much smaller group of ultimate beneficiaries. Chivucute argued that greater transparency over beneficial ownership is therefore essential before judging how far PROPRIV has genuinely broadened participation in Angola’s economy. Some of his conclusions are considerably more critical than the government’s presentation of the programme. During the discussion he compared the direction of Angolan privatisation with the concentration of wealth associated with Russia’s post-Soviet privatisations. That is Chivucute’s assessment, rather than an established description of the programme. But it raises a legitimate question for PROPRIV: > **Should success be measured by the number of assets privatised — or by what the programme does to the distribution of economic power?** --- #### ****What exactly is PROPRIV?** PROPRIV is Angola’s privatisation programme, launched as part of the economic reforms pursued under President João Lourenço. At its most basic, its purpose is to reduce direct state participation in the economy by selling state-owned assets and stakes in companies to private investors. But not every privatisation is economically equivalent. Selling a small non-strategic company outright is very different from selling a minority stake in a major bank, telecoms operator or energy company while the state retains effective control. That distinction became one of the central themes of the Angola Briefing discussion. The headline number of transactions can therefore tell only part of the story. Other useful measures include how much capital was raised, who acquired the assets, whether ownership subsequently became more dispersed, and how much control the state actually relinquished. --- ## A stock exchange changes the equation There is an important counterargument. Lourenço cautioned against looking at the shortcomings of PROPRIV and concluding that nothing meaningful has changed. Angola now has something it did not previously have: an increasingly functional public equities market. Companies including banks, insurer ENSA, BODIVA itself and telecoms operator Unitel have come to market. Publicly traded companies create prices that can be observed. They require greater disclosure. And, at least in principle, they allow a much wider group of investors to own pieces of important Angolan businesses. The market is still extremely young, and recent price movements have provided an early lesson that buying shares also means accepting losses as well as gains. But its existence is itself part of the reform story. And **Unitel** may be the most interesting example of all. Lourenço said she had once doubted that she would see Unitel reach the stock market. It did; but the structure of the transaction also demonstrates the limits of Angola’s privatisation model. The state was able to bring private investors into Unitel and raise capital **without giving up control of the company**. For Lourenço, that is PROPRIV in miniature. --- #### ****Why Unitel matters** Telecommunications is a strategically important sector, and the company itself is one of Angola’s most important businesses. A public listing therefore goes considerably further than selling a collection of small state assets. It exposes a major company to public-market investors and contributes to the development of BODIVA. But a minority listing does not necessarily transfer control. That makes Unitel a useful example of the compromise running through Angola’s privatisation programme: bring private capital into major assets, develop a functioning capital market and demonstrate economic reform — while stopping short of relinquishing state control over strategically important businesses. --- ## Money for projects, but not for people? The ownership question also connects to a seemingly separate story: the latest confrontation between the government and Angola’s teachers. Teachers have returned to classrooms following the latest industrial action, but implementation of the agreement remains important. The government says career updates are planned for 53,755 education workers admitted between 2017 and 2020, with 27,334 cases already validated for payment from October. The remaining files are expected to be dealt with in the first half of 2027. Chivucute questioned whether teachers would trust those commitments after previous disputes. Lourenço identified two overlapping problems. One is money. Debt servicing and competing demands on the budget limit how much room the government has to increase public-sector spending. But the other is **state capacity**. Even where an agreement has been reached and money is theoretically available, administrative systems can struggle to implement changes. That makes the contrast with large infrastructure projects politically significant. Angola can mobilise enormous sums for visible capital projects while apparently struggling with comparatively mundane administrative processes affecting salaries and careers. ## The reform paradox There is a temptation to tell Angola’s economic story in one of two ways. The first is the official reform story: privatisation, macroeconomic stabilisation, new investment and a growing capital market. The second is the sceptical version: old networks of economic power have simply been replaced by new ones. The discussion on this week’s Angola Briefing suggested something more complicated. Real reforms have happened. Macroeconomic management has changed. Angola has reduced some of the extraordinary institutional conflicts that characterised the old system. BODIVA exists and is developing. Major companies are coming to market. But economic liberalisation is taking place inside a political system in which control over major economic assets remains important. That creates a tension. The government wants private capital, functioning markets, and for international investors to see evidence of reform. But surrendering control of the biggest assets is something else entirely. Which brings us back to the original question. After years of PROPRIV, it is no longer enough to ask how much has Angola privatised, but rather: **Who bought it? Who ultimately owns the buyers? Who controls the finance? And how much control has the state really surrendered?** --- ### Watch the discussion Claudio Silva is joined by **Marisa Lourenço**, political and economic risk analyst and strategic adviser specialising in Southern Africa, and **Florindo Chivucute**, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola. **Watch the full Angola Briefing →** ### The state cannot escape its companies URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-state-cannot-escape-its-companies/ Last updated: 2026-09-25T10:22:02.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo met International Monetary Fund managing director Kristalina Georgieva in New York this week as Mozambique seeks a new financial programme. A Fiscal Risks Report published by his own government helps explain why the negotiations will be difficult. The liabilities of state-owned enterprises were equivalent to 48.4% of GDP in 2024. --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/investing-in-angola-opportunity-reform-and-the-reality-on-the-ground/): [Investing in Angola: opportunity, reform and the reality on the groundAngolan economist Francisco Paulo and Angolan political analyst and consultant Claudio Silva join Fernando Lima for today’s Angola Briefing, from Zitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-500008fa-8b10-4063-941c-72942ce7500e.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1682107845065-f89ebccb1523-c3c4f444-de8d-4d34-8042-69ddd90ccb5b.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/investing-in-angola-opportunity-reform-and-the-reality-on-the-ground/) --- *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/baf25635-66bf-4dea-992d-e888accb6a2b/)*.* That figure is not an immediate bill for the Treasury. State companies own assets and earn revenue with which to meet their obligations. Yet their financial position deteriorated between 2023 and 2024: debt and other liabilities increased, shareholders’ equity declined and turnover fell. Taxes paid by the sector dropped by more than 21%, from MZN31.2bn ($489.4m) to MZN24.4bn ($382.7m). The state is exposed through guarantees, sureties, debt-repayment agreements and comfort letters. These commitments increased by 4% in 2025\. If a company cannot pay, part of its burden may pass to a government already struggling to finance salaries, debt service and basic public services. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Investing in Angola: opportunity, reform and the reality on the ground URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/investing-in-angola-opportunity-reform-and-the-reality-on-the-ground/ Last updated: 2026-09-25T10:03:29.000Z Angola is attracting foreign investment again, including a striking rise in investment outside the oil industry. But how much has actually changed for a company trying to establish and operate a business in the country? This week, **Fernando Lima** was joined by two regular panelists: entrepreneur and Angola commentator **Claudio Silva** and economist **Francisco Miguel Paulo** to discuss the investment climate, the barriers businesses still face, and whether Angola is building the conditions for sustainable economic diversification. They also discussed the latest **teachers’ strike**, **Grupo Carrinho**’s growing presence in the banking sector, and Angola’s attempt to use international events and celebrities including **LeBron James** and **Will Smith** to raise the country’s profile as a **tourism** destination. [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Register with Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) ## **Investing in Angola: easier to enter, harder to operate** There are signs that Angola is becoming more attractive to foreign capital. Non-oil foreign direct investment reached **$971.8 million in the first half of 2026**, up **187%** from the same period last year and its highest level in 18 years. The figure already exceeds the total recorded for the whole of 2025\. But oil and gas still accounted for **82% of total FDI**, and overall investment fell 3% as petroleum-sector inflows declined. The government has also made formal efforts to make investing easier. A reorganisation of investment promotion agency AIPEX this year created a **One Stop Center**, bringing together representatives of government departments involved in approving investment projects and giving it powers intended to reduce bureaucratic obstacles. The IMF nevertheless said this month that reform momentum had slowed and called for further improvements to the business environment, governance and the conditions for foreign investment. For Francisco Miguel Paulo, the gap between those reforms and the experience on the ground remains substantial. “You can open up a company on the internet,” he told the Angola Briefing. The bigger question, he argued, comes afterwards: whether that company can obtain reliable electricity and water, navigate inspections and licences and operate without being weighed down by bureaucracy. He cited companies in industrial areas around Viana that still depend on generators or water brought in by truck. That distinction — between creating a company and actually running one — goes to the heart of Angola’s investment challenge. The IMF reached a similar diagnosis in its 2026 Article IV consultation, highlighting continuing problems with access to credit and foreign exchange, business regulation, governance and financial infrastructure. Claudio Silva approached the issue as an entrepreneur operating businesses in Angola. His concerns included the amount of paperwork still required for relatively basic business procedures, shortcomings in the education system that make it harder to recruit skilled staff, and vulnerabilities in the country’s payments infrastructure. “Our workforce is not ready to compete at an international level,” he said, arguing that businesses are dealing directly with the consequences of weaknesses in education. He also pointed to the reliance of electronic payments on a relatively fragile telecommunications infrastructure, recalling the disruption caused when Unitel suffered an outage. Francisco argued that some of the most important reforms are even more fundamental. He highlighted the need for universal identity documentation, formal registration of land and property, better education and vocational training, healthcare and a court system capable of enforcing contracts. Without those foundations, he argued, much economic activity remains difficult to formalise and finance. There is also a question about what Angola’s improving investment numbers actually represent. Francisco cautioned against treating rising headline FDI as evidence that diversification has been achieved, noting that much of the investment still flows towards oil and minerals. The BNA data behind the latest surge in non-oil FDI identify financial flows rather than the projects and subsectors receiving them, making it difficult to determine exactly what is driving the increase. The same problem appears in the structure of the domestic economy. Francisco noted that non-oil sectors now make up most of GDP, but argued that headline diversification figures can obscure the nature of employment. Agriculture, for example, accounts for a significant share of economic activity while much of its workforce remains informal. For foreign investors, therefore, Angola presents two realities at once. The formal framework is becoming easier: company registration has been simplified, investment facilitation institutions have been strengthened and capital is beginning to flow into non-oil sectors at levels not seen for years. But the operating environment still depends on infrastructure, skills, access to finance, reliable public services and predictable administration. Angola’s next test is not simply attracting another billion dollars of FDI. It is whether that investment can create productive businesses outside the extractive industries — and whether those businesses can operate, expand and employ Angolans once they arrive. --- **Enjoying the Angola Briefing?** Subscribe to receive our twice-weekly briefing on the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola, including our expert discussions and analysis of what they mean for investors, businesses and policymakers. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) --- ## **Teachers’ strike exposes deeper problems in public education** Angola’s teachers began a new series of strikes this month after the National Teachers’ Union, SINPROF, accused the government of failing to implement parts of an agreement reached in January. The first strike period was scheduled to run from **21 September to 15 October**, with further stoppages planned later in the academic year. Career progression has been one of the central disputes. The government says **53,755 education workers** are due career updates and that **27,334 cases** have already been validated for payment beginning in October. It says it has been implementing the January agreement, while SINPROF has argued that important commitments remain outstanding. The government and union subsequently reported progress after more than six hours of negotiations, although the decision on whether to lift the strike was left to teachers meeting in assemblies. For Francisco Paulo, career progression is crucial to understanding why disputes keep recurring. He pointed to teachers recruited in earlier years who, he said, remain on the same career grade despite additional experience and qualifications. But both panelists argued that the dispute reflects a much wider problem in education. Claudio Silva said weaknesses in public education are increasingly visible to employers attempting to recruit young Angolans. Families able to afford it often respond by paying for private education or sending children abroad, while lower-income households remain dependent on an overstretched public system. Francisco pointed to shortages of places as another symptom, arguing that public provision has failed to keep pace with demand. The result, the panelists said, is an increasingly stratified education system in which access to quality schooling depends heavily on a family’s means. The implications extend beyond schools. If Angola wants to attract investment into manufacturing, services, technology and other labour-intensive sectors, the quality and availability of its workforce will be part of the investment proposition. The education crisis is therefore also an economic competitiveness problem. --- ## **Carrinho’s banking expansion puts concentration and regulation in focus** Grupo Carrinho’s rapid expansion through the Angolan economy is increasingly extending into banking. The group has agreed to acquire Portuguese bank BPI’s **33.35% stake in Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA)** in a transaction with fixed components worth **€388.5 million**, plus a variable component linked to BFA’s dividend. Completion remains subject to regulatory and other approvals. At the same time, Carrinho’s proposed entry into Banco Keve remains unresolved almost two years after Angola’s competition regulator cleared the transaction. Expansão reports that the BNA still has not formally concluded the process, although the central bank treats the group as having an effective participation for supervisory purposes. The competition regulator had previously identified potential risks arising from Carrinho’s interests across different sectors of the economy. The BNA has also said it had been informed of the proposed BFA transaction but had not yet received the formal documentation necessary to assess it. Francisco Paulo noted how dramatically Carrinho’s position has changed in a relatively short period, from a much less prominent company before 2017 to a group with major interests across food, agriculture and finance. Claudio Silva argued that this is precisely why the banking acquisitions deserve scrutiny. A company operating across agriculture, manufacturing and finance potentially gains significant advantages from controlling financial institutions, he said, particularly because access to credit remains one of the major constraints facing Angolan businesses. He stressed that there was **no evidence of wrongdoing by Grupo Carrinho** and that its transactions were being conducted within the legal framework, but questioned the broader implications of allowing large economic groups to develop extensive positions across several sectors. The regulatory question is therefore bigger than either Keve or BFA: how should Angola encourage the emergence of strong domestic companies without allowing financial and industrial power to become excessively concentrated? --- ## **Angola puts celebrities on the tourism map — but can visitors get around the country?** Luanda hosted the UIM E1 electric powerboat championship for the first time on **12–13 September**, becoming the competition’s first venue in Southern Africa. Among the visitors were NBA star **LeBron James** and actor and producer **Will Smith**, whose respective teams compete in the championship. The Angolan government explicitly presented the event as part of a strategy to promote tourism, attract private investment and strengthen the international profile of the **Visit Angola** brand. Smith’s Westbrook Racing team itself carries Visit Angola branding. James and Smith were also received by President João Lourenço, with discussions covering tourism, cinema and basketball. Claudio Silva, who has worked extensively in Angola’s hospitality and tourism sector, welcomed the government’s decision to treat tourism as an economic priority but questioned whether high-profile events are being matched by investment in the infrastructure needed to build a functioning tourism industry. His concern was less about whether celebrity visits generate publicity than about what happens when an ordinary visitor tries to travel outside Luanda. He pointed to poor roads, unreliable domestic flights and the limited ability to fly internationally directly into regional destinations such as Benguela, Lubango or Namibe. Angola, he argued, is attempting to market attractions that remain difficult and expensive to reach. “Tourism starts by domestic tourism,” Claudio said, arguing that Angola needs transport, accommodation and other basic infrastructure before international promotion can deliver its full economic potential. That leaves a familiar challenge. Events such as E1 can put Angola in front of international audiences and associate the country with globally recognised figures. Turning that visibility into a sustainable tourism industry, however, will depend less on who visits Luanda for a weekend than on whether ordinary travellers can reliably explore the rest of the country. ## **Coming up on the Angola Briefing** We’ll be back on **Monday, 28 September** to look at **privatisation and the new Angolan capitalism**: after years of PROPRIV, who owns Angola’s economy, what has really changed, and what does the emergence of powerful domestic groups mean for competition and investment? Then, on **Thursday, 1 October**, we turn to the **Lobito Corridor** and ask who actually stands to benefit from one of Angola’s most important infrastructure and regional trade projects. And on **Monday, 5 October**, we’ll look **beyond Luanda**, examining whether Benguela, Huambo, Lubango and other cities can develop stronger economic centres of their own. Subscribe to the **Angola Briefing** to receive every edition directly in your inbox, along with details of upcoming live discussions. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Thanks for reading, and thanks to **Claudio Silva** and **Francisco Miguel Paulo** for joining us this week. See you on Monday. ### Ransom from the poor URL: https://www.zitamar.com/ransom-from-the-poor/ Last updated: 2026-09-23T15:54:08.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique has two distinct kidnapping crises. Criminal groups in its cities have generally targeted wealthy business families able to pay large ransoms. Conflict-linked abductions in the north fall on fishermen, motorcycle-taxi drivers, farmers, transporters and children. Their captivity can provide money, labour and recruits. The government has received credit for the decline in prominent urban kidnappings since Daniel Chapo became president. Those crimes damaged Mozambique’s reputation and generated pressure from families with economic and political influence. The victims in Cabo Delgado rarely command comparable attention. Their disappearances merge into the reporting of a conflict now approaching its ninth year. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b6cf7adc-3ea7-4e55-9e98-181a7fc4af18/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Insurgents accused of killing three and abducting 12 in Muidumbe and MacomiaFive people were seized near Miangaleua and seven in Chai on Tuesday, while local sources say the insurgents are demanding MZN50,000 for each hostage![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-dd4010ed-e80f-491d-965f-8235658cd8ea.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-23-13.10.28-8028ff7b-46ff-45cd-b060-898e3f5e9a02.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-accused-of-killing-three-and-abducting-12-in-muidumbe-and-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The United Nations humanitarian affairs agency, OCHA, recorded 249 people abducted across Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula during the first half of 2026, down from 337 a year earlier. The organisation nevertheless describes the use of abduction as increasingly systematic, with victims taken for ransom, forced labour, recruitment and the indoctrination of children. Reports from the north describe demands of tens of thousands of meticais from families living close to subsistence. Households borrow, sell assets and seek contributions from relatives. Insurgents may accept less than they initially demand, taking whatever families can assemble. Vehicles, fishing boats and logging equipment are also seized for ransom. Responsibility is not always clear. Criminals can imitate insurgent methods, and there have been allegations that members of the security forces have exploited the confusion surrounding the conflict. Those claims require evidence. The uncertainty itself assists perpetrators: armed groups, ordinary criminals and abusive officials can all hide behind an attribution to “terrorists”. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents accused of killing three and abducting 12 in Muidumbe and Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-accused-of-killing-three-and-abducting-12-in-muidumbe-and-macomia/ Last updated: 2026-09-23T11:18:45.000Z Insurgents have killed at least three people and abducted 12 others in a series of incursions across Muidumbe and Macomia districts since the weekend, spreading fear among communities near the Messalo River and raising concerns about security along the EN380. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The revolutionary will not be televised URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-revolutionary-will-not-be-televised/ Last updated: 2026-09-22T23:02:20.000Z Good evening. Venâncio Mondlane used live broadcasts to lead what he called a revolution against Mozambique’s disputed 2024 election result. Those broadcasts now provide much of the evidence in a prosecution that could imprison him for more than 20 years. He wanted the resulting trial carried on the same medium. The Supreme Court has refused. The decision is lawful. Mozambique’s criminal procedure rules prohibit the recording or transmission of court proceedings unless a judge authorises it. Public justice means that citizens and journalists may enter the courtroom, report what happens and consult the case file. It does not give a defendant the right to appear before a national television audience. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/35c30136-1a10-4e1e-a5c1-dced3bc837e2/)*.* --- [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/Zitamar-Angola-Briefing-Banner.png)](www.zitamar.com/angola) Zitamar is now in Angola! Click below for the latest edition of the Angola Briefing, a twice-weekly newsletter modeled on our Mozambique Daily Briefing but built on an expert discussion broadcast live and recorded. Click below to find out what it's all about: [Angola’s oil industry fights to hold the lineCan new discoveries and investment keep production above 1m barrels per day, and can Angola finally turn more of its hydrocarbons into domestic economic value? Economist Francisco Paulo and consultant Marisa Lourenço join Fernando Lima to discuss![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-25507636-d471-4fde-a958-5315673bab35.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar Ltd![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/conference-pic-0ef0583f-8036-43ce-9c1b-596431bb7473.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/angola/the-angola-briefing-an-oil-and-gas-special/) --- [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The court has also given intelligible reasons for refusing permission. A broadcast could expose expert witnesses in a terrorism case, allow witnesses waiting to testify to follow earlier evidence, put pressure on judges and turn the proceedings into political propaganda. Mondlane is an unusually effective communicator with an obvious interest in making the courtroom another platform for his contest with Frelimo. Yet none of those risks required the complete exclusion of cameras. The law already protects people who object to being filmed. Sensitive testimony could have been heard without a broadcast, witnesses could have been shielded and transmission could have been delayed. The court had several ways to preserve control over the proceedings while allowing the public to see most of the prosecution’s case. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Living in the World Bank’s pockets URL: https://www.zitamar.com/living-in-the-world-banks-pockets/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T21:29:35.000Z Good afternoon. The World Bank is providing $35m to help Mozambique replenish medicines and medical supplies, and is financing the $250m Bus Rapid Transit system under construction in Greater Maputo. Its money also supports water systems, drainage, sanitation, agriculture and public administration. Across much of the country, services associated with ordinary government depend on an international financial institution. Mozambique’s 2027 Fiscal Risks Report explains why. Public-sector salaries and debt service could absorb 96% of tax revenue next year. For every 100 meticais collected, only four would remain for goods and services, domestic public investment, transfers and emergencies. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bc21a57e-bcbf-4011-9e7a-ac28b9340b39/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That projection describes a state with almost no room to govern using its own revenue. Teachers, nurses and other public servants must be paid, while failure to service debt would deepen the financing crisis. Medicines, roads, water, transport and disaster response are left competing for what remains or waiting for external support. The problem is the cost and rigidity of the payroll, rather than an unusually large public service. Mozambique employs around 357,000 public servants, a number the World Bank considers relatively modest by regional standards. Yet salaries absorb an exceptionally large share of revenue. Debt accumulated without producing sufficient returns further restricts spending, while weak procurement, inefficient public companies and corruption reduce the value obtained from scarce resources. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola’s oil industry fights to hold the line URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/the-angola-briefing-an-oil-and-gas-special/ Last updated: 2026-09-23T07:53:59.000Z Welcome to the Angola Briefing, Zitamar News’ guide to the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola. Each edition combines the latest reporting with analysis from journalists and specialists who know the country closely. Yesterday afternoon, host and Zitamar editor-at-large Fernando Lima was joined by **Marisa Lourenço**, a political-risk analyst and strategic adviser covering energy and investment across southern Africa, and **Francisco Miguel Paulo**, an Angolan economist and researcher specialising in taxation, fiscal policy and economic diversification. They discussed Angola’s falling inflation and the Banco Nacional de Angola’s increasingly optimistic growth outlook, new figures showing that most construction projects surveyed across the country are paralysed, and Angola’s inclusion in a new JPMorgan emerging-market debt index. In **IN FOCUS**, we turn to Angola’s oil industry following the Angola Oil & Gas conference earlier this month: can new discoveries and investment keep production around 1m barrels per day, and can Angola finally turn more of its hydrocarbons into domestic economic value? [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) # **THE LATEST NEWS** ## **BNA cuts rates as inflation falls below 9% and raises growth forecast** **Sources:**[ RNA](https://rna.ao/rna.ao/2026/09/18/comite-de-politica-monetaria-avanca-com-cortes-nas-taxas-directoras-do-bna-para-facilitar-o-financiamento-a-economia-e-tornar-o-credito-menos-caro/?ref=zitamar.com) ·[ INE](https://www.ine.gov.ao/publicacoes/detalhes/NTc0ODc%3D?ref=zitamar.com) The Banco Nacional de Angola has cut its benchmark interest rate from 15.75% to 14.75% and reduced banks’ local-currency reserve requirement from 17.5% to 16.5%, after annual inflation fell to 8.78% in August from 9.33% in July. The BNA also sharply upgraded its forecast for economic growth this year to 6.15%, from 3.6% previously. Inflation has fallen substantially from 18.88% a year earlier, although price pressures remain considerably higher in some important areas: education prices rose 19.33% year-on-year, food and non-alcoholic beverages 9.94%, and health 9.66%. *Analysis: Francisco Paulo said returning to single-digit inflation is an important macroeconomic achievement, but stressed that households are unlikely to feel much immediate relief because prices are still rising and purchasing power remains weak. He also questioned how effectively lower policy rates translate into cheaper or more accessible credit in an economy where businesses face structural obstacles to obtaining bank finance. Marisa Lourenço likewise cautioned against equating better headline numbers with better living standards, and said the striking gap between the BNA’s growth forecast and those of institutions such as the IMF merits scrutiny — while acknowledging that the central bank has access to more recent and granular data. Paulo added that the bigger test of Angola’s reported non-oil growth is whether it begins to generate formal employment, rather than further expansion of the informal economy.* ## **Nearly eight in ten construction projects surveyed by INE are paralysed** **Sources:**[ INE](https://www.ine.gov.ao/publicacoes/detalhes/NTc0OTA%3D?ref=zitamar.com) ·[ Valor Económico](https://valoreconomico.co.ao/artigo/mais-de-78-das-obras-de-todo-o-pais-encontram-se-paralisadas?ref=zitamar.com) Of 5,691 construction projects surveyed by the National Statistics Institute in the second quarter of 2026, 4,450 were paralysed and only 1,241 remained under construction — meaning just over 78% of the sites visited were stalled. Benguela was particularly badly affected, while the national survey also shows that most of the sites covered are family-led or self-build projects rather than developments undertaken by large private companies. *Analysis: Paulo said the figures help qualify the upbeat story being told by headline non-oil growth: construction was once one of the principal motors of Angola’s post-war expansion, but its growth is now far weaker. He cautioned, however, that the survey does not make it straightforward to compare the economic importance of a stalled family home with that of a major commercial or public project. Lourenço said the figures expose deeper weaknesses in Angola’s financial system: developers struggle to finance projects while households have little access to mortgages, creating a cycle in which buildings remain unfinished despite strong underlying housing demand. Large public works can meanwhile bolster aggregate construction figures even while much of the smaller-scale building economy remains stagnant.* ## **Angola joins JPMorgan’s new emerging-market local-currency debt index** **Sources:**[ Valor Económico](https://valoreconomico.co.ao/artigo/angola-integrada-no-novo-indice-global-de-obrigacoes-da-jpmorgan?ref=zitamar.com) ·[ Africa Index](https://africaindex.com/blog/jpmorgan-gbi-em-edge-africa-zambia-angola-2026?ref=zitamar.com) Angola has been selected for JPMorgan’s new GBI-EM Edge index, a benchmark for local-currency government debt in smaller emerging and frontier markets that is expected to launch before the end of September. The reported launch universe comprises 26 countries, including 14 in Africa, although JPMorgan had not yet publicly confirmed the final country weightings when Angola’s inclusion was reported. Membership should give kwanza-denominated government debt greater visibility among international institutional investors. *Analysis: Lourenço described inclusion as another small but meaningful sign of Angola’s increasing integration into international capital markets, but cautioned that it is not a “silver bullet” for weaknesses in the domestic financial system. Paulo said the index could support the government’s longer-term effort to diversify its financing sources by encouraging international investors to buy kwanza-denominated domestic debt rather than Angola relying as heavily on foreign-currency bonds and bilateral borrowing. Both therefore saw the development as positive primarily because of the visibility and potential investor access it creates, rather than as evidence that Angola has already developed a deep and liquid capital market.* --- # **IN FOCUS: Angola’s oil industry fights to hold the line** The[ Angola Oil & Gas conference](https://angolaoilandgas.com/?ref=zitamar.com) held in Luanda earlier this month suggested that the country’s petroleum sector is in better shape than it was a few years ago. New discoveries were announced, major international companies signed fresh agreements, and the government used the event to project confidence in the industry’s future. That is a notable change from the persistent narrative of decline that has hung over Angolan oil for much of the past decade. But it does not yet amount to a return to growth. As Monday’s Angola Briefing made clear, the more immediate achievement has been to stabilise production at around 1m barrels a day — a respectable outcome for a mature offshore producer, but a long way from the boom years. Angola is currently producing[ about 1.04m barrels a day](https://www.verangola.net/va/en/02026/Economy/50089/Vera-Daves-public-spending-on-fuel-subsidies-will-rise.htm?ref=zitamar.com), close to the[ 1.05m bpd assumption in the 2026 budget](https://www.verangola.net/va/en/02026/Economy/50089/Vera-Daves-public-spending-on-fuel-subsidies-will-rise.htm?ref=zitamar.com). For Marisa Lourenço, that in itself is significant. Angola’s mature fields are naturally declining, so simply holding production steady requires continual investment. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/Angola-oil-and-gas-stats-graphic.png) “The government has to work very hard so that it doesn’t go below current production levels,” she said during the webinar. “It seems like it has managed to arrest that for now.” Francisco Paulo took a similar view, though with greater emphasis on what that means in practice. Much of the investment now being announced, he argued, is not the beginning of a new petroleum boom but the cost of preventing a sharper fall in output. That distinction matters. Angola may be succeeding in managing decline more effectively, but that is not the same thing as rebuilding the industry to anything like its former scale. ### **Smaller gains, better used** The developments announced at the conference support that reading. ExxonMobil reported another discovery in[ Block 15 at Vicango Este-01](https://mirempet.gov.ao/web/noticias/anpg-exxonmobil-e-parceiros-realizam-nova-descoberta-no-bloco-15?ref=zitamar.com), while TotalEnergies said its[ Acacia-5 discovery in Block 17](https://totalenergies.com/newsroom/exploration-in-angola-totalenergies-announces-a-new-discovery-on-block-17-and-enters-two-new-exploration-blocks/?lang=eng&ref=zitamar.com) is expected to add about 6,000 bpd through a tie-back to the existing Pazflor production system. Neither announcement suggests a transformational discovery. Both are nonetheless important. They show how Angola can extract more value from a mature basin by linking smaller finds to infrastructure already in place. In an industry where new standalone offshore developments are expensive and slow to deliver, that is a sensible strategy. The same logic underpins efforts to encourage new spending on older assets. Angola is trying to squeeze more life out of existing fields and processing infrastructure rather than depending solely on giant new discoveries. That may prove a more realistic model for the next phase of the sector. ### **A broader investor base** There are also tentative signs of renewed exploration interest. During the conference, ANPG formalised[ risk-service contracts with Shell, Equinor and Sonangol for Blocks 19, 34 and 35](https://mirempet.gov.ao/web/noticias/aguas-profundas%3A-anpg-formaliza-novos-acordos?ref=zitamar.com). The regulator also advanced arrangements with Shell, QatarEnergy and Sonangol on Blocks 8 and 22 in the Kwanza Basin. That matters less for any immediate production gain than for what it says about investor sentiment. Shell’s deeper re-engagement and QatarEnergy’s presence suggest that Angola’s regulatory reforms and revised commercial terms are having some effect. Whether they lead to commercially significant new reserves is another matter: exploration agreements still have to result in wells, discoveries and development plans. Lourenço also highlighted growing interest from Gulf investors. That gained further weight after the conference when Oman’s state energy group OQ and Sonangol signed a[ cooperation framework covering oil and gas, LNG, fertilisers, ammonia, petrochemicals and trading](https://oq.com/en/news-and-media/newsroom/20260918-angola-agreements?ref=zitamar.com). The governments of Angola and Oman also signed broader[ energy agreements covering upstream, midstream and downstream cooperation](https://www.fm.gov.om/en/56632/?ref=zitamar.com). These remain frameworks for possible cooperation rather than firm project commitments. Even so, they point to a sector attracting interest from a more diverse group of partners. ### **The old contradiction remains** The more difficult question is whether Angola can generate more domestic value from the hydrocarbons it produces. The contradiction is familiar: Angola is a major crude exporter but remains heavily dependent on imported refined fuels. At the conference, Sonangol said Angola imported[ about 1.8m tonnes of refined petroleum products in the first half of 2026 at a cost of roughly $1.96bn](https://angolaoilandgas.com/news/angola-targets-425000-bpd-refining-capacity-import-bill-hits-2b-six-months?ref=zitamar.com). The government wants to reduce that dependence through an expansion of refining capacity, notably at Lobito as well as through other projects. Lourenço made the strategic case for refining clearly. Greater local processing would reduce Angola’s exposure to external fuel-supply shocks, lower import dependence and potentially create export opportunities in regional markets. Paulo was more cautious about the economics. Refineries are expensive to build and operate, and their commercial logic depends not only on Angolan demand but on whether they can serve a wider regional market. Refining may make strategic sense, but its viability cannot simply be assumed. That debate is sharpened by the continued fiscal burden of fuel subsidies. Finance minister Vera Daves de Sousa said this month that[ fuel subsidies could amount to 2.48% of GDP in 2026](https://www.verangola.net/va/en/02026/Economy/50089/Vera-Daves-public-spending-on-fuel-subsidies-will-rise.htm?ref=zitamar.com), compared with 0.9% envisaged in the budget. Higher oil prices improve crude revenues but also raise the cost of keeping domestic fuel prices below market levels. Paulo suggested that the political room for further subsidy reform is limited, particularly as the 2027 elections approach. The government has not said it is abandoning the reform, but its political sensitivity is clear. ### **A more modest ambition** What emerged from the webinar was a more measured view of Angola’s oil future than the conference rhetoric might imply. Angola is not on the verge of returning to the production levels of the 2000s. Nor is it simply presiding over unmanaged decline. Instead, it appears to be pursuing a more modest strategy: prolong production from mature fields, attract enough exploration capital to slow reserve depletion, and capture more value through refining, gas and other downstream activity. There is promise in that approach, but also considerable uncertainty. New exploration must yield commercially meaningful discoveries. Refining projects must prove viable at scale. And the government still has to turn the ambition of adding value to petroleum production into industries capable of generating employment and investment beyond the upstream oil sector. For now, holding production close to 1m barrels a day looks less like a staging post on the way back to Angola’s former output levels than an achievement in itself. --- Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Angola Briefing. We’ll be back on **Thursday** with another business-focused edition, looking at **investing in Angola and the wider business environment**, alongside our review of the latest political, economic and business developments. Thanks again for watching, listening and reading. ### The governor and the party URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-governor-and-the-party/ Last updated: 2026-09-20T10:37:32.000Z Good afternoon. Eduardo Abdula’s complaint about interference in Nampula has earned him a public rebuke from one of Frelimo’s most senior figures. Filipe Paúnde, a member of the party’s Political Commission, says the governor broke party discipline by airing an internal dispute in public. The exchange concerns more than the proper venue for a disagreement. Abdula, widely known as Tio Salimo, accused former provincial officeholders now based elsewhere of continuing to interfere in the management of Nampula. He also spoke in defence of the provincial first secretary, who he said was under similar pressure. His message was simple: people living and governing in Nampula should have room to run the province. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/57552a87-d7ac-452d-a952-9fe01fd568bc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Paúnde’s answer was that Frelimo already has structures through which such complaints can be made. That sounds procedurally reasonable. It also places the interests of the party above the public’s interest in knowing who influences provincial decisions. If officials in Maputo are attempting to direct appointments, policy or the distribution of political positions in Nampula, the dispute cannot be reduced to an internal disciplinary matter. The confrontation exposes an ambiguity created by decentralisation. Provincial governors are elected as heads of party lists and are meant to exercise authority derived from voters. They remain members of parties whose national leadership expects discipline and retains substantial control over political careers. Frelimo appears comfortable with elected governors until their electoral mandate begins to compete with the party hierarchy. Abdula is unusually well placed to test that limit. He comes from Nampula, has developed a recognisable public identity and presents himself as an active provincial leader rather than an emissary from Maputo. His visibility during security and social crises has strengthened the impression that he answers directly to the province. He has also indicated a willingness to confront established interests, a politically valuable position in a province where public suspicion of elite networks runs deep. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The work behind the work URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-work-behind-the-work/ Last updated: 2026-09-17T17:39:04.000Z Good afternoon. Early each morning, thousands of domestic workers travel from the outskirts of Mozambique’s cities to cook, clean and care for other people’s children. Their labour allows many of their employers, especially women, to leave home and earn a salary. Some of those workers, in turn, depend on relatives or still more poorly paid helpers to care for their own families. This chain of dependency supports much of urban working life, but remains largely absent from official statistics and ordinary labour protections. Agreements are usually verbal, wages vary widely and employers determine working hours. A worker can serve the same household for years without a contract, social security registration or reliable proof of what she is owed. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e65d0f48-a35d-4e58-947b-e205f86df09b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Domestic service in Mozambique also carries a colonial inheritance. Settler households depended on poorly paid African servants whose work was treated as personal service rather than employment carrying enforceable rights. Independence changed who could occupy the employer’s side of that relationship without removing its underlying hierarchy. Black elites and an expanding urban middle class inherited a household economy still sustained by cheap and weakly protected labour. Decree 52/2026 attempts to change that. It generally requires written contracts and social security registration, limits working hours and provides for leave, weekly rest, protection against harassment and a minimum wage to be fixed later by the government. The rules enter into force 180 days after their publication on 3 September. The likely effect will not be uniform. Workers employed by wealthier households may receive contracts, contributions and paid leave. Those employed by families with less money—or competing for work in a crowded market—may be offered fewer days, dismissed or shifted into casual arrangements. The regulation could improve conditions in the most visible part of the sector while driving the rest further out of sight. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola’s Security Apparatus and the Battle for 2027 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-security-apparatus/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T11:12:01.000Z **Welcome to the Angola Briefing**, Zitamar News’ guide to the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola as it heads towards the 2027 elections. Each edition combines the latest reporting with analysis from journalists and specialists who know the country closely. This week, host and Zitamar editor-at-large **Fernando Lima** was joined by **Paula Cristina Roque**, author, researcher and security-sector analyst, and Executive Director of Intelwatch. They discussed the government’s plans for the **North-South railway corridor**, including the €1.084 billion contract for the section towards Menongue, before turning to the political questions dominating the run-up to **2027**: voter registration, recent changes across the armed forces, police and intelligence services, and the unresolved **MPLA succession**. **From next week, the Angola Briefing moves to twice-weekly publication**, with two editions covering the most important political, economic and business developments affecting Angola. We begin with a special edition on the oil and gas industry, featuring analyst [**Marisa Lourenço**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/marisalourenco/?ref=zitamar.com) and economist [**Francisco Paulo**](https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/authors/francisco-paulo/cv??ref=zitamar.com). **If Angola matters to your work, subscribe now to receive both editions each week from next week.** The Angola Briefing remains free during the pilot phase, with selected editions becoming subscriber-only afterwards. --- # THE LATEST NEWS - **BNA cuts interest rates and raises 2026 growth forecast to 6.15%** - **Government advances €1bn North-South railway contract through direct award** - **IN FOCUS: Angola’s succession debate puts the security apparatus under scrutiny** ### 1\. BNA cuts interest rates and raises 2026 growth forecast to 6.15% The Banco Nacional de Angola [cut its benchmark policy rate from 15.75% to 14.75%](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/economia/detalhe/comite-de-politica-monetaria-do-bna-alivia-taxas-de-juro-e-baixa-coeficiente-de-reservas-obrigatorias-em-moeda-nacional-74678.html?ref=zitamar.com) at its September monetary policy meeting and reduced the reserve requirement on local-currency deposits from 17.5% to 16.5%. The central bank said the easing reflected continued progress on inflation and a more favourable short and medium-term outlook. Annual inflation fell to **8.78% in August**, while monthly inflation slowed to 0.59%, from 0.75% in July. The BNA also [raised its forecast for 2026 GDP growth to 6.15%](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/economia/detalhe/comite-de-politica-monetaria-do-bna-alivia-taxas-de-juro-e-baixa-coeficiente-de-reservas-obrigatorias-em-moeda-nacional-74678.html?ref=zitamar.com). It had previously projected growth of 3.6%. The latest revision follows reported year-on-year GDP growth of **8.74% in the second quarter**, with non-oil activity expanding by 9.24% and the oil sector by 5.64%. The bank now expects the non-oil economy to grow by 7.16% this year, supported by agriculture and forestry, fisheries, manufacturing, trade and construction. Credit to the economy stood at **Kz7.31 trillion** in August. It was 11.72% higher than a year earlier, although it had contracted by 1.2% since the beginning of 2026\. International reserves stood at $15.32 billion, equivalent to 6.59 months of imports. ### 2\. Government advances €1bn North-South railway contract through direct award The government has [invited a consortium of Angola’s Omatapalo and Spain’s Quantum Solutions Emerging Markets to submit the proposal for Lot 4 of the North-South railway corridor](https://novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/governo-convida-omatapalo-e-quantum-para-construcao-do-lote-4-do-corredor-ferroviario-norte-sul-obra-foi-aprovada-por-ajuste-directo-e-vale-mil-milhoes-de-euros-74651.html?ref=zitamar.com), covering the section between Station 5 and Menongue. President João Lourenço approved the project in March through a simplified procurement procedure. The maximum price is **€1.084 billion including VAT**. The Transport Ministry’s invitation, published on the Public Procurement Portal, says the simplified procedure was justified by technical and intellectual suitability and by “imperative urgency”. The documentation allows negotiation over price, the construction timetable, financing guarantees and other contractual elements, although the proposed price cannot exceed the €1.084 billion ceiling. The project forms part of the wider Malanje, Kuito and Menongue railway connection, for which Lourenço approved expenditure approaching **€5 billion** in March. > *Roque placed the railway within the political context of the final year before the 2027 election. She argued that large public-works programmes have historically been used for electoral purposes and questioned how much previous infrastructure spending has generated in local employment and associated industries. She also expressed concern about the use of higher oil revenues to finance major projects at this point in the political cycle.* > > *Roque was considerably more critical of the procurement itself. She alleged political connections between Omatapalo and the ruling establishment and questioned the transparency of awarding such a large project without an open competitive tender. Those claims go beyond what is established in the procurement reporting reviewed here and should be treated as her assessment. The published documentation does, however, confirm the use of a simplified procedure and a price ceiling exceeding €1 billion.* > > *The economic test is broader than whether the railway is eventually built. A project of this scale can lower transport costs and connect production centres to markets if freight demand, connecting infrastructure and maintenance are sufficient. Roque’s intervention raises the parallel question of how much of the expenditure remains in the domestic economy through jobs, suppliers and new commercial activity. With close to €5 billion authorised for the wider connection, those outcomes will determine much of the project’s eventual economic return.* --- ## IN FOCUS: Angola’s succession debate puts the security apparatus under scrutiny Angola’s approaching political transition is increasingly difficult to separate from changes inside the institutions that control security and intelligence. President João Lourenço’s [latest personnel overhaul](https://rna.ao/rna.ao/2026/09/02/presidente-joao-lourenco-efectua-mudancas-nas-chefias-das-faa-e-da-policia-nacional/?ref=zitamar.com) reached the armed forces, National Police, Criminal Investigation Service, military justice, intelligence bodies and the Casa Militar. Twenty-six generals and admirals were retired after reaching the age limit, while other officers were moved into posts covering military intelligence, special forces, logistics, provincial police commands and presidential strategic analysis. The process has continued beyond the initial reshuffle. On 9 September, Lourenço approved changes to the organic regulations of the **Serviço de Investigação Criminal**, including the revocation of the 2018 decree that created its dedicated anti-corruption directorate. The same day he replaced the Interior Ministry delegate and provincial police commander in Lunda Norte (see the[ presidential decrees](https://www.lexlink.eu/legislacao/angola/14793/ia-serie/por-tipo-de-documentolegal/2026/172?ref=zitamar.com)). These changes follow an earlier reorganisation at the centre of presidential security. In April, Lourenço removed Francisco Furtado as Minister of State and Chief of the Casa Militar and [transferred](https://www.cipra.gov.ao/noticias/2805/governo/decretos-presidenciais/mudancas-na-casa-militar-do-presidente-da-republica?ref=zitamar.com) Defence Minister João Ernesto dos Santos, known as “Liberdade”, into the role. Some of this can be explained by institutional renewal. Angola emerged from decades of conflict with a large officer corps, and the formal retirement of generals who have reached the statutory age limit is hardly evidence by itself of political manoeuvring. The September decisions also contain considerable continuity. Officers have been shifted between senior positions rather than simply removed from the system, while the principal chiefs of several security institutions remain in place. The political context nevertheless gives these decisions greater weight. Lourenço is serving his second presidential term, while separately seeking another mandate as **MPLA president**. His candidacy for the party leadership was formally submitted in May, and the MPLA’s congress is scheduled for 9 and 10 December. [The party says](https://www.mpla.ao/2026/05/14/processo-de-candidatura-de-joao-lourenco-entregue-a-subcomissao-de-candidaturas-do-mpla/?ref=zitamar.com) that congress will renew its leadership structures and prepare it for the 2027 general election. The eventual choice of the MPLA’s presidential candidate remains a separate process. Lourenço himself has previously said the candidate for the presidency would be selected through the party’s statutory bodies. Speaking on this week’s Angola Briefing, **Paula Cristina Roque** argued that the retirements should be read alongside the continued influence of senior security figures who remain in office. She described the security establishment as top-heavy and suggested further changes could follow as the country approaches the election. She also pointed to economic pressures affecting lower-ranking personnel and questioned how those strains might affect cohesion within the police, armed forces and intelligence services. These are Roque’s assessments rather than established explanations for the personnel changes. The succession therefore raises two overlapping questions. One concerns the MPLA: who can command sufficient support inside the party to become its candidate in 2027, and what relationship would that person have with Lourenço if he remains party president? The other concerns the state: how will the security institutions behave during a transition in which presidential authority, party leadership and the interests of established security figures may no longer sit as neatly with one individual? The recent appointments do not establish that Lourenço is reorganising the security apparatus specifically to manage his succession. They do show that important posts are changing hands at the same time as the political succession moves from a distant question to an immediate institutional problem. The composition of the security leadership, the degree of continuity among its most powerful figures, and any further changes before the December MPLA congress will therefore deserve close attention. --- Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Angola Briefing. We’ll be back next week with a discussion of Angola’s oil industry, looking at the latest developments in production, investment and the sector’s wider economic outlook. Fernando will be joined by **Marisa Lourenço**, strategic risk adviser and political analyst, and **Francisco Paulo**, economist and specialist in taxation, fiscal reform and African development — who joined us earlier this month for a discussion on Angola’s business environment: Thanks again for watching, listening and reading. ### Room on board URL: https://www.zitamar.com/room-on-board/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T16:52:47.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique now has a regular public shipping service carrying commercial freight along its coast. Civitas Partners’ CPG Shipping connects Maputo, Beira, Nacala and the LNG project at Afungi, shifting cargo away from a deteriorating road network and offering businesses an alternative route across a long and geographically difficult country. The advantages are particularly clear in the north. Heavy lorries accelerate the deterioration of the EN1 north-south highway, while floods can interrupt road connections for weeks. Cargo travelling to Afungi by road must also cross parts of Cabo Delgado exposed to insurgent attacks. Ships can move large volumes without imposing the same cost on the roads or facing the same security risks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a19cc35d-3714-4dd3-8795-d598c36ee4c8/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents kill local force member near Nangade-Palma borderInsurgent activity rises in Nangade after period of relative calm![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-ec0e3454-9d79-4403-b5dc-5256dc5d6f0d.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-16-18.07.57-ec885d0d-c898-4181-b5c0-858255690984.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-local-force-member-near-nangade-palma-border/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) CPG says it has carried about 14,000 TEU since beginning regular operations in April 2025\. Transport Minister João Matlombe described this as equivalent to removing approximately 14,000 lorries from the roads, although the two measures are not directly interchangeable: a 40-foot container represents two TEU but may travel on one lorry. The national cabotage total is larger, however, because CPG’s figure excludes the captive services supporting TotalEnergies’ LNG project and Dugongo Cimentos. Those three operations demonstrate that cabotage can serve different markets. TotalEnergies and Dugongo use ships for their own projects; CPG is the largest coastal operator and the only one offering a scheduled service to any customer. It carries food and other consumer goods, and construction materials northwards and brings timber, edible oils, fertiliser and other consumer products south. The shortage of return cargo that undermined earlier operations is becoming less serious. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents kill local force member near Nangade-Palma border URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-local-force-member-near-nangade-palma-border/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T16:26:09.000Z A member of Mozambique’s Local Force militia was killed near the border between Nangade and Palma districts this week, amid increased insurgent activity in the surrounding forests. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### More than a corridor URL: https://www.zitamar.com/more-than-a-corridor/ Last updated: 2026-09-16T10:45:53.000Z Good afternoon and welcome to yesterday's newsletter. South African police last week raided a warehouse in Pretoria containing what they described as a Mandrax laboratory capable of producing as many as 800,000 tablets a day. Two Mozambicans were arrested and described as “runners” - intermediaries working for people whom investigators have yet to identify. Their arrest adds another fragment to a picture extending across Mozambique’s borders. In April, two Mexicans and a Mozambican were arrested at Maputo International Airport on suspicion of international drug trafficking, document forgery and criminal association. Searches in Maputo province subsequently uncovered large quantities of chemical substances. Investigators suspect that the Mexicans intended to establish a drug laboratory and may have links to the Sinaloa cartel. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/65f67b1a-3e4e-4142-b574-16badc64120d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique has long served as a transit route. Heroin and methamphetamine arrive through the Indian Ocean; cocaine comes from Latin America; ports, airports and roads carry consignments towards South Africa and more distant markets. Local couriers, transporters and corrupt officials help the trade move. Such operations require far more than an unguarded beach or a bribed customs officer. They depend on warehouses, companies, false documentation, bank accounts, vehicles and people able to provide protection. The profits must then enter the legitimate economy without attracting scrutiny. Each additional local function gives criminal organisations a firmer place in Mozambique’s commercial and state institutions. Mozambique’s geography makes that process easier. Its long and lightly monitored coastline connects it to maritime routes from Asia. Maputo brings together a port, an international airport, warehouses and road access to South Africa, the region’s largest market. Northern ports and coastal communities offer additional entry points. Legitimate regional trade provides the traffic and infrastructure in which illicit consignments can disappear. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Impunity is the message URL: https://www.zitamar.com/impunity-is-the-message/ Last updated: 2026-09-14T18:43:08.000Z Good afternoon. While President Daniel Chapo was visiting Inhambane last week, armed men arrived at the home of Ilídio Facitela Gustavo in Morrumbene. According to Anamola, they identified themselves as police officers and took him away in front of his wife and child. His body was found the following day in neighbouring Homoíne. Gustavo was Anamola’s political mobilisation coordinator in Morrumbene and is also reported to have been a police officer. Venâncio Mondlane says he was to be a witness in Mondlane’s forthcoming Supreme Court trial over the protests following the disputed 2024 elections. That does not establish who killed Gustavo or why. The abductors may only have posed as police, and Mondlane has not demonstrated that the murder was connected to the trial. But it is the latest in a succession of killings and disappearances affecting people associated with Mondlane and other government critics. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/107045b2-b7b7-409d-ad6b-f8f208bf96f8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mondlane’s lawyer Elvino Dias and Podemos representative Paulo Guambe were shot dead in Maputo in October 2024\. Journalist and opposition activist Arlindo Chissale was abducted in January 2025 and remains missing. Anamola organiser Anselmo Vicente was shot dead in Chimoio in May. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has not been entirely silent. In April, Attorney-General Américo Letela told parliament that three suspects had been identified and questioned in the Dias–Guambe investigation, with two held at the Maputo Remand Centre. Investigators were pursuing three theories, including a possible connection to Nini Satar and a forged death certificate prepared for Edite Cylindo in a case in which Dias had been charged. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The Road to Angola's 2027 Elections: opposition divisions and an MPLA succession battle URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/the-road-to-angolas-2027-elections-618/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:05:25.000Z **Welcome to the Angola Briefing**, Zitamar News’ twice-weekly guide to the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola. **From next week, the Angola Briefing is expanding.** Every Monday and Thursday, we’ll bring subscribers the essential news from Angola, our analysis of what it means, and insight from journalists, analysts and other experts who know the country. The **Monday Briefing will be exclusively for paid subscribers**, giving you a sharper start to the week with the developments and emerging issues we think international businesses, investors, diplomats and other Angola-watchers need to have on their radar. Thursday’s edition will continue to combine our news review with the expert discussion that has become central to the Angola Briefing. **If understanding Angola matters to your work, now is the time to subscribe.** Subscribe now to receive both Briefings each week and support independent, specialist reporting on one of Africa’s most important and least well-covered economies. [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) This week, host and Zitamar editor-at-large **Fernando Lima** is joined by **Florindo Chivucute**, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola and an expert on democracy, civil society and human rights. We begin with worsening hunger in southern Angola despite the inauguration of new dams, the government’s €658 million Luanda water project, and major transactions reshaping the country’s banking sector. Then, in our election special, Fernando and Florindo examine the opposition’s prospects of challenging the MPLA in 2027, the unresolved tensions between UNITA and PRA-JA, and the contest over who could eventually succeed João Lourenço. They also discuss Higino Carneiro’s legal challenge, the independence of Angola’s courts, political violence, voter disengagement and the difficulties of measuring public opinion ahead of the election. --- # TODAY’S STORIES - **Food insecurity worsens in southern Angola despite new dams** ([*FEWS NET*](https://fews.net/southern-africa/angola?ref=zitamar.com), [*CIPRA*](https://cipra.gov.ao/noticias/3095/governo/pcessa/programa-de-combate-aos-efeitos-da-seca-no-sul-de-angola-vai-ser-executado-na-sua-plenitude?ref=zitamar.com)) - **Government approves €658 million expansion of Luanda’s water network** ([*Government of Angola / CIPRA*](https://governo.gov.ao/noticias/3101/governo/em-luanda/rede-de-agua-sera-expandida-para-abastecer-cerca-de-tres-milhoes-de-habitantes-em-zonas-cinzentas?ref=zitamar.com)) - **BFA sale and Standard Bank privatisation reshape Angola’s banking sector** ([*Expansão*](https://www.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/carrinho-compra-3335-do-bfa-ao-bpi-numa-operacoes-avaliada-em-3885-milhoes-de-euros-74422.html?ref=zitamar.com), [*Standard Invest*](https://standardinvest.co.ao/oferta-publica-de-venda-standard-bank-de-angola?ref=zitamar.com)) ### 1\. Southern Angola faces worsening food insecurity despite new dams The UN Food and Agriculture Organization [warns that weaker harvests and a likely dry start to the next growing season could aggravate food insecurity into early 2027](https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AGO&ref=zitamar.com). FAO reports the largest rainfall deficits in central Angola, while southern millet and sorghum yields are expected to be near their five-year average. Separately, [Amnesty International reports that recurring drought and inadequate protection of livelihoods have driven families from southern Angola into Namibia](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/09/namibia-drought-displaced-angolans-face-human-rights-abuses/?ref=zitamar.com), where displaced women and children face human-rights abuses. President João Lourenço [inaugurated the Ndúe and Calucuve dams in Cunene on 5 September](https://scm.gov.ao/web/noticias/barragens-do-ndue-e-calucuve-vai-reforcar-a-seguranca-hidrica-no-cunene?ref=zitamar.com). According to the government, their combined storage capacity is 311 million cubic metres, intended to improve water security and support agriculture and livestock. > *Florindo Chivucute welcomed the investment but questioned whether it would deliver relief quickly enough. He said Friends of Angola had repeatedly called for an emergency declaration and international assistance. His argument exposes a gap between the timescale of infrastructure programmes and the immediate needs of households struggling to feed themselves.* > > *Reliable water supplies could help families protect livestock and resume farming. Recovery becomes harder, however, once animals have been sold or families have abandoned their land. Emergency assistance can preserve the means of earning a living, reducing the risk that one failed season becomes years of dependence.* > > *The dams should therefore be assessed alongside the support available to households through the coming lean season. Chivucute also questioned maintenance arrangements and whether local communities had been sufficiently consulted. Those concerns deserve follow-up: the location and reliability of water access will determine who benefits. Evidence that families can sustain production and remain on their land would tell us considerably more than storage capacity alone.* ### 2\. Government approves €658 million Luanda water project President João Lourenço has authorised a [€658 million project to rehabilitate and expand Luanda’s drinking-water distribution network](https://www.opais.ao/politica/pr-aprova-despesas-de-658-milhoes-de-euros-para-expansao-da-rede-de-agua-em-luanda/?ref=zitamar.com). The government says it could benefit approximately three million residents in densely populated neighbourhoods with inadequate coverage. The authorisation provides for simplified procurement, citing external financing, with Maabar Investments SPC undertaking the work and Oman Investment Bank providing financing under an agreement between Angola and Oman. A further [€19.7 million has been authorised for supervision](https://www.opais.ao/politica/pr-aprova-despesas-de-658-milhoes-de-euros-para-expansao-da-rede-de-agua-em-luanda/?ref=zitamar.com), to be undertaken by a consortium of DAR Al-Handasah and DAR Angola. The government says the scheme will complement existing initiatives, including Bita and Quilonga Grande. > *Expanding distribution could turn investment in water production into a service that reaches more homes. Reliable, affordable supplies would also ease the time and expense households devote to obtaining water, potentially leaving more income available for food and other essentials. Those gains depend on the network working consistently after construction.* > > *The procurement arrangement warrants scrutiny. External financing explains the government’s stated choice of procedure, but the public still needs to understand how the price was assessed and what obligations accompany the financing. Publishing the contract terms and delivery milestones would make it easier to judge value for money and identify delays.* > > *Maintenance was a central concern in the webinar’s discussion of the Cunene dams. The same question applies in Luanda, where new connections will require dependable operation and a budget for repairs. The three-million-person estimate should be treated as a target. Reporting how many households receive water, how regularly and at what cost would provide a more useful measure of progress.* ### 3\. Major transactions reshape Angola’s banking sector BPI has [agreed to sell its 33.35% stake in Banco de Fomento Angola to Congolian Financial, part of the Carrinho Group](https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/bpi-vende-participacao-de-3335-no-bfa-a-angolana-congolian-financial-por-3885-milhoes/?ref=zitamar.com). Fixed payments total approximately €388.5 million, plus a variable amount equal to half the 2026 dividend attributable to those shares. [Completion remains conditional on regulatory clearances and Unitel not exercising its right of first refusal](https://www.cmc.ao/sites/default/files/2026-09/Comunicado%20-%20%20Acordo%20de%20Compra%20entre%20BPI%20e%20CFSA.pdf?ref=zitamar.com). Separately, the state is [offering 34% of Standard Bank Angola between 11 and 25 September](https://www.bfa.ao/pt/centros-investimento/poupancainvestimento/oferta-publica-de-venda-standard-bank/?ref=zitamar.com). Of the bank’s total capital, [24% is reserved for Standard Bank Group and 10% for the public](https://economiaemercado.com/artigo/consorcio-de-sete-sociedades-distribuidoras-lidera-operacao-de-alienacao-de-34-do-sba?ref=zitamar.com). [Trading on BODIVA is expected to begin on 30 September](https://es.marketscreener.com/noticias/angola-aprueba-la-venta-del-34-de-la-filial-de-standard-bank-confiscada-a-un-magnate-ce785bdbd888f023?ref=zitamar.com). > *Chivucute’s concern was that changes in ownership could concentrate economic influence without improving access to credit. Carrinho’s* [*existing interests in BCI and Banco Keve*](https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/bpi-vende-participacao-de-3335-no-bfa-a-angolana-congolian-financial-por-3885-milhoes/?ref=zitamar.com) *make that a legitimate question for regulators, although the BFA agreement does not establish a banking monopoly. Where a commercial group also owns banks, scrutiny of lending to related companies becomes particularly important. Independent credit decisions help protect depositors and competing businesses from conflicts of interest.* > > *The Standard Bank transaction offers a different ownership model, combining greater participation by its international parent with a public share sale. A listing can improve disclosure and give more investors access to bank earnings. Selling existing shares, however, does not itself provide the bank with fresh capital for lending.* > > *Regulators should examine influence across Carrinho’s banking interests and the safeguards on lending within the group. For Standard Bank, the public allocation will be worth watching: who buys the shares, and how effectively minority investors can hold management to account, will shape the listing’s wider value.* --- # **IN FOCUS** # The Road to Angola’s 2027 Elections: opposition divisions and an MPLA succession battle *PRA-JA’s decision to go it alone weakens UNITA’s proposed opposition front, while Higino Carneiro’s legal challenge and an unresolved succession struggle create uncertainty inside the governing party.* Angola’s opposition is preparing for the 2027 election with competing answers to a basic question: how does dissatisfaction become a change of government? UNITA has renewed its [appeal for a broad Patriotic Front](https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/unita-reitera-aposta-em-ampla-frente-patriotica-para-alternancia-do-poder-em-angola/?ref=zitamar.com), while Abel Chivukuvuku says [PRA-JA will stand independently](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/pra-ja-servir-angola-foge-de-bloco-comum-com-outros-partidos-da-oposicao-para-derrubar-o-mpla-em-2027-74385.html?ref=zitamar.com). The disagreement concerns more than campaign tactics. It tests whether parties can offer a convincing account of how they would govern together. That account needs to start with living conditions. [Amnesty International’s September report](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/09/namibia-drought-displaced-angolans-face-human-rights-abuses/?ref=zitamar.com) documents how recurrent drought, compounded by inadequate protection of rural livelihoods, has pushed Angolans into Namibia. In this week’s Angola Briefing, Florindo Chivucute argued that hunger and unemployment were eroding support for the MPLA. His assessment identifies a potential electoral vulnerability; it cannot establish how widespread that shift is. The government has tangible investments to defend. João Lourenço [inaugurated the Ndúe and Calucuve dams on 5 September](https://scm.gov.ao/web/noticias/barragens-do-ndue-e-calucuve-vai-reforcar-a-seguranca-hidrica-no-cunene?ref=zitamar.com), and has authorised a [€658 million expansion of Luanda’s water network](https://www.opais.ao/politica/pr-aprova-despesas-de-658-milhoes-de-euros-para-expansao-da-rede-de-agua-em-luanda/?ref=zitamar.com). Such infrastructure could improve agricultural production and ease households’ burden of securing water. Its value depends on maintenance and distribution long after construction ends. The political test is whether promised benefits reach families; spending commitments alone cannot demonstrate that they do. For rural households, reliable water could protect livestock and reduce the need to sell productive assets during drought. Families already short of food, however, cannot wait for the full benefits of infrastructure. Emergency support and the budgets needed to operate new systems deserve scrutiny alongside construction contracts. An opposition promising better services should explain how it would fund those less visible, continuing obligations. Unity can strengthen a challenge to the MPLA because [the presidency goes to the head of the national list winning the most votes](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/AO/AO-LC01/election/AO-LC01-E20220824/?ref=zitamar.com). Yet coalition arithmetic is imperfect. PRA-JA, [legalised in 2024](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/pra-ja-servir-angola-foge-de-bloco-comum-com-outros-partidos-da-oposicao-para-derrubar-o-mpla-em-2027-74385.html?ref=zitamar.com), has an understandable interest in establishing its own identity. Separate lists could reach voters reluctant to support UNITA, even as they risk dividing support. Votes cannot simply be transferred by agreement between leaders. The governing party also faces questions about internal competition. On 10 September, the Constitutional Court [rejected Higino Carneiro’s injunction challenging the exclusion of his MPLA leadership candidacy](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/tribunal-constitucional-julga-improcedente-providencia-cautelar-de-higino-carneiro-contra-chumbo-a-corrida-a-lideranca-do-mpla-74557.html?ref=zitamar.com). According to Novo Jornal, the court considered intervention premature while internal party remedies remained available. That procedural reasoning should not be mistaken for a determination of who should lead the MPLA, or evidence by itself of presidential interference. Beyond these leadership disputes, [August’s clashes between police and UNITA supporters in Uíge](https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/unita-reitera-aposta-em-ampla-frente-patriotica-para-alternancia-do-poder-em-angola/?ref=zitamar.com) raise questions about the conditions for political participation. Parties need room to organise and voters need confidence that participation is worthwhile. [UNITA’s call for more registration brigades](https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/unita-reitera-aposta-em-ampla-frente-patriotica-para-alternancia-do-poder-em-angola/?ref=zitamar.com) points to practical obstacles that coalition negotiations cannot resolve. Official [turnout was 44.8% in 2022](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/AO/AO-LC01/election/AO-LC01-E20220824/?ref=zitamar.com), although that figure alone cannot explain why registered voters did not cast ballots. The useful test over the coming year is whether governing and opposition parties accept measurable commitments on services and make their financing open to scrutiny. That would give the campaign substance beyond leadership negotiations, and voters a basis for holding the eventual winner to account. --- Thank you for reading the Angola Briefing Newsletter, and to Florindo Chivucute for joining us this week. Tune in next week for a special episode on Angola’s oil sector, exploring the industry’s outlook and what it means for the country’s economy. ### A ban without authority URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-ban-without-authority/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T17:49:20.000Z Good afternoon. The accidental discovery of a new gold-bearing seam near the main Seis Carros mine on 3 September triggered an immediate rush. Miners using picks and hoes dug numerous deep shafts through fragile ground, cutting across a village road and reportedly destroying three precarious homes. Within one week, four pits collapsed and killed 15 miners, including a 16-year-old and an elderly man; six died in the latest collapse early yesterday. The speed of the excavation helps explain the immediate danger. But it does not explain how mining on this scale could resume at a site officially closed for approximately ten months. Seis Carros was already being worked clandestinely, particularly at night, before the latest discovery drew more miners back. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0e5b5c7d-20a5-4b1c-9507-f69a6138f21f/)*.* [Subscribe from just 12$ a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Survivors have alleged that police officers guard the site during the day but allow miners to enter after dark in exchange for payments. All four fatal collapses occurred at night. If those allegations are true, officers responsible for enforcing the closure have instead helped create the conditions in which miners are dying. The claims require an urgent and independent investigation. The authorities should establish who was deployed at Seis Carros, who controlled access and whether money changed hands. Fifteen deaths cannot be treated merely as the consequence of miners ignoring an official prohibition when the prohibition itself may have become a source of illicit income. Vanduzi administrator Armando Mude Canheze offers a different explanation. He blames *gombiros*—unaffiliated miners who enter pits without permission—and says police have avoided confrontation because the men are desperate and could respond violently. He now wants the new excavations filled using machinery protected by a stronger police contingent. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State claims Niassa camp attack a week after the raid URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claims-niassa-camp-attack-a-week-after-the-raid/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T12:53:58.000Z Islamic State has claimed responsibility for last week's attack on a hunting camp and the village of Marangira, in Niassa province, but made no mention of the people abducted during the raid or a local woman whom provincial authorities said was killed. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### A narrowing banking system URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-narrowing-banking-system/ Last updated: 2026-09-11T06:58:13.000Z Mozambique’s five largest banks made a combined profit of MZN8bn ($125m) in the first half of this year, down 16% from approximately MZN9.6bn ($150m) in the same period of 2025. Three of the five earned less. Standard Bank’s profit fell 36%, Millennium bim’s declined 37% and BCI’s dropped 10%. Absa increased its profit largely because expected credit losses fell sharply, while Moza Banco returned to profit as operating income rose and impairment charges declined. The overall picture is therefore one of weakening profitability, despite improvements at two banks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f9157833-b1df-40ed-97dd-83f23387536a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Lending is also contracting. Standard Bank’s net loan book shrank by 11% in six months, including a 17% fall in corporate and sovereign lending. Lending by BCI fell 5% and Moza Banco’s declined 7%, while Millennium bim’s was broadly unchanged. Even stable nominal lending lost value to inflation. Part of the explanation lies with the Bank of Mozambique. In May it increased the reserve requirement on local-currency deposits from 29% to 39%, immobilising a large share of banks’ funds at the central bank without interest. Weak economic conditions have also made businesses and households riskier borrowers. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### More than another meeting URL: https://www.zitamar.com/more-than-another-meeting/ Last updated: 2026-09-09T17:15:37.000Z Good afternoon. The International Monetary Fund delegation arriving in Maputo today may begin negotiations over a new financial programme. Some optimists believe an agreement could emerge from this mission, but the visit is more likely to test whether the government and Fund are ready to negotiate seriously. The previous $456m Extended Credit Facility, approved in May 2022, did not simply reach a successful conclusion. Four disbursements were made, but in April 2025 the government and IMF agreed to abandon the fifth and sixth reviews and begin designing a successor programme. Mozambique is therefore trying to rebuild a relationship that had stopped working. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b2543b71-d09f-49fa-b970-99efea4779be/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (September Update)Islamic State Mozambique’s (ISM) 3 September attack on a tourist hunting camp in Niassa province is the group’s first foray into the province since May last year![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-1e6fbe3c-1995-490f-b81f-e2a908fbbfc4.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/MCM-Dashboard-up-d3cb8fc9-e5a3-4eef-82bc-00ff2b4c833f.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-se/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Since discussions in Washington and Paris earlier this year, Chapo’s government has tried to demonstrate that it accepts some IMF criticism. It has begun rescheduling debt, reducing the public wage bill, enforcing compulsory retirement more strictly, identifying ghost workers, improving fiscal disclosure and addressing problems at state-owned companies. Those steps strengthen its case. But they also expose contradictions. Domestic banks have become reluctant to absorb still more government securities. There are indications —still requiring confirmation— that institutions such as INSS, EDM and other state companies are being encouraged to buy them instead. The argument for this approach is that it would return interest payments to the state rather than to commercial banks. State companies can also negotiate deposits with commercial banks at preferential rates. But if public companies are being used as buyers of last resort for state debt, the government is asking the IMF to support reforms of those same companies while drawing resources away from their core functions. EDM needs capital to maintain and expand electricity supply, not to finance the budget. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (September Update) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-se/ Last updated: 2026-09-09T04:23:21.000Z ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique’s (ISM) 3 September attack on a tourist hunting camp in Niassa province is the group’s first foray into the province since May last year. In August, ISM’s presence in the bordering Montepuez district had prompted the [United States State Department](https://travel.state.gov/en/international-travel/travel-advisories/mozambique.html?ref=zitamar.com) to advise against all travel to Niassa, citing hunting activities as being particularly risky. The recent attack will increase pressure on hunting tourism operators to suspend operations in Niassa. The quandary, however, is that security forces rely on the air assets and trained rangers of tourism companies and conservation organizations that have so far prevented ISM from establishing a presence in Niassa. Elsewhere, the group’s presence in the town of Mocímboa da Praia presents a threat to residents and workers from business and humanitarian organizations in the area, particularly those who are forced to use the N380 due to the temporary closure of Mocímboa da Praia Airport. ## Key developments **14 August |** The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism notes recent calls for dialogue with the insurgents in his [End of Mission Statement](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/08/country-visit-mozambique-end-mission-statement?ref=zitamar.com), amplifying domestic efforts to promote talks with the insurgents. **15 August |** Police [fire on opposition Anamola supporters](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/anamola-contabiliza-quatro-feridos-ap%C3%B3s-a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-policial/a-78388800?ref=zitamar.com) gathering for a march in Quelimane. More than 18 months since 2024’s troubled elections, the potential for widespread political violence remains, particularly in opposition-supporting areas such as Quelimane. **21 August |** Mocímboa da Praia Airport closes for renovation works scheduled to last two months. The development comes after President Daniel Chapo’s [announcement](https://aimnews.org/2026/07/02/comandante-chefe-das-fds-instrui-para-intensificacao-da-ofensiva-contra-o-terrorismo/?ref=zitamar.com) in July that the military headquarters of the Northern Operation Theater had moved from Pemba to Mocímboa da Praia. **24 August |** Members of theLocal Force [attack](https://mozanorte.blogspot.com/2026/08/forca-local-acusada-de-ameaca-e-rouba.html?ref=zitamar.com) the Nicuita village secretary in Ancuabe district, reportedly in relation to a political dispute. The incident highlights continuing issues of indiscipline with the Local Force, which has been under military command since 2023\. **25 August |** Anamola party leader Venâncio Mondlane [announces](https://aimnews.org/2026/08/26/mondlane-summoned-by-supreme-court-over-five-criminal-charges/?ref=zitamar.com) he has been summoned by the Supreme Court to stand trial on charges relating to 2024’s post-election violence. The trial, which is expected to start in the coming months, could be a flashpoint for civil unrest, particularly in Maputo. ## FADM is unable to prevent ISM’s incursion into Niassa province Despite the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique’s (FADM) determined pursuit of ISM fighters in Montepuez and Balama districts, and deployment of forces to Niassa province, it was unable to prevent an ISM incursion into Niassa. On 27 July, an ISM force of up to 150 fighters arrived in Ntola in the Montepuez district. They left Ntola after clashing with a pursuing FADM force on 30 July, when they moved north to the informal Shamba Kubwa gold mining site, where the pursuing FADM force attacked them on 1 August, killing at least 16 militants (*see map below*). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/data-src-image-8064138b-80cd-42e4-b837-cf3a4aaef586.png) The deployment of FADM troops on the Niassa side of the Lugenda river prevented the ISM force from entering the province from Shamba Kubwa. They moved south instead, where FADM attacked them near Lusaka in Montepuez, and again in the Balama district. By this stage, the original ISM force had broken into smaller groups. FADM blocked at least one group from moving back toward Meluco district by deploying along the R698\. On 31 August, a group of around 30 ISM fighters moved from Lusaka into Niassa’s Marrupa district, where on 3 September, they attacked a hunting camp near Nanlixa village and killed two staff members. Other members of staff fled into the bush, and two tourist hunters who were not at the camp during the attack were airlifted to safety. The ISM fighters burned the camp and left with at least two vehicles, which were later found abandoned. Niassa’s hunting season runs from July to November, so the attack will likely prompt cancellations and contribute to a downturn in the hunting tourism sector. The more important implications are for security sector reform. The operations involved troops trained by the European Union, Rwanda, and Algeria, and may encourage continued support to the security sector. ISM’s successful incursion into Niassa illustrates that the group continues to have the upper hand in maneuvering in rural areas. Mozambique may use this argument to leverage support for air assets in counter-insurgency operations in order to reduce reliance on private operators in the province. ## Abductions and arrests in Mocímboa da Praia demonstrate ISM’s continued influence in the town On 14 August, ISM abducted people from the Filipe Nyusi and Josina Machel neighborhoods of Mocímboa da Praia and fishers at sea. They also brought supplies to Malinde, north of the town, by boat. Local sources differed on the number abducted, with estimates ranging from six children to up to 50 women. According to sources in the town, some abductees may have been released after ransom payments. Residents of the targeted neighborhoods are predominantly Makonde. As such, a humanitarian source says that the abductions have contributed to the flight of Makonde people from the town, reflecting Mocímboa da Praia’s long-standing ethnic tensions. ISM also abducted fishers at Tambuzi Island off the coast of Mocímboa da Praia. This was part of a wider spate of abductions off the Macomia coast in which [dozens of fishers were abducted](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-dozens-of-fishermen-off-macomia-coast/) in August. It is unclear if these abductions of fishers were for ransom or forced recruitment. In Mocímboa da Praia town, security forces’ actions against ISM’s support network intensified in August. According to local sources, one woman was arrested in Pemba in connection with the delivery of supplies in Malinde on 20 August. This followed the arrest of a young man suspected of supplying ISM at a FADM checkpoint on the southern side of the town two days prior. He is rumored to be connected to a local figure who is facing terrorism financing charges. Local sources say there is growing concern in the town about the willingness of the town’s youth to support ISM activities in the absence of other opportunities. The concern is shared by authorities, who in August stepped up surveillance of motorcycle operators, increased patrols around the town, and reached out to community leaders for support. If not addressed, ISM logistics operations in Mocímboa da Praia town will continue to support the group’s operations in the province, particularly in coastal areas. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/data-src-image-27b2cdd4-9d81-470a-b9ea-9ca384c4fecb.png) ### A quota for Frelimo URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-quota-for-frelimo/ Last updated: 2026-09-08T20:04:41.000Z Good afternoon. At the Victory Day ceremony in Maputo’s Praça dos Heróis on 7 September, President Daniel Chapo announced that 10% of agricultural projects would be reserved for veterans of Mozambique’s liberation struggle. It is a bad policy in a sector too important to be distributed according to political pedigree. Agriculture supports most Mozambican livelihoods and is fundamental to food security. Land, finance and viable projects are already scarce. Reserving a substantial share for one politically powerful constituency means withholding opportunities from farmers, entrepreneurs and young people who may be better able to use them productively. This is especially provocative in a country where resentment is already intense over the access enjoyed by Frelimo leaders and their families to land, licences, contracts and other valuable state-controlled opportunities. Many Mozambicans will see Chapo’s announcement not as recognition of sacrifice but as another example of the ruling elite reserving the best of the country for itself. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5615e800-558c-40da-8199-d73b17e79236/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The policy is also based on a category that has changed profoundly. Being a liberation veteran was once a biographical fact: a person had participated in the struggle that ended more than half a century ago. It has increasingly become a transferable and effectively hereditary status, extending benefits to children and other descendants who took no part in that struggle. In Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the number of people receiving veterans’ pensions has long been regarded as implausibly high in relation to the number of genuine surviving combatants. Veteran status has become a source of income and influence, while the organised veterans’ lobby can exert considerable pressure on provincial and district officials. The Local Force in Cabo Delgado is nominally associated with veterans, but in practice includes many younger men attracted partly by the prospect of an allowance. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Workers reported killed at Niassa hunting camp are alive in insurgent hands, sources say URL: https://www.zitamar.com/workers-reported-killed-at-niassa-hunting-camp-are-alive-in-insurgent-hands-sources-say/ Last updated: 2026-09-05T17:49:55.000Z Two workers whom Zitamar News reported killed in Thursday’s attack on a hunting camp in Niassa were seen alive in the custody of the insurgents, a source at the safari operators’ association said. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Niassa’s outsourced front line URL: https://www.zitamar.com/niassas-outsourced-front-line/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T15:21:38.000Z Good afternoon. The attack on the Mozambique Wildlife Adventures hunting camp beside Marangira was first of all a lethal assault on its workers. A South African conservation trainee and the camp’s Mozambican head cook were killed, while 13 other employees remained unaccounted for when *Zitamar* reported the incident. [Americans airlifted out of Niassa hunting camp after suspected insurgent attack kills twoThree American hunters flown out by helicopter after camp beside Marangira town is looted and burned; 13 workers still missing![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-69f9e0bc-9064-49df-8fe0-44440f572f1b.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-03-20.24.06-3b7adc6e-f88d-487e-bdee-a5fd4e8ad142.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/americans-airlifted-out-of-niassa-hunting-camp-after-suspected-insurgent-attack-kills-two/) Suspected Islamic State-linked insurgents looted and burned the camp, approximately 40km east of Marrupa and outside the Niassa Special Reserve. They burned one vehicle and loaded another with stolen goods before driving away—the same pattern seen when insurgents attacked the Chapungu-Kambako camp inside the reserve in April 2025. Looting supplies and obtaining transport offer a straightforward explanation for the raid. *Zitamar*’s reporting also indicates that the group intended to continue deeper into Niassa, a province that has provided recruits to the insurgency and contains informal mining areas that could offer supplies and income. Those possibilities caution against claiming that Marangira was selected principally for its propaganda value. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7bc0c233-2db3-4794-bcf9-bb98359ef70d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But the choice of an internationally connected hunting operation deserves consideration. MWA is owned by Carlos Queiroz, the football manager born in Nampula in 1953 who was reappointed as Ghana’s head coach this week. Three American clients, who had been hunting elsewhere in the concession, fled with staff into the bush and were later evacuated by helicopter. Foreigners have reportedly been present at insurgent bases around Catupa. That does not prove that outsiders selected or directed the Marangira attack, but it raises the possibility that the insurgents are receiving advice about targets likely to produce international attention. A concession owned by a globally recognised football manager and hosting American clients would meet that description. The killing of a South African citizen has also alarmed safari operators. South Africa provides clients, professional hunters and expertise to Mozambique’s hunting industry, and news of the death could generate damaging publicity in one of its most important markets. Had the American hunters been killed or taken hostage, the effect would have been greater still. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola’s business climate: confidence returns, constraints remain URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-business-climate-confidence/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:06:55.000Z Angola’s latest economic figures offer some of the strongest evidence in years that growth is broadening beyond oil. [GDP expanded 8.74% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026](https://www.opais.ao/economia/pib-cresce-874-no-segundo-trimestre-com-impulso-do-sector-nao-petrolifero-atingindo-924/?ref=zitamar.com), while the non-oil economy grew even faster, at 9.24%. Diamond extraction, information and communications, hospitality, manufacturing and financial services all recorded double-digit growth. [Inflation also fell to 9.33% in July](https://sge.ine.gov.ao/Indicadores?ref=zitamar.com), returning to single digits after years of much higher price increases. Those numbers suggest an economy moving in the right direction. However, the question remains of how much of that improvement is reaching companies, workers and households. [Unemployment was stuck at 21.5% in the second quarter](https://sge.ine.gov.ao/Indicadores?ref=zitamar.com), and much of Angola’s employment remains informal. Economist Francisco Paulo told the *Angola Briefing* this week that the composition of growth, concentrated in the oil and diamond sectors, helps explain the disconnect. Oil and diamonds can generate large increases in output without creating employment on a similar scale because both industries are highly capital-intensive. Growth in agriculture, manufacturing and other labour-intensive sectors would have a more direct effect on formal employment and household incomes. However, these sectors have not grown at the same rate as oil and diamonds, meaning that many people have yet to feel the benefits reflected in the headline figures. There are other limits to what the headline figures can deliver. Angola still imports much of what it consumes, while weak purchasing power constrains domestic demand. Paulo argued that locally produced goods can also struggle to compete with imports because of the cost of producing and moving goods inside the country. The problem is particularly acute outside the main cities, where poor roads can prevent farmers from getting produce efficiently to major markets. Consequently, especially in rural areas, these growth figures are felt less. While caveats remain around Angola’s impressive macroeconomic indicators, they do not make the improvement any less significant. Non-oil growth above 9% is notable in an economy that has spent decades trying to reduce its dependence on petroleum. Nor is the gap between falling inflation and public perceptions necessarily evidence that the statistics are wrong: slower inflation means prices are rising more slowly, not that they are falling. The test is whether the current expansion lasts long enough, and spreads widely enough, to change the structure of the economy. Stronger formal employment, rising purchasing power, lower logistics costs and sustained private investment would provide more convincing evidence that Angola’s improving numbers are becoming an improvement in economic life. --- Thanks for reading Angola Briefing! This post is public so feel free to share it with colleagues who may also find it useful. --- # Also in the news: ### Higher tolls raise the cost of moving goods Angola has introduced a new road-toll regime, with charges ranging from Kz250 to Kz7,000 at non-border toll stations and from Kz2,500 to Kz85,000 at border crossings, depending on the vehicle. Under [Presidential Decree 147/26](https://www.angolex.com/paginas/decreto-presidencial/regras-operacionais-taxas-postos-portagens-rede-nacional-estradas-147a-26a.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), which entered into force on 18 August, the revenue is assigned to the Road Fund and Emergency Works to finance the conservation and maintenance of the national road network. Payments are made in kwanzas through the state’s RUPE system. [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/situacao-das-portagens-conhecida-esta-quinta-feira-em-luanda-74225.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)[ reported the new tariff structure here](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/situacao-das-portagens-conhecida-esta-quinta-feira-em-luanda-74225.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). > The immediate effect for transport companies is another operating cost in a country where logistics are already expensive. Francisco Paulo expects businesses to pass at least part of the increase through to the prices of the goods they transport. The question is what companies receive in return. > > Paulo argued that higher tolls would be easier to justify if the money produced visibly better roads. Poor maintenance already imposes costs of its own through damaged tyres, vehicle repairs and slower journeys. Those problems extend beyond large freight operators: farmers in some municipalities struggle to get produce from rural areas to the main centres of consumption because the roads are inadequate. > > The government is therefore trying to solve one cost problem by imposing another. If toll revenue improves the road network, businesses could eventually recover part of the additional charge through faster and more reliable transport. Without that improvement, the new tariffs simply add to the cost of moving goods across a large and difficult market. ### New ownership register raises the compliance bar Angola has introduced mandatory registration of companies’ ultimate beneficial owners under **Law 7/26 of 19 August**. The legislation creates a Central Beneficial Ownership Register, requiring companies and other covered entities to identify the individuals who ultimately own or control them. Existing entities have **180 days** to comply. Proof of registration can be required when establishing or maintaining business relationships, while fines for companies can reach **Kz50 million** for very serious infringements. [*Expansão*](https://www.expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/lei-impoe-registo-obrigatorio-do-beneficiario-efectivo-na-central-74332.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)[ reported on the new requirements](https://www.expansao.co.ao/angola/detalhe/lei-impoe-registo-obrigatorio-do-beneficiario-efectivo-na-central-74332.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), while the [legislation itself sets out the registration and disclosure regime](https://lex.ao/docs/assembleia-nacional/2026/lei-n-o-7-26-de-19-de-agosto/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). > The rules strengthen an area that has long affected Angola’s access to international finance. Banks and other regulated businesses need to know who ultimately controls the companies with which they transact, particularly when assessing money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks. > > Paulo argued that the principle is difficult to dispute: financial relationships depend on trust, and identifying the ultimate beneficiary is an established part of due diligence. Angola’s commercial banks already maintain compliance departments, although the new regime could increase their costs. > > Implementation will determine how the reform is received. Paulo cautioned that disclosure requirements need to be applied consistently and for their stated transparency purpose, rather than becoming a tool for pursuing particular individuals. That distinction is important in a system where stronger formal rules will only improve the business climate if companies and investors trust the institutions enforcing them. ### ExxonMobil puts $3bn behind the future of Block 15 ExxonMobil is advancing an investment programme worth around **$3 billion** to extend production from Angola’s Block 15\. Brian Unietis, the company’s director-general in Angola, said this week that the programme covers the extension of Kizomba C until 2032 and Kizomba A and B until 2037\. Block 15 has produced more than 2.7 billion barrels since operations began. [*Economia & Mercado*](https://economiaemercado.com/artigo/exxonmobil-acciona-pacote-de-3-mil-milhoes-usd-para-incremento-da-producao-petrolifera-em-angola?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)[ reported the latest announcement](https://economiaemercado.com/artigo/exxonmobil-acciona-pacote-de-3-mil-milhoes-usd-para-incremento-da-producao-petrolifera-em-angola?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). The investment should not, however, be treated as an entirely new $3 billion commitment made this week. Angola’s petroleum ministry [announced the investment and Block 15 life-extension programme in 2025](https://mirempet.gov.ao/web/noticias/investimento-de-3-mil-milhoes-prolonga-operacoes-no-bloco-15?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), while the ANPG had already agreed an extension of the production-sharing contract to 2037\. The latest announcement provides a clearer timetable for putting those commitments into effect. > For Paulo, ExxonMobil’s willingness to continue committing capital is evidence that major oil companies still see Angola as a market where they can earn a return. That is important as the government tries to stabilise production after years of decline from the peaks reached earlier this century. > > The investment also exposes the central tension in Angola’s diversification story. Oil accounts for a much smaller share of GDP than it once did, yet Paulo noted that it continues to dominate exports, fiscal revenues and foreign investment. Much of the investment that reaches the non-oil economy is itself concentrated in mining, another capital-intensive sector. Agriculture and manufacturing attract far less despite their greater potential to create employment. > > Extending mature fields can protect export earnings and government revenue, but it does not remove the structural problem. Another period of stronger petroleum income would give Angola more resources with which to diversify; history suggests that using those revenues to build productive sectors outside oil is the harder part. ### BFA–Citibank deal strengthens Angola’s dollar link Banco de Fomento Angola has become the first Angolan bank to establish a correspondent banking relationship and open a US-dollar account with Citibank. BFA [announced the agreement on 25 August](https://www.bfa.ao/pt/o-bfa/actualidade/noticias/parceria-bfacitibank/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), saying Citi’s international network would support the processing of transactions and facilitate financial flows between Angola, the United States and other markets. The bank described the agreement as recognition of its governance, risk-control and compliance systems. The deal follows a difficult decade for Angola’s access to dollar correspondent banking. The IMF reported that global banks began withdrawing direct US-dollar relationships with Angolan banks in 2015, forcing more transactions through intermediary institutions and increasing costs. [*Expansão*](https://stg24.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/norte-americano-citybank-e-o-novo-correspondente-bancario-em-dolares-do-bfa-74271.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)[ reports that negotiations between BFA and Citi took more than three years](https://stg24.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/norte-americano-citybank-e-o-novo-correspondente-bancario-em-dolares-do-bfa-74271.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), including an extended due-diligence process. > Paulo sees the agreement as a potentially important step in the rehabilitation of Angola’s international banking links. Direct dollar correspondence could make transactions easier for companies trading internationally and reduce reliance on third-country banking channels. He also expects other Angolan banks to seek similar relationships if BFA’s agreement proves successful. > > There is a wider business-climate argument. Foreign investors need to be able to move capital into Angola and, just as importantly, repatriate profits without excessive friction. A credible domestic banking system with stronger direct connections to global financial institutions lowers one of the practical barriers to operating in the country. > > One agreement does not amount to a wholesale return of international correspondent banking. Paulo cautioned that it is still too early to judge the effects of the Citi relationship. But after years in which Angola’s financial isolation complicated trade and dollar transactions, BFA has provided a test of whether stronger compliance standards can begin reopening channels that were lost a decade ago. Thanks for joining us for this edition of the *Angola Briefing*. We’ll be back next week to bring you the latest developments shaping Angola, and analysis from our panel. See you then. ### Counting what Mozambique produces URL: https://www.zitamar.com/counting-what-mozambique-produces/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T07:03:07.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday's newsletter. Mozambique’s government regularly announces targets for increasing agricultural production, developing value chains and creating domestic industry. But a new publication from the National Statistics Institute suggests that the state does not reliably know how much the country already produces. INE acknowledges that its agricultural figures for 2021-2025 contain gaps and inconsistencies and cannot always be compared across years. In the absence of dedicated field surveys, figures for cultivated land and crop production in 2021 and 2022 were estimated by the agriculture ministry, while some figures for 2024 came from administrative records. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bbfdaa76-dfe0-4ff7-8084-6947ca9a8fc9/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Americans airlifted out of Niassa hunting camp after suspected insurgent attack kills twoThree American hunters flown out by helicopter after camp beside Marangira town is looted and burned; 13 workers still missing![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-31fc099b-3dcd-4974-82cb-c763788531bc.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-09-03-20.24.06-aec70a23-a1a5-475f-a566-88564112b8a2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/americans-airlifted-out-of-niassa-hunting-camp-after-suspected-insurgent-attack-kills-two/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) INE deserves credit for disclosing these limitations. Statistical uncertainty is unavoidable in a country where much economic activity is rural, informal and difficult to observe. Concealing that uncertainty would be worse. But candour does not solve the underlying problem. It is impossible to design or evaluate an agricultural policy without a reasonably dependable baseline. If production supposedly rises, policymakers need to know whether farmers actually grew more or whether the method of estimating their output changed. The same applies to government targets, such as the proposed tripling of cotton production from approximately 20,000 to 60,000 tonnes. Without consistent measurements, success can be declared—or failure concealed—by changing the figures being compared. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Americans airlifted out of Niassa hunting camp after suspected insurgent attack kills two URL: https://www.zitamar.com/americans-airlifted-out-of-niassa-hunting-camp-after-suspected-insurgent-attack-kills-two/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T22:24:19.000Z Suspected Islamic State-linked insurgents attacked a hunting camp in Niassa province on Thursday morning, killing two people and forcing clients and staff to flee into the bush, *Zitamar News* has learnt. Three American hunters were rescued by helicopter. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### An independent governor? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/an-independent-governor/ Last updated: 2026-09-03T09:04:43.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday’s daily. President Daniel Chapo gave Felisberto Navalha an extensive list of instructions when swearing him in on Wednesday as governor of the Bank of Mozambique. The central bank must help address shortages of foreign currency, contain domestic public borrowing, widen access to credit, promote technological innovation and bring financial services to rural Mozambique—all while maintaining low inflation, a stable currency and a sound banking system. These are legitimate objectives. Businesses cannot invest if they cannot obtain foreign currency to import equipment and materials. Farmers and small companies cannot expand without finance. A central bank that protects excellent macroeconomic indicators while the productive economy remains starved of money would have a narrow understanding of stability. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/efb0d0d2-6187-46d3-b35a-e70ed9ff0ba7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chapo was also right that monetary policy cannot solve those problems alone. Mozambique’s shortage of foreign currency ultimately reflects weak and undiversified exports. High interest rates cannot compensate for fiscal indiscipline, poor infrastructure or an unfavourable business environment. The Ministry of Finance and the central bank must talk to each other, particularly when growing domestic borrowing by the state absorbs liquidity that could otherwise finance companies. But the context makes Chapo’s demand for coordination politically sensitive. Many figures in Frelimo, the government and the business sector resented Rogério Zandamela’s strict focus on inflation, tight credit and firm supervision of commercial banks. Zandamela did not always manage those relationships well, and some of the central bank’s penalties could appear arbitrary or disproportionate. Nevertheless, his willingness to resist pressure was an important defence against politically convenient monetary policy. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### One day, two new governors URL: https://www.zitamar.com/one-day-two-new-governors/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T19:36:46.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo’s revocation of Waldemar de Sousa’s appointment as governor of the Bank of Mozambique today may have prevented a damaging situation from continuing. It does not deserve to be presented as evidence of decisive leadership. Naming a governor one evening, postponing his inauguration the following morning and replacing him within 24 hours suggests that the original decision was taken without adequate preparation. The Presidency has cited only “supervening issues”. It has not said that the reversal resulted from the criminal case reportedly opened against Sousa in 2020 over administrative authorisations connected to the hidden debts. The timing invites that conclusion, particularly because activist Adriano Nuvunga publicly raised the case shortly before the appointment was revoked, but it remains an inference rather than an established fact. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f3c96463-7b41-4e12-b240-12708a869095/)*.* # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Chapo revokes central bank governor appointment amid ‘hidden debts’ accusation stormWaldemar de Sousa appointment revoked in less than 24 hours amid protests that he is still facing accusations of having approved $2bn illegal state-backed borrowing![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-2b2089b5-2330-4b84-9e5a-3735e19df012.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-11-14.50.50-f921f5e1-3da7-425e-9124-7605af54db06.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-revokes-central-bank-governor-appointment-amid-hidden-debts-accusation-storm/) [Subscribe from just £9 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) If the case was the problem, it was hardly new. The accusation had been publicly reported six years earlier. Either the Presidency knew about it and initially decided that it presented no obstacle, or those advising Chapo failed to discover something available in the public record. Neither explanation inspires confidence in the integrity checks applied to appointments at the highest level of the state. The security services also have questions to answer. They are supposed to examine the records of potential presidential appointees before their names are approved. If they vetted Sousa, did they identify the unresolved case and report it to the President? If they did, why did the appointment proceed? If they did not, their failure is particularly serious given the sensitivity of the position and the ease with which the information could be found. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo revokes central bank governor appointment amid ‘hidden debts’ accusation storm URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-revokes-central-bank-governor-appointment-amid-hidden-debts-accusation-storm/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T06:43:07.000Z Mozambican President Daniel Francisco Chapo on Tuesday named economist Felisberto Dinis Navalha as governor of the Bank of Mozambique, reversing the appointment of Waldemar Fernando de Sousa that had been announced only the previous evening. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A trial with no easy winner URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-trial-with-no-easy-winner/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T21:24:47.000Z Good afternoon. Venâncio Mondlane’s trial presents Mozambique’s government with an awkward political calculation. A conviction could remove or constrain the country’s most effective opposition politician. But the proceedings could also give Mondlane a national platform, reinforce his claim to be the victim of political persecution and deepen the divisions left by the disputed 2024 elections. Mondlane and Anamola have therefore called for the trial to be broadcast live. That demand is not merely about transparency; Mondlane is a skilled communicator who may welcome the opportunity to turn a criminal prosecution into a public judgment on the election, the conduct of the police and the government’s treatment of its opponents. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Waldemar de Sousa named new Bank of Mozambique governorFormer central bank director replaces Rogerio Zandamela who has spent a decade in the top job![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-bd86928e-2c8d-492a-a025-d90346557fb7.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-11-14.50.50-e6ab0f82-296b-40e8-ac78-11b5c94939b2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/waldemar-de-sousa-named-new-bank-of-mozambique-governor/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It will also be a test of the Supreme Court. The judges must demonstrate that they can assess an intensely political case independently, requiring the prosecution to prove each charge rather than accepting the government’s account of the post-election crisis. The five charges reportedly carry combined potential sentences exceeding 20 years. That is relevant to the dispute over Mondlane’s immunity: lawyers argue that, because the alleged offences effectively carry a life sentence*,* proceedings could continue without authorisation from the Council of State. Its decision of 10 June may therefore have been legally unnecessary, making its political purpose still more questionable. The seriousness of labels such as “incitement to terrorism” must be matched by evidence connecting Mondlane’s words or actions to identifiable crimes. The post-election violence was not simply generated by Mondlane. It arose from widespread frustration over the election results, the opaque and discredited processes that produced them and the state’s response to the protests. Calling demonstrations and stoppages does not by itself make Mondlane responsible for every subsequent death or act of destruction. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Waldemar de Sousa named new Bank of Mozambique governor URL: https://www.zitamar.com/waldemar-de-sousa-named-new-bank-of-mozambique-governor/ Last updated: 2026-08-31T21:06:29.000Z Waldemar de Sousa, a former director of the Bank of Mozambique, will succeed Rogerio Zandamela as governor of the central bank tomorrow, the Mozambican presidency announced on Monday evening. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Powered by dividends URL: https://www.zitamar.com/powered-by-dividends/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T18:39:57.000Z Good afternoon. Electricidade de Moçambique reported a net profit of about $113m for 2025\. Look closely, and the figure flatters the company. Almost all of it, some $111m, came as dividends from the firms EDM holds stakes in, most of it from CEZA, the company set up to take over Portugal's share of the Cahora Bassa scheme. The operating result, what EDM earns from buying, moving and selling electricity, was only about $32m, a margin of 3.5% on revenue. Strip out the dividends, and the business of keeping the lights on barely covers its costs. That income is an advantage, of course. Most African utilities would be glad of a dependable dividend arriving each year from a stake in a large hydro asset. The trouble is what the money is doing: rather than funding expansion, it's filling the gap the core business can't cover, so that EDM can report a profit at all. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0ed690cc-5f46-404e-be7c-07f641636e02/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) EDM has been tasked with delivering the government's promise of electricity for every Mozambican by 2030\. The chairman, Joaquim Ou-chim, talks of 58 administrative posts still to reach, but that measures territory on a map, not households with power. The real yardstick sits in the government's own National Energy Compact, drawn up for the World Bank's Mission 300\. It puts access at 60.1% in 2024, though EDM now claims about 70%, and says reaching everyone by 2030 will take another 4.9m connections: about 423,000 a year on the grid, and 435,000 a year off it. In 2024, EDM made about 412,000 on-grid connections, close to the annual rate required. Off-grid, however, where the poorest and most scattered households are, it managed 140,000, less than a third of the pace needed. Off-grid is meant to deliver 29% of what remains, the part EDM finds hardest and least profitable, and it's the part falling furthest behind. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola’s election-year spending dilemma URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-election-year-spending-dilemma/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:08:15.000Z **Welcome to this week’s Angola Briefing**, our regular review of the political and economic developments shaping Angola, combining the most important news of the week with analysis from our expert panel. This week, host and journalist **Fernando Lima** was joined by **Florindo Chivucute**, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, and **Cláudio Silva**, Angolan entrepreneur and political and economic commentator, to discuss the mounting economic pressures as Angola heads towards the 2027 elections, as well as the latest developments in the MPLA succession, political tensions in Uíge and the Lobito Corridor. Below, we bring together the key news and the main insights from their discussion. Angola is now a year away from its next general election, and the economic choices that will shape the campaign are becoming harder to postpone. The government has powerful political reasons to protect consumers and accelerate visible public investment, but the state of the public finances is pulling hard in the oppposite direction. The tension is evident in the latest fiscal figures. Angola recorded a deficit of Kz3.9 trillion ($4.3 billion) in the first half of 2026, according to calculations by *Expansão* based on Finance Ministry data, up 259% from the same period last year. Spending on goods and services rose 54.1%, while expenditure on fuel subsidies increased 55.6%. Fuel illustrates the government’s predicament particularly well. The economic case for phasing out subsidies has long been clear: they are expensive, encourage cross-border smuggling and divert resources from other priorities. But previous increases in fuel prices have contributed to social unrest, making further reform considerably more politically difficult as the 2027 election approaches. Cláudio Silva told this week’s Angola Briefing that he sees little prospect of another substantial fuel-price increase before the election. His expectation is instead that the government will once again turn towards infrastructure and other highly visible expenditure as voting approaches, following a pattern seen ahead of previous elections. The inauguration this week of the new Luanda Convention Palace offers an awkward backdrop to that debate. The government presents the 80,000-square-metre complex, which includes a 3,000-seat theatre and facilities for major international meetings, as part of Angola’s attempt to attract conferences and other large events. There may be a legitimate economic argument for building such infrastructure, but at a time of intense pressure on household incomes it also invites questions about opportunity cost and the government’s spending priorities. That matters because the political return from a traditional pre-election spending push is far from guaranteed. Silva argued during our discussion that inaugurating infrastructure shortly before an election has become a familiar MPLA strategy, yet the party’s electoral support has nevertheless declined substantially over successive elections. Florindo Chivucute made a related point: younger voters in particular are more likely to judge the government on jobs, education, services and their economic prospects than on the MPLA’s historical record. Finding the money presents another problem. The government can borrow domestically or externally, postpone other expenditure or hope that oil revenues provide additional room, but none offers unlimited resources. And while the IMF has no programme in Angola and therefore limited direct leverage over government decisions, international lenders and investors ultimately make their own judgements about Angola’s fiscal trajectory and the price at which they are prepared to finance it. This leaves the MPLA confronting a difficult electoral calculation. Fiscal restraint, further subsidy reform and tighter control of public investment could strengthen the economy but impose costs on voters before they go to the polls. Spending heavily might postpone some of that pain and create a sense of activity, but could also increase borrowing requirements and eventually add to inflationary and currency pressures. More fundamentally, it is unclear whether another burst of state spending can substantially change political attitudes that have formed over years. As Silva put it during our discussion, dissatisfaction is rooted not simply in today’s prices but in employment, education, healthcare and perceptions of economic management. The choice facing the government is therefore not simply whether to spend more before 2027\. It is whether Angola still has the fiscal space to mount a conventional pre-election push — and whether doing so would deliver the political return the MPLA needs. --- # Also in the news: ## Higino Carneiro keeps the MPLA succession question alive The battle over who will lead the MPLA into 2027 remains unresolved, with Higino Carneiro continuing to challenge the rejection of his candidacy for the party presidency. The MPLA’s candidacy commission declared his application null in July, saying its verification found only 2,561 valid subscriptions among 14,493 examined and alleging false and irregular documentation. The Constitutional Court subsequently admitted Carneiro’s request for a precautionary suspension of that decision and ordered the MPLA to respond. > Carneiro’s challenge matters beyond the immediate question of whether he eventually appears on the ballot at the MPLA congress. The episode is testing whether a senior figure from within the party establishment can mount a genuine challenge for its leadership, at a moment when President João Lourenço has yet to settle publicly the question of succession. > > Our panel was deeply sceptical about Carneiro’s prospects. Chivucute argued that the concentration of political and institutional power around the presidency leaves him fighting on an uneven playing field, while Silva placed the dispute in the longer history of an MPLA that has rarely tolerated genuine competition for its top job. Silva’s prediction was unequivocal: Lourenço will ultimately face no meaningful challenge for the leadership. > > Whether that prediction proves correct remains to be seen. But the Carneiro affair has already turned what might otherwise have been a managed internal succession process into a public argument about how much competition the MPLA is prepared to accommodate within its own ranks. ## Uíge raises an early warning over political space Violence surrounding a planned UNITA event in Uíge has added another dimension to concerns about the political environment ahead of 2027\. UNITA’s youth wing said 31 people were injured, ten seriously, during the police intervention on 8 August. Police said they had used “moderate force” after organisers failed to comply with instructions to move the event, and senior police officials have since rejected what they describe as attempts to turn the incident into a partisan controversy. > The disagreement over precisely what happened is itself significant. Silva noted during our discussion that images and video circulated rapidly on social media, making it harder for official accounts of confrontations to go unchallenged. More broadly, both panelists saw Uíge as part of a longer-running problem in which opposition mobilisation is treated differently from activity by the ruling party. > > Chivucute expects pressure to fall particularly heavily on political organisations regarded as a genuine threat to the MPLA, rather than being applied uniformly to every opposition party. Silva offered a slightly different interpretation: the security forces, he argued, become especially uncomfortable when any organisation demonstrates an ability to mobilise substantial numbers on the streets. > > Either way, Uíge is an early test of something that will become increasingly important over the next year: whether opposition parties can organise and campaign freely as the election approaches. With Angola’s young population increasingly distant from the experience of the civil war, attempts to deter political mobilisation may also have a different effect from those they produced in previous generations. ## Lobito Corridor moves another step closer to reality The Lobito Corridor received another significant financial commitment this month, with the African Development Bank approving a $255 million loan and $10 million grant to support Zambia’s participation. The financing is intended to help develop the Zambian leg of the corridor, including a new railway connection towards Angola, alongside roads, trade facilitation, energy and other investments. The AfDB says further resource mobilisation could eventually take its contribution to as much as $500 million. > For Silva, the accumulation of financing and infrastructure commitments is evidence that Lobito is moving beyond geopolitical rhetoric towards something tangible. Connecting the existing Angolan and Congolese rail systems effectively, and ultimately extending the corridor into Zambia, would turn the Port of Lobito into a much more important Atlantic outlet for the mineral-rich Copperbelt. > > The larger question for Angola is what happens around the railway. Transit fees and port activity are obvious benefits, but the corridor’s economic significance will depend on whether it generates investment, industry and employment inside Angola rather than functioning principally as a route carrying Congolese and Zambian minerals to the coast. > > Chivucute was optimistic that Western and multilateral involvement could bring greater scrutiny and local benefits, while stressing that these outcomes depend on how agreements are negotiated and implemented. That is increasingly the right benchmark for Lobito: not whether the corridor will happen, but who captures the value as it does. ### The fight for Frelimo begins URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-fight-for-frelimo-begins/ Last updated: 2026-08-27T19:09:45.000Z Good afternoon. Frelimo has set the date and place for its 13th congress: Nampula, from 20 to 25 July next year. It’ll be the first congress held under Daniel Chapo’s leadership. The Central Committee meeting in Chimoio this week that fixed the date appeared routine, but it fired the starting gun for nearly a year of manoeuvring over who controls the party. The congress matters because of what it produces. Delegates will elect a new Central Committee, which will in turn choose the Political Commission, Frelimo’s most powerful executive body and one whose decisions routinely influence the government. A strong party leader traditionally uses those elections to consolidate control. Chapo inherited national party structures formed before he became Frelimo president and does not yet have a machine comparable to the one Armando Guebuza and Filipe Nyusi had once commanded. The question is whether he can build one in Nampula, or will continue governing through organs containing several competing interests. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4813fc07-2502-4828-9f37-db5704917182/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) There is a related argument about how far the president of the republic should follow decisions taken by a party body with no constitutional authority over the state. Some figures in Frelimo have questioned whether the present Political Commission is sufficiently aligned with Chapo. That framing suits the president’s supporters, but misrepresents the institution. The Political Commission is a party organ, not Chapo’s cabinet, and is meant to take collective decisions. There is also little public evidence that it has tried to prevent him from governing. Its members know their positions would be contested after Chapo’s inauguration in January 2025, and open confrontation with the sitting party president would give them little advantage. Chapo nevertheless has a choice. He can try to fill the Central Committee and Political Commission with loyalists, giving himself firmer control of Frelimo. Or he can accept competing tendencies and people prepared to challenge him. The first option would make internal management easier, but weaken his claim that renewal means greater openness and self-criticism. Replacing allies of Filipe Nyusi and other tendencies with allies of Daniel Chapo would alter the balance of power without changing the system. And this is what exactly Frelimo apparatchics are expecting. Inflammatory language claiming a determined battle against corruption, but the status quo of privileges and patronage to be maintained. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The First Lady's invisible partners URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-first-ladys-invisible-partners/ Last updated: 2026-08-26T17:22:24.000Z Good afternoon. Gueta Chapo says the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) is tired of asking for money. On a visit to Chimoio this week, the First Lady, who also chairs the ruling party's women's wing, announced that it would build a large hotel, complete with an events hall for weddings, as the commercial heart of a new "women's sustainability centre." The complex, she said, "must make money." The organisation had to stop going around with its hand out. The aim is reasonable. But a business needs capital before it earns any, and a body with no money cannot build a hotel by itself. Someone else will pay. Neither Gueta nor the report of her visit named the cost, the owner, or the operator. In Mozambique, those who pay for the ruling party's ventures expect a return, and her plan to copy the model everywhere only multiplies the question of what that return would be. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/67a21cf4-895f-4c60-979f-d2b7394eb864/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The same silence runs through everything her office does. In February she [promised](https://www.zitamar.com/gueta-antoinette-trips-on-her-capulana) a free capulana to every Mozambican woman, some 18 million of them, for Women's Day on 7 April, without saying who would pay. By April, she was admitting she had no factory, that the cloth depended on "partners" and donations, and that the churches might step in. The promise fell apart. In Anchilo, in Nampula, women who came out to demand what they'd been promised were dispersed by riot police with tear gas and live rounds. Two were wounded, one of them a child. It happened again in April, when the First Lady arranged treatment in India for a sick young man, Dillan Vasco. The news came in a presidential communiqué that praised her work "with partners," named none of them and gave no figures. Charity is announced from the presidency, credited to anonymous benefactors and never itemised. The public is invited to applaud and told nothing. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cheap at the price URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cheap-at-the-price/ Last updated: 2026-08-25T18:09:02.000Z Good afternoon. On Friday, a subsidiary of Shandong Xinsheng Minerals, the Chinese company formerly called Shandong Yulong Gold, completed its purchase of 70% of Triton Minerals’ graphite assets in Cabo Delgado, closing a deal that stalled this year in a payment dispute. The A$17m ($11m) sale covers the Ancuabe project and the Cobra Plains concession, buying control from a small Australian company that could never fund the digging. On its own it would be a footnote, but it fits a pattern that is starting to look deliberate. The same appetite was on show in January, when President Daniel Chapo cut the ribbon on a graphite mine and processing plant at Nipepe, in Niassa, built by DH Mining, part of China’s Jinan Yuxiao group, at a reported cost of between $150m and $200m and a planned 200,000 tonnes a year. Between them, Chinese companies now control a large portfolio of undeveloped graphite deposits in the north along with its biggest new processing plant. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5b88cdcc-df6c-41cc-994f-f3faf737620e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chinese control is far from complete, and that is what Mozambique still has to lose. Syrah Resources of Australia owns the far larger Balama mine, rated at about 350,000 tonnes a year, though running below that; a German-owned mine at Ancuabe, part of the AMG group, shipped to Germany for years before being suspended in 2023; and the UK’s Total Graphite holds two undeveloped deposits, at Montepuez and Balama Central. Graphite matters more than its low profile suggests. It’s the main ingredient in the anodes of the batteries in electric cars and grid storage, and its supply chain is the most concentrated of any critical mineral. China mines about three-quarters of the world’s natural graphite and does around 90% of the processing that turns it into battery material. Western governments have spent years and billions building an alternative, and Mozambique, with some of the best deposits anywhere, is central to that effort. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A new era without a reckoning URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-new-era-without-a-reckoning/ Last updated: 2026-08-24T18:01:11.000Z Good afternoon. Daniel Chapo closed Frelimo’s National Cadre Conference in Chimoio on Sunday by declaring the start of a “new era” in the ruling party. In Frelimo, there is no room for the corrupt, he said, no place for thieves, and the party is no sanctuary for criminals. He promised to shake the party’s tree until the rotten fruit falls. The language was unusually blunt, and the message was familiar. Chapo declared a new era once before, at his inauguration in January 2025, with the same pledges to fight corruption, open opportunities for the young and bring government closer to the public. The improvements since have been modest. The conference was a chance to say what would now change inside the party that has governed Mozambique for 51 years. Instead, he offered another statement of intent. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a2318b18-ee12-4920-bf64-0c316c80bfc2/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chapo acknowledged that listening without acting would frustrate the public. Yet the conference made no binding decisions. Its recommendations go to an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee on Wednesday, and later into the theses for next year’s party congress. The new era begins with proposals for further consideration. More revealing was his diagnosis of Frelimo’s damaged reputation. A small minority of members involved in corruption, organised crime and drug trafficking, he argued, had led society to associate their conduct with the party. Each offender should answer individually, without their crimes being tied to Frelimo. That is a convenient distinction, and it does not fit Mozambique’s experience. Corruption involving Frelimo members has not simply been individuals stealing while the party looked away. Access to state jobs, public contracts, business licences and natural resources has long run through political connections, and state resources are routinely turned to the party’s advantage at election time. Businesspeople cultivate Frelimo because political protection can decide who reaches the state and its money. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The coast the state is losing URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-coast-the-state-is-losing/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T19:55:15.000Z Good afternoon. Frelimo's national cadres conference opens today in Chimoio, where the ruling party will spend three days discussing the country's direction. Far to the north, on the Cabo Delgado coast, a quieter contest is going the other way. The state is losing its grip on the fishing communities, and the insurgents are moving in. In March, a navy patrol opened fire on six fishing boats off Calugo, near Mocímboa da Praia, killing at least 13 young men. It was the deadliest in a run of such attacks. Since early 2024, the navy has targeted fishermen at least ten times, leaving at least 85 dead. The Calugo killing drew unusual attention, and the criticism appears to have registered. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e5a2b8da-c42d-4003-891c-ee204e8cfa47/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Since then, *Zitamar* has not found another fatal attack by the navy on fishermen. That deserves notice, and it may reflect changed orders or more restraint. But no policy change has been announced, and fewer reported killings could equally mean less patrolling or thinner reporting. In May the navy itself seized two boats off Pangane and, sources say, demanded about $4,000 to return them. This week soldiers stand accused of beating fishermen. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Processing intentions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/processing-intentions/ Last updated: 2026-08-20T18:43:22.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s plans to claim a free 15% stake in mining projects and allocate at least 20% of extracted minerals to domestic consumption and processing reflect a familiar and reasonable ambition: the country should retain more of the value generated by its natural resources. The 15% holding should give the state a direct interest in successful projects without requiring it to finance the initial investment. But ownership alone does not guarantee substantial public revenue. The value of the stake will depend on how projects are financed, how their costs are calculated, and whether profits are eventually distributed. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b9fdaaf3-f549-4cba-8ee4-8c8b1adf5769/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Islamic State insurgents retreat from edge of Niassa reserveMilitants who reached the buffer zone of the Niassa Special Reserve in late July have pulled south and east along the Messalo River, easing fears of a push into Niassa province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-d7e0e994-4c5c-4176-bcf4-72f294ada0a2.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-08-20-17.16.16-eb8090ae-4936-4b99-8703-46899cbe2056.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-insurgents-retreat-from-edge-of-niassa-reserve/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The 20% domestic requirement raises still more questions. Does “allocation” mean mining companies must sell locally if a buyer exists, or that one-fifth of production cannot be exported even when Mozambique has no industry able to use it? What level of activity will qualify as processing? Minerals are commonly cleaned, separated or graded before export, but that is very different from manufacturing finished or intermediate products inside Mozambique. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State insurgents retreat from edge of Niassa reserve URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-insurgents-retreat-from-edge-of-niassa-reserve/ Last updated: 2026-08-20T15:28:04.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents who reached the edge of the Niassa Special Reserve in late July have retreated south and east along the Messalo River, moving away from the reserve after a series of clashes with Mozambican government forces. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Counted, not recovered URL: https://www.zitamar.com/counted-not-recovered/ Last updated: 2026-08-19T18:43:27.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s anti-corruption system is getting busier, and on its own terms that looks like progress. In the first half of 2026, the Central Office for Combating Corruption (GCCC) handled 1,646 cases, up 9.1% from 1,509 a year earlier. It concluded 559, against 491, and issued indictments in 368 of them. That’s real activity, and it shouldn’t be dismissed. The financial result is much harder to defend. The GCCC put the indicative loss to the state in the cases it handled at MZN3.235bn ($50.6m) and reported recovering MZN581,130 ($9,100). On the figures as presented, that is 0.018% of the loss: for every MZN1,000 identified as lost, less than 20 cents came back. If the two figures cover different stages or sets of cases, the GCCC should say so. As published, the recovery rate is close to zero. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1e3a61f1-79bd-43d9-be7f-41ce02e5afcb/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That gap matches the diagnosis in the Centre for Public Integrity’s report on Mozambique’s National Integrity System, published in June. It describes a country with an extensive body of anti-corruption laws and institutions whose application remains formal, reactive and poorly coordinated. The GCCC keeps files moving, but too few prosecutors and investigators, insufficient funding, weak technology and limited coordination hold back the results. The government’s own 2023–2032 Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption in Public Administration (EPCCAP) identified weak accountability for offenders and poor communication between internal audit units and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. President Daniel Chapo has repeatedly promised to fight corruption, and his government has taken an institutional step by creating the State Inspectorate-General and appointing its leadership in May. But the credibility of that reform will depend on published findings, referrals, sanctions and the recovery of public money, including in cases involving state companies or politically connected officials. The GCCC figures show how wide the gap between institutional change and measurable results remains. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The case for talking URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-case-for-talking/ Last updated: 2026-08-18T17:05:06.000Z Good afternoon. Almost nine years into the war in Cabo Delgado, the insurgents are still there. Mozambican troops, Rwandan forces and, until 2024, a Southern African regional mission have recovered towns and reduced the territory under insurgent control. They have not ended the war. A UN Security Council monitoring report published this month estimates that Islamic State Mozambique has grown to 400-500 fighters despite continuing multinational operations. It says recruitment intensified between December and March, and that the group has pushed south towards mineral-rich Meluco and Montepuez and into Ancuabe and Chiúre. Having spent years courting the coastal communities it relies on, the group has now turned on them, seizing fishing boats and their crews along the Macomia coast. Nine years after the first attack, the insurgency is mobile, adaptive and able to replace at least some of its losses. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/66f4df15-54bf-450b-9500-98f2fd30b841/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The estimate shouldn't be treated as a census. The monitoring team doesn't publicly explain how it arrived at the range, and casualty and recruitment figures in Cabo Delgado remain opaque. Recent government operations inflicted insurgent losses, particularly around Catupa and in the coastal Macomia, but there's no exact public count of the dead. The report is more convincing on direction than on precision: continued recruitment, movement into new districts and the use of small cells all show that military pressure has contained the group without eliminating it. Ben Saul, the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, reached a similar assessment during his visit to Mozambique this month. He describes the military posture as “offensive defence”, containing and reacting to the insurgents rather than pursuing them. This may reduce the intensity of the fighting, he warns, but it leaves the group room to reorganise. Attacks against civilians have become more frequent, severe and geographically dispersed over the past year. A military solution, Saul concludes, does not appear imminent. His report then presses a question Maputo has acknowledged in principle but not pursued in practice. Saul says some political leaders have shown openness to dialogue, although no official initiative has followed. That observation cites a 2026 Institute for Security Studies paper, but the openness is not merely second-hand. In a 2025 interview with Al Jazeera, Chapo said his government was trying to understand the insurgency’s leadership and motivations, and argued that wars ultimately end at the negotiating table. That was a public signal of willingness, but it has yet to produce a channel, an intermediary or preparations for talks. Saul’s recommendation is therefore the next logical step: after nine years, Mozambique should consider where negotiations to reduce and ultimately resolve the conflict could begin. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The unreformed police URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-unreformed-police/ Last updated: 2026-08-17T17:23:06.000Z Good afternoon. On Saturday, police fired tear gas to stop members and supporters of Anamola marching through Quelimane after a rally marking the party’s first anniversary. The marchers were gathered at the Sagrada Família football pitch and meant to walk through the city after the speeches. Police deployed along the main avenues made sure they did not. On Monday, the Zambezia police command gave its account, in a statement carried by the broadcaster Miramar. It said Quelimane is midway through a ten-day carnival, and that the authorities had agreed with Anamola beforehand to hold only a static rally, not a march. When the rally ended, and people tried to form a marching column, the police say they ignored orders to disperse, threw stones and broke a police windscreen, and that the gas, lasting about five minutes, contained that. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/16692408-c3d6-4f54-91bd-fdfdf73b55a0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The account answers one question and opens several. Under Mozambican law, a march can be restricted, but by the civil authorities, in writing, not by the police on the day, and the command has shown no such order. Its version also runs against the weekend footage, which shows a crowd preparing to move off with no disorder before the gas, and against Anamola's account that it had notified the route. The city's own mayor called the response muscled and disproportionate, hard to square with a claim that all sides had agreed to the terms. Whether stones came before or after the gas is what an independent inquiry is for. A public-order power is not a blank cheque to be cashed after the event. That is why the context matters. The gas went off a day after Ben Saul, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, ended a ten-day visit with a statement listing extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and excessive force by the security services. His subject was Cabo Delgado, not opposition rallies, but the thread is the same: a security apparatus that answers to no one. And it lands a week before Frelimo gathers its cadres in Chimoio, from 21 to 23 August, for a conference the party is selling as its own renewal. A show of strength by Mondlane, in a city the opposition already governs, was never going to be welcome that week. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A convenient enemy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-convenient-enemy/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T21:01:42.000Z Good afternoon. Every few months, an official explains that the state cannot stop the plunder of Cabo Delgado’s forests because the insurgency has made the province too dangerous to police. The provincial delegate of the environmental agency (AQUA), Achimo Francisco, gave *Notícias* the latest version this week (see below): security risks have restricted field inspections, he said, and the agency has been forced to move its main inspection centre to Montepuez. It is half the story, and the more comfortable half. A 2024 Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) research found that more than 89% of the timber Mozambique sent to China between 2017 and 2023, some 3.7m tonnes worth $1.3bn, was exported in breach of the national ban on log exports. Former environment minister Celso Correia once estimated that illegal logging cost Mozambique more than half a billion dollars a year. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1657d558-6a43-4ed1-9892-ba608527d5d1/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The conflict in Cabo Delgado cannot explain a trade of this scale. Timber must be cut, loaded, driven through checkpoints, processed, documented, and placed aboard ships. There are documented cases of detained trucks being released after calls from senior members of the Frelimo establishment or veterans of the liberation struggle. Chinese traders cultivate the same political protection. The EIA reported that Chinese timber and mining trader Yu Guofa, known as “Cabeça Grande”, claimed close relations with former president Filipe Nyusi and former general Alberto Chipande. Another source told the investigators that Chipande helped him obtain timber documents. Former minister Isabel Nkavandeka, an influential Frelimo figure, owns a 10,000-hectare concession in Muidumbe. The EIA reported that a Chinese businessman allegedly used her export licence in a scheme involving 102 containers of illegal timber sent to China and subsequently returned to Mozambique. Nine people were reportedly charged, but Nkavandeka was not among them, and her concession and export licence were not suspended. Her case allegedly shows how legal concessions and political connections may provide cover for a much larger illegal trade. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Angola’s Foreign Policy: Balancing Old Partners and New Opportunities URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/angolas-foreign-policy-balancing/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:12:24.000Z Welcome back to Angola Briefing from Zitamar News. This new product is still in a pilot phase, and for the month of August will: - Remain free to watch, listen to, and read - Run once a week, except for the week of Thursday the 20th, when it will take a break to allow for staff holidays. The pilot phase will allow us to hit the ground running in September with a regular Briefing helping investors, diplomats, IFIs and other stakeholders understand and make informed decisions on Angola. The new model will feature editions focused on particular issues, featuring sector experts. Please get in touch if there are issues you would particularly like to see covered, or questions you would like answered. You can hit reply if you’re reading this as an email, leave a comment online, or get into the Angola Briefing chat on Substack. In this episode, we look at Angola’s fuel shortages, the new “fake news” law and worsening food insecurity in the south, before turning to the country’s evolving foreign policy and how Luanda is balancing closer ties with the US and Europe against its longstanding relationships with China and Russia. Please help the Angola Briefing to grow by forwarding this email or otherwise sharing the Briefing with friends and colleagues with an interest in Angola. And make sure you subscribe, for free, to keep receiving all our Briefings and updates. # **IN FOCUS** ## Angola’s Foreign Policy: Balancing Old Partners and New Opportunities > *Luanda is drawing closer to the US and Europe while keeping China central and Russia at the table* Angola’s growing relationship with the United States has taken another step beyond trade and infrastructure. A new **2026–2031 defence cooperation roadmap**, agreed during the second US–Angola Joint Defence Cooperation Committee in Luanda on 5–6 August, envisages closer ties in military training, maritime security, cyber-defence and other areas. ([ANGOP](https://www.angop.ao/noticias/politica/angola-e-eua-reforcam-cooperacao-no-dominio-da-defesa/?ref=zitamar.com);[ US Embassy in Angola](https://ao.usembassy.gov/united-states-and-angola-hold-second-defcom/?ref=zitamar.com)). The agreement also fits the Trump administration’s new approach to Africa. Washington says it is shifting its emphasis from aid towards trade and “commercial diplomacy”, using embassies, development finance and infrastructure policy to support US companies, secure supply chains and improve access to critical minerals. The State Department cites the Lobito Corridor as a leading example of that policy. ([US State Department](https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-african-affairs/2026/03/america-first-in-africa/?ref=zitamar.com)) It is tempting to see these developments as an Angolan pivot to the West. The discussion in this week’s *Angola Briefing* suggested a broader strategy. João Lourenço is widening Angola’s room for manoeuvre, diversifying sources of finance and security cooperation while avoiding an exclusive alignment with any single bloc. That approach is visible across Angola’s main relationships. Europe is putting increasingly large sums behind the Lobito Corridor and related projects, with Team Europe saying it is mobilising more than **€2 billion** for transport, energy, agriculture, skills and local value chains ([European Commission](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/lobito-corridor-building-future-together%5Fen?ref=zitamar.com)). Washington also regards the route from the Congolese and Zambian copper belts to the Atlantic as commercially and strategically important. Defence cooperation suggests that the relationship is acquiring greater political depth, rather than remaining centred on one railway project. **While Angola’s relationship with Russia is historically rooted in Cold War support, its current relationship is far more limited and transactional.** Russia’s economic footprint has shrunk significantly following Western sanctions and the exit of Russian diamond giant Alrosa from Angola’s Catoca mine, which [removed](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/omani-fund-replaces-russias-alrosa-angolan-diamond-miner-catoca-2025-06-09/?ref=zitamar.com) one of its last major commercial positions in the country. Today, cooperation is largely concentrated on maintaining legacy Soviet-era military equipment and limited defence training links, alongside continued diplomatic engagement after Moscow [appointed](https://ria.ru/20260728/putin-2107530759.html?ref=zitamar.com) a new ambassador to Luanda in 2026\. In return, Angola maintains a pragmatic diplomatic relationship with Russia in multilateral forums, but the partnership is no longer a major driver of trade, investment or security policy compared with China, the EU or the United States. China places an even clearer limit on any simple realignment. Its ambassador [says](https://www.angop.ao/noticias/politica/angola-e-china-registam-10-8-mil-milhoes-de-dolares-em-trocas-comerciais/?ref=zitamar.com) bilateral trade reached **$10.8 billion in the first half of 2026**, after totalling **$20.8 billion in 2025**. Angola’s own trade statistics give a clearer measure of the imbalance: China received **47% of Angolan goods exports in 2025** and supplied **20.4% of its imports**. The United States accounted for only **1.3% of exports and 5.5% of imports**. ([Angola National Statistics Institute, 2025 trade yearbook](https://www.ine.gov.ao/Arquivos/arquivosCarregados//Carregados/Publicacao%5F639148703883186386.pdf?ref=zitamar.com)) The comparison with Angola’s Western partners is instructive. EU goods trade with Angola totalled **€7.9 billion in 2025**, down from about €9.5 billion in 2024 ([European Commission trade factsheet](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb%5Fresults/factsheets/country/details%5Fangola%5Fen.pdf?ref=zitamar.com)). US goods trade was approximately **$2 billion**. American exports to Angola rose by 72.6% during the year, but US imports from Angola fell by 53.4%, largely reflecting the reduced weight of Angolan oil in the relationship ([US Trade Representative](https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/angola?ref=zitamar.com)). China remains by far Angola’s largest single-country commercial partner. Western strategic engagement is growing faster than its trade footprint. The financial relationship with Beijing is also evolving rather than ending. Chinese lenders committed more than **$49 billion** to Angola between 2000 and 2024, although that figure represents loan commitments rather than the amount still outstanding ([Chinese Loans to Angola report](https://friendsofangola.org/report/report-chinese-loan-commitments-to-angola-2000-2024/?ref=zitamar.com)). Angola’s public-debt office says China’s share of the debt stock fell from **34% in 2020 to 19% in 2025**, while oil-collateralised debt to Chinese creditors [declined](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/china-deixou-de-ser-o-maior-credor-de-angola-em-2025%5Fn1713243?ref=zitamar.com) to about **$7.3 billion**. Luanda has reduced one form of dependence, but Chinese trade, finance and technology remain deeply embedded in the economy. That history has brought roads, railways, housing and other infrastructure, while also exposing weaknesses in Angola’s development model. Florindo Chivucute described the result as “development without inclusion”: large capital flows and ambitious projects alongside persistent poverty and limited benefits for much of the population. Earlier Chinese lending and contracting often operated with little public scrutiny inside an already centralised political economy. Diversifying sources of finance will achieve little if weak oversight, privileged access and poor accountability survive under a different group of foreign partners. Russia, meanwhile, has lost ground without disappearing. A Luanda court convicted two Russian nationals of offences including espionage and terrorism in July, sentencing them to **11 and eight years in prison**; both men [deny wrongdoing](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/23/two-russian-men-jailed-angola-terrorism-and-spying?ref=zitamar.com) and have appealed. Russian state-controlled diamond producer Alrosa has also [left](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/omani-fund-replaces-russias-alrosa-in-angolan-diamond-miner-catoca-2025-06-09?ref=zitamar.com) its 41% holding in Catoca after Western sanctions complicated banking and diamond sales. Yet Moscow [appointed](https://ria.ru/20260728/putin-2107530759.html?ref=zitamar.com) a new ambassador to Angola on 28 July, signalling that it intends to preserve its diplomatic presence. Angola now has more foreign-policy options than it did a decade ago. Competition over minerals, infrastructure, markets and security gives Luanda greater bargaining power, but leverage only has value if it produces better investment terms, stronger local supply chains and more transparent financing. Otherwise Angola may become more strategically important to its partners without becoming significantly more prosperous for its own population. # Also in the news: ## **Fuel shortage persists despite new refining capacity** **Sources:**[ Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/depois-de-a-sonangol-negar-escassez-governo-admite-falta-de-combustivel-e-culpa-preco-internacional-73798.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ Valor Económico](https://valoreconomico.co.ao/artigo/escassez-de-combustiveis-persiste-e-afecta-varias-provincias-do-pais?ref=zitamar.com),[ ANGOP](https://www.angop.ao/noticias/sociedade/falta-de-combustivel-provoca-longas-filas-no-cunene/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ MIREMPET/IRDP](https://mirempet.gov.ao/web/noticias/irdp-apresenta-balanco-do-iv-trimestre-de-2025?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ Sonangol](https://www.sonangol.co.ao/sonangol-tranquiliza-populacao-quanto-ao-abastecimento-de-combustiveis/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) Petroleum minister Diamantino Azevedo has acknowledged a national fuel shortage, citing increased consumption, international prices, logistical constraints and financial difficulties at Sonangol. The problem remained acute this week in Benguela, Cabinda, Huíla and Cunene, although supply in Luanda was reported to be more stable. In Ondjiva, motorists have waited as long as three days to fill up, while petrol has sold on the informal market for Kz2,000 a litre and as much as Kz3,000 near the Santa Clara border, compared with an official pump price of Kz300. The underlying dependence remains large. Official IRDP figures show that imports supplied **73% of Angola’s fuel consumption in 2025**, at a cost of about **USD2.6 billion**; imports accounted for 84% of fuel acquired in the final quarter. The Luanda refinery’s newer petrol unit has capacity of 1.58 million litres a day, while the first phase of the Cabinda refinery can process 30,000 barrels a day. Sonangol announced a stabilisation plan involving road and maritime deliveries in May, and Azevedo says the present shortage is being addressed, but **no timetable or new emergency measure has been announced and shortages were still being reported on 11 August**. > *The latest crisis is harder to dismiss as a temporary logistics problem because it comes after substantial investment intended to reduce Angola’s dependence on imported fuel. Inês Silva traced that dependence to decades in which Angola exported crude and used the proceeds to import refined products rather than building sufficient refining capacity. Florindo Chivucute focused on the payment chain between the state, Sonangol and suppliers. The IMF describes the same structural tension: Sonangol imports fuel in foreign currency, sells it domestically below market prices and is supposed to recover the subsidy from the state. New refineries should gradually reduce the import bill, but they do not solve that financing problem. Until Angola can reliably fund the gap between import costs and controlled pump prices — or reform subsidies without another severe cost-of-living shock — fuel shortages are likely to remain a recurring risk rather than an exceptional event.* ### **New disinformation law raises stakes for online speech ahead of 2027** **Sources:**[ Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/publicada-em-diario-da-republica-a-lei-que-pune-a-disseminacao-de-informacoes-falsas-na-internet-com-ate-10-anos-de-prisao-73765.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ AngoLEX – Law 6/26](https://angolex.com/paginas/leis/lei-contra-informacoes-falsas-internet-6a-26a.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com),[ CPJ](https://cpj.org/2025/10/cpj-partners-urge-angola-to-amend-draft-law-on-false-information/?ref=zitamar.com),[ Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/24/angola-reject-bill-to-restrict-civil-society?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) Angola’s Law Against False Information on the Internet entered into force on 4 August. It applies to content produced abroad when aimed at an Angolan audience and requires platforms to publish information on content removals and inauthentic accounts, submit monthly reports to the regulator and take action against material deemed false. The law also establishes administrative fines and allows criminal liability for intentionally producing or disseminating false information. There is an important discrepancy in the reporting on penalties. **Novo Jornal says the law establishes prison terms reaching ten years for cases involving elections or national security. The published text reproduced by AngoLEX does not contain those sentencing bands:** Article 29 instead refers offences to the existing Penal Code and provides for applicable minimum and maximum sentences to be increased by up to half. That point should therefore be treated cautiously unless the official Diário da República text establishes otherwise. The legislation had already prompted substantial international concern while it was being drafted. The **Committee to Protect Journalists and 37 other press-freedom and human-rights organisations** urged the government to amend the bill, warning that vague definitions, criminal sanctions and its extraterritorial scope could encourage censorship and affect journalists based outside Angola. Human Rights Watch subsequently cited the disinformation proposal as part of a broader expansion of state controls over civic and public life. > *The practical significance will become clearer as Angola approaches the 2027 election. Florindo Chivucute sees the law as part of a wider body of legislation that civil-society groups fear can be used against dissent, while Inês Silva emphasised the importance of Facebook and other platforms as spaces where Angolans discuss unemployment, living costs and government policy outside the more constrained traditional media environment. The risk extends beyond prosecutions. Broad liability and removal requirements can encourage platforms, editors and individual users to err on the side of silence, particularly when the boundary between a false factual claim and legitimate criticism is uncertain. In an election year, that could narrow one of the few arenas in which political debate has remained relatively difficult for the authorities to control.* ### **Food insecurity in southern Angola set to worsen during lean season** **Source:**[ ReliefWeb – Angola Key Message Update](https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/angola-key-message-update-july-2026-january-2027-crisis-ipc-phase-3-aligned-outcomes-are-expected-south-during-lean-season?ref=zitamar.com) Parts of southern Angola are expected to deteriorate from Stressed food-security conditions to Crisis during the October 2026–January 2027 lean season. The assessment identifies poor harvests, drought, water and pasture shortages, transport costs and falling livestock values among the pressures on households in Cunene, Namibe, Huíla and Cuando Cubango. Cattle prices were reported at around Kz150,000 in May, down from roughly Kz400,000 in 2023. > *The latest warning describes a recurring structural problem rather than an isolated bad season. Chivucute argued that successive governments have relied on temporary interventions without reducing the vulnerability of communities repeatedly hit by drought and food shortages. Silva raised a related governance problem: the gap between official presentation of large water and anti-drought projects and the conditions reported by communities and religious organisations on the ground. Investment in dams and water infrastructure may improve resilience, but repeated food crises suggest that measuring success by projects completed is insufficient without evidence that household livelihoods are becoming more secure.* ### The democratic deficit enshrined in law URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-democratic-deficit-enshrined-in-law/ Last updated: 2026-08-13T15:27:03.000Z Good afternoon. Adriano Nuvunga’s open letter asks the Constitutional Council to defend the 437,921 people who voted for the Frelimo list led by Margarida Mapandzene Chongo as governor of Gaza. His political instinct is right, but his legal claim is weak. Mapandzene formally resigned, the provincial assembly declared a permanent vacancy, Frelimo selected Alfeu Cuna from among its assembly members, and President Daniel Chapo swore him in last Friday, presenting the whole sequence as the law simply taking its course. On the public record, it did. Nuvunga turns a vote for a party list into a direct personal mandate. Mapandzene headed Frelimo’s list, and voters knew her victory would make her governor, but her name was not on the ballot as a candidacy in its own right. The same framework lets the winning party choose the replacement when the post falls vacant. Unless there is evidence that the resignation was coerced, the Council has little to act on. That “little” is not “nothing”: in July the Council ordered a Podemos figure reinstated to a parliamentary post he had been removed from, so it is not wholly deaf to how parties treat those they put in office. But the circumstances there were different. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9e3bc59b-c1ea-4884-9d47-ccdd2bf0b0cc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The evidence of coercion has not been made public. Reports that Frelimo leaned on Mapandzene may be credible, but an allegation is not proof. Her letter cited personal and professional reasons, and she has since said she is leaving in peace and with a clear conscience. Nuvunga is asking the Council to treat political suspicion as an established constitutional violation. It has no power to reach inside a party meeting, and cannot infer coercion simply because the official explanation is unconvincing. The weakness of the complaint should not obscure the defect it identifies, which is real, did not begin in Gaza, and is not Frelimo’s alone. Elected provincial governors were a Renamo demand, granted in the decentralisation package that accompanied the peace process and written into the constitution in 2018 by agreement of the two main parties. What Renamo secured, though, was not a governor chosen directly by voters but the head of whichever party list tops the provincial poll, installed and later removable by that party. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The right buyer for the job URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-right-buyer-for-the-job/ Last updated: 2026-08-12T17:26:45.000Z Good afternoon. This week the government authorised a technical team to negotiate the sale of part of the state’s 66% stake in Mozambique Telecom (Tmcel), the state-owned mobile and fixed-line operator. The decision is overdue. A cash-strapped government has little reason to keep funding a chronically loss-making company. Council of Ministers spokesman Inocêncio Impissa presented the sale as a means to recapitalise Tmcel and attract a private investor. As far as it goes, that is sound. The numbers explain the urgency. In 2024, Tmcel lost MZN4.44bn ($69m), more than double its MZN2.13bn ($33m) loss the year before. Liabilities of MZN37.94bn ($594m) exceeded assets of MZN23.38bn ($366m), leaving negative equity of MZN14.56bn ($228m). Ernst & Young issued a disclaimer of opinion because it could not obtain sufficient audit evidence on several material balances and matters. Separately, it identified material uncertainty over Tmcel’s ability to continue operating and noted that the company had lost more than half its share capital. The finance ministry puts Tmcel in its highest fiscal-risk category, alongside LAM and Airports of Mozambique. Keeping it in its present form simply passes the bill to taxpayers. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/213b584d-af92-4939-842d-4f848aa73363/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents abduct dozens of fishermen off Macomia coastThe insurgents appear to have sought a hostage-for-prisoner exchange rather than the cash ransom demanded in previous abductions![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-b0f721f4-6336-4e4b-b357-2d9b41001c2d.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-27-17.19.53-a477e4d2-3918-4f76-9dbf-ca1f1f2f214e.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-dozens-of-fishermen-off-macomia-coast/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) How did we get here, and how will the sale be handled? In 2018, state-owned mobile operator Mcel merged with fixed-line and internet provider TDM to form Tmcel. The merger was supposed to combine their networks, customers, and expertise in a competitive national operator. Instead, it brought together two troubled companies without resolving their debts, high costs, or weak commercial culture. For years, TDM, Mcel and then Tmcel were treated less as commercial businesses than as extensions of the state and the ruling Frelimo party. Board positions and jobs could reward political loyalty, while commercial discipline, technical competence and accountability came second. That patronage helped create an oversized workforce and protected poor management from the consequences of failure. The state allowed valuable public assets to decay, and is seeking a private investor only after the company has become a fiscal liability. This cannot be blamed simply on a lack of infrastructure or investment. Tmcel inherited TDM’s fixed network and national fibre backbone and Mcel’s mobile business. It later agreed a $153m modernisation programme with Huawei. By the end of 2024, it had modernised or activated 1,248 sites. The failure was its inability to turn those assets into a sustainable business. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents abduct dozens of fishermen off Macomia coast URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-dozens-of-fishermen-off-macomia-coast/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T18:30:44.000Z Dozens of fishermen, and maybe as many as 150, were abducted by insurgents on 6 August along the coast between the villages of Pequeue and Milamba, in the Quiterajo administrative post of Macomia district, Cabo Delgado. Some have since escaped after Mozambican and Rwandan forces carried out a bombing raid on the area, according to at least one local source. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A sweetener, not a blank cheque URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-sweetener-not-a-blank-cheque/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T17:58:47.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique's government is pressing the Tax Authority to collect every metical it can. It is rolling over Treasury bonds it cannot readily repay, and leaning on donors to pay for basic services. Yet it keeps granting tax benefits whose recipients are secret and whose benefits have never properly been tested. A new study by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) puts the accumulated revenue at MZN355bn ($5.5bn) between 2009 and 2025. That total shouldn't be read as money the state could simply have banked. Some breaks may have drawn in investment that would not have come otherwise, and taxing every exempt import could slow the economy. But the IMF and others doubt that incentives usually decide an investment; stability and a sound business climate matter more. The real failure is that the government has never checked. CIP argues that the government cannot say which investments needed the breaks, how many jobs they created, or whether they were worth the revenue given up. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ea3f653d-26ca-459a-8a0d-87336e8a93f0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (August Update)State forces operations in Macomia district’s Catupa forest area have put Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) under pressure![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-2e998ba0-1434-43be-b70f-0febdfbf3b5b.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/MCM-July2026-Header.png-c8cbf76f-1f76-45e3-b47e-9147947fc4c7.webp)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-august-update/) The scale makes that failure hard to defend. Tax breaks rose from MZN7.9bn ($123m) in 2009 to MZN30.9bn ($483m) last year. Over the period, they averaged the equivalent of almost the entire public health budget. That does not prove the money could instead have gone to hospitals. It shows the size of the bet the state is making without knowing the odds. The design of the scheme adds a second problem. Around two-thirds of the benefits go to imports, through waived VAT, customs duties and excise. By law, that relief is only meant to apply when the goods can't be made in Mozambique. But the CIP could find no sign of how, or whether, anyone checks. A policy meant to attract investment may just be subsidising imports, and undercutting the local production the government says it wants. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (August Update) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-august-update/ Last updated: 2026-08-11T17:03:31.000Z ## Overview: State forces operations in Macomia district’s Catupa forest area have put Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) under pressure, prompting groups of fighters to move south and west. Clashes in the area since late June account for over one-third of all such clashes in Catupa since May 2025. To the south, they threaten communities across Quissanga, Meluco, Ancuabe, and Chiúre districts, and Nampula province, with the threat of attacks on the southern section of the N380 and N1 highways likely to restrict commercial, humanitarian, and civilian traffic. The move west to Montepuez will disrupt small-scale and informal mining projects west of the R698 road linking Montepuez to Mueda. Traffic on the R698 remains at risk of attack, following the hijacking of three vehicles on 26 July. As the group has moved northward to Niassa, civilian communities in Mecula district are at risk of attack and displacement. This diffusion of ISM activities will strain the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) considerably, creating opportunities for ISM actions in its Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe heartlands. ## Key developments **2 July |** President Daniel Chapo [announces](https://aimnews.org/2026/07/02/comandante-chefe-das-fds-instrui-para-intensificacao-da-ofensiva-contra-o-terrorismo/?ref=zitamar.com) that the Northern Operational Theater command of the Defense and Security Forces is moving from Pemba to Mocímboa da Praia. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) headquarters is in Mocímboa da Praia, so this move should facilitate better coordination with the RDF. **8 July |** The Central Bank of Mozambique releases its [Financial Stability Report 2025](https://www.bancomoc.mz/media/zvlk2dkr/relat%C3%B3rio-de-estabilidade-financeira-2025.pdf?ref=zitamar.com), identifying “military instability” in Cabo Delgado as undermining national financial stability by denting investor confidence and restricting the flow of goods in the province. **9 July |** During a visit to Maputo, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov [says](https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20260709-mo%C3%A7ambique-e-r%C3%BAssia-apostados-em-cooperar-na-luta-contra-o-terrorismo?ref=zitamar.com) Russia is willing to provide counter-insurgency support to Mozambique. While unlikely, considering Wagner Group’s failure in 2019, Russia is a potential supplier of lethal equipment to Mozambique, something western partners have resisted. **10 July |** Mozambique LNG has announced a call for tenders for [upgrading electronic surveillance](https://executivedigest.sapo.pt/mocambique-ataques-totalenergies-reforca-sistema-com-120-camaras-e-vedacao-de-alta-seguranca/?ref=zitamar.com#goog%5Frewarded) of the project’s perimeter fence. The call for tenders indicates that the project is not moving from the fortress model that allowed the project to resume. **18 July |** A Rapid Intervention Unit police officer shoots a man dead while arresting him in Maputo province’s Manhiça district. ## State forces launch operations in Catupa, but ISM’s main base remains secure State forces made a concerted push to contest ISM’s control of Catupa forest on two fronts in July. Since mid-June, there have been repeated clashes around the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) outposts at Catupa and Namabo, and an RDF operation close to Cogolo (*see map below)*. These account for approximately half of all engagements between the forces since mid-2025\. ISM claims that on 5 July they successfully countered a FADM attempt to recapture the Catupa outpost, which FADM had abandoned in January, and that they pushed FADM from Namabo the same day. Namabo, located less than 4 kilometers east of the N380, was most recently taken by ISM on 22 June, then recaptured by FADM and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) on 28 June. Since mid-June, there have been at least 64 fatalities in these operations. Fighting between 5 and 12 July alone led to conservative estimates of at least 20 fatalities, though some local sources have given estimates of up to 60 fatalities among state forces. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/08/data-src-image-d41d886b-31e5-4d10-8140-86e51eaab6db.png) To the east, on 23 July, the RDF attacked an ISM position close to Cogolo village, approximately 10 km from the coast. The RDF shelled and raided the position, killing at least five ISM militants. ISM claims to have attacked an RDF position in the area the following day, and to have killed six RDF soldiers and one informant, damaged a vehicle, and taken weapons. Such positions, known as ribats, are often temporary, and established to protect the main base. FADM and RDF operations prompted some ISM militants to move north in smaller groups. They clashed with a FADM patrol in southern Mocímboa da Praia district on 4 July, and on 23 July with an RDF patrol at Miangelewa in Muidumbe district on the N380\. Since international intervention in 2021, all attempts to dislodge ISM from its Catupa stronghold have been unsuccessful. These latest efforts, particularly those by the RDF at Cogolo, however, demonstrate state forces’ renewed focus on limiting ISM’s influence on the Macomia coast, which has grown in recent years. While the operations have created short-term disruption to ISM, previous operations in Catupa have been short-lived, so we expect ISM to maintain its stronghold in Catupa. ## ISM pushes south and west, exposing roadways and mining sites to predatory activity In response to state forces’ pressure in Catupa, some ISM fighters have moved southward. Initially moving through Quissanga, Mecufi, and Meluco districts they subsequently moved south to Ancuabe and Chiúre districts and west to Montepuez. One group proceeded further south to cross to Eráti district in Nampula province. The group in Montepuez is moving toward Niassa province. The southward movement had begun by 8 July, when over 30 fighters arrived in Cagembe village in Quissanga. Despite subsequent sightings in the area, they were not disturbed by FADM until 29 July, when the two forces clashed at Ntessa village, about 15 km south of Cagembe. Informal gold mining sites were targeted in Ancuabe district. At a mining site on 13 July and at Muaja gold mines on 20 July, miners and others were kidnapped. At Muaja, some were held for ransom of up to 60,000 meticais (900 USD), while others were forcibly recruited into ISM, according to a local source. After the move west into Montepuez, on 26 July they held three vehicles and their passengers for ransom on the R698 linking Montepuez to Mueda. The incident occurred near Nicocue village. According to victims, 389,000 meticais ($6,000) was transferred to the insurgents for at least 10 people, along with three vehicles including a logging truck. The group, numbering as many as 150, moved north after the Nicocue incident toward Niassa province, passing through the Shamba Kubwa mining area on 31 July. Past behavior suggests that ISM will maintain a presence in the south through August. In that time, ISM will continue to threaten road traffic and mining sites with a view to raising money. FADM will be under pressure to increase escorts on the N1 and the R698 routes in order to keep them open to commercial and humanitarian traffic. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/08/data-src-image-b1769e58-e339-403a-bb49-bd9352c1c9c3.png) ### Decentralisation on a donor budget URL: https://www.zitamar.com/decentralisation-on-a-donor-budget/ Last updated: 2026-08-10T18:27:57.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique has spent almost three decades expanding municipal government without settling who will pay for it. A study presented last week by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) found that Beira's visible record of investment between 2022 and 2024 rested heavily on money from the Netherlands, the World Bank, Germany and the European Union. The city's own revenue largely covered its running costs, but not its main capital projects. Donor-funded drains, coastal protection and sanitation are welcome. They do not amount to financial autonomy. The National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique (ANAMM) says central government has disbursed only about half the transfers due to municipalities each year since 2024, and that some councils have received just 8% of this year's allocation. A mayor cannot plan services, pay suppliers or make credible investment commitments when statutory transfers arrive late or not at all. The squeeze is not felt evenly. Councils run by the opposition have long complained, with some grounds, that late or missing transfers fall hardest on them, a charge the government denies. And the outside money is unreliable in its own way: donors are trimming aid and steering what remains towards trade and business, not roads and drains. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f1f53719-ebca-4434-a2ba-3fcba270f076/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The first responsibility lies with central government. If it assigns councils duties, it must make transfers predictable and sufficient, while keeping an equalisation mechanism for poorer municipalities that cannot raise what Maputo, Matola or Beira can. The municipal tax code dates from 2008 and needs revising. Waiting for a development partner to repair every road and build every drain is no fiscal model. Municipal leaders cannot lay all the blame on Maputo. Too many councils have weak tax administration, heavy wage bills and debts that pass from one mandate to the next. In February, a court in Cabo Delgado ordered Pemba's bank accounts blocked over a disputed debt of about MZN65m (about $1m) run up under the previous administration, and the case has already reached the town hall's ability to pay salaries. Nor does competence always decide who runs a city. Parties reward loyalty with the top of the municipal list, and some mayors take office with little of the technical skill the job demands. Municipal office is too often treated as a political prize and a source of jobs, not as an administration that delivers services within a budget. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A quiet takeover URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-quiet-takeover/ Last updated: 2026-08-09T09:14:09.000Z Good afternoon. Across northern Mozambique, community radio stations established and managed by local associations are gradually being absorbed by the state-run Instituto de Comunicação Social (ICS). The stations often retain their names and continue broadcasting from the same buildings, but their independence—and with it one of the few means rural communities possess to hold local authorities to account—is disappearing. Radio is especially important in districts rarely reached by newspapers and television. Mozambique’s local stations fall broadly into four groups: those controlled by the state through the ICS; community stations run by civic associations, many affiliated with the community radio forum FORCOM; stations belonging to churches; and purely commercial broadcasters, found mainly in larger towns and cities. It is the association-run stations that provide the clearest form of independent community broadcasting. They answer to local management bodies rather than to the government, provincial governor or district administrator. They are also the stations now being lost. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### The Road to Angola's 2027 Elections: Who controls the party, the vote and the economy? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/the-road-to-angolas-2027-elections/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:19:15.000Z Welcome back to Angola Briefing from Zitamar News. This new product is still in a pilot phase, and for the month of August will: - Remain free to watch, listen to, and read - Run once a week, except for the week of Thursday the 20th, when it will take a break to allow for staff holidays. The pilot phase will allow us to hit the ground running in September with a regular Briefing helping investors, diplomats, IFIs and other stakeholders understand and make informed decisions on Angola. The new model will feature editions focused on particular issues, featuring sector experts. Please get in touch if there are issues you would particularly like to see covered, or questions you would like answered. You can hit reply if you’re reading this as an email, leave a comment online, or get into the Angola Briefing chat on Substack. Today’s edition is focused on the road to the 2027 elections, unquestionably the biggest issue overshadowing all others in Angola right now, and for the coming year. Please help the Angola Briefing to grow by forwarding this email or otherwise sharing the Briefing with friends and colleagues with an interest in Angola. And make sure you subscribe, for free, to keep receiving all our Briefings and updates. --- # **IN FOCUS** # **Angola’s 2027 election has already begun** *The MPLA succession dispute, a legal challenge over vote-counting technology, and pressure on civil society are testing the institutions that will shape the vote’s credibility* Angola will not hold its next general election until 2027, but the conditions under which it will be fought are already being established. The dispute over the MPLA leadership, a court challenge to the choice of the company providing election technology, and growing concern over the treatment of government critics may appear unrelated. Together, however, they add up to significant doubts over whether Angola can enter the next election with broadly accepted rules, credible institutions and sufficient political space for a genuinely competitive contest. The immediate focus is the MPLA. Higino Carneiro’s challenge to the rejection of his leadership candidacy has reached the Constitutional Court, while João Lourenço remains firmly in control of the party machinery ahead of the December congress. Carneiro may ultimately fail, but his persistence has exposed the difficulty the MPLA continues to have in accommodating internal competition. This matters beyond the governing party because Lourenço cannot constitutionally seek another term as President of the Republic in 2027\. The MPLA must therefore decide not only who leads the party, but who will inherit its political project and contest an election in which its continued dominance can no longer be assumed. Whoever emerges will face an electorate very different from the one over which the MPLA established its long supremacy. Much of Angola’s population is young, with little or no memory of the civil war. For these voters, the historical legitimacy of the liberation movements matters less than employment, incomes, education, healthcare and prospects for a better life. As Cláudio Silva argued on this week’s *Angola Briefing*, this generational shift helps explain the growing distance between the MPLA and younger urban voters and the appeal of UNITA leader Adalberto Costa Júnior. The 2022 election already demonstrated the scale of the governing party’s challenge in Luanda and other urban centres. Yet the credibility of 2027 will depend on much more than the identities of the candidates. The Liberal Party’s challenge to the award of the election technology and logistics contract to INDRA highlights longstanding concerns about confidence in electoral administration. The central issue should not be reduced to the Spanish company itself. It is whether the National Electoral Commission can demonstrate that procurement, technology, transmission and aggregation of results are transparent and subject to meaningful scrutiny. Questions that can be answered before the election should not be allowed to become disputes about legitimacy after it. The same principle applies to political space. Civil-society organisations are already protesting against what they describe as the use of the justice system against government critics. It would be wrong to assume that every arrest or prosecution is politically motivated, but an election cannot command broad confidence if opposition parties, activists, journalists and ordinary citizens believe that criticism or political organisation exposes them to intimidation. Nor is electoral competition equal if public media remain overwhelmingly associated with the government while opposition voices struggle for comparable access, particularly outside Luanda. There is still time to address these weaknesses. The courts can demonstrate their independence by resolving political and electoral disputes promptly and transparently. The CNE can publish more information about its procedures and permit credible independent scrutiny of election technology. Public media can provide meaningful space for competing political voices, while the authorities can demonstrate that peaceful organisation and criticism will be protected rather than treated as threats to the state. None of this favours the MPLA, UNITA or any other party. It favours an election whose result Angolans can trust. That distinction will become increasingly important as 2027 approaches, particularly if the contest is close. The election has not yet formally begun, but the contest over its credibility already has. > `The news summaries regarding the developments discussed in the leader above, can be read below 👇` --- # **Also in today’s *Angola Briefing*:** - Unitel outage exposes Angola’s dependence on one network ([Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/unitel-foi-hoje-admitida-em-bolsa-e-retoma-servicos-de-forma-gradual-apos-ataque-cibernetico-73586.html?ref=zitamar.com), [Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/politica/item/34798-adalberto-costa-junior-exige-transparencia-e-auditoria-apos-apagao-da-unitel?ref=zitamar.com), [Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/34827-unitel-anuncia-reposicao-total-dos-servicos-uma-semana-apos-ciberataque?ref=zitamar.com)) - State companies absorb USD352 million but return only USD83 million ([Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/empresas-publicas-custaram-352-milhoes-usd-ao-pais-e-so-renderam-83-milhoes-em-2025-73666.html?ref=zitamar.com), [Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/sonangol-e-unitel-safam-sector-empresarial-publico-de-prejuizos-ainda-maiores-73667.html?ref=zitamar.com)) - Carneiro takes rejected MPLA leadership bid to court ([Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/opiniao/item/34824-congresso-do-mpla-em-disputa-judicial?ref=zitamar.com), [Novo Jornal](https://novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-candidatura-de-higino-carneiro-anulada-pela-sub-comissao-de-candidaturas-do-congresso-em-actualizacao-73413.html?ref=zitamar.com), [MPLA](https://www.mpla.ao/2026/04/19/processo-de-candidaturas-ao-9-o-congresso-do-mpla-decorre-ate-outubro/?ref=zitamar.com)) - INDRA contract dispute puts CNE procurement under scrutiny ([O País](https://www.opais.ao/politica/partido-liberal-pede-anulacao-do-concurso-que-admitiu-contratacao-da-indra-para-as-eleicoes-de-2027/?ref=zitamar.com), [Angola24Horas](https://www.angola24horas.com/politica/item/34039-partido-liberal-recorre-ao-tribunal-supremo-para-travar-concurso-da-cne-e-contestar-escolha-da-indra?ref=zitamar.com), [CNE](https://www.cne.ao/noticia/INDRA%2Bapresenta%2B%C3%A0%2BCNE%2Bplano%2Bpara%2Bsolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o%2Btecnol%C3%B3gica%2Be%2Blog%C3%ADstica%2Bpara%2Bas%2BElei%C3%A7%C3%B5es%2BGerais%2Bde%2B2027.?ref=zitamar.com)) - Vigil turns attention to pressure on government critics ([Lusa/RTP](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/amnistia-internacional-pede-libertacao-de-ativista-angolano-general-nila%5Fn1731035?ref=zitamar.com), [DW](https://amp.dw.com/pt-002/novos-protestos-pela-liberta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-presos-pol%C3%ADticos/a-76556097?ref=zitamar.com), [Angola24Horas](https://www.angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/32936-sociedade-civil-angolana-organiza-vigilia-pela-libertacao-dos-presos-politicos?ref=zitamar.com)) ### **Unitel outage exposes Angola’s dependence on one network** **Sources:**[ Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/ataque-cibernetico-deixa-unitel-sem-rede-na-vespera-da-estreia-em-bolsa-73567.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/economia/detalhe/unitel-ataque-cibernetico-tira-maior-operadora-de-telecomunicacoes-angolana-do-ar-noticia-actualizada-73558.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/politica/item/34791-unita-quer-comissao-de-inquerito-parlamentar-para-apurar-causas-do-apagao-na-unitel?ref=zitamar.com),[ Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/politica/item/34798-adalberto-costa-junior-exige-transparencia-e-auditoria-apos-apagao-da-unitel?ref=zitamar.com),[ Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/34817-ataque-a-unitel-continua-a-afetar-pagamentos-digitais-e-paralisa-negocios-em-luanda?ref=zitamar.com),[ CIAM/Jornal de Angola](https://www.ciam.gov.ao/ao/noticia/5281?ref=zitamar.com) A cyberattack on Unitel disrupted communications and digital services across Angola as the country’s dominant mobile operator entered the stock market. Unitel serves about 20.8 million customers and controls roughly 76% of the market. UNITA has called for an independent audit, parliamentary hearings and a commission of inquiry, although no inquiry has been confirmed. Unitel has yet to publish a detailed account of the failure or its economic cost. > *The outage exposed a weakness extending beyond Unitel’s systems. Customers who moved to Africell encountered an operator unable to absorb the sudden increase in demand, leaving Angola without effective redundancy in essential communications infrastructure. Partial privatisation has widened Unitel’s shareholder base without ending state control, making disclosure a test for regulators as well as the company. Parliament’s consideration of the Cybersecurity Law adds urgency, but stronger security powers should be accompanied by mandatory incident reporting, independent technical scrutiny and judicial oversight.* ### **State companies absorb USD352 million but return USD83 million** **Sources:**[ Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/empresas-publicas-custaram-352-milhoes-usd-ao-pais-e-so-renderam-83-milhoes-em-2025-73666.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/sonangol-e-unitel-safam-sector-empresarial-publico-de-prejuizos-ainda-maiores-73667.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/dividendos-e-privatizacao-do-bfa-empurram-lucros-da-unitel-para-1584-mil-milhoes-kz-em-2025-71486.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/angola-lng-millennium-bcp-e-galp-valem-53-do-lucro-da-sonangol-em-2025-71979.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Sonangol](https://www.sonangol.co.ao/sonangol-disponibiliza-relatorio-e-contas-2025/?ref=zitamar.com) Angola spent Kz320.9 billion, approximately USD352 million, recapitalising and subsidising state-owned companies in 2025, while receiving about USD83 million from the sector. The 78 companies that submitted accounts reported an aggregate profit of Kz949 billion. That result was heavily dependent on Sonangol and Unitel: without their combined profits, the sector would have recorded a loss of about Kz72 billion. > *The headline profit obscures the financial weakness of much of the state-owned sector. It also leaves an important question unanswered: how much of the performance attributed to Sonangol and Unitel came from their principal operations rather than dividends, investments or asset holdings? Privatisation may be appropriate for some companies, but a sale alone will not correct weak governance or prevent a public monopoly from becoming a private one. The immediate priority is fuller disclosure of subsidies, returns and operating results, followed by company-specific decisions on restructuring, sale or closure.* ### **Carneiro takes rejected MPLA leadership bid to court** **Sources:**[ Angola24Horas](https://angola24horas.com/opiniao/item/34824-congresso-do-mpla-em-disputa-judicial?ref=zitamar.com),[ Novo Jornal](https://novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-candidatura-de-higino-carneiro-anulada-pela-sub-comissao-de-candidaturas-do-congresso-em-actualizacao-73413.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-higino-carneiro-responde-a-anulacao-da-sua-candidatura-a-presidencia-do-partido-73458.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-06-25/47350501/higino-carneiro-entrega-candidatura-ao-mpla-com-19-mil-subscri%C3%A7%C3%B5es?ref=zitamar.com),[ MPLA](https://www.mpla.ao/2026/04/19/processo-de-candidaturas-ao-9-o-congresso-do-mpla-decorre-ate-outubro/?ref=zitamar.com) Angola’s Constitutional Court has admitted Higino Carneiro’s challenge to the rejection of his candidacy for the MPLA leadership. The dispute concerns supporting forms that party officials allegedly found invalid or falsified, as well as Carneiro’s claim that the decision breached the MPLA’s electoral timetable. The party congress is scheduled for 9–10 December. ### **INDRA contract dispute puts CNE procurement under scrutiny** **Sources:**[ O País](https://www.opais.ao/politica/partido-liberal-pede-anulacao-do-concurso-que-admitiu-contratacao-da-indra-para-as-eleicoes-de-2027/?ref=zitamar.com),[ Angola24Horas](https://www.angola24horas.com/politica/item/34039-partido-liberal-recorre-ao-tribunal-supremo-para-travar-concurso-da-cne-e-contestar-escolha-da-indra?ref=zitamar.com),[ CNE](https://www.cne.ao/noticia/INDRA%2Bapresenta%2B%C3%A0%2BCNE%2Bplano%2Bpara%2Bsolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o%2Btecnol%C3%B3gica%2Be%2Blog%C3%ADstica%2Bpara%2Bas%2BElei%C3%A7%C3%B5es%2BGerais%2Bde%2B2027.?ref=zitamar.com),[ Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/amostras-dos-kits-dos-materiais-nao-sensiveis-apresentados-a-cne-pela-indra-72040.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Lusa/VerAngola ](https://www.verangola.net/va/en/032026/Politics/48054/General-elections-2027-Spanish-company-Indra-will-manage-the-electoral-process-for-the-fifth-time.htm?ref=zitamar.com)The Liberal Party has asked the Supreme Court to annul the award of the technological and logistics contract for the 2027 election to Spanish company INDRA. It alleges irregularities in the tender and a lack of transparency over the evaluation criteria. INDRA has meanwhile presented its implementation plan to the National Electoral Commission. ### **Vigil turns attention to pressure on government critics** **Sources:**[ Lusa/RTP](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/amnistia-internacional-pede-libertacao-de-ativista-angolano-general-nila%5Fn1731035?ref=zitamar.com),[ DW](https://amp.dw.com/pt-002/novos-protestos-pela-liberta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-presos-pol%C3%ADticos/a-76556097?ref=zitamar.com),[ Angola24Horas](https://www.angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/32936-sociedade-civil-angolana-organiza-vigilia-pela-libertacao-dos-presos-politicos?ref=zitamar.com),[ Jornal Folha 8](https://jornalf8.net/2025/pela-libertacao-dos-presos-do-regime/?ref=zitamar.com) Civil-society groups held a vigil in Luanda to demand the release of people they describe as political prisoners. Organisers accused the justice system of being used against government critics and called for an end to politically motivated detention. The authorities accuse detainees cited by activists of offences including rebellion, terrorism and public incitement to crime. ### Transparency is becoming harder to avoid URL: https://www.zitamar.com/transparency-is-becoming-harder-to-avoid/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T17:59:35.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambicans have been given an unusual amount of financial information in recent weeks. Moza Banco has published interim accounts, and the IGEPE website now carries the 2025 reports and accounts of a wide range of state-owned and state-controlled companies. The sovereign wealth fund reports its market value. And yesterday the central bank published detailed figures to defend its intervention in Moza Banco almost ten years ago. Separately, the transport ministry has advertised four executive director posts at the roads authority ANE. In a state that has too often treated public information as the property of office-holders, this is welcome. It would be premature, however, to call this a conversion by Mozambique's governing class. Much of the disclosure is required by law, regulation or by the conditions attached to international support. Public procurement notices became more visible after sustained pressure from donors and lenders. Sovereign wealth fund reporting is a legal safeguard, not a favour from the central bank. Commercial banks publish accounts because the financial system requires them to. The improvement lies in institutions complying more consistently, and in the public having more material with which to judge them. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b7045cc6-ad4b-4b9a-8f81-15e1a98afc52/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Publication is only the first test, because figures can be arranged before they are shown. Moza Banco's first-half profit of MZN273.9m ($4.3m), against a MZN149.6m ($2.3m) loss a year earlier, did not come from a bank that has started trading better. It booked its impairment provisions in the 2025 accounts, opened January with a balance sheet already cleared, and has seen its loan book shrink since. EMOSE, the state insurer, announced a third year in profit, which is true and nearly empty: the profit fell 94.5%, to about MZN20m ($0.3m), held up by past reserves rather than by the business itself. A clean headline can be an accounting choice. That is why the accounts matter, and why they matter only if someone reads past the first line. The central bank's own statement shows how much a fuller account can add. It says that in September 2016 Moza Banco had negative own funds of MZN24.9bn ($389m) and a solvency ratio of minus 100.21%; that the shareholders were given until May 2017 to recapitalise and could not; and that the capital was then opened to outsiders through a MZN8.2bn ($128m) increase, taken up by Kuhanha, the company that manages the central bank's own pension fund. Moçambique Capitais, then the majority shareholder, disputes the account, arguing that the bank has aired matters covered by banking secrecy and that the courts have already ruled on the intervention. The public can now weigh both sides. But the explanation came almost ten years after the event, and only after questions at a press conference. Late and contested disclosure beats silence. It is not exemplary accountability. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The cashew rules are the easy part URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-cashew-rules-are-the-easy-part/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T18:04:40.000Z Good afternoon. More than three years after parliament passed a new cashew law, the government has finally approved the regulation needed to enforce it. The government says the rules cover the whole chain, from planting and drying to processing, import and export, and will make the sector more competitive. Passing rules is the easy part. The harder question, which the announcement steps around, is whether the state can make anyone follow them. Start with the export surtax on raw nuts, currently 18%, which the government has proposed raising to 22%. Whether it is 18% or 22% barely matters, because much of it is never collected. Industry figures tell *Zitamar* that exporters routinely avoid the levy by paying officials along the chain, or by under-declaring the value and quantity of what leaves the country. A rate that is negotiable at the port is not really a rate at all. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/154e21d4-97fc-4769-a028-9d780ae84281/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That is where the damage is done, and it is not mainly at the Tanzanian border. Last season, the authorities put the raw nuts smuggled overland from Cabo Delgado into Tanzania at 7,600 tonnes, costing the state more than MZN114m ($1.8m) in unpaid duty. That is the piece we can count. The larger leak, industry sources say, runs through the port of Nacala, in the under-invoicing of the main export flow to India, Vietnam and increasingly China. Nuts declared at a fraction of their value, or passed off as shells, let the exporter dodge the surtax and keep hard currency abroad. There is no public figure for what this costs, which is part of the problem. That distortion is what starves Mozambique's factories. An exporter moving under-invoiced nuts and laundered dollars can outbid a legitimate processor for the farmer's crop, because the point of the deal is not the cashew but the clean money and the foreign exchange that come out of it. For the farmer, the higher price is welcome and rational. For a factory that pays tax, wages and electricity, it is a contest it cannot win. The result is in the numbers: in the first quarter of this year, raw cashew exports earned $68.4m, while the processed kernel, the part that carries the jobs, earned $2.9m. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### LNG training dispute tests the meaning of national unity URL: https://www.zitamar.com/lng-training-dispute-tests-the-meaning-of-national-unity/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T16:12:04.000Z Good afternoon. The dispute over the decision to begin training 260 participants in TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG Academy in Matola raises difficult questions about national unity, the distribution of natural-resource wealth and the particular claims of a province that has borne the heaviest costs of Mozambique’s insurgency. Should opportunities created by the gas project be shared equally across the country, or should Cabo Delgado receive preferential treatment as the province hosting it? The Forum of Civil Society Organisations of Cabo Delgado, Focade, has criticised the choice of the Industrial and Commercial Institute of Matola for the academy’s initial classroom training. It argues that institutions in Pemba could host the programme and that holding it more than 2,000km away is inconsistent with commitments to local content and the development of the project’s host province. Participants are expected to undertake subsequent practical training at the project site in Afungi, Palma district. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7b7f2c4d-0cae-4d3b-bf7c-c92c42aa43a7/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Cabo Delgado insurgents clash with troops at edge of Mozambique’s Niassa reserveWestward push brings insurgents to the reserve’s buffer zone, raising fears of an incursion into Niassa province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-8585cdbc-eb29-4c53-aef4-e278413f684f.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-08-04-14.31.30-56265ae8-4e71-4d34-8462-bbb64f35e2ee.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-clash-with-troops-at-edge-of-mozambiques-niassa-reserve/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Holding the classroom programme in Cabo Delgado could direct spending, equipment and teaching experience towards the province. It might strengthen a local institution and leave behind capacity able to serve future students and employers. Training residents of Cabo Delgado elsewhere is not necessarily the same as developing the province’s own ability to train people for the gas economy. But Mozambique LNG is also a national project exploiting a national resource. Its jobs, training and contracts cannot be treated as the exclusive property of one province. Young Mozambicans elsewhere face unemployment and limited access to technical education, and the country needs to avoid turning the distribution of resource wealth into a competition between regions. Nor have the costs of defending Cabo Delgado been borne only by people from Cabo Delgado. Soldiers from across Mozambique, including many from the south, have been deployed to fight the insurgency, and some have lost their lives there. Their service strengthens the argument that the country as a whole has a stake in the province’s security and resources. If national solidarity requires people from other provinces to help defend Cabo Delgado, they cannot automatically be told that the economic opportunities created there belong only to local residents. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Delgado insurgents clash with troops at edge of Mozambique's Niassa reserve URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-clash-with-troops-at-edge-of-mozambiques-niassa-reserve/ Last updated: 2026-08-20T15:43:04.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents reached the edge of Mozambique's Niassa Special Reserve in late July and clashed with government troops, in a westward push that has raised fears they could cross into Niassa province. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique’s cereal deficit is also a credit deficit URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-cereal-deficit-is-also-a-credit-deficit/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T08:25:45.000Z Mozambique spends around $700m a year importing cereals, while domestic production of rice and wheat remains hundreds of thousands of tonnes below what the country consumes. The government’s proposed response includes increasing production and establishing a 20,000-tonne strategic reserve ahead of possible poor rains. But neither will overcome the financial conditions preventing domestic producers from investing and expanding. According to Cereals Institute director-general Jobe Fazenda, Mozambique has an annual rice deficit of roughly 600,000 tonnes and a wheat deficit of 700,000 tonnes. Virtually all the wheat consumed in the country is imported, along with a substantial proportion of its rice. Flood damage at Chinese-owned rice producer Wanbao in Gaza has further reduced domestic supply. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/df61329f-8030-468e-9586-9118c22a5430/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The figures are another measure of the failure of successive campaigns to make agriculture the foundation of Mozambique’s economy. The country has land, water and labour, yet remains dependent on imported staples and vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices, foreign-currency availability and the weather. As economist Yasser Dada has argued, the problem cannot be separated from the price and availability of finance. The Bank of Mozambique has cut its benchmark interest rate substantially since January 2024, but the IMF estimates that real commercial lending rates remained around 11.5% in late 2025, as the central bank continues to prioritise low inflation and a stable metical. Private-sector credit had stagnated since September 2024, even as bank deposits increased. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Zitamar Daily Briefing, 31 July 2026 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-daily-briefing-31-july-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T17:49:15.000Z Hello. Zitamar can point to two important exclusive stories in the past week: Thursday’s revelation that TotalEnergies and Sumitomo have left the consortium developing the Mphanda Nkuwa hydropower project, and the news yesterday that Gemfields is seeking a buyer for gold mine prospects in Cabo Delgado over the continuing insecurity there. Both stories get a mention in the latest edition of our Cabo Delgado newsletter, out today — along with a round-up of our exclusive reporting from the conflict there. In lieu of a leader in this newsletter today, please check out those articles and newsletter, before logging off to enjoy your weekend. [Insurgent attacks spread across Cabo Delgado after battle for CatupaFighters have raided villages and mining areas over recent weeks, causing insecurity to spread through Cabo Delgado![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-c6a5665c-47cb-44a3-825c-4834500a1119.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-08-01_082736181-8548b4b8-12e1-4b67-997d-cb17e4c45f72.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-attacks-spread-across-cabo-delgado-after-battle-for-catupa/) But before you go: Zitamar has now launched the Angola Briefing, which also has a new edition out today. Check it out below! [Unitel goes dark, oil output falls, and a year on from Luanda unrestZitamar’s Angola Briefing from 30 July 2026![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/https-3A-2F-2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com-2Fpublic-2Fimages-2F0555f879-41c1-494e-a919-57cc2327ad09-2Ffavicon-48x48-b88b77f0-59a9-4871-810d-01e0d505c77c.png)Angola BriefingFernando Lima and Cláudio Silva and ines.silva![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/https-3A-2F-2Fsubstack-video.s3.amazonaws.com-2Fvideo_upload-2Fpost-2F208989618-2Fc3a66cb6-c1cc-4478-92a1-7d4f3c1fe693-2Ftranscoded-00001-f6aa2918-f8ef-4e1a-8efb-db4ee81b026b.png)](https://www.angolabriefing.com/p/unitel-goes-dark-oil-output-falls?ref=zitamar.com) --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Gemfields joint venture seeks buyer for Cabo Delgado licences after security suspensionA portfolio of gold and mineral licences near Nairoto has been put up for sale after insurgent attacks forced the evacuation of personnel![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-937df400-f787-4943-9537-f0bdb6983683.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/gemfields-rubies-ebbd7e21-e4c8-4915-8659-712e9b606b2d.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/gemfields-joint-venture-seeks-buyer-for-cabo-delgado-licences-after-security-suspension/) --- # Also in the news: - **Public debt rises to MZN1.1tn despite fall in external borrowing** - Sources:[ *O Económico*](https://www.oeconomico.com/divida-externa-cai-75-mas-stock-total-sobe-para-11-biliao-de-meticais/?ref=zitamar.com),[ *Integrity*](https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/66842?ref=zitamar.com) - **Artisanal miners resist eviction from Tete gold concession** - Sources: *STV*,[ *O País*](https://www.pressreader.com/mozambique/o-pais/20260728/281590952354215?srsltid=AfmBOopal5Ypd3fDSnZNhY5CczDfUw97fnXQaqzGelAFEIsR4fGGD6lg&ref=zitamar.com) - **LAM plans to expand fleet to 13 aircraft by year-end** - Source:[ *MZNews*](https://mznews.co.mz/lam-preve-expandir-a-frota-para-13-aeronaves-ate-ao-final-do-ano/?ref=zitamar.com) - **Theft and vandalism cost Mozambique-Malawi power project $3.5m** - Source:[ *Rádio Moçambique*](https://www.rm.co.mz/roubo-e-vandalismo-causam-prejuizo-de-35-milhoes-de-dolares-no-projecto-energetico-mocambique-malawi/?ref=zitamar.com) - **Pequenos Libombos reservoir secures Greater Maputo water supplies** - Source: *Notícias* *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers.* _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar News tiers only._ ### Insurgent attacks spread across Cabo Delgado after battle for Catupa URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-attacks-spread-across-cabo-delgado-after-battle-for-catupa/ Last updated: 2026-08-01T06:29:16.000Z Fighters have raided villages and mining areas over recent weeks, causing insecurity to spread through Cabo Delgado _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Gemfields joint venture seeks buyer for Cabo Delgado licences after security suspension URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gemfields-joint-venture-seeks-buyer-for-cabo-delgado-licences-after-security-suspension/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T12:57:22.000Z A joint venture between UK-based gemstone miner Gemfields and its Mozambican partner is seeking a buyer for its portfolio of gold and mineral licences in Cabo Delgado after suspending work because of insecurity. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Nudges toward dialogue in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/nudges-toward-dialogue-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T13:42:39.000Z > By Joseph Hanlon Two public pushes for peace talks this month, changes in Frelimo and the insurgents, and a more public recognition that the Cabo Delgado war will continue indefinitely may be slowly changing the mood within government toward some sort of talks with Cabo Delgado insurgents. Today \[28 July 2026\] the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) hosted a briefing by Mozambican journalist Borges Nhamirre which pushed harder on the ISS December 2025 Policy Biref “Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency”. In today’s briefing Nhamirre stressed that dialogue is essential to ”identify grievances and conflict drivers, rebuild trust,” and create the conditions for formal negotiations. But he warned that today, “no dialogue is happening” and the government does not support informal contacts. And a publication this month by three Mozambican security experts with extensive knowledge of Cabo Delgado says “it is possible to engage in dialogue and negotiations“ with the insurgents. They are Salvador Forquilha, João Pereia and Emílio Zeca, who are part of a newly formed NGO, the Tibverane Foundation, founded with Swiss funding and Mozambique government support. Both stress the importance of starting with the roots of the insurgency – lack of jobs, political and economic exclusion particularly affecting Muslim communities, abuse by security forces, and control from Maputo instead of locally. Nhamirre stresses the importance of changes within Frelimo and government. The previous president Filipe Nyusi was from Cabo Delgado and was put into the job by the powerful Frelimo Makonde elite there. It was said he did their bidding, in particular trying to win the war militarily and not negotiate. The current president Daniel Chapo grew up in Beira, Sofala, in the centre of the country, which has a very different elite which often does not follow the line set in Maputo. All three authors of the Tibverane paper are also from Beira. *África Monitor Intelligence* (13 July) says Pereia is close to Chapo and was chosen by the President to be director of Tibverane. Nhamirre reports that the Makonde have lost substantial power in Frelimo and the government, with few ministers, and Chapo has more space for movement. The final change has been on the ground. At the start of the war a decade ago, the insurgents showed their power by beheading local villagers. This stopped as the insurgents learned the importance in any guerilla war of ‘winning hearts and minds’. Thus there is an accommodation between insurgents and local people across much of Cabo Delgado. Internally displaced people are now returning to their villages, in part because of poor conditions in the camps for the displaced, and in part because they fear the Mozambique security forces more than the insurgents. The other change is the realisation in the international community that the civil war will continue indefinitely. It has already been agreed that the entire gas liquification process will be inside a fortress on the Afungi peninsula (near Palma) with access only by sea and air, but not by land. The Afungi fortress concept assumes that the war continues outside the walls. And on 10 July TotalEnergies announced an entire new security ring surrounding the Afungi fortress with an electrified fence and 120 cameras . At the same time it delayed the building in South Korea of 17 LNG tankers, already delayed from a planned delivery in 2023\. The new delivery date is 2030, and LNG cannot start without boats to take it away. And Japanese ambassador Keiji Hamada announced on 23 July that Japan would stop giving aid for reconstruction because the ‘instability’ makes it impossible to do infrastructure construction. This harsh judgements comes from one of the oldest and most loyal aid donors, who see no end to the war. Humanitarian aid for those affected by the war will continue, he said. The involvement of the Swiss is important and there needs to be more coordinated support from donors, There are at least six NGO and INGO attempts to push for negotiations, but all are small and they do not cooperate because they are all fighting for the limited pool of donor money. Despite the UK’s virtual withdrawal from Mozambique, there is one thing it could still do. Tony Blair was in Maputo 20 July and met with Chapo who apparently asked for military support. More useful would be for the UK to provide help from Jonathan Powell, Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s National Security Adviser. He was chief British negotiator in the successful peace settlement in Northern Ireland, and has worked in Mozambique. He was also Chief of Staff to Blair when he was Prime Minister, so Powell’s assistance might be via the Blair Foundation which is present in Mozambique. Powell wrote the excellent 2014 book [*Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Talking-Terrorists-How-Armed-Conflicts/dp/1847922295?ref=zitamar.com) which should be read by NGOs, government and donors involved in this war – it is available on Kindle. And it should be remembered that at the end of the Proxy War there were peace talks in Rome (July 1990 to October 1992) with Renamo which led to elections and some “terrorists” becoming members of parliament. \+ Borges Nhamirre, ‘Dialogue initiatives for peacebuilding in Cabo Delgado*,* slides,ISS, 27 July 26 [https://bit.ly/ISS-Nhamirre-CdG](https://bit.ly/ISS-Nhamirre-CdG?ref=zitamar.com) \+ Borges Nhamirre, ‘Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency, ISS, 3Dec25 [https://bit.ly/ISS-dialogue-Dec25](https://bit.ly/ISS-dialogue-Dec25?ref=zitamar.com) \+ Tibverane, (9 Mb) ‘Is it possible dialogue and negotiate with al-Shabaab?’ [https://university.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/TIBVERANE\_POLICY\_PAPER\_02\_06\_2026 Is dialogue possible.pdf](https://university.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/TIBVERANE%5FPOLICY%5FPAPER%5F02%5F06%5F2026%20Is%20dialogue%20possible.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) \========================================= **To subscribe or unsubscribe:** [**https://bit.ly/Moz-sub**](https://bit.ly/Moz-sub?ref=zitamar.com) \========================================= **ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED** but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are in my archive on [http://bit.ly/Mozamb](http://bit.ly/Mozamb?ref=zitamar.com) ### Unitel goes dark, oil output falls, and a year on from Luanda unrest URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/unitel-goes-dark-oil-output-falls/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:23:58.000Z Hello, and welcome to the latest edition of *Zitamar*’s new Angola Briefing. *Zitamar* has been providing news, analysis and intelligence from Mozambique since 2015, for an audience including international investors, diplomats, financial institutions, energy majors, and international NGOs. We are delighted to now be able to bring our brand of intelligent news to Angola, through the new Angola Briefing. Subscribers get: - a twice-weekly webinar, which subscribers can join live and ask questions - a twice-weekly newsletter sent to subscribers, with the biggest news from Angola and analysis from our expert commentators - the recorded webinar, which subscribers can watch at their convenience - a podcast version of the webinar It’s also worth signing up for free; non-paying subscribers will receive one of the weekly newsletters and access to the recording of the end-of-week webinar. [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) # **IN FOCUS** ## **Cyberattack overshadows Unitel’s successful stock-market debut** *The state raised Kz300.3bn from the flotation, but the nationwide disruption revealed the economic risks created by Unitel’s dominant market position.* Unitel made a striking debut on Angola’s stock exchange this week. Its shares rose 24.88% on their first day of trading, even as the company worked to restore mobile services following a cyberattack that disrupted communications and electronic payments across the country. The state raised Kz300.3bn from the sale of a 15% stake in Angola’s largest telecommunications operator. Demand exceeded the 7.5m shares available, generating 17,549 subscription orders and bringing more than 11,000 new shareholders into the company. Unitel’s share price climbed from the offer price of Kz40,040 to approximately Kz50,000. Unitel said the attack was detected at 2.20 am on Tuesday and affected mobile voice, data and internet services nationwide. Payment terminals using Unitel SIM cards were disrupted, while some banking customers could not receive the verification messages needed to complete transfers. Services began returning after around 36 hours. By Thursday, Unitel said it had gradually restored them in 15 provinces, although recovery was not yet complete. The scale of the disruption reflects Unitel’s position in the economy. The company has approximately 20.8m customers, controls around 76% of Angola’s telecommunications market and reported net profits of more than Kz158bn in 2025\. Those figures help explain the demand for its shares. They also show how heavily households and businesses depend on its network. “If Unitel goes down, the country pretty much comes to a standstill,” Cláudio Silva said during this week’s Angola Briefing. For restaurants and retailers, the outage meant lost payments and interrupted trade. Other businesses struggled to communicate with staff and suppliers. The effects were more severe for customers without fixed internet access or a connection from another provider. Angola does have competing mobile operators, including Africell and Movicel. Demand for Africell SIM cards reportedly increased during the outage. Their ability to provide an immediate substitute remains limited, however, particularly outside the areas where their networks are strongest. Unitel’s market position has therefore created a concentration risk extending well beyond the company and its shareholders. The strong first-day share performance is understandable in that context. Investors were buying into a profitable operator with a dominant position in an essential market. The rally demonstrates confidence in Unitel’s capacity to generate returns, but provides little evidence about the resilience of its infrastructure. Important questions about the incident remain unanswered. Unitel is working with the authorities and international partners to identify the attackers. It has said it is considering whether the timing was intended to disrupt its admission to the stock exchange, although it has presented this as one hypothesis and has not identified those responsible. Cyberattacks can affect even well-funded telecommunications companies, and the outage does not by itself establish whether Unitel’s ownership structure or market dominance contributed to the breach. Its fixed telecommunications services were not affected, according to the company. A fuller assessment will require evidence about how the attackers gained access, which safeguards failed and whether adequate backup systems were available. Unitel’s limited public communication during the outage nevertheless added to the uncertainty. Silva noted that long gaps between company statements created room for rumours and conspiracy theories. As a listed company, Unitel will face closer scrutiny over the speed and quality of its disclosures, as well as the investment it makes in network resilience. The flotation gives the government some encouragement as it prepares further sales under ProPriv. Its wider significance should be treated cautiously. Unitel is unusually profitable and occupies a dominant market position; investor demand for its shares cannot be assumed for state assets with weaker finances, poorer governance or more difficult restructuring needs. The more consequential test comes after the first-day rally. Unitel must explain the failure and show that its listing brings greater transparency and stronger operational discipline. Future ProPriv transactions will gain credibility only if they improve how strategic companies are governed. A change in minority ownership is too limited a reform on its own. # **Also in today’s Angola Briefing:** - Unitel shares jump on stock-market debut despite cyberattack ([Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/unitel-foi-hoje-admitida-em-bolsa-e-retoma-servicos-de-forma-gradual-apos-ataque-cibernetico-73586.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), [O País](https://www.opais.ao/economia/estado-encaixa-mais-de-300-milhoes-de-kwanzas-com-opv-da-unitel/?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/unitel-retoma-servicos-73584.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)) - Oil production falls short of budget target as offshore incentives advance ([Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/producao-de-petroleo-fica-abaixo-do-previsto-no-primeiro-semestre-73503.html?ref=zitamar.com), [Ponto de Situação](https://www.pontodesituacao.ao/executivo-aprova-incentivos-fiscais-para-impulsionar-exploracao-petrolifera-nos-blocos-34-e-35-4657?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)) - Businesses still await support a year after deadly Luanda unrest ([Novo Jornal/Lusa](https://novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/grave-dos-taxistas-um-ano-apos-tumultos-em-luanda-empresario-virou-mendigo-73525.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com), [Novo Jornal](https://novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/greve-dos-taxistas-um-ano-apos-os-tumultos-taxistas-garantem-que-detencoes-nao-os-amedrontaram-nem-travaram-reivindicacoes-73565.html?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)) --- ### **Unitel shares jump on stock market debut despite cyberattack** **Sources:** [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-29/47536504/unitel-valoriza-24-88-na-estreia-em-bolsa-de-angola-apesar-de-falhas-da-rede?ref=zitamar.com), [Lusa](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-29/47535957/unitel-comunicou-ataque-%C3%A0s-autoridades-e-trabalha-com-parceiros-internacionais-para-apurar-origem?ref=zitamar.com), [O País](https://www.opais.ao/economia/estado-encaixa-mais-de-300-milhoes-de-kwanzas-com-opv-da-unitel/?ref=zitamar.com), [Economia & Mercado](https://www.economiaemercado.co.ao/mercados/bolsa/accoes-da-unitel-disparam-2488-na-estreia-em-bolsa/?ref=zitamar.com), [Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/empresas/detalhe/unitel-foi-hoje-admitida-em-bolsa-e-retoma-servicos-de-forma-gradual-apos-ataque-cibernetico-73586.html?ref=zitamar.com), [Novo Jornal](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/unitel-retoma-servicos-73584.html?ref=zitamar.com) The state’s sale of a 15% stake in Unitel got off to a strong start, with the shares rising 24.88% on their debut on the Bolsa de Dívida e Valores de Angola (BODIVA). The flotation is the first major transaction under the government’s ProPriv programme and is intended to broaden participation in Angola’s capital markets. Trading was overshadowed by a cyberattack that disrupted Unitel’s mobile and internet services, affecting electronic payments and banking services across the country. The company said it had informed the authorities and was working with international partners to investigate the incident and restore services. The government plans to privatise nine further assets before the end of the year, including stakes in Standard Bank Angola, Endiama, TAAG and Angola Telecom. > *The flotation is an important milestone for ProPriv. Unitel is one of Angola’s most recognisable companies, but investors still needed convincing that a large public offering could succeed. This week’s sale suggests there is demand for well-prepared transactions.* > > *The cyberattack should not detract from that achievement, but it does highlight how dependent Angola has become on a small number of critical digital systems. As further strategic assets come to market, investors are likely to pay as much attention to the resilience of the wider operating environment as to the companies themselves.* --- ### **Oil production falls short of budget target as offshore incentives advance** Sources: [Expansão](https://www.expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/producao-de-petroleo-estagna-e-mantem-se-abaixo-da-meta-do-oge-73574.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Ponto de Situação](https://www.pontodesituacao.ao/executivo-aprova-incentivos-fiscais-para-impulsionar-exploracao-petrolifera-nos-blocos-34-e-35-4657?ref=zitamar.com) Oil production remained below the level assumed in the 2026 State Budget during the first half of the year, reinforcing concerns over declining output from Angola’s mature oilfields. At the same time, the government has proposed a package of fiscal incentives for offshore Blocks 34 and 35, including lower taxes, improved production-sharing terms and accelerated depreciation, in an effort to attract fresh upstream investment. The proposed measures are intended to improve project economics and encourage exploration and development as Angola seeks to stabilise medium-term oil production. > *The government has little choice but to make Angola’s offshore sector more competitive. Production from mature fields continues to decline, while international oil companies have become increasingly selective about where they invest.* > > *The awkward reality is that Angola’s plans to diversify the economy still depend on an oil industry capable of generating the revenues to finance that transition. Lower production therefore makes attracting new upstream investment more—not less—important.* --- ### **Businesses still await support a year after deadly Luanda unrest** **Sources:** [Novo Jornal/Lusa](https://novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/grave-dos-taxistas-um-ano-apos-tumultos-em-luanda-empresario-virou-mendigo-73525.html?ref=zitamar.com),[ Novo Jornal](https://novojornal.co.ao/sociedade/detalhe/greve-dos-taxistas-um-ano-apos-os-tumultos-taxistas-garantem-que-detencoes-nao-os-amedrontaram-nem-travaram-reivindicacoes-73565.html?ref=zitamar.com) One year after the July 2025 taxi strike and riots, business owners affected by the unrest say they are still waiting for the support promised by the government. Novo Jornal reports that one hotel owner has yet to rebuild after his property was destroyed, despite the announcement of a Kz50bn financing programme for affected businesses. Taxi association leaders also say the grievances that triggered last year’s protests remain unresolved, insisting they will continue campaigning over fuel prices and working conditions despite the arrests that followed the unrest. Official figures put the death toll at 30, with 277 people injured and 1,515 arrests. > *The anniversary is a reminder that the political consequences of last year’s unrest have not disappeared. Rising living costs, youth unemployment and frustration with public services continue to shape public opinion, even if the protests themselves have subsided.* > > *Economic reforms are ultimately judged by whether they improve everyday life. That remains the government’s biggest political challenge as the 2027 elections draw closer.* --- ### **Other Headlines** **Public debt returns to pre-pandemic levels** ([Expansão](https://expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/divida-publica-ultrapassa-os-72-mil-milhoes-usd-e-regressa-aos-niveis-pre-covid-19-73521.html?ref=zitamar.com)) Angola’s public debt rose 16% year on year to $72.1bn in the first half of 2026, driven by Eurobond issues and increased domestic borrowing. **Government strengthens ANIESA’s inspection powers** ([Economia & Mercado](https://www.economiaemercado.com/artigo/executivo-reafirma-extincao-do-inadec-e-atribui-poderes-exclusivos-de-inspeccao-a-aniesa?ref=zitamar.com)) Proposed reforms would abolish INADEC, transfer its functions to ANIESA and remove the SIC’s economic-inspection responsibilities. **Kwanza joins SADC payments system** ([BNA](https://www.bna.ao/publicacoes-e-media/comunicacao/comunicados/detalhe/957?ref=zitamar.com)) The kwanza has become the second settlement currency in SADC-RTGS, allowing eligible regional payments to be settled directly in the Angolan currency. **Studies launched for West–East highway** ([Ministry of Public Works](https://minopuh.gov.ao/web/noticias/autoestrada-oeste-leste-avanca-com-assinatura-de-memorando-para-estudos-e-projectos?ref=zitamar.com)) Angola will invest around $21m in studies for the proposed 1,300km highway connecting Benguela with Bié and the Moxico provinces. ### The high price of stability URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-high-price-of-stability/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T20:38:39.000Z Good afternoon. As central bankers go, Rogério Zandamela has never lacked confidence in his own judgement. Speaking after what may prove to be his final Monetary Policy Committee meeting as governor, he used the occasion not simply to explain the Bank of Mozambique's latest decisions, but to defend the defining choices of his decade in office. He described personally ordering the rescue of Moza Banco in the absence of a legal framework, dismissed critics as people hiding behind "technicalities", and insisted that political leaders had given him the freedom to take difficult decisions without interference. There is much in that record that deserves recognition. Zandamela inherited a central bank whose credibility had been badly damaged by the hidden debts scandal and a financial system facing an existential crisis. He rebuilt the Bank of Mozambique's authority as a regulator, imposed discipline on commercial banks and demonstrated a degree of institutional independence that remains unusual in Mozambique's public sector. Many governors would have found it easier to bend under political pressure. By his own account, successive presidents allowed him not to. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fd6b974a-950e-4076-82de-7dbe3cfd1658/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies and Sumitomo withdraw from 1.5 GW Mphanda Nkuwa projectFrench and Japanese partners leave project but government insists it remains on track![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-0683d4ab-cd45-4837-908a-04b8c82a0afc.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Picture1-3429156c-a4e1-47cb-a81e-194c611753ce.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-and-sumitomo-withdraw-from-1-5-gw-mphanda-nkuwa-project/) [Insurgents clash with government forces in QuissangaWednesday’s firefight in Tapara may be the first armed clash between insurgents and government forces in Quissanga in well over a year![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-3e8f4b26-bb78-4bd6-98a6-cdd2d80b0fe3.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-30-18.14.30-43916895-9f58-42dc-a8a2-086f9d3f9ab0.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-clash-with-government-forces-in-quissanga/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But institutions exist to serve the economy, not the other way around. That is where Zandamela's legacy becomes much more contentious. Throughout his tenure, the overriding objective was macroeconomic stability. Inflation was to be squeezed down, the metical held stable, and liquidity tightly controlled. Commercial banks were to be more closely supervised and more heavily sanctioned when they fell short of the regulator's sometimes unpredictable, and arguably self-serving, expectations. Those policies undoubtedly delivered results. Inflation fell dramatically from the post-hidden debts crisis years, the exchange rate stabilised and confidence gradually returned to the financial system. But they came at a cost. For much of the past decade, Mozambique has had some of the highest real borrowing costs in the region. Businesses repeatedly complained that credit was prohibitively expensive. Manufacturers argued that an artificially strong metical made imports cheaper while undermining domestic production. Farmers struggled to compete with imported food from more productive neighbours. At a time when the country needed investment and diversification, monetary policy often appeared designed first and foremost to avoid risk rather than encourage growth. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### TotalEnergies and Sumitomo withdraw from 1.5 GW Mphanda Nkuwa project URL: https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-and-sumitomo-withdraw-from-1-5-gw-mphanda-nkuwa-project/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T17:03:16.000Z French energy giant TotalEnergies and Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation have quit the consortium developing the 1,500 MW Mphanda Nkuwa hydropower project in Tete province, *Zitamar News* has learnt. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents clash with government forces in Quissanga URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-clash-with-government-forces-in-quissanga/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T16:31:13.000Z Insurgents clashed with Mozambican government forces on Wednesday afternoon in Tapara village, Quissanga district, Cabo Delgado, marking the first reported armed confrontation between the two sides in the district since February 2025, according to data collected by Mozambique Conflict Monitor project of Zitamar and conflict monitoring group ACLED. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Who is building the Beira Corridor? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-is-building-the-beira-corridor/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T18:28:01.000Z Good afternoon. Every day, more than 2,000 trucks pass through the Machipanda border post, carrying goods between the Port of Beira and Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo. When those trucks spend two or three days waiting to cross the border, the costs ripple far beyond the queues themselves. Freight becomes more expensive, exporters less competitive and imports costlier. Few infrastructure projects could have a more immediate impact on Mozambique's economy than reducing those delays. For that reason, the government's decision to move ahead with a one-stop border post at Machipanda deserves to be welcomed. Unlike many grand industrial announcements that promise to transform the economy one day, improving the efficiency of an existing trade corridor can deliver benefits from the moment it opens. Sometimes the most important economic reforms are also the least glamorous. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ad997a25-77ea-40a4-ba0b-1965473db15f/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) However, the announcement also brings cause for concern. The Machipanda concession has been awarded to the same Chinese consortium — Zhongmei Engineering and Union Portlink Capital — that is already developing the Beira Port Access Road and was recently handed the concession for the Dondo Logistics Terminal. The projects have followed different procurement routes: the access road as a public-private partnership, the Dondo terminal through direct negotiation linked to that project, and the Machipanda concession reportedly following a public tender. But in any case, within a matter of months, the same consortium has been handed three of the Beira Corridor's most strategically important logistics projects. If the consortium has consistently submitted the strongest technical and financial proposals, then it should win. But it inevitably raises questions. Why has this consortium emerged so prominently? How were competing proposals evaluated? What vision does the government have for the future ownership and operation of the corridor as a whole? And is there a risk of conflicts of interest if various points on the corridor have common ownership? _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### When criticism becomes a crime URL: https://www.zitamar.com/when-criticism-becomes-a-crime/ Last updated: 2026-07-28T18:20:04.000Z Good afternoon. One of the men arrested this week for insulting President Daniel Chapo does not deny making the video that led to his detention. He apologised for what he said, and explained why he said it. According to his account, the incident dates back to February, when flooding cut the EN1 in Gaza province. He and a group of friends were helping vehicles carry goods across the flooded section of road to earn a little money when riot police arrived and, he claims, opened fire, apparently mistaking them for thieves. Angry and frustrated, he recorded a video directing insults at the president. Five months later, he was arrested. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6bef2b5c-32a4-49c0-ab5d-0dee03bb72f4/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents step up attacks in Cabo Delgado following battle for CatupaInsurgents split into several groups, raiding villages and gold mines and threatening movement on the two main roads linking the north and south of the province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-0bcbcb74-f439-4d68-a9a5-59de4f68d82b.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-28-15.13.47-92657f05-c8b9-46e8-be0c-5d3f25add2f6.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-step-up-attacks-in-cabo-delgado-following-battle-for-catupa/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The story emerging from Zambézia is different, but equally troubling. Five people have been detained over a Facebook page that regularly publishes allegations of corruption and criticism of the government. Yet the page itself remains online and continues to post new material. According to messages published by its administrators, some of those arrested were not responsible for running the page at all, but had merely commented on its posts. That claim has not been independently verified. But if it proves true, it raises uncomfortable questions about the scope of the investigation. None of this is to suggest that everything posted on social media should be beyond the reach of the law. There is a legitimate distinction between political criticism and coordinated disinformation campaigns. States have a duty to investigate incitement to violence, organised attempts to spread false information or genuine threats against public officials. But it is vital that the authorities respect that distinction. Criminal law should be used carefully and proportionately. Arresting citizens over an angry outburst recorded months earlier, or potentially over comments on a Facebook page, suggests that the law is being used less to protect public order than to protect the dignity of the presidency. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents step up attacks in Cabo Delgado following battle for Catupa URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-step-up-attacks-in-cabo-delgado-following-battle-for-catupa/ Last updated: 2026-07-29T08:32:31.000Z Islamic State-backed fighters have stepped up their operations in Cabo Delgado throughout July, mounting incursions on the two main roads linking the north and south of the province, the N380 national road and the regional R698 Montepuez-Nairoto-Mueda road, and threatening road traffic. The escalation follows successive and intense clashes around the Catupa base, in Macomia district, contested since June between pro-government forces and insurgents. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Who is selling Mozambique's flag? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-is-selling-mozambiques-flag/ Last updated: 2026-07-28T07:09:02.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday's newsletter. Mozambique found itself unexpectedly caught up in one of the world's most sensitive geopolitical flashpoints this week after the LPG tanker *Disha* was attacked in Iranian waters while sailing under the Mozambican flag. The government's maritime authority, Itransmar, responded quickly, insisting the vessel has never been registered in Mozambique and has no right to fly its flag. The registration, it said, was fraudulent. This is not an isolated case. In March, the tanker *Deyna*, suspected by France of belonging to Russia's sanctions-busting "shadow fleet", was intercepted in the western Mediterranean while also claiming to sail under the Mozambican flag. French investigators concluded that the registration was false, but found no evidence that the Mozambican authorities themselves had issued it. But two cases in four months suggest a pattern rather than a coincidence. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7cf2cd85-53ed-4a84-8bb3-1964be5315c4/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Commercial vessels cannot simply decide to change nationality by painting a different flag on the stern. A ship can only have one nationality at a time. Registering under a new flag requires its previous registration to be cancelled and replaced with documentation recognising the new flag state. If vessels are repeatedly appearing with apparently credible Mozambican registration, somebody is producing documents capable of convincing foreign authorities that those ships belong on Mozambique's register. Who? Industry figures contacted by *Zitamar* stressed that registering vessels is exclusively the responsibility of Itransmar, but also described corruption within the maritime administration as a longstanding concern. Their suspicion is not that the Mozambican state has adopted a policy of providing cover for sanctions evasion or illicit shipping, but that individuals may be exploiting weaknesses in the system, issuing or selling fraudulent registration certificates without official authorisation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Beware the ‘enemies of peace and unity’ URL: https://www.zitamar.com/beware-the-enemies-of-peace-and-unity/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T21:39:02.000Z > 🇦🇴 Zitamar today launched a new Angola Briefing, with a webinar hosted by Fernando Lima with analysts Claudio Silva in Luanda, and Ines Silva in Lisbon. > The recorded webinar is available at [www.angolabriefing.com](https://www.angolabriefing.com/?ref=zitamar.com), where you can also sign up to receive a newsletter similar to the Zitamar Daily Briefing. Look out for the podcast version too. [MPLA succession, rising debt, Lobito and Russian spies - the new Angola Briefing from Zitamar NewsWatch now | A recording from the Angola Briefing![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/https-3A-2F-2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com-2Fpublic-2Fimages-2F0555f879-41c1-494e-a919-57cc2327ad09-2Ffavicon-48x48-ba9b8fa2-cec6-4faf-8a8d-67e21f27b749.png)Angola BriefingFernando Lima and Cláudio Silva and ines.silva![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/https-3A-2F-2Fsubstack-video.s3.amazonaws.com-2Fvideo_upload-2Fpost-2F208330301-2Fdbbb6f70-03a6-4bfe-954c-654d5de33704-2Ftranscoded-1784907536-da17da0a-601e-4c3c-81ff-ed9984ddc472.png)](https://substack.com/@fernandolima897751/note/p-208330301?r=8tfb&ref=zitamar.com) --- Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo struck a familiar note this week as he addressed supporters in Nampula. Mozambicans, he said, should remain vigilant against "enemies of peace and national unity", going on to warn of "the people who killed your brother, claiming they had won the elections". It was a clear reference to opposition figurehead Venancio Mondlane and supporters of him and his new party, Anamola. The confrontational, accusatory rhetoric is not new — but it is increasingly jarring in the context of other moves in the direction of reconciliation. Earlier this month the government hosted a national conference on transitional justice, bringing together ministers, academics, religious leaders and civil society organisations to consider how Mozambique should deal with the legacy of the post-election crisis. The discussion was not simply about creating a truth commission or compensation fund. Participants repeatedly returned to broader themes: acknowledging what happened, rebuilding trust between citizens and the state, strengthening institutions and ensuring that political violence is not repeated. Reconciliation, several speakers argued, depends not only on justice but also on a shared understanding of the past. [Breaking the silence is only the first stepMozambique’s first national conference on transitional justice marks an important political shift. The harder question is whether it will lead to accountability as well as dialogue![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-bbd27de3-e6e8-4458-bd43-a04e351122ad.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/746742940_1457474686412726_766231429019430727_n-9b71d22d-2ae1-41e0-a987-9c593292c220.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/breaking-the-silence-is-only-the-first-step/) Chapo’s remarks illustrated just how far Mozambique still is from achieving that. While opposition supporters were responsible for violence, attacks on public buildings, looting and widespread destruction of property after the last elections, state security forces were responsible for at least as many deaths—and almost certainly considerably more—during their response to demonstrations. Any process of transitional justice worthy of the name will eventually have to reckon with both realities — not to mention the widespread belief that the election itself was stolen to secure Daniel Chapo's victory. The problem is not confined to one side. Mondlane has shown little interest in lowering the political temperature either, recently calling Chapo *mata-reza* — literally, a "kill-pray" — in a deliberately provocative reference to the deaths that followed the election, contrasted with his performative visits to religious institutions. His response this week to Chapo's claim that the two men remain in contact was equally provocative, saying the only communication between them had come through the continued persecution and killing of ANAMOLA supporters. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### MPLA succession, rising debt, Lobito and Russian spies - the new Angola Briefing from Zitamar News URL: https://www.zitamar.com/angola/mpla-succession-rising-debt-lobito/ Last updated: 2026-09-21T12:28:02.000Z Hello, and welcome to the new Angola Briefing from *Zitamar News* — which follows below after a brief introduction. *Zitamar* has been providing news, analysis and intelligence from Mozambique since 2015, for an audience including international investors, diplomats, financial institutions, energy majors, and international NGOs. We are delighted to now be able to bring our brand of intelligent news to Angola, through the new Angola Briefing. Subscribers get: - a twice-weekly webinar, which subscribers can join live and ask questions - a twice-weekly newsletter sent to subscribers, with the biggest news from Angola and analysis from our expert commentators - the recorded webinar, which subscribers can watch at their convenience - a podcast version of the webinar It’s also worth signing up for free; non-paying subscribers will receive one of the weekly newsletters and access to the recording of the end-of-week webinar. [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/09/image_2026-09-21_135645623.png)](#/portal/signup) Sign up to Zitamar News and select the Angola Briefing newsletter to receive every issue in your inbox. [Sign up now ](#/portal/signup) --- # **IN FOCUS** ## **MPLA: Carneiro’s exclusion makes Angola’s succession more dangerous** *The MPLA may be able to eliminate internal competition, but it cannot eliminate the public discontent that will shape the 2027 election* The rejection of Higino Carneiro’s candidacy for the MPLA presidency makes João Lourenço’s victory at the party congress in December appear almost certain. But it does not answer who will be president of Angola after 2027. Carneiro’s submission may contain the irregularities alleged by the MPLA’s candidacy subcommittee. Of the 14,493 supporting forms it counted, the committee declared just 2,561 valid. Carneiro is entitled to ask why a final-looking decision was announced months before the candidacy deadline, however, and to demand an opportunity to inspect the thousands of forms declared invalid or false. The dispute is more significant than Carneiro’s prospects. His candidacy offered the MPLA an opportunity to demonstrate that it could manage internal competition after half a century in power. Instead, the party appears to be reverting to its established practice of treating a challenge to its leader as an act of disloyalty. Lourenço need not seek an unconstitutional third presidential mandate to preserve his influence. By remaining MPLA president, he could oversee the choice of the party’s national candidate and retain substantial authority if that candidate wins. Eliminating Carneiro therefore strengthens Lourenço’s grip on the succession while leaving Angolans uncertain about who is being prepared to lead them. That approach carries growing risks. The MPLA’s machinery remains formidable, particularly outside the major cities, where opposition parties face persistent obstacles to organising. But its electoral base is ageing while Angola’s overwhelmingly young population becomes more urban, connected and impatient. UNITA’s strong performance in Luanda in 2022 demonstrated the scale of that shift. The MPLA can control access to its congress more easily than it can control this wider political change. Social media is weakening its dominance over information, while stagnant living standards and scarce employment are giving younger Angolans little reason to defend the existing settlement. A competitive leadership contest might have helped the MPLA adapt before 2027\. By closing that route, the party is pushing political competition back outside its own structures — where it will be harder to manage and potentially much more disruptive. # Also in today’s Angola Briefing: - **Carneiro challenges exclusion from MPLA leadership contest** ([*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-22/47504095/angolano-higino-carneiro-vai-reclamar-da-anula%C3%A7%C3%A3o-da-candidatura-%C3%A0-presid%C3%AAncia-do-mpla?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-higino-carneiro-responde-a-anulacao-da-sua-candidatura-a-presidencia-do-partido-73458.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*DW*](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/jurista-acusa%C3%A7%C3%B5es-s%C3%A3o-manobra-para-afastar-higino-carneiro/a-78080057?ref=zitamar.com)*)* - **Debt rises as World Bank warns of declining per capita incomes (**[*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-21/47495138/corredor-do-lobito-%C3%A9-crucial-para-inverter-empobrecimento-de-angola-banco-mundial?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/economia/detalhe/stock-da-divida-angolana-atinge-72-mil-milhoes-usd-e-corresponde-a-5124-do-pib---governo-73386.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Ministry of Finance*](https://www.minfin.gov.ao/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/noticia/divida-garantida-por-petroleo-reduz-para-6-83-mil-milhoes-de-dolares-no-i-semestre-de-2026?ref=zitamar.com)) - **Lobito financing advances as Barra do Dande seeks $900m** ([*Africa Finance Corporation announcement reported by Africa.com*](https://www.africa.com/afc-secures-landmark-753-million-financing-for-lobito-corridor-railway-project?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Expansão*](https://www.expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/dois-passos-decisivos-aproximam-o-corredor-do-lobito-dos-objectivos-73299.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Mercado*](https://mercado.co.ao/chinesa-huatong-angola-vai-investir-900-milhoes-de-dolares-para-modernizar-terminal-portuario/?ref=zitamar.com)) - **Government considers higher electricity tariffs for large consumers (**[*Angola24Horas*](https://angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/34743-governo-analisa-aumento-das-tarifas-da-electricidade-para-grandes-consumidores?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*VerAngola*](https://www.verangola.net/va/pt/072026/Politica/49585/Governo-quer-ajustar-tarifas-de-electricidade-para-grandes-consumidores.htm?ref=zitamar.com)) - **Russian nationals jailed for terrorism and espionage (**[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/23/two-russian-men-jailed-angola-terrorism-and-spying?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-22/47500897/tribunal-de-luanda-condena-cidad%C3%A3os-russos-a-penas-de-pris%C3%A3o-de-11-e-oito-anos?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*RFI*](https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20260722-angola-minist%C3%A9rio-p%C3%BAblico-recorreu-das-senten%C3%A7as-no-chamado-caso-dos-russos?ref=zitamar.com)) ### **Carneiro challenges exclusion from MPLA leadership contest** ([*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-22/47504095/angolano-higino-carneiro-vai-reclamar-da-anula%C3%A7%C3%A3o-da-candidatura-%C3%A0-presid%C3%AAncia-do-mpla?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-higino-carneiro-responde-a-anulacao-da-sua-candidatura-a-presidencia-do-partido-73458.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*DW*](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/jurista-acusa%C3%A7%C3%B5es-s%C3%A3o-manobra-para-afastar-higino-carneiro/a-78080057?ref=zitamar.com)*)* *Sources:* [*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-22/47504095/angolano-higino-carneiro-vai-reclamar-da-anula%C3%A7%C3%A3o-da-candidatura-%C3%A0-presid%C3%AAncia-do-mpla?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/politica/detalhe/mpla-higino-carneiro-responde-a-anulacao-da-sua-candidatura-a-presidencia-do-partido-73458.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*DW*](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/jurista-acusa%C3%A7%C3%B5es-s%C3%A3o-manobra-para-afastar-higino-carneiro/a-78080057?ref=zitamar.com) The MPLA’s candidacy subcommittee has annulled Higino Carneiro’s bid for the party presidency, citing serious irregularities in the documentation submitted by his campaign. Of the 14,493 supporting forms counted by the committee, 2,561 were declared valid, 9,659 invalid and 2,273 false. Carneiro has filed a complaint with the commission preparing the party’s 9–10 December congress, arguing that the decision was premature because candidacies can be submitted until 25 October. He has demanded access to the rejected forms and a document-by-document review in the presence of his representative. President João Lourenço is currently the only validated candidate for the MPLA leadership. > *It is difficult to see Carneiro forcing his way back into the contest. The allegations over his supporting documents give the MPLA grounds to pursue disciplinary or even legal action against him, and the party leadership has shown little appetite for genuine competition. His carefully phrased challenge may now be about preserving his standing within the party and demonstrating that he has support, rather than any real expectation of defeating Lourenço.* > > *Carneiro’s candidacy was still revealing. The enthusiasm it generated, including among some younger Angolans, reflected a desire for choice and change rather than excitement about Carneiro himself. For the first time, the MPLA faced the possibility of a real contest for its leadership and responded by closing it down before it could develop.* > > *The more interesting question is what Lourenço plans to do with another term as MPLA president. He would not need to seek a third term as head of state to remain highly influential: he could choose the party’s 2027 candidate and retain considerable power after the election. That may settle the immediate contest inside the MPLA, but it does nothing to tackle the party’s waning appeal among young and urban Angolans.* --- ### **Debt rises as World Bank warns of declining per capita incomes** *Sources:* [*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-21/47495138/corredor-do-lobito-%C3%A9-crucial-para-inverter-empobrecimento-de-angola-banco-mundial?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Novo Jornal*](https://www.novojornal.co.ao/economia/detalhe/stock-da-divida-angolana-atinge-72-mil-milhoes-usd-e-corresponde-a-5124-do-pib---governo-73386.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Angolan Ministry of Finance*](https://www.minfin.gov.ao/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/noticia/divida-garantida-por-petroleo-reduz-para-6-83-mil-milhoes-de-dolares-no-i-semestre-de-2026?ref=zitamar.com) Angola’s public debt rose 9.1% during the first half of 2026 to Kz65.8tn ($72bn), equivalent to 51.24% of GDP, according to the government’s review of its Annual Borrowing Plan. External debt accounted for Kz46.5tn and domestic debt Kz19.3tn. The increase followed approximately $4bn of Eurobond issuance, while the government also bought back $1.2bn of securities ahead of large maturities in 2028–29 and reduced oil-collateralised debt to $6.83bn. Separately, the World Bank forecast average economic growth of 2.7% in 2026–28, below annual population growth of around 3.1%, and projected that approximately 42% of Angolans will remain in poverty through 2027. > *Debt at 51% of GDP does not look alarming on its own. Angola’s difficulty is that much of its ability to pay still depends on oil revenues, exchange-rate stability and access to relatively expensive foreign borrowing. The government is trying to smooth the large repayments coming in 2028–29, but investors will be watching the cost and terms of the new debt more closely than the headline ratio.* > > *The World Bank’s growth forecast tells a less comfortable story. If the economy keeps growing more slowly than the population, the average Angolan will continue getting poorer even while GDP rises. An oil industry that creates relatively few jobs cannot absorb the country’s large and youthful workforce, leaving informal work as the only available option for much of the population.* > > *Official claims of lower inflation and renewed growth may therefore have limited resonance outside government. Prices can rise more slowly without becoming affordable, while GDP can expand without producing enough jobs or improving basic services. Angola needs growth that reaches households through employment, education, electricity, water and sanitation; the present model is struggling to deliver it.* --- ### **Lobito financing advances as Barra do Dande seeks $900m** *Sources:* [*Africa Finance Corporation in Africa.com*](https://www.africa.com/afc-secures-landmark-753-million-financing-for-lobito-corridor-railway-project?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Expansão*](https://www.expansao.co.ao/economia/detalhe/dois-passos-decisivos-aproximam-o-corredor-do-lobito-dos-objectivos-73299.html?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Mercado*](https://mercado.co.ao/chinesa-huatong-angola-vai-investir-900-milhoes-de-dolares-para-modernizar-terminal-portuario/?ref=zitamar.com) The Lobito Corridor has reached a $753m financial close for upgrading its Angolan railway infrastructure, with financing from Africa Finance Corporation, the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo has also approved a public-private partnership with Mota-Engil to rehabilitate the Dilolo–Kolwezi–Lubumbashi–Sakania railway. Separately, Huatong Angola Industry and Berkshire Waterhouse Infrastructure Development have announced a proposed $900m investment in a deep-water terminal and associated infrastructure in the Barra do Dande Free Zone. The renewable 25-year sub-concession is awaiting institutional approvals, with its first phase expected to take 24 months. > *After years of speeches and announcements, the $753m financial close makes the Lobito Corridor look much more real. US participation gives the project greater financial and geopolitical weight and is a clear success for Lourenço. Even so, coordinating Angola, the DRC, Zambia and numerous investors and lenders will be complicated, and nobody should expect the corridor’s full economic promise to materialise quickly.* > > *The bigger test is what Angola builds around the railway. Simply moving Congolese and Zambian minerals to the Atlantic would leave Angola playing the familiar role of an export route for unprocessed resources. The opportunities lie in processing, manufacturing, agriculture, logistics, tourism and other activity along the line, creating businesses and employment that remain in Angola.* > > *Barra do Dande could eventually add another major logistics and industrial hub, but it remains much less advanced. Its promoters have announced $900m of investment and a 25-year sub-concession, while the necessary institutional approvals are still pending. For now, Lobito has crossed an important threshold from ambition to financed project; Barra do Dande has yet to do the same.* --- ### **Government considers higher electricity tariffs for large consumers** *Sources:* [*Angola24Horas*](https://angola24horas.com/sociedade/item/34743-governo-analisa-aumento-das-tarifas-da-electricidade-para-grandes-consumidores?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*VerAngola*](https://www.verangola.net/va/pt/072026/Politica/49585/Governo-quer-ajustar-tarifas-de-electricidade-para-grandes-consumidores.htm?ref=zitamar.com) The government’s Economic Commission has reviewed a proposal to increase electricity tariffs for large consumers while leaving household and social tariffs unchanged. The government says the partial adjustment is intended to improve the finances of public electricity companies and support investment in expanding and modernising the system. No proposed tariff level or implementation date has been announced. > *There is a reasonable argument for asking large consumers to pay more. Angola has invested substantially in dams and solar generation, but public electricity companies still lack the money to maintain and expand a system that does not reach much of the population. Selling power below cost indefinitely is unlikely to solve that problem.* > > *The awkward part is that the businesses being asked to pay more are the same manufacturers, miners and other investors Angola wants to attract. Protecting household consumers is politically understandable after the backlash against fuel-subsidy reform, but it risks loading more costs onto a relatively small formal business sector. Higher electricity bills could make proposed industrial projects less competitive before they have even begun operating.* > > *Much will depend on what companies receive in return. Investors may accept higher tariffs if the supply becomes more reliable and they can spend less on generators, fuel and backup systems. Paying more for the same unreliable service will be a much harder sell, particularly if businesses conclude that they are being used to preserve politically protected prices elsewhere in the system.* --- ### **Russian nationals jailed for terrorism and espionage** *Sources:* [*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/23/two-russian-men-jailed-angola-terrorism-and-spying?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*Lusa*](https://www.lusa.pt/lusofonia/Angola/article/2026-07-22/47500897/tribunal-de-luanda-condena-cidad%C3%A3os-russos-a-penas-de-pris%C3%A3o-de-11-e-oito-anos?ref=zitamar.com)*,* [*RFI*](https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20260722-angola-minist%C3%A9rio-p%C3%BAblico-recorreu-das-senten%C3%A7as-no-chamado-caso-dos-russos?ref=zitamar.com) A Luanda court has sentenced Russian nationals Igor Ratchin and Lev Lakshtanov to 11 and eight years in prison respectively for offences including criminal association, espionage, terrorism and illegally retaining foreign currency. TPA journalist Amor Carlos Tomé received a two-year suspended sentence, while former UNITA youth official Francisco Oliveira, known as Buka Tanda, was acquitted. Prosecutors alleged that the defendants participated in an international network seeking to destabilise Angola and influence the 2027 elections. The prosecution and defence have appealed, and the Russian defendants remain detained pending a ruling. > *The case still contains more questions than answers. Russian influence and disinformation operations elsewhere in Africa are real, so the possibility of some foreign political activity in Angola cannot simply be ruled out. But the information made public so far does not clearly explain how the two men posed a terrorist threat or planned to destabilise the country.* > > *Blaming foreign actors also gives the government a useful way to avoid dwelling on the domestic causes of last year’s unrest. The protests grew out of anger over living costs and the conduct of the security forces, while social media allowed people to organise and circulate footage beyond the control of traditional media. Describing that mobilisation primarily as foreign destabilisation risks mistaking the channel through which anger spread for the reason it existed.* > > *The convictions may therefore say as much about official anxiety ahead of the 2027 election as they do about Russian activity. The government faces a political environment in which opposition voices and images of unrest can spread rapidly online. Broad use of terrorism and espionage charges could be intended to deter both foreign involvement and domestic collaboration, but may also complicate relations with Russia and deepen concerns about political freedoms.* You can also get a 7-day free trial of the full Angola Briefing. Click the button below to take advantage: ### Gaza governor forced out by Frelimo chiefs URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gaza-governor-forced-out-by-frelimo-chiefs/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T09:44:47.000Z Margarida Mapanzene becomes the first provincial governor to resign under President Daniel Chapo, amid an ongoing corruption scandal in Gaza _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Conservation needs more than new concessions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/conservation-needs-more-than-new-concessions/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T17:29:25.000Z Good afternoon. The government wants to open Mozambique's 29 conservation areas to more private concessions, in a bid to increase tourism revenues from around $200m a year before the Covid-19 pandemic to more than $1bn, while creating jobs and attracting investment to some of the country's most remote regions. There is no obvious reason why that should not be possible. Southern Africa has repeatedly shown that well-managed conservation can become a major economic activity. South Africa's Kruger National Park is one of the continent's leading tourist destinations. Closer to home, Gorongosa National Park has demonstrated what sustained investment, professional management and long-term commitment can achieve, restoring wildlife while creating employment and supporting surrounding communities. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a745fbd5-6bb8-4973-834c-23810f8d356f/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But while Mozambique has the natural assets to compete, it has often lacked the policy consistency to give investors confidence. Some conservation areas remain little more than lines on a map. Others have suffered years of underinvestment, weak management or illegal exploitation of timber and wildlife. At the same time, conservation operators have periodically found themselves in conflict with provincial authorities and local political leaders. Gorongosa has experienced repeated tensions with the Sofala provincial government. Karingani, on the South African border, has also faced disputes with local authorities. In Niassa, disagreements between officials and conservation managers have raised doubts about the government's commitment to long-term partnerships. None of that encourages investment. Nor does the continuing uncertainty over the purpose of some protected areas. Mozambique has long sought to expand mining and other extractive industries, creating periodic concerns that commercial interests could eventually take precedence over conservation. Investors will understandably hesitate if they cannot be confident that today's conservation concession will still be protected tomorrow. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A nation deserves better monuments URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-nation-deserves-better-monuments/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T18:53:52.000Z Good afternoon. The Chimoio municipality has removed its newly unveiled statue of Josina Machel after widespread criticism and ridicule over its appearance. The sculptor says the work was altered without his approval and has promised to produce a replacement. The decision should spare the municipality further embarrassment, but should also prompt a wider discussion in Mozambique. This is the second time in little more than a year that a monument to one of Mozambique's founding figures has become the subject of public ridicule. The [Eduardo Mondlane statue unveiled in Maputo](https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-new-statue-of-eduardo-mondlane-unveiled-watch/?ref=zitamar.com) in 2024 provoked similar criticism, with many questioning whether it bore any real resemblance to the man it sought to commemorate. In neither case did anyone dispute the importance of the historical figures themselves. People simply asked why the monuments failed to do them justice. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bd3dc2e3-e60f-4fab-90f4-1b6ae8008989/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Public monuments are unlike most public works. Roads deteriorate, buildings are renovated and governments come and go. Statues are intended to outlive them all, and shape how future generations encounter the people who helped build the nation. Mozambique has often chosen to commemorate those figures through a fairly uniform visual language. Samora Machel statues stand across the country. Heroes' Square has become the template for countless memorials. Familiar symbols are repeated from province to province. There is nothing inherently wrong with creating a recognisable national style, but repetition should not become a substitute for artistic ambition. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A cleaner balance sheet is not a turnaround URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-cleaner-balance-sheet-is-not-a-turnaround/ Last updated: 2026-07-21T15:38:00.000Z Good afternoon. One after another, Mozambique's state-owned companies have begun reporting surprisingly positive financial results. Petromoc almost tripled its profits last year. Airports of Mozambique returned to the black. LAM now says it has completed a year of "financial and operational recovery", announcing a profit of MZN5.3bn ($83m). At first glance, it looks like a remarkable turnaround across the public sector. The reality is both more encouraging and more complicated. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/46d47754-6cb4-4a55-9d07-c61634eed88d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For several years, the Institute for the Management of State Holdings (IGEPE), backed by the government, has been quietly carrying out one of the biggest restructurings of Mozambique's public companies since independence. The objective is straightforward: remove the toxic debts accumulated over decades, transfer liabilities that rightly belong to the state onto the government's own balance sheet, and give companies a chance to operate on a commercial footing. There is a strong case for doing that. Many of these debts were not created because the companies themselves were poorly managed. Petromoc accumulated liabilities while implementing politically imposed fuel subsidies, while Airports of Mozambique inherited debts linked to government decisions to build the Maputo and Nacala airports. LAM has long been expected to fulfil political and social objectives that no purely commercial airline would accept. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Shared language, shared values? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/shared-language-shared-values/ Last updated: 2026-07-21T09:29:51.000Z President Daniel Chapo's expression of concern over the arrest of Guinea-Bissau opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira during his visit to Portugal might have passed largely unnoticed outside Lusophone diplomatic circles. Instead, it provoked a furious response from Guinea-Bissau's military-backed authorities, who accused Chapo of hypocrisy and lacking the moral authority to comment on another country's affairs while Mozambique continues to grapple with terrorism and political unrest. It was not an isolated reaction. Guinea-Bissau's current leadership has also sharply criticised the government of Cabo Verde and, earlier, Timor-Leste's President José Ramos-Horta after they voiced concerns over political developments in the country. A pattern is emerging: criticism from fellow Portuguese-speaking countries is increasingly treated not as friendly advice but as illegitimate interference. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ee1ec740-f5cf-415e-9452-b04508e0ab8b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That poses a question for the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), of which these countries are all members. The organisation likes to present itself as more than a shared language and colonial history. Its founding documents speak of democracy, human rights, constitutional order and the rule of law as common values. Yet whenever those principles come under strain within one of its member states, the organisation has shown little appetite for confronting the issue publicly. In that respect, the CPLP stands apart from several comparable organisations. The Commonwealth has suspended members following coups or serious breaches of democratic norms. The Organisation internationale de la Francophonie has done the same in countries including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea. The African Union routinely suspends governments that come to power through unconstitutional means. Those decisions are often controversial, but they reflect a willingness to defend the standards those organisations say they represent. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique cannot afford to fear urbanisation URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-cannot-afford-to-fear-urbanisation/ Last updated: 2026-07-19T07:23:58.000Z Good morning and welcome to the newsletter for Friday 17 July 2026. At last week’s UN High-Level Political Forum in New York, Mozambique’s finance minister Carla Louveira said rapid population growth and urbanisation are placing increasing pressure on Mozambique's public finances. Schools, hospitals, housing and transport are struggling to keep pace with expanding cities, while the countryside is losing young people who once sustained agricultural production. The plain facts are undeniable. The country's population is growing by almost a million people a year, while economic growth has stalled and public finances remain under severe strain. Every new suburb requires roads, electricity, water, schools and health centres that the state struggles to finance. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8adf573a-5cf2-4888-9814-77d96f794936/)*.* [![CTA Image](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/07/image_2026-07-19_091907586.png)](#/portal/signup) For full summaries and analysis of the top stories, take out a Pro subscription [Turn Pro ](#/portal/signup) But it is a reality that Mozambique has to face up to. People leave villages because cities offer better prospects. The minimum wage for a security guard in Maputo is MZN8,000 a month. Some smallholder farmers earn as little as MZN1,200\. As long as that gap persists, migration will continue regardless of official policy. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Breaking the silence is only the first step URL: https://www.zitamar.com/breaking-the-silence-is-only-the-first-step/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T20:41:14.000Z Good afternoon. Something unusual happened in Maputo this week. For the first time, senior representatives of the Mozambican state sat alongside civil society to discuss transitional justice — how the country should confront the legacy of political violence, compensate victims and prevent future abuses. On the platform were the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, representatives of the Attorney-General's Office and the police, diplomats, academics and victims themselves. That may not sound remarkable in many countries. In Mozambique, it is. For decades, the state's instinct has been to look forward rather than back. The civil war ended without a truth commission. The political violence that followed was managed through negotiated settlements rather than public reckoning. In the context of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and the deadly post-election violence of 2024, official discussion has focused largely on restoring order rather than examining responsibility. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/37646049-f0d6-4443-a8e2-a16b7b7fc51b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique turns to Exxon for gas to fuel 400MW Palma power plantPlan for major power plant next to the LNG projects in Cabo Delgado represents Mozambique’s latest bid to find a use for its domestic market allocation![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-a4176649-44df-40da-802d-45dd25a9ad27.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Oil_Platform_Supporting_Image---Square-11--2880-x-2880--c3c4e950-311c-4f82-bde0-b399469e2f83.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-turns-to-exxon-for-gas-to-fuel-400mw-palma-power-plant/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This week's conference, organised by Mozambique’s non-governmental Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD) and supported by George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, suggested that may be beginning to change. Interior Minister Paulo Chachine acknowledged that Mozambique's recent history — from armed conflict to violent extremism and the post-election unrest — demonstrates that peace cannot be taken for granted. He spoke of the need for professionalism, legality and proportionality in policing demonstrations, and reaffirmed that the police should act impartially and in accordance with the Constitution. Those are welcome statements. They would have been difficult to imagine from a government platform only a year ago. But equally significant was what remained unsaid. The conference addressed the consequences of violence — victims, reparations, institutional reform and guarantees of non-repetition — but stopped short of confronting its causes. No senior official acknowledged that the post-election protests were driven by widespread allegations of electoral fraud, nor was there any suggestion of responsibility for the excessive use of force that accompanied the state's response. Civil society, led by CDD, argued that reconciliation cannot be built on silence. "There is no reconciliation without truth," CDD head Adriano Nuvunga told participants. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique turns to Exxon for gas to fuel 400MW Palma power plant URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-turns-to-exxon-for-gas-to-fuel-400mw-palma-power-plant/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T14:17:37.000Z Mozambique's state power utility, EDM, is in direct negotiations with the US oil company ExxonMobil to secure the supply of natural gas for a 400MW thermal power station it wants to build in Cabo Delgado’s Palma district, home to two giant LNG projects run by Exxon and TotalEnergies. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### One gate for fuel URL: https://www.zitamar.com/one-gate-for-fuel/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T16:49:39.000Z Good afternoon. The government has created a new state-owned company, the National Petroleum Products Procurement Company (ENAPP), which will hold the exclusive right to arrange the importation of the fuel Mozambique wholly depends on. For about 30 years that job has run through Importadora Moçambicana de Petróleos (Imopetro), a nominally private company every importer had to join to import fuel collectively. ENAPP now succeeds it, taking exclusive control of national fuel procurement. There is a real problem that needs to be solved, and the government’s reasoning, which *Zitamar News* has seen, suggests it has understood it well. The Imopetro model had become a barrier rather than a gateway: membership was capped, so newly licensed distributors waited more than five years to start importing. Because Imopetro was private, the state — constitutionally responsible for keeping the country supplied and for setting prices — had no direct control over a strategic chain, and it cites the April-May shortages this year as proof it must be able to act. Days before the decree, the attorney-general also announced an inquiry into millions of dollars of illicit fuel-trade transactions in the form of re-export and duty-dodging schemes that undercut honest traders. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a99084ce-4858-4fe8-a2ca-4f7ce7104196/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The decree also answers the obvious objection that the state is muscling into private-sector work as previously noted in this [newsletter](https://www.zitamar.com/a-bull-in-a-rice-shop/). On paper, ENAPP is not a trader: it is barred from producing, distributing or selling fuel. Distributors remain the legal importers and pay for the cargo; ENAPP only arranges the buying. Any newly licensed distributor must be admitted; board and staff may hold no interest in fuel companies; accounts must be audited and published. And, crucially for cost, ENAPP is funded first from the commission Imopetro already drew from the regulated price; not, in principle, a new charge. So the change is more considered than its critics allow. But three big questions remain. The first is concentration. Exclusivity makes ENAPP the single door for the nation’s fuel, and the energy minister must personally approve which suppliers win the contracts, giving him great power over a strategic flow, and with it the temptation of commissions and favouritism. The government promises transparency and audits; whether they bind in practice is the test. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Public money demands public accountability URL: https://www.zitamar.com/public-money-demands-public-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T09:43:05.000Z Good morning, here is yesterday’s newsletter — apologies once again for the delay. Televisão de Moçambique's latest audited accounts tell two different stories. One is attracting the headlines: a dispute over whether the broadcaster failed to provide information to its auditors. The other is more important: TVM remains financially dependent on the state, continues to accumulate losses and survives despite auditors warning of material uncertainty over its future. *Carta de Moçambique* reported that auditors from Moore were unable to verify key balances because documentation had not been provided. TVM responded forcefully, insisting that it had supplied all the information formally requested. Both statements can be true. The audit itself does not accuse TVM of concealing information. It says the auditors could not obtain sufficient evidence to verify certain balances and were not presented with explanations for material discrepancies that emerged during the audit. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6abb9aff-8a40-4739-8b8b-b18937335d9b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But these omissions are less important than the fact that TVM generated only around MZN151m ($2.3m) in commercial revenue last year while receiving more than MZN531m ($8.2m) in government subsidies. Personnel costs alone exceeded its commercial income several times over. The broadcaster ended the year with a MZN107m ($1.7m) loss and negative equity of more than MZN1bn ($17m). State holding company IGEPE itself acknowledges that the company faces severe financial difficulties and is looking for ways to ensure its continued operation. There is nothing inherently wrong with a public broadcaster relying on state funding. In most countries, public broadcasters receive public money because they provide services the commercial market may not. But that also means they should not seek to maximise advertising revenue in a way that distorts competition with private broadcasters. Their role is different. Public funding should buy public value, not market dominance. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Galp arbitration puts Mozambique's tax rules on trial URL: https://www.zitamar.com/galp-arbitration-puts-mozambiques-tax-rules-on-trial/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T09:02:59.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday’s delayed newsletter. Galp's decision to take Mozambique to international arbitration over the taxation of its sale of a stake in the Rovuma Basin is on its face a technical dispute over competing tax calculations. But it is shaping up to become an important test of how effectively Mozambique can enforce its right to tax the enormous gains generated by transactions involving the country's natural resources. The dispute concerns Galp's sale of its 10% interest in Area 4 to XRG, the international investment arm of Abu Dhabi's ADNOC. The transaction is worth up to $1.38bn, with Galp receiving $881m on completion, a further $100m after the final investment decision on Coral Norte, and another $400m if Rovuma LNG reaches FID. The disagreement is not over Mozambique's capital gains tax (CGT) rate, but on how the taxable gain should be calculated — that is, how much should be deducted from the sale price before tax is applied. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fb267ea0-1f8d-4e45-83c5-41a6605fb5ab/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique's Tax Authority argues that Galp realised a capital gain of around $1bn and has demanded $176m in tax, since CGT — at 32% — is only levied on 55% of the capital gain for oil and gas assets held for more than five years. Galp says its taxable gain was only a small fraction of that amount, and that the tax due was settled as part of the transaction. The difference stems from the two sides' radically different views of the deductible cost base, although neither has publicly explained in detail which costs account for the gap. Four Maputo lawyers with experience of major extractive-sector tax disputes, consulted by Zitamar, all believe the Tax Authority has the stronger legal position. They argue that Mozambique's legislation is intended to tax the increase in value between acquiring and disposing of an asset, and that companies cannot simply expand the deductible cost base in ways not envisaged by the law. If that interpretation prevails, the Tax Authority's assessment is likely to stand. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### South Africa remains many Mozambicans’ best bet for work URL: https://www.zitamar.com/south-africa-remains-many-mozambicans-best-bet-for-work/ Last updated: 2026-07-10T16:19:29.000Z Good afternoon. Demand has risen sharply in Maputo for the brown passport, the special travel document issued to Mozambicans legally recruited for work in South African mines and on commercial farms. The increase follows the latest wave of xenophobic intimidation, which has forced hundreds of Mozambicans to return home. At first glance, it might seem surprising that people recently driven out of South Africa are already looking for documents that could enable them to go back. In reality, it reflects an economic relationship that neither xenophobic movements nor presidential promises can easily undo. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/595bd8d0-c1f8-4373-9c86-f668b6299d2a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) South Africa remains the natural destination for Mozambican migrant labour. It is nearby, its economy is vastly larger, and generations of Mozambicans have built family, commercial and employment links across the border. Portugal and the Gulf states may offer opportunities to some workers, but they are not realistic substitutes for the large numbers of people who have traditionally found work in South Africa’s mines, farms, construction sites, shops and informal economy. The challenge is enormous. The IMF estimates that around 500,000 young Mozambicans enter the labour market every year. No realistic combination of LNG, public-sector hiring or overseas recruitment schemes comes close to absorbing that number. President Daniel Chapo has suggested that returning migrants could find jobs in Mozambique’s expanding oil and gas projects or through labour agreements with countries farther afield. Those possibilities should be explored, but they cannot absorb more than a fraction of the country’s unemployed and underemployed workforce. LNG projects employ thousands during construction, not the hundreds of thousands Mozambique needs to accommodate, while overseas recruitment programmes are necessarily selective and limited. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas should pay for Mozambique's future, not define it URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-should-pay-for-mozambiques-future-not-define-it/ Last updated: 2026-07-10T09:34:28.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday’s daily. There was a striking consensus at this week's International Conference on Inclusive and Sustainable Development. President Daniel Chapo, the World Bank and the European Union all came with the same message: Mozambique's natural resources will not, by themselves, deliver prosperity. Chapo spoke of ending the divide between extractive megaprojects and the wider economy. The World Bank argued that revenues from gas and minerals should finance infrastructure, education, health and stronger institutions. The European Union stressed the importance of governance and sound policy choices. Even Akinwumi Adesina, the former president of the African Development Bank, urged Mozambique to use its natural resources to drive wider economic transformation. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5fa26987-94c8-4aba-929f-8e8df86c9c43/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That represents an important shift in strategy. Fifteen years ago, the focus was on attracting LNG investment. More recently, attention turned to local content and jobs, state participation, and industrial projects to use Mozambique’s domestic allocation of the gas. Yesterday's discussion implicitly recognised that none of those, on their own, will transform Mozambique's economy — a welcome dose of realism. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Parliament needs to ask the right questions in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/parliament-needs-to-ask-the-right-questions-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T17:37:27.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican parliament’s Defence, Security and Public Order Committee has begun a working visit to Cabo Delgado, declaring that military operations against the insurgency are legal and necessary to defend national sovereignty. On one level, that is self-evident. Every state has the right, indeed the obligation, to defend its territory against an armed insurgency. But that is not the question Parliament should be asking. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8fc3bfbe-9527-451d-af20-0cb86d6d180d/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Islamic State claims to have retaken Catupa base after government offensiveInsurgents say they killed 11 government soldiers and recaptured the strategic base days after Mozambican and Rwandan forces reportedly seized it![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-24dc8a0d-e5b5-46fd-b6aa-50aaa2c84952.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-07-09.49.28-5de81069-d4df-40b1-be61-79542b086474.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claims-to-have-retaken-catupa-base-after-government-offensive/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For nearly a decade, Cabo Delgado has been Mozambique's biggest national security challenge. It has claimed thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of people, drawn in foreign military forces and reshaped the country's political and economic priorities. Yet the Assembleia da República has played only a limited public role in examining the conflict or holding the executive to account. That makes this week's visit welcome in itself. Mozambique's elected representatives should spend more time in Cabo Delgado, listening not only to military commanders but also to local authorities, humanitarian organisations, businesses and the communities most directly affected by the conflict. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### An economy waiting to happen URL: https://www.zitamar.com/an-economy-waiting-to-happen/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T16:10:31.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo opened this week's National Higher Education Conference with a familiar diagnosis. Universities, he argued, should stop producing graduates disconnected from the labour market and instead become engines of innovation, applied research and economic development. He is right. A higher education system that produces employable graduates rather than simply awarding degrees is an essential part of any successful economy. But there is another side to that equation. Graduates need an economy capable of employing them. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8ada3f20-3025-4ed0-8ade-be26095f06c7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The latest economic indicators suggest Mozambique is still struggling to provide one. National accounts published last week showed the economy growing by just 0.1% in the first quarter of 2026, effectively stagnating. Investment fell by almost 40%, while the extractive sector contracted sharply, dragging overall growth close to zero. Now, Standard Bank’s latest Purchasing Managers' Index suggests the private sector is no longer shrinking, but nor is it expanding. A reading of exactly 50.0 is that of an economy treading water. Standard Bank has cut its forecast for Mozambique's economic growth this year to just 0.7%, while sharply increasing its inflation forecast following the fuel shortages that disrupted businesses in May and June. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State claims to have retaken Catupa base after government offensive URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claims-to-have-retaken-catupa-base-after-government-offensive/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T08:11:31.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents claim to have recaptured the Catupa base in Macomia district, Cabo Delgado, following intense fighting with Mozambican government forces just days after government troops retook the base. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### More than a trade fair URL: https://www.zitamar.com/more-than-a-trade-fair/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T17:14:36.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo's appearance as guest of honour at Tanzania's Saba Saba trade fair might easily have been dismissed as routine presidential diplomacy. Instead, it reflects one of the more significant shifts in Mozambique's regional relationships over the past five years. Relations between the two countries were notably strained during the presidency of John Magufuli. Differences over Tanzania's long-running border dispute with Malawi did little to help, while the insurgency in Cabo Delgado exposed frustrations on both sides of the border. Tanzania questioned whether Mozambique was doing enough to contain a conflict that threatened to spill northward. At the same time, many in Dodoma saw little benefit in committing scarce resources to its neighbour's war. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c0898537-615f-48d7-af31-5e663d40148a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That began to change under President Samia Suluhu Hassan. Filipe Nyusi invested considerable political capital in rebuilding the relationship, recognising that Tanzania's cooperation would be indispensable if the insurgency were to be contained. Chapo has inherited a partnership that is now far stronger than it was just a few years ago. Security remains the most obvious reason why that matters. Tanzania has every interest in preventing insurgents from establishing themselves along its southern frontier, while Mozambique benefits from showing that regional support in Cabo Delgado extends beyond Rwanda alone. A broader coalition strengthens both the military effort and its political legitimacy. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique takes the fight to the insurgents URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-takes-the-fight-to-the-insurgents/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T10:46:28.000Z Hello and welcome to the Zitamar Conflict Newsletter, our weekly digest of developments in northern Mozambique, with a particular focus on Cabo Delgado. It has been an intense week. Mozambican and Rwandan forces launched a major offensive in Macomia district, insurgents ambushed a convoy on the N380, and President Daniel Chapo signalled a shift in the government's military strategy. The biggest conflict incident was probably the joint Mozambican-Rwandan operation to retake the Catupa base in Macomia district, which has been outside government control since January. According to *Zitamar* sources, the operation began around 27 June, five days after insurgents overran the nearby Namabo military position. The Mozambican and Rwandan militaries responded with helicopter strikes and a ground attack on the Catupa base, as well as an increased presence along the Macomia-Mucojo road. We reported the incident first on our dedicated Conflict Incidents channel on Telegram, and then through the Zitamar Daily on Wednesday: [Zitamar Mozambique conflict updatesMozambican and Rwandan forces this week launched an operation to recapture the Catupa base in Macomia district, central Cabo Delgado, which has been in the hands of Islamic State-backed insurgents since the end of January. According to Zitamar sources, the forces began coordinated action around 27 June, five days after insurgents struck the nearby Namabo military position, killing some five soldiers. Sources describe a helicopter strike on an insurgent position near Cogolo on 28 June, followed by a significant security presence across the Mucojo–Macomia road and an FDS-led assault on the Catupa base itself. Images from NASA Firms (such as that featured above), the US space agency’s satellite imaging tool to monitor fires on earth, show fires along the N380 road to the west, the Macomia-Mucojo road to the south, the Mucojo-Quiterajo road and to the south of Messalo. The fires don’t cover the dense forest but the surrounding area, suggesting that insurgent defensive lines outside the forest have been targeted. A resident of Macomia town who spoke with Zitamar claimed that government forces had recaptured the base and inflicted heavy insurgent casualties. Zitamar has not been able to verify this independently. Catupa, a forest area to the east of the N380 road in Macomia district, has been an insurgent stronghold since 2021\. The insurgents have repeatedly laid improvised explosive devices on the surrounding roads to restrict the movement of Mozambican and Rwandan forces. Sign up for Zitamar’s new newsletter dedicated to the Cabo Delgado conflict, in the ‘Account’ section in the top right corner of www.zitamar.com![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/favicon-32x32-2b8fd910-1492-41c9-9a67-18d4263bf54d.png)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/BX4hSLaiy194yOA4nBkd4avCx9mxyJB3oUaoI9PWU5CI3ImIKDJmwEJzkZcTNl-0SGOC-uWNErCYCul1Ds3uVISfebJPe9_TdyqtcEBISo5eKu1HIVg8pJeY7JfCnpLNS3zoJbLM-BjVIq9PdGmNbQyQeb4eolQ5Bnmnz7oulzwtqVUBH6W6on_B_ppzPpUyoNEYbP3iCT3Zzlbo2uDb6dlqAd9cDFd2AcqDO_X3nM3QJHxAu3GqzaDhTgkOxpynQ9NoCOI4r-AXnGguiivjUH7PRMbnGU8sso82STI8B2upqCz6vHhPAN-17M2EsWxFU-xizMNnXMCAnyjPDzeCJw-00e8a9c0-5e78-418f-89f0-81ad4414c2d1.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarconflictupdates/15?ref=zitamar.com) [Taking the fight back to CatupaAn offensive this week to recapture the insurgent stronghold of Catupa shows that Mozambique and Rwanda are trying to regain the initiative in Cabo Delgado![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-5c3ef256-2295-4c62-be65-05778be87a49.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-01-17.44.00-711795bb-8ca4-4f0e-ba86-43b41506ddfe.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/taking-the-fight-back-to-catupa/) Meanwhile, Islamic State Mozambique has resumed targeting traffic along the N380, the strategic road linking Sunate (also known as Silva Macua) and Awasse. On Thursday, insurgents ambushed a military-escorted convoy on the stretch between Antadora and Chitunda, near the border of Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe districts. The attackers opened fire as the convoy entered the area, prompting an exchange with the military escort and causing the convoy to scatter. [Insurgents ambush military-led convoy on Mocímboa-Muidumbe borderThe incident prompted clashes between insurgents and security forces as Local Forces detain suspected insurgents in Muidumbe![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-fc2db7c9-da0b-4fdf-aea1-773f4681c752.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-03-13.25.57-6a0eab7d-7b0b-435e-bc77-547153da5ba4.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-ambush-military-led-convoy-on-mocimboa-muidumbe-border/) Elsewhere, a man was killed by unidentified attackers on Thursday morning while working in a field near Saca, between Metoro and Silva Macua in Ancuabe district, according to local sources. The victim was with his wife when they were confronted by the attackers. Although residents initially suspected insurgents were responsible, Zitamar has not been able to confirm this independently. President Daniel Chapo visited Cabo Delgado this week, and announced that the headquarters of the Northern Operational Theatre (TON) will be relocated from Pemba to Mocímboa da Praia, placing military command closer to the main operational areas of Palma, Macomia and Quissanga. [When conservation becomes politicalThe dismissal of two game-farm managers in Gaza over blocked access roads highlights how difficult it remains to balance conservation, investment and community rights, especially when valuable land is involved![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-3a863638-f91d-48b0-979c-5c35075c6cb5.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/deborah-varrie-BZs-C7p4Xzw-unsplash-05b7d8a1-7d43-4f8f-bf3f-f3f533fe7047.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/when-conservation-becomes-political/) Chapo said the move would enable faster responses to insurgent activity and improve operational coordination. He also pledged continued investment in military infrastructure, logistics, equipment and training. Although it remains unclear when the command headquarters was previously moved from Mueda to Pemba, the latest relocation suggests the government is placing greater emphasis on securing the northern corridor, including the area surrounding the LNG projects. [When conservation becomes politicalThe dismissal of two game-farm managers in Gaza over blocked access roads highlights how difficult it remains to balance conservation, investment and community rights, especially when valuable land is involved![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-b4fbfa92-0e5c-4c43-ac37-aa744bed5a91.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/deborah-varrie-BZs-C7p4Xzw-unsplash-be760018-c57f-448e-af69-55b357d918ba.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/when-conservation-becomes-political/) A new report by ACLED, published on 26 June under the Mozambique Conflict Monitor project in partnership with Zitamar, argues that Islamic State Mozambique is consolidating control over an enclave stretching more than 100km along Cabo Delgado's coastline and up to 50km inland. The area extends from Mocímboa da Praia to Quissanga, bounded by the N380 to the west and the Indian Ocean to the east. The report argues that, under commander Farido Sulemani and spiritual leader Ulanga, the group has shifted since 2023 from indiscriminate violence towards a strategy of coercive control over predominantly Muslim Mwani communities. This includes preaching, restricting movement through roadblocks, and securing supplies, while continuing violent attacks and resource extraction in southern districts. It identifies the N380 as the enclave's western frontier, where ransom-style extortion of travellers has become an increasingly important source of revenue—a pattern that closely mirrors this week's convoy ambush. The report warns that continued attacks on civilians, coupled with an ineffective state response, risk further eroding public confidence in the government. It also cautions that perceptions that the Mozambique LNG project is better protected than surrounding communities could undermine the project's social licence to operate. [Preaching, coercion, and sectarianism: How the Islamic State is building a stronghold in MozambiqueWithin an emerging enclave on the Cabo Delgado coast, insurgents are seeking to gain legitimacy among local communities.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/android-icon-192x192-080d4ba3-fcb9-4a1e-a3fa-f3990c88490c.png)ACLED![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Header-ISM-494ea051-fee7-475b-a5e4-ba84d13e3f06.png)](https://acleddata.com/report/preaching-coercion-and-sectarianism-how-islamic-state-building-stronghold-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com) President Chapo continued his travels north from Cabo Delgado to Tanzania on 2 July, as guest of honour at the 50th Dar es Salaam International Trade Fair (Saba Saba), at the invitation of President Samia Suluhu Hassan. Presented as a mission to strengthen economic diplomacy, the visit formally focused on trade, investment and regional integration, but appears to have included plenty of face-time with President Suluhu which likely focused on the Islamist insurgency just across Tanzania’s southern border. Tanzania maintains a deployment in the district of Nangade, which Chapo will be keen to ensure is there to stay. [When conservation becomes politicalThe dismissal of two game-farm managers in Gaza over blocked access roads highlights how difficult it remains to balance conservation, investment and community rights, especially when valuable land is involved![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-0f901467-eaec-41e2-b31c-0992efcdf953.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/deborah-varrie-BZs-C7p4Xzw-unsplash-6e344e1b-657e-403a-bc81-16ece5126619.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/when-conservation-becomes-political/) That's all for now; watch this space, as well as our [Telegram channel](https://t.me/zitamarconflictupdates?ref=zitamar.com) and the *Zitamar Daily Briefing*, for further updates. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) ### When conservation becomes political URL: https://www.zitamar.com/when-conservation-becomes-political/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T15:40:06.000Z Good afternoon. The dismissal of the managers of the Muthemba and Gaza Safari concessions, together with investigations into alleged wildlife offences and blocked community roads, is ostensibly a local administrative matter. But it raises a much broader question: how should Mozambique govern the land it has set aside for wildlife conservation and tourism? Conservation in Mozambique is not simply about protecting animals. Wildlife concessions are expected to attract investment, create jobs, generate tourism revenue and conserve biodiversity. At the same time, they occupy landscapes where communities have long lived, farmed, grazed livestock and travelled between villages. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/dad230ff-5f0d-49a8-b372-40e022620068/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents ambush military-led convoy on Mocímboa-Muidumbe borderThe incident prompted clashes between insurgents and security forces as Local Forces detain suspected insurgents in Muidumbe![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-192d9b15-a88c-43d9-8e77-c3618c9ae295.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-07-03-13.25.57-b65f30da-ce10-4a73-843e-370ce2b7ecb6.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-ambush-military-led-convoy-on-mocimboa-muidumbe-border/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) If concession managers have unlawfully blocked public roads, the government is right to investigate. Protected areas cannot become private kingdoms where neighbouring communities lose access to schools, markets or health centres. Wildlife may be a national asset, but so is freedom of movement. But investors need confidence that disputes will be handled through transparent procedures rather than sudden political intervention. Tourism and conservation projects require long-term capital and patient management. If operators believe their position depends as much on political winds as on complying with the law, Mozambique risks discouraging precisely the investment it says it wants. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents ambush military-led convoy on Mocímboa-Muidumbe border URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-ambush-military-led-convoy-on-mocimboa-muidumbe-border/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T11:53:16.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents ambushed a military-escorted convoy on the N380 highway in Cabo Delgado province on Thursday, briefly abducting six civilians before Rwandan troops intervened and rescued them. No fatalities were reported, but the attack sparked clashes with security forces, disrupted traffic and left several people with minor injuries. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### One election, one opportunity for fraud URL: https://www.zitamar.com/one-election-one-opportunity-for-fraud/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T07:44:34.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday's daily. Mozambique's National Elections Commission (CNE) says it will study the possibility of holding the country's municipal, provincial, legislative and presidential elections on the same day. The official argument is simple: elections are expensive, and combining them would reduce costs. However, after the events of 2024, cost is unlikely to be the first concern of most Mozambicans. The last general election triggered the country's deepest political crisis in decades. Domestic observers, international missions and opposition parties documented widespread irregularities, while months of protests left hundreds dead. Public confidence in the electoral system has yet to recover. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b02044e5-0dc9-4776-b5c7-fcd495c187d9/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [South32 finds new owner for aluminium plants — except MozalAlcoa’s multi-billion dollar purchase of the Australian group’s aluminium portfolio leaves Mozal’s future unresolved, as South32 retains Mozambique smelter![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-1a2ddbf0-fbae-4039-a8a0-7b8192241025.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Mozal-Aluminium-Operations-South-32-1-28fff2e9-af72-42fe-8313-2dc56f14d441.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/south32-finds-new-owner-for-aluminium-plants-except-mozal/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Against that backdrop, any proposal to redesign Mozambique's electoral calendar should be judged against one overriding question: would it make elections more credible, or less? Municipal elections have often proved more fertile ground for opposition parties than national polls. They also take place only in municipalities, not across the whole country. That gives smaller parties, civil society groups and observers a more realistic chance of monitoring the vote closely, deploying delegates and challenging irregularities. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Taking the fight back to Catupa URL: https://www.zitamar.com/taking-the-fight-back-to-catupa/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T18:21:59.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambican and Rwandan forces appear to have launched a major operation to retake the Catupa base in Macomia district. If confirmed, it would mark more than a tactical success. It would suggest the security forces are trying to regain the initiative in one of Cabo Delgado’s most contested areas. The timing is important. During April and May, several insurgent groups moved through southern Cabo Delgado, underlining the continued ability of Islamic State Mozambique to disperse, raid and unsettle areas far beyond its main coastal zone of influence. Along the Macomia coast, meanwhile, Mozambique’s navy has been increasingly active, trying to disrupt maritime supply routes used by the insurgents. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/25a813f3-4520-4471-8b19-73bf30afc6cf/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Since August 2024, government forces have been trying to re-establish control across Macomia district. While Rwandan detachments have helped consolidate government positions around Mucojo and Pangane, Catupa and Quiterajo have repeatedly changed hands, illustrating how contested the district remains. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### South32 finds new owner for aluminium plants — except Mozal URL: https://www.zitamar.com/south32-finds-new-owner-for-aluminium-plants-except-mozal/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T15:10:27.000Z US aluminium producer Alcoa has agreed to acquire most of South32's global aluminium business in a deal worth up to $5.6bn, but Mozambique's Mozal aluminium smelter has been excluded from the transaction, leaving the future ownership of one of the country's largest industrial assets unresolved. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Dialogue alone will not bring Cabo Delgado back URL: https://www.zitamar.com/dialogue-alone-will-not-bring-cabo-delgado-back/ Last updated: 2026-06-30T16:22:02.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo arrived in Cabo Delgado this week with a message of reconciliation. Speaking in Montepuez, he urged insurgents to abandon violence and join Mozambique's Inclusive National Dialogue, arguing that peace is essential if the province is to develop. No conflict that has lasted nearly nine years is likely to end through military action alone. At some stage, dialogue will almost certainly form part of any lasting settlement. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1b4af576-2f58-4090-bdf0-1ddefcd48688/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But dialogue is not a strategy in itself. It is the conclusion of a political process, not the beginning of one. Chapo did not announce an amnesty, a reintegration programme or any mechanism through which insurgents could safely surrender. Nor did he explain why fighters should abandon the influence they have built in parts of Cabo Delgado in return for a simple invitation to talk. The insurgency has also changed. In parts of coastal Cabo Delgado, it is no longer relying only on spectacular attacks and indiscriminate violence. It is seeking to build acceptance — or at least tolerance — among some local communities through preaching, coercion and selective violence, while discouraging cooperation with the state. Its ambition is not simply to survive military operations, but to make the state's return more difficult by presenting itself as an alternative source of authority. Recent analysis by Peter Bofin for the Mozambique Conflict Monitor, Zitamar’s joint project with ACLED, suggests that this political project is now as important as the group's military campaign. [Preaching, coercion, and sectarianism: How the Islamic State is building a stronghold in MozambiqueWithin an emerging enclave on the Cabo Delgado coast, insurgents are seeking to gain legitimacy among local communities.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-icon-180x180-2663342a-2515-44cd-92ad-f96a2aa65c50.png)ACLED![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Header-ISM-f7ac009a-19f1-4a96-97da-4c9b6b38410e.png)](https://acleddata.com/report/preaching-coercion-and-sectarianism-how-islamic-state-building-stronghold-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com) That means the contest in Cabo Delgado is no longer only about territory. It is about legitimacy. Military operations can prevent insurgents from holding towns or threatening strategic projects. They cannot, on their own, persuade communities that the state deserves their confidence. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Building infrastructure is only half the job URL: https://www.zitamar.com/building-infrastructure-is-only-half-the-job/ Last updated: 2026-06-29T16:52:14.000Z Good afternoon. Joaquim Chissano Avenue has reopened after three years of disruption from drainage and sanitation works. That is good news for Maputo. The project expands the city's sewerage network, should improve sanitation for around 12,000 families, and forms part of a wider programme to reduce flooding and improve the functioning of the city centre. The investment is worthwhile. Better drainage means fewer floods, lower health risks and a city that functions more efficiently. Businesses can operate more reliably, residents spend less time dealing with the aftermath of heavy rain, and infrastructure itself lasts longer. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/82303f40-1be6-4159-9330-cf7a197ec8bb/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But projects like this should also prompt another question. Not whether they should happen, but how long they should take. The disruption extended well beyond a single road. Sewerage works affected sections of Joaquim Chissano, while the wider drainage improvements disrupted some of the busiest routes linking Maputo's downtown with the upper city. Every extra month under construction imposed a cost. Journeys took longer, fuel consumption increased, deliveries became less reliable, and businesses lost customers. Those costs rarely appear in project accounts, but they are paid by the economy nonetheless. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Fuel queues are back because Mozambique still has no fuel fix URL: https://www.zitamar.com/fuel-queues-are-back-because-mozambique-still-has-no-fuel-fix/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T14:26:08.000Z Good afternoon. Fuel queues are back in Maputo and Matola. That should not be happening if the problem were simply one of supply. According to energy sector regulator ARENE, Mozambique has 110,000 tonnes of diesel and 40,000 tonnes of petrol in stock. *Savana* reports that around 150,000 tonnes of fuel are sitting in bonded warehouses or under “financial hold”, meaning they can only be released to distributors once bank guarantees are presented. The fuel exists. The problem is getting it into the market. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3e97b938-af75-4b98-beb4-91404a24d911/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Cabo Delgado update, 26 June 2026Zitamar’s new regular newsletter providing updates on the conflict in northern Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-cfac485c-a3cc-4c11-aa15-85d75276c18d.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Bowker![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-06-26_152525104-7509af5d-0dd5-4bcf-83ed-19bafdc634dc.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-cabo-delgado-update-26-june-2026/) [Insurgents attack Namabo military position in MacomiaAt least five soldiers killed in overnight attack on Namabo position, Islamic State claims![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-9d31dae5-48fc-4579-83ef-8ef103df2245.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-06-26_145923455-fb8e07fe-c3e2-4e84-a0b1-606c12c06ef9.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-attack-namabo-military-position-in-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That makes this a different kind of shortage. It is a shortage created by price regulation, foreign currency, bank guarantees and political fear. Fuel distributors say current prices do not cover import costs. They want petrol to rise to at least MZN120 ($1.88) per litre and diesel to MZN130 ($2.03). The government is resisting another immediate increase, because it fears the social consequences. Fuel price rises quickly become transport price rises, food price rises and political anger. The government tried to manage the last crisis by leaning on Petromoc. In May, the state-owned fuel company was told to raise its market share quota from 24% to 42% and supply retailers beyond its usual network. That was never a sustainable solution. *Savana* reports that Petromoc became overwhelmed and has now returned to its previous quota. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Zitamar Cabo Delgado update, 26 June 2026 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-cabo-delgado-update-26-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T13:28:52.000Z Hello and welcome to *Zitamar*'s conflict newsletter, rounding up the week's main conflict incidents and economic developments in northern Mozambique, in particular in Cabo Delgado province. The current plan is to put out a newsletter once a week, depending on news flow. Most of the incidents and updates contained in the newsletter will have appeared on our new Telegram channel dedicated to conflict updates, which you can join here: [Zitamar Mozambique conflict updatesRegular updates from Zitamar News on the conflict centred on Cabo Delgado province, northern Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-6372f804-c436-4fec-9fe9-f6f0e7542199.png)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/al5YszsJpHeu2QthxrGZyA1DPOPRhZLBYTR0gda225_Gy2QfNtxWUH59Bv_z_ReVOsjNAc_z7rxh64T8E2Yas--JTDFiYOD9rn5_3ZI24BhQCcCvDLGYFRdxum0C6VQD1zGg5f9Qsnnd049IknXCryGZR63_duiNTXL5ALweHSBZNRdHAbe_n5G2i0KorukZSj_wgOMVvFvPkNvmdoT3WgKH5APg3fia0BjWD-CEnBzD58f6AJxe_2NPFd0HEVmbPF9J8fvWSR-fhI919gYJmBPyP6RH30K9Og8FiFcNQkFsyutNe2PP6otJ5RZeAIj2xG5ZJN5YkCmJlg-vwSHfKw-fcca505b-51b2-42e3-a6a8-af3ce08a68f6.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarconflictupdates?ref=zitamar.com) The launch of this newsletter coincides with a change in the regular Update published by the Mozambique Conflict Monitor (MCM, formerly Cabo Ligado), our joint project with conflict monitoring organisation ACLED. That Update is shifting from fortnightly to monthly. The [last fortnightly edition](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-1-14-june-2026/) came out this week. All MCM updates will also be sent to subscribers of this newsletter from now on. Anyone with a *Zitamar* account, whether free or paid, can currently receive this newsletter, though this is subject to change. --- The most significant event this week in the Cabo Delgado conflict was an attack by Islamic State (IS) fighters on the military position at Namabo, in Macomia district, on the night of 22 June. IS claimed to have killed five soldiers. The position has been targeted before — most recently on 31 January, when Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters struck the Catupa and Namabo positions. [Insurgents attack Namabo military position in MacomiaAt least five soldiers killed in overnight attack on Namabo position, Islamic State claims![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-8ffac3df-1c9c-41b2-abc2-08bc9359bbee.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-06-26_145923455-006da5d3-2b9c-44c1-bd2d-1a943f70a74a.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-attack-namabo-military-position-in-macomia/) In a further blow to the Mozambican Armed Defence Forces (FADM), one of the navy's vessels sank on 18 June between Matemo and Ibo islands during rough weather. At least nine crew members are feared dead. The same vessel has been repeatedly implicated in the killing of fishermen off the coast of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia. [Nine feared dead after Mozambican navy boat sinks off Cabo DelgadoTwo sailors survived after a naval vessel capsized between Matemo and Ibo islands during rough weather, while a separate shipwreck near Vamizi Island claimed two civilian lives![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-5e9a7ee4-5d60-4553-b4cf-ee4081ada9b3.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-24-12.22.26-3c36f3bb-87db-4de6-bb74-81cb95f53d1e.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/nine-feared-dead-after-mozambican-navy-boat-sinks-off-cabo-delgado/) These attacks follow the return of insurgents from southern Cabo Delgado, after roughly two months in the region. Fighters have been using the Quissanga corridor to move towards Mucojo, in Macomia district, with frequent movement along the villages of Cagembe and Bilibiza. Reports suggest that other groups are once again leaving Mucojo — heading south within Cabo Delgado, and west towards the N380 road. [Insurgents regroup in Quissanga after southern incursionInsurgents are likely making their way back toward their traditional stronghold of Macomia district![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-fdc41435-7bca-4a9f-ac2a-bbe3081929a8.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-19-14.47.53-488475ad-1ffb-4df1-a3a2-f57de85f9f6d.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-regroup-in-quissanga-after-southern-incursion/) Several outlets reported that an unofficial curfew was in force in Mocímboa da Praia. *Zitamar* sought to verify this with multiple sources in the town: some said no curfew existed, while others reported no restrictions on movement. In a conflict-affected area, such differing perceptions are common. According to Zumbo FM, the administrator of Mocímboa da Praia [denied](https://www.zumbofm.com/index.php/noticias/item/7486-cabo-delgado-governo-de-mocimboa-da-praia-desmente-rumores-de-recolher-obrigatorio-na-vila?ref=zitamar.com) that any curfew was in place. The story was covered in our Daily Briefing on Tuesday: [Airport company’s profit exposes Mozambique’s public-company debt chainWhen state companies owe each other money, who actually pays?![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-6dbbb692-fad0-4ef7-89ce-17869a86a39f.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-23-09.44.00-d3bcb97e-9810-40e2-b44a-099e3458eedc.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/airport-companys-profit-exposes-mozambiques-public-company-debt-chain/) The Agency for the Integrated Development of the North (ADIN) is to roll out a community-focused project aimed at empowering young people and creating economic opportunities across Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, minister of planning and development Salim Valá announced. The $250m MozCommunity initiative is funded by the World Bank and will reach all 56 districts in the three northern provinces, he said. See Wednesday's Daily: [Mozambique’s steel test in South AfricaA provisional South African duty on steel pipes from Mozambique shows what happens when regional industrialisation starts to compete with South African manufacturers![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-4c51cfc7-f2bd-459d-beb6-44f3b6169cc9.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-06-25_093314916-3a4eb310-c991-4e72-8840-643a5ce189f1.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-steel-test-in-south-africa/) And in other news from the province, Italian oil and gas company Eni has begun sounding out contractors for a third floating LNG platform offshore Mozambique. Mozambique Rovuma Venture (MRV), the Eni- and ExxonMobil-led consortium developing the Area 4 gas fields, has invited companies to submit expressions of interest for the engineering, procurement, construction, installation and commissioning of a third FLNG unit, with capacity of up to 6mtpa — significantly larger than the existing Coral Sul platform and the Coral Norte platform currently in development. [Eni tests market for larger third floating LNG platformThe third FLNG platform on the Rovuma Basin’s Coral field will be significantly larger than the existing Coral Sul and the forthcoming Coral Norte![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-22996d84-10ee-4a78-a7aa-ee17391a6af2.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-15-17.42.34-e7036566-5bda-40ce-93a2-0429595e6f2e.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/eni-tests-market-for-larger-third-floating-lng-platform/) Not this week, but since the last MCM Update, Cabo Delgado also has a new Secretary of State: Fernando de Sousa, who moves from the same position in Nampula. The outgoing Cabo Delgado SoS, Plácido Pereira, moves the other way. De Sousa is pictured at the top of the newsletter. That's all for now. Again, this newsletter is available to free subscribers but if you don’t already support *Zitamar News* through a paid subscription, please consider doing so: [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) ### Insurgents attack Namabo military position in Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-attack-namabo-military-position-in-macomia/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T13:01:35.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents overran a Mozambican military position in Macomia district, Cabo Delgado province, on Monday night, killing at least five soldiers and forcing others to abandon the camp, according to local sources and an Islamic State claim. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique’s steel test in South Africa URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-steel-test-in-south-africa/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T11:39:47.000Z > With apologies for the late arrival of yesterday's Daily. Happy Independence Day! Mozambique talks constantly about industrialisation. Much of that talk happens in conferences, speeches and investment forums, where the word can become an ambition more than an economic reality. The case of ETG Steel Solutions and Falcon Steel is different. Here is a company manufacturing steel products in the Beluluane Free Trade Zone, close to Maputo, and selling them into South Africa and the wider regional market. Falcon Steel, owned by ETG, markets products manufactured by ETG Steel Solutions in Mozambique, including pipes, tubes, roofing, steel sections and other products used in construction, mining, water, sewerage, agriculture and manufacturing. Its own promotional material makes the South African market central to the business, stressing that Beluluane is less than 550km from Johannesburg. That is exactly what Mozambique should want from an industrial zone. It is also the kind of opportunity we discussed recently in relation to the N4 corridor. Mozambique should not only serve as a route for South African trade through Maputo port. It should use the corridor, its ports, power and industrial parks to capture more value inside the domestic economy. [Bring the corridor economy homeA new concession for the N4 highway is an opportunity to capture more value for Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-f89d6374-9226-49d7-a9b2-301586c97a52.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/IMG_8674-24ff2b05-d192-4ae0-a32e-3fc8ce3de133.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/bring-the-corridor-economy-home/) The details matter, however. It appears that while some of the steel coil used by ETG in Mozambique is imported from South Africa, more is imported from China, before being processed at Beluluane and then exported as pipes and tubes to South Africa. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0c46dfbe-ba13-42dd-8772-566bdb9732d0/)*.* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Eni tests market for larger third floating LNG platformThe third FLNG platform on the Rovuma Basin’s Coral field will be significantly larger than the existing Coral Sul and the forthcoming Coral Norte![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-136534f0-25f7-4272-b7da-832341c5c0f3.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-15-17.42.34-640537f2-01a3-4f68-9d18-4ecba952b099.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/eni-tests-market-for-larger-third-floating-lng-platform/) [Nine feared dead after Mozambican navy boat sinks off Cabo DelgadoTwo sailors survived after a naval vessel capsized between Matemo and Ibo islands during rough weather, while a separate shipwreck near Vamizi Island claimed two civilian lives![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-42ad5b3a-4fe9-4c60-83e7-d3fa02521424.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-24-12.22.26-ce1a362a-e784-4d91-9d56-6b9d2c8f2061.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/nine-feared-dead-after-mozambican-navy-boat-sinks-off-cabo-delgado/) --- [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That makes this a more complicated test of regional industrialisation. It is not simply South African steel going to Mozambique and returning with value added. It is imported steel being transformed in Mozambique, then entering the South African market as a Mozambican-made product. If the processing meets the rules, that is how an industrial zone is supposed to work. But it also explains why South African producers are pushing back. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Eni tests market for larger third floating LNG platform URL: https://www.zitamar.com/eni-tests-market-for-larger-third-floating-lng-platform/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T15:12:50.000Z Italian oil and gas company Eni has begun sounding out contractors for a third floating LNG platform offshore Mozambique, in the first concrete sign of progress since the company confirmed it was assessing another FLNG development in Area 4. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Nine feared dead after Mozambican navy boat sinks off Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/nine-feared-dead-after-mozambican-navy-boat-sinks-off-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T10:39:54.000Z At least nine Mozambican navy personnel are feared dead after a vessel sank off Cabo Delgado province during a night patrol on 18 June, local sources say. The vessel, which had previously been implicated in at least [two incidents](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) of the military [killing fishermen](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-fishermen-off-coastal-macomia/) off the Cabo Delgado coast, went down in the channel between Matemo and Ibo islands as it returned from a patrol mission on Matemo Island. The exact number of personnel on board remains unclear, although several sources said at least 11 members of the navy were aboard. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Airport company’s profit exposes Mozambique’s public-company debt chain URL: https://www.zitamar.com/airport-companys-profit-exposes-mozambiques-public-company-debt-chain/ Last updated: 2026-06-23T21:21:46.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique Airports is back in the black. Aeroportos de Moçambique reported net earnings of MZN637m ($10m) in 2025, reversing a loss of MZN1.53bn ($24m) the previous year. That is good news for a company responsible for around 20 airports and airfields across the country. Mozambique needs working airports, especially if it wants to build tourism, attract investors and connect provincial economies more effectively to Maputo and the outside world. But the turnaround may be little more than a change in how the accounts are presented. AdM linked the improvement chiefly to the reversal of impairment losses connected to the restructuring of debt owed by LAM, and to the reorganisation of its own liabilities. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b040e16a-511b-432f-9460-9947bccda139/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That points to a wider problem in Mozambique’s public sector. State-owned companies do not operate in isolation. When one does not pay another, the debt moves through the system. LAM’s unpaid obligations weaken AdM. AdM has its own obligations to suppliers and utilities. Public institutions that fail to pay electricity or water bills weaken EDM and water companies. Municipalities that do not pay for public lighting add another layer of arrears. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique talks diversification, but still looks to gas URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-talks-diversification-but-still-looks-to-gas/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T17:10:00.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo has spent the past few days trying to sell Mozambique as a broader investment destination. On Friday, he received ExxonMobil’s new Mozambique managing director, Johanna Boothey, and the secretary-general of the African Golf Confederation, Michael Aggrey. On Sunday, he used the Presidential Golf Day to present tourism as a platform for investment, jobs and economic diplomacy. This morning, he received a delegation from U.S. International Finance Partners, which is looking at opportunities in real estate, energy, hospitality, health and technology. It is a good ambition. Mozambique needs a broader-based economy, with tourism, agriculture, fisheries, logistics, manufacturing and services all featuring prominently. Mozambique has coastline, ports, corridors, fertile land, energy resources and a young labour force. Chapo himself acknowledged in his golf speech that Mozambique’s economy is concentrated in gas and the extractive industries, and said the country must also bet on tourism, agriculture, industry, transport, logistics, energy and other sectors. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/53b60073-8c6a-466a-872f-e1053aa6205d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But when the conversation turns to where the big money will come from, it still returns to gas. ExxonMobil’s Rovuma LNG project is currently the clearest example. Boothey told Chapo that ExxonMobil was encouraged by progress on the project and remained committed to working with the government. A final investment decision (FID) on the project is likely before the end of this year. A recent Standard Bank study put the possible state revenues from the ExxonMobil-led project at up to $150bn over its 30-year life. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Delgado needs watching as LNG machinery restarts URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-needs-watching-as-lng-machinery-restarts/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T15:17:15.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s LNG projects are ramping up, as evidenced by a rash of procurement notices, supplier calls and preparatory contracts issued this week, as we report today. Sometimes, the news is in the ads. The pattern is more important than any single notice. TotalEnergies’ Mozambique LNG project is preparing work at Afungi, while Mozambique Rovuma Venture, operator of Area 4, is also becoming visibly more active. That matters. For much of the public discussion around Cabo Delgado, the question of a restart has centred on TotalEnergies. The latest notices suggest Rovuma LNG is also beginning to swing into action. That is welcome for Mozambique, if renewed mobilisation brings work, local contracts, tax revenue and wider economic activity. But Cabo Delgado has not become a simple operating environment while the gas companies were away. *Zitamar* sources in Quissanga report repeated insurgent movements through the district since early June, suggesting armed groups are using the area as a corridor toward positions in Macomia while taking food from agricultural zones. The same province that hosts Mozambique’s largest investment projects remains an active conflict zone. [LNG projects issue flurry of tenders as activity ramps up in Cabo DelgadoProcurement notices signal renewed activity around both LNG projects on the Afungi peninsula, despite ongoing security issues in Cabo Delgado province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-f8ae3dea-154e-4f58-8e90-01977e3bc7ec.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Bowker![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-06-19_153013373-967bc3c0-5915-4b82-a946-001a1d97620a.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/lng-projects-issue-flurry-of-tenders-as-activity-ramps-up-in-cabo-delgado/) [Insurgents regroup in Quissanga after southern incursionInsurgents are likely making their way back toward their traditional stronghold of Macomia district![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-1b948184-e241-46dc-b41e-56b2aa671c1b.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-19-14.47.53-536424f5-5936-4415-bb21-75e1bbd436a9.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-regroup-in-quissanga-after-southern-incursion/) The risks are wider than the battlefield. This week, *Zitamar* and Forbidden Stories reported on an unpublished UN report and interviews alleging sexual exploitation by workers linked to the TotalEnergies-led project and sexual violence by Mozambican soldiers in Cabo Delgado. The allegations are serious, and contested by those implicated. They are also a reminder that restarting LNG requires scrutiny of communities, contractors, security forces and grievance systems, not just construction schedules and security perimeters. [Revealed: Unpublished UN report implicates workers on TotalEnergies-led project in sexual exploitation and Mozambique’s military in sexual violenceMozambican soldiers have been accused of rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Cabo Delgado, while staff working on TotalEnergies’ LNG project allegedly coerced women into sex, according to interviews and an unpublished UN report obtained by Forbidden Stories![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-5f46bebc-6ac1-48e6-a89e-8848ba4e9603.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-18-14.24.06-000ea012-b6e2-44af-b0b0-5a95ff48254a.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/revealed-unpublished-un-report-implicates-workers-on-totalenergies-led-project-in-sexual-exploitation-and-mozambiques-military-in-sexual-violence/) Mozambique needs the economic momentum that LNG can bring. Cabo Delgado also needs transparent information, accountable security, careful local-content management and serious attention to communities living around the projects and along insurgent routes. For that reason, Zitamar will now begin sending periodic Cabo Delgado conflict updates through a dedicated newsletter. Readers who want to receive them can sign up by clicking **Account** in the top right of zitamar.com, hitting **Manage** next to **Emails**, and turning on the **Zitamar Mozambique conflict updates** newsletter. The fortnightly Mozambique Conflict Monitor update, produced alongside global conflict monitoring organisation ACLED, will also be sent through that list. The contracts are starting to move. The conflict is moving too. We will be watching both. # Agenda: - **Today:** Mozambican delegation led by Finance Minister Carla Loveira participates in annual meetings of the Islamic Development Bank Group - **Tomorrow–Monday:** Anamola’s National Convention, at which the party leader will be elected, with Venâncio Mondlane as the sole candidate --- # Also in the news: - **CTA warns business climate is worsening (**[**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/18/economia-desacelera-no-1o-trimestre-apesar-de-sinais-de-estabilidade-macroeconomica/?ref=zitamar.com)**,**[ ***Diário Económico***](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/negocios/empresas/cta-alerta-para-regressao-no-ambiente-de-negocios-no-primeirotrimestre/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***Evidências***](https://evidencias.co.mz/2026/06/18/cta-alerta-que-estabilidade-macroeconomica-nao-chega-e-pede-regularizacao-de-atrasos-do-estado/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***MZNews***](https://mznews.co.mz/economia-desacelera-em-55-por-cento-no-primeiro-trimestre-de-2026/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***O País***](https://opais.co.mz/cta-exige-reformas-e-decisoes-corajosas-para-melhorar-competitividade/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Development bank urged to focus on productive investment (**[***Diário Económico***](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/bdm-defende-aposta-no-investimento-produtivo/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***Diário Económico***](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/financas/bni-critica-modelos-de-financiamento-importados-sem-adaptacao-ao-pais/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***Diário Económico***](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/banca/banco-de-desenvolvimento-devera-complementar-banca-comercial-defende-fundacao-dom-cabral/?ref=zitamar.com)**,** [**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/18/moza-banco-e-fdc-debatem-financiamento-do-crescimento-economico-de-mocambique/?ref=zitamar.com)**,**[ ***MZNews***](https://mznews.co.mz/moza-banco-e-fundacao-dom-cabral-promovem-debate-sobre-o-financiamento-a-economia/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Fifteen Ethiopians intercepted in Zambézia (**[***Folha de Maputo***](https://www.folhademaputo.co.mz/pt/noticias/nacional/perseguicao-na-en1-trava-15-etiopes-em-rota-ilegal/?ref=zitamar.com)***,***[ ***Notícias***](https://jornalnoticias.co.mz/destaque/quinze-etiopes-retidos-na-zambezia/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Four injured as police disperse Mondlane supporters in Nampula (AIM, Lusa)** - **Mining industry warns new ownership rules may deter investors (**[***Reuters***](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mozambiques-new-mine-ownership-rules-could-deter-foreign-investment-industry-2026-06-18/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** ## CTA warns business climate is worsening ([AIM](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/18/economia-desacelera-no-1o-trimestre-apesar-de-sinais-de-estabilidade-macroeconomica/?ref=zitamar.com),[ *Diário Económico*](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/negocios/empresas/cta-alerta-para-regressao-no-ambiente-de-negocios-no-primeirotrimestre/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *Evidências*](https://evidencias.co.mz/2026/06/18/cta-alerta-que-estabilidade-macroeconomica-nao-chega-e-pede-regularizacao-de-atrasos-do-estado/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *MZNews*](https://mznews.co.mz/economia-desacelera-em-55-por-cento-no-primeiro-trimestre-de-2026/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *O País*](https://opais.co.mz/cta-exige-reformas-e-decisoes-corajosas-para-melhorar-competitividade/?ref=zitamar.com)) Mozambique’s Confederation of Economic Associations, the CTA, says the business environment deteriorated in the first quarter of 2026, with its Macroeconomic Environment Index falling from 62% in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 55%. CTA said floods, foreign currency shortages, fuel supply constraints and uncertainty were weighing on business activity, despite signs of macroeconomic stability. It called for structural reforms to improve competitiveness, including better access to finance, modernised infrastructure, administrative simplification, greater foreign-currency availability and payment of state arrears to companies. > *The CTA’s warning, which is in line with other recent pessimistic outlooks for Mozambique’s economy, underlines the gap between macroeconomic stabilisation and conditions facing businesses on the ground. With growth barely positive, forex scarce and state arrears still weighing on cash flow, the private sector is not yet feeling a real recovery.* ## Development bank urged to focus on productive investment ([*Diário Económico*](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/bdm-defende-aposta-no-investimento-produtivo/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *Diário Económico*](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/financas/bni-critica-modelos-de-financiamento-importados-sem-adaptacao-ao-pais/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *Diário Económico*](https://www.diarioeconomico.co.mz/2026/06/18/economia/banca/banco-de-desenvolvimento-devera-complementar-banca-comercial-defende-fundacao-dom-cabral/?ref=zitamar.com), [AIM](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/18/moza-banco-e-fdc-debatem-financiamento-do-crescimento-economico-de-mocambique/?ref=zitamar.com),[ *MZNews*](https://mznews.co.mz/moza-banco-e-fundacao-dom-cabral-promovem-debate-sobre-o-financiamento-a-economia/?ref=zitamar.com)) The Development Bank of Mozambique (BDM) should complement commercial banks rather than compete with them, participants in a Maputo debate organised by Moza Banco said. Speakers argued that the bank should provide long-term finance for strategic sectors and projects that are difficult to fund through normal commercial lending. Carlos Arruda, of the Dom Cabral Foundation, said the bank should fill gaps in the financial market, while BDM executive committee chairman João Macaringue said the institution was created to support productive investment and the structural transformation of the economy. > *The question remains of why a new institution is necessary when Mozambique already has a National Investment Bank (BNI) with a very similar development-finance mandate. If the problem is the lack of long-term finance for productive investment, the government needs to explain whether the new BDM will replace, absorb or complement BNI. But the new institution will also need to avoid being infected by vested interests of Frelimo elites.* ## Fifteen Ethiopians intercepted in Zambézia ([*Folha de Maputo*](https://www.folhademaputo.co.mz/pt/noticias/nacional/perseguicao-na-en1-trava-15-etiopes-em-rota-ilegal/?ref=zitamar.com)*,*[ *Notícias*](https://jornalnoticias.co.mz/destaque/quinze-etiopes-retidos-na-zambezia/?ref=zitamar.com)) Police in Zambézia intercepted 15 Ethiopian nationals travelling hidden in a vehicle on National Road Number One, in a case linked to irregular migration. Reports say the group entered Mozambique through Melosa, in Milange district, and was travelling toward Nampula. The vehicle was stopped in Ile district after the driver ignored a police order to stop in Mocuba and was pursued. The passengers were removed from the vehicle and are being held pending legal procedures. > *The case points again to Mozambique’s role as a transit country for irregular migration, with EN1 used as a long-distance corridor to South Africa — still an El Dorado for many Africans despite a recent surge in xenophobic sentiment and violence there.* ## Four injured as police disperse Mondlane supporters in Nampula (AIM, Lusa) At least four people were injured as police dispersed supporters of Venâncio Mondlane during his arrival in Nampula for Anamola’s first National Convention, according to AIM and Lusa. The DECIDE Electoral Platform said one person was hit by a live round, while three others were injured by shrapnel from a dispersal grenade, and taken to Nampula Central Hospital. Video streamed live on Mondlane’s Facebook page showed police firing at least one tear gas canister as hundreds of supporters followed the vehicle carrying him through the city, with police positioned at several points, including near the airport exit. Anamola’s convention runs from 20 to 22 June and is expected to bring together around 400 delegates to elect Mondlane formally as the party’s president. Anamola has repeatedly denounced police harassment of its members and supporters. AIM notes that two Anamola members were shot dead over the past month in Inhambane and Manica, and says DECIDE has recorded more than 20 attacks against opposition party members since July 2025. > *Anamola can still draw large crowds around Mondlane, but its efforts to turn that support into formal party organisation are taking place under police pressure and a rising pattern of reported attacks on opposition activists. The convention will test whether Mondlane’s movement can become a durable national structure, especially as Renamo remains absorbed by internal disputes and Podemos slides further into irrelevance.* ## Mining industry warns new ownership rules may deter investors ([*Reuters*](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mozambiques-new-mine-ownership-rules-could-deter-foreign-investment-industry-2026-06-18/?ref=zitamar.com)) Mozambique’s new mining law could make the country less attractive to foreign investors, according to Geert Klok, vice-president of the Mozambique Chamber of Mines, speaking at a mining conference in Zimbabwe. The law requires the state to hold at least 15% in all mining ventures. The government says the change is intended to strengthen national control over strategic resources. The law also restricts exports of unprocessed or semi-processed minerals unless approved by the minister and linked to plans for domestic processing, a policy Klok said the Chamber supports if the government ensures reliable water, electricity and transport infrastructure. > *The government’s push for a larger state role in mining is understandable, but it raises the cost of clarity for investors. If Mozambique wants more local processing and more public upside, it also has to provide the infrastructure, security and predictable rules that make those projects bankable.* ### LNG projects issue flurry of tenders as activity ramps up in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/lng-projects-issue-flurry-of-tenders-as-activity-ramps-up-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T14:07:34.000Z Procurement notices signal renewed activity around both LNG projects on the Afungi peninsula, despite ongoing security issues in Cabo Delgado province _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Insurgents regroup in Quissanga after southern incursion URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-regroup-in-quissanga-after-southern-incursion/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T13:57:31.000Z Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado have returned to familiar territory in the district of Quissanga, in the centre of the coastal region of the province, having apparently ended a period of activity in southern districts. Local sources have reported repeated sightings of armed groups across the district since early June, suggesting that insurgents are trying to move back toward positions in neighbouring Macomia, while using agricultural areas in Quissanga to obtain food. Sources reported armed groups moving between Ancuabe, Bilibiza, Cagembe, Mucojo and Namuaco, with some groups carrying large quantities of food. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozal needs a business model, not just a rescue URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozal-needs-a-business-model-not-just-a-rescue/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T14:45:24.000Z Good afternoon. The future of the Mozal aluminium smelter, if there is one, will depend on a structure that makes sense for the company, for Mozambique’s largest electricity generator the Cahora Bassa dam, for South African utility Eskom, and for the two governments trying to keep one of the region’s most important industrial assets alive. Newspaper *Evidências* reported this week that the government has reached a preliminary understanding with South African stakeholders including Eskom and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), and Australian mining group South32, on a gradual reopening of Mozal, a new energy arrangement and a different shareholder structure. It says HCB and Eskom could be brought into the company, increasing the role of state entities in a project long dominated by South32 and South Africa’s IDC. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/711491fa-89e4-4b91-bdd3-8922c1342567/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Revealed: Unpublished UN report implicates workers on TotalEnergies-led project in sexual exploitation and Mozambique’s military in sexual violenceMozambican soldiers have been accused of rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Cabo Delgado, while staff working on TotalEnergies’ LNG project allegedly coerced women into sex, according to interviews and an unpublished UN report obtained by Forbidden Stories![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-b93cb685-ae09-4e39-81b4-571401007f89.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-18-14.24.06-45de6a9f-513c-47bd-a016-0a39cfad0ea4.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/revealed-unpublished-un-report-implicates-workers-on-totalenergies-led-project-in-sexual-exploitation-and-mozambiques-military-in-sexual-violence/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That idea has a clear logic. Mozal’s crisis was always about electricity. Aluminium smelting is one of the most energy-intensive industries in the world. South32 said the proposed tariffs would make Mozal uncompetitive, while HCB argued that some of the terms demanded would put its own financial sustainability at risk. Eskom was part of the old power model, but South Africa also has to decide how far it can go in supporting cheap power for a smelter outside its borders. Bringing the power suppliers inside the shareholder structure might help solve that problem. If HCB and Eskom share in Mozal’s future profits, they have more reason to support a power arrangement that keeps the smelter running. It would turn a dispute between power sellers and an aluminium producer into a regional industrial bargain. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Revealed: Unpublished UN report implicates workers on TotalEnergies-led project in sexual exploitation and Mozambique's military in sexual violence URL: https://www.zitamar.com/revealed-unpublished-un-report-implicates-workers-on-totalenergies-led-project-in-sexual-exploitation-and-mozambiques-military-in-sexual-violence/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T14:07:51.000Z > **By** Mariana Abreu **Additional reporting by** Costanza Gambarini and Luke Barratt (SourceMaterial), Gaëlle Laleix (RFI), Jörg Brase (ZDF) **Warning:** **This article contains explicit descriptions of rape, sexual abuse, and child abuse;** In 2019, the French energy giant TotalEnergies began operations on an extraction project in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s northernmost province and one of the country’s poorest regions. There, TotalEnergies established Mozambique liquefied natural gas (LNG), one of the world’s largest LNG projects, with investments totaling over 20 billion dollars. By then, residents had already endured two years of violence at the hands of an Islamic State-affiliated, local Islamist insurgency known as Al-Shabaab. The conflict has claimed over 6,000 lives and displaced over 1.3 million people. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-71cd011f-6664-4d29-b770-a99df53ae21a.png) In red, Cabo Delgado Province (Credit: Profoss, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons). Now, previously unpublished documents and interviews reveal women and girls have borne the heaviest burden, facing sexual violence from all sides, including by some of the Mozambican soldiers initially deployed to protect them and by some employees working for the TotalEnergies’ led Mozambique LNG project. In 2025, Tomazina\*, a 25-year-old resident of Palma, a coastal town in Cabo Delgado that neighbours the Mozambique LNG project site, travelled to the TotalEnergies compound in the Afungi Peninsula, some 20 kilometers away. Tomazina, whose name has been changed for her protection, had heard about vacancies there and wanted to submit a job application. “There were so many people,” she told Forbidden Stories. She was hopeful when the man in charge of collecting applications pulled her from the line and suggested she give him her phone number to discuss opportunities. “He called me that afternoon,” Tomazina recalled. Then he said, ‘I’m going to help you get that job, but in exchange I also have a request. I’d like to have sex with you.’” A week later, their relationship became sexual. Tomazina soon contacted him to ask about the job, but he “stopped responding to my messages,” she said. Between January and April 2024, a UN agency dedicated to sexual and reproductive health, collected testimonies that describe similar accounts, including how women and girls were allegedly coerced into sex by men linked to the Mozambique LNG project, in exchange for employment. “They tell women and girls that if they sleep with them, they will give them a job. Girls accept, and men say, ‘The job will come soon,’ but sometimes, it does not even come,” a resident told the UN agency. These testimonies were assembled into a previously unpublished report, titled “Voices of Mozambique,” which sought to document gender-based violence (GBV) in the region. The accounts were gathered across the districts of Mueda, Nangade, Muidumbe, Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Mecufi, through interviews with more than 100 people, including survivors from displaced, host, and returnee communities, as well as local figures and GBV specialists. The latter included national authorities, religious leaders, academics, and national and international protection and humanitarian actors. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-dec64b8d-58d0-4dee-8185-f26058d5ce46.png) Overwhelmingly, the report exposes sexual violence committed by Mozambique’s armed forces and Al-Shabaab against the women and children of Cabo Delgado. The report also documents the coercion of sex workers by staff associated with TotalEnergies' LNG project. Throughout the report, all but one reference to TotalEnergies was replaced with the term "multinational energy company." A TotalEnergies spokesperson said that Mozambique LNG “is not aware of such allegations but takes them very seriously.” The project, the spokesperson said, has a mechanism in which people affected by the company’s operations can formally submit concerns. “We have reviewed the grievances lodged in the project grievance mechanism and have no such report,” the spokesperson said. Asked why the report was never made public, a UN spokesperson said that “operational dynamics and insecurity at the time made it impossible to bring this report up to the standards needed for publication,” adding that the 100-page document had been “used internally to inform programme development.” **“You give your body away”** According to the UN report, women moved to the Palma area hoping to find work around TotalEnergies’ LNG project. Many who were unable to secure employment would “resort to sex work to survive.” | “They ask women to pay to get the job. The women say they do not have any, so the men say they can get the job if they sleep with them.”A person interviewed by the UN. | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | “It’s been very hard because there’s no jobs. I don’t have a means of living. So I have to resort to other ways of providing for my children and my family,” Mwanajuma\*, a 27-year-old mother of two whose name was changed for her protection, told the consortium. Mwanajuma said that after being deceived several times, she no longer agrees to sexual relationships for promises of employment. Instead, certain workers on the site demand she pay them to secure a job offer. “They ask for 10,000 meticais \[about €135\].’ If you don’t have that money, you don’t get the job.” “They ask women to pay to get the job,” one interviewee told the UN. “The women say they do not have any, so the men say they can get the job if they sleep with them.” Another interviewee said, “they started sleeping with the people from Total because they had more money.” When asked to identify the men who had attempted to perform such transactions with them, Mwanajuma and Tomazina implicated workers with ISCO, a TotalEnergies subcontractor. ISCO Segurança is a Mozambican security company affiliated with Rwanda-based ISCO Security, which is linked to Crystal Ventures, the investment arm of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The company provides security services at the Afungi site . (ISCO and Crystal Ventures did not reply to our request for comment.) While it has been a year since Tomazina’s assault, she admitted the experience still weighed heavily on her. “I ask myself why I had to go through all of this. Life is hard, there’s no jobs, someone used that to trick you. You give yourself away, you give your body away, you give them everything, believing this was the time your life was going to improve. But it never does.” **Widespread abuse** In 2025, TotalEnergies relaunched its operations in Cabo Delgado, after a four-year interruption. During that time, it paid Mozambican armed forces for security, to protect its gas installations from Al-Shabaab. Mozambican soldiers, the report stated, are alleged to be responsible for rape, transactional sex, extortion and abuse, including against minors. A TotalEnergies’ internal report seen by Forbidden Stories, and obtained by ReCommon, an Italian non-profit focusing on corporate accountability issues, shows that the Mozambique LNG project, led by TotalEnergies, "was informed about several cases of JTF \[Joint Task Force\] misbehaviours in and around the village" in 2022\. One account included in the UN report described an incident involving a teenage girl. “Yesterday, a military officer offered a drink to a girl who was 15-16 years old. Then, he demanded to be paid back for the drink. As she did not have money, he forced her to have sex with him, as a way of payment for the drink. There is a motel over here; we could hear her yelling and crying,” one testimony recounted. In a 2024 interview with SourceMaterial, a partner on this consortium, Zura\*, a 20-year-old resident of Nacala whose name has been changed, recounted crossing paths with three soldiers on her way home from Palma. But they blocked her path and insisted she come to them. “They tore off my blouse,” she said. “They tied me up and covered my eyes, so I couldn’t see.” Zura said they raped her repeatedly and stole her money. And yet, she felt she had no avenue for redress. **No deterrent justice** Locals have grown wary of the army because of such abuses, as recounted by several civilians who spoke with the consortium. “They don't come to protect us, if they find anything with you they want, they take it forcibly. Did \[they\] come to protect us or to take our things away?” Mariamo\*, a 32-year-old Palma resident whose name has been changed, told the consortium. Mariamo’s testimony corroborates interviews collected by RFI, a member of Mozambique Exposed, who traveled to Cabo Delgado. “We don't trust them, because they are not trustworthy, they kill the people,” Fatima Alidi, a resident of Mocímboa da Praia, said. (The Mozambican Ministry of Defence did not reply to Forbidden Stories’ questions.) According to the report, many victims of sexual violence never obtain justice. This is due, in part, to few courts in the region and the prevalence of informal justice practices. Disputes are often handled informally by the community leader, who “covers it up because they prefer to solve matters through private arrangements.” For soldiers, there is no deterrent justice within the community, despite many of them having been implicated in child marriages, early pregnancies, and transactional sex. “Even if the perpetrator is detained, the day after, he is walking around in the neighbourhood,” another GBV expert in Pemba told the UN. Survivors of rape, the report found, won’t report the crime because some members of the military claim to be untouchable. Zura said she reported to police that members of the military raped her and showed them her bloodied clothes, but the soldiers were simply redeployed to an area a few kilometres up the road. **“A fact-free Neverland”** Even if unintentionally, multinational companies like TotalEnergies act as a catalyst for the conflict, Kete Mirela Fumo, a specialist on human rights and corporate abuses for Justiça Ambiental, a Mozambican NGO, told the consortium. “Directly or indirectly, these projects end up worsening the situation, especially when there is information showing that the same projects are funding armed forces that later commit human rights abuses.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-3622df6b-ade1-4d11-9bcc-d60569563a9d.png) Kete Mirela Fumo, specialist on human rights and corporate abuses for Justiça Ambiental, a Mozambican NGO, interviewed by the consortium (Credit: ZDF). In a 2024 investigation published by Politico, journalist Alex Perry revealed that TotalEnergies paid Mozambican soldiers of a Joint Task Force (JTF). The soldiers were assigned to protect its LNG site in Cabo Delgado and were found to have detained, tortured, and executed dozens, if not hundreds, of civilians around the perimeter of TotalEnergies’ compound. The revelations have since led to legal charges against the company. In late 2025, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) filed a complaint in France accusing TotalEnergies of complicity in war crimes, torture and enforced disappearance of dozens of civilians, and for "having directly financed and materially supported the Joint Task Force... \[which\] allegedly detained, tortured and killed dozens of civilians on TotalEnergies’ gas site.” Contacted by the consortium, TotalEnergies said it “firmly rejects all such accusations.” Presumed innocent, it claims that “neither Mozambique LNG nor, a fortiori, TotalEnergies had received, at the time, any information regarding such allegations.” ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-baab4958-5a7d-4249-81f2-80c2fbdd6d69-1-1.png) Journalist Alex Perry. Perry, the journalist, said the company has failed to confront the scale of suffering surrounding the project. “Total won't or doesn't acknowledge any of the stuff that we discovered, ” Perry told ZDF, a member of this consortium. “Total is in a fact-free Neverland,” he said. Clara Gonzales, a programme director at ECCHR, the organization behind the legal complaint involving TotalEnergies, told the consortium that the company’s stance has been “surprising and cynical.” It will be up to the justice system to establish the facts. Mariamo, the 32-year-old Palma resident interviewed by the consortium, said a soldier assaulted her after he refused to pay for alcohol she had sold him. The same incident was described in a TotalEnergies’ internal report seen by Forbidden Stories, and obtained by ReCommon. According to the document, Mariamo received medical support through the project and the officer’s “hardship compensation” was suspended before he was removed. When she reported the incident to police, the soldier threatened her, she told SourceMaterial. “Whatever you can do, no one will imprison me,” she recalled him saying. “We will kill you.” ### Road safety starts before the police arrive URL: https://www.zitamar.com/road-safety-starts-before-the-police-arrive/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T15:38:27.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique is preparing to revise its Road Code, with plans for a points-based driving licence, CCTV-backed enforcement and updated rules for new types of vehicles. These are sensible reforms, and long overdue. Yet events in Tete this week show how limited legal reform will be if the state cannot enforce basic safety rules consistently, cleanly and without violence. At least two people were killed during protests by moto-taxi operators after a municipal inspection operation. The immediate dispute appears to have involved requirements such as registration, helmets and reflective vests. Those demands are reasonable. Moto-taxi drivers and their passengers are exposed to serious risk every day, and the state has a duty to make that work safer. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/98977d6b-39cc-4d3f-a2f3-9ca337ffc34d/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (1-14 June 2026)After two months in southern Cabo Delgado, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) insurgents have begun to return to bases in Macomia![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-f9b42c2f-ea2a-4431-9c5b-37e45a5af8c1.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-17-15.59.39-b9e64e67-c8fd-4e70-b2e5-44a3c78a838b.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-may-2026-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The difficulty is that Mozambique often allows informal transport systems to grow for years before trying to impose order. Moto-taxis become livelihoods. Chapas keep cities moving. Small boats connect communities. Roadside markets serve travellers. These are not marginal activities; they are part of the country’s daily economy. When regulation finally arrives, it adds costs to businesses and passengers who already operate on narrow margins. That does not mean safety rules should be abandoned. It means they have to be introduced earlier, applied predictably and enforced without corruption. A points-based licence system will have limited effect if many drivers do not have licences. Higher fines will not change behaviour if fines can be made to disappear. CCTV may help, but only if people believe the law is being applied fairly rather than selectively. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (1-14 June 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-may-2026-2/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T10:24:40.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (1 - 14 June 2026) At least **11** political violence events (**2,408** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **8** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,632** since 1 October 2017) At least **4** reported civilian fatalities (**2,772** since 1 October 2017) At least **11** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,224** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview After two months in southern Cabo Delgado, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) insurgents have begun to return to bases in Macomia. They are likely a little richer, having passed through four informal mine sites during their time in the south. ISM also remained active in the north, deploying IEDs in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia district and clashing with a Mozambican navy vessel. A clash between miners and police at the Namanhumbir ruby mines was a reminder that beyond the insurgency, natural resources remain contentious. ## Situation summary **ISM return from the south** Having been in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts since mid-April, ISM militants seem to finally be making their way back to Macomia district. They are departing as they arrived, visiting informal mining sites and being largely undisturbed by either Mozambican or Rwandan security forces. During their time in southern Cabo Delgado, they were a threat to [at least two large-scale commercial mining sites](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-6-may-2026?ref=zitamar.com) and [upended the lives of over 21,000](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-161?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) people now living in displaced people’s centers in Ancuabe, Chiúre, and Montepuez districts. Between 1 and 4 June, ISM militants were active in and around at least four villages in the Mesa area of Ancuabe district. Mpene to the west is a known ruby mining site, while there is an informal gold mine at N’naua to the east. At N’naua, they kidnapped an unknown number of people. According to one source, the victims were children. Another said the victims were miners and were released for a ransom of 10,000 meticais each. Fighters then made their way east toward Quissanga in at least two groups of 10 to 20 men each. According to a source, one group spent some time at an artisanal gold mine known as Nabala, approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Meluco town. In Quissanga, they went by Cagembe village, a site they regularly pass through. Having visited at least four mining sites since mid-April, raised some money through ransom, and looted goods in numerous villages, ISM’s trip south has likely been worth it, as it [likely was in November last year](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-12-november-2025?ref=zitamar.com). The failure of the security forces to respond made this sojourn possible. There are two camps, one Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and one Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), where troops are well placed to respond to ISM’s sojourns south, but from which they rarely do. Without a strengthened, and more responsive, security presence in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts, ISM will undertake more such sojourns south as it seeks to strengthen control over informal mining operations and bring in recruits from Nampula. **Police and miners clash at Namanhumbir** ISM is not the only actor looking to control access to mining areas. According to a [report in Moz24h](https://moz24h.co.mz/palco-de-sangue-namanhumbir/?ref=zitamar.com), two people were killed in a clash between informal miners and an officer of the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). The report claims that the officer was taking bribes to let miners into the mining area known as BCI, but soon after tried to force them to leave. According to the report, the UIR officer shot one miner before other miners overpowered him, seized his weapon, and shot him. The incident illustrates the persistently poor management of informal mining operations that presents a risk to large commercial operations through heightened insecurity. More fundamentally, it places miners’ lives at risk, whether at the hands of police or insurgents. **ISM attack in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts** ISM remained active in the north while its larger force was in the south of the province. The Islamic State (IS) central media office claimed three IED attacks on Rwandan patrols between 1 and 4 June. Two of these, both on 1 June, near Limala in Mocímboa da Praia and in Cogolo village on the Macomia coast, were controlled explosions by the Rwandan forces, according to a security source. The successful attack occurred between Limala and Mbau in southern Mocímboa da Praia district. IS issued a video clip of this attack, showing a military truck being hit by an IED, likely detonated by command wire. The RDF has positions in Mbau, and in Mucojo on the coast. Further east in the Muidumbe district, ISM insurgents entered Xitaxi village on 6 June, killing two people and stealing food, according to two sources. They were able to attack although FADM has a position at the eastern end of the village. **ISM and state forces clash at sea** ISM also remains active at sea. Local sources reported that militants landed on Matemo island on 2 June, where according to local sources they purchased food and destroyed a health center, having looted it of supplies. The following day, and 50 km north in waters off Quiterajo, ISM clashed with a Mozambican navy patrol. The clash occurred in an [exclusion zone](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-3-june-2026?ref=zitamar.com) around the mouth of the Messalo river that FADM is trying to enforce. ## Focus: IEDs as ISM’s first ring of defense ACLED first records ISM deploying an IED in 2021\. Since then, ACLED records 45 IED incidents involving ISM, of which 35 have been in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. Most deployments have been on roads that surround the Catupa forest, with the purpose of constraining the movement of FADM and Rwandan forces and discouraging approaches to ISM’s main camp (*see map below*). The IEDs in this way act as an outer defensive ring. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-ec046ca9-aad1-46c7-8d06-660a2722c4da.png) Still, ISM’s deployment of the three IEDs between 1 and 4 June, though the RDF identified and destroyed two, had impacts beyond the one successful detonation. Detection operations are defensive measures that tie up resources that could otherwise be involved in more proactive counter-insurgency operations. The impact of a successful IED deployment is much greater. This is seen first in the injury to soldiers in the vehicle struck, but also in the cost of recovery operations in the wake of such an attack. The vehicle struck in southern Mocímboa da Praia was operating from the RDF’s Mbau base, from which regular patrols to Limala are made. The RDF’s aim is to at least restrict movement to and from the Messalo river basin from the Mocímboa da Praia side. Since 2021, ACLED records eight IED incidents on that stretch of road. This is not surprising, given the conditions on the ground (*see graphic below*). Vehicles traveling on a poor road, with heavy vegetation on either side, and numerous turns are particularly vulnerable to attack. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-47124046-7d4d-4916-a89f-2cc1db5e1c03.png) Combating IED use will require continued detection efforts. More fundamentally, it demands stopping the supply of explosives. The bomb maker or makers are likely in Catupa, so degrading ISM’s technical capacity is not likely feasible in the short term. In the meantime, they present a direct threat to state forces and their ability to degrade ISM’s operations, rather than civilian traffic. As the IEDs are detonated by command wire rather than by pressure, the bomber can target military traffic precisely, while his companion captures the moment on his phone for use in IS propaganda. ## Roundup *Three people, including a priest, held over the killing of the Quelimane bishop* Osório Citora Afonso, the 54-year-old Catholic bishop of Quelimane and apostolic administrator of the Archdiocese of Beira, was [shot dead](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/06/bispo-da-diocese-de-quelimane-morto-a-tiro/?ref=zitamar.com) in the early hours of 6 June at the Episcopal Palace in Quelimane, Zambézia province. The investigative agency Sernic said he was killed with an AKM-type firearm, struck in the chest near the heart, and that the body was found in a corridor. Investigators have [arrested](https://cisanewsafrica.com/2026/06/mozambique-three-suspects-arrested-in-bishop-osorio-afonso-assassination-as-church-prepares-for-burial-in-nampula-on-june-13/?ref=zitamar.com) three people in connection with the killing, a Catholic priest of the Quelimane diocese, together with a guard and a gardener who worked at the bishop's residence. President Chapo, Pope Leo XIV, the European Union, and the United States all [expressed](https://360mozambique.com/development/pope-leo-xiv-eu-and-us-call-for-justice-over-the-murder-of-the-bishop-of-quelimane/?ref=zitamar.com) shock, condemnation, and called for swift clarification of the crime and accountability for those responsible. At the same time, the Mozambican bishops conference and African church bodies pressed for a swift, transparent investigation into both the perpetrators and any masterminds behind the killing. *Mozambique and DRC agree to share counter-terrorism and mining expertise* The governments of Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo [have agreed](https://360mozambique.com/development/governments-of-mozambique-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-agree-to-share-expertise-in-combating-terrorism/?ref=zitamar.com) to deepen bilateral cooperation by exchanging knowledge and experience in key areas, including counterterrorism, mining, energy, trade, and regional integration. Mozambican Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Maria Lucas said both countries face terrorist threats and can benefit from sharing lessons learned and strengthening the capabilities of their security forces, with support from international partners such as the EU. The DRC also committed to sharing expertise in the management of mineral resources and energy sectors. *Cost dispute strains ties between Chapo and TotalEnergies chief* Relations between TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné and Mozambican President Daniel Chapo appear to [have soured](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-salvation-will-come-at-a-price/?ref=zitamar-daily-briefing-newsletter) over the French major’s 4.5 billion USD claim for cost overruns tied to the force majeure that halted Mozambique LNG between April 2021 and October 2025\. A government-commissioned audit by the British firm Bayphase challenged part of that claim, finding much of the sum unjustified, and Mozambique is now resisting roughly $2 billion of the disputed costs. The two leaders are understood to have held at least one tense meeting recently, and Chapo has so far refused to amend the project's plan of development to absorb the new costs or revise the price of the two liquefaction trains. ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (1-14 June 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-1-14-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T10:29:08.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (1 - 14 June 2026) At least **11** political violence events (**2,408** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **8** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,632** since 1 October 2017) At least **4** reported civilian fatalities (**2,772** since 1 October 2017) At least **11** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,224** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview After two months in southern Cabo Delgado, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) insurgents have begun to return to bases in Macomia. They are likely a little richer, having passed through four informal mine sites during their time in the south. ISM also remained active in the north, deploying IEDs in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia district and clashing with a Mozambican navy vessel. A clash between miners and police at the Namanhumbir ruby mines was a reminder that beyond the insurgency, natural resources remain contentious. ## Situation summary **ISM return from the south** Having been in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts since mid-April, ISM militants seem to finally be making their way back to Macomia district. They are departing as they arrived, visiting informal mining sites and being largely undisturbed by either Mozambican or Rwandan security forces. During their time in southern Cabo Delgado, they were a threat to [at least two large-scale commercial mining sites](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-6-may-2026?ref=zitamar.com) and [upended the lives of over 21,000](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-161?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) people now living in displaced people’s centers in Ancuabe, Chiúre, and Montepuez districts. Between 1 and 4 June, ISM militants were active in and around at least four villages in the Mesa area of Ancuabe district. Mpene to the west is a known ruby mining site, while there is an informal gold mine at N’naua to the east. At N’naua, they kidnapped an unknown number of people. According to one source, the victims were children. Another said the victims were miners and were released for a ransom of 10,000 meticais each. Fighters then made their way east toward Quissanga in at least two groups of 10 to 20 men each. According to a source, one group spent some time at an artisanal gold mine known as Nabala, approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Meluco town. In Quissanga, they went by Cagembe village, a site they regularly pass through. Having visited at least four mining sites since mid-April, raised some money through ransom, and looted goods in numerous villages, ISM’s trip south has likely been worth it, as it [likely was in November last year](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-12-november-2025?ref=zitamar.com). The failure of the security forces to respond made this sojourn possible. There are two camps, one Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and one Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), where troops are well placed to respond to ISM’s sojourns south, but from which they rarely do. Without a strengthened, and more responsive, security presence in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts, ISM will undertake more such sojourns south as it seeks to strengthen control over informal mining operations and bring in recruits from Nampula. **Police and miners clash at Namanhumbir** ISM is not the only actor looking to control access to mining areas. According to a [report in Moz24h](https://moz24h.co.mz/palco-de-sangue-namanhumbir/?ref=zitamar.com), two people were killed in a clash between informal miners and an officer of the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). The report claims that the officer was taking bribes to let miners into the mining area known as BCI, but soon after tried to force them to leave. According to the report, the UIR officer shot one miner before other miners overpowered him, seized his weapon, and shot him. The incident illustrates the persistently poor management of informal mining operations that presents a risk to large commercial operations through heightened insecurity. More fundamentally, it places miners’ lives at risk, whether at the hands of police or insurgents. **ISM attack in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts** ISM remained active in the north while its larger force was in the south of the province. The Islamic State (IS) central media office claimed three IED attacks on Rwandan patrols between 1 and 4 June. Two of these, both on 1 June, near Limala in Mocímboa da Praia and in Cogolo village on the Macomia coast, were controlled explosions by the Rwandan forces, according to a security source. The successful attack occurred between Limala and Mbau in southern Mocímboa da Praia district. IS issued a video clip of this attack, showing a military truck being hit by an IED, likely detonated by command wire. The RDF has positions in Mbau, and in Mucojo on the coast. Further east in the Muidumbe district, ISM insurgents entered Xitaxi village on 6 June, killing two people and stealing food, according to two sources. They were able to attack although FADM has a position at the eastern end of the village. **ISM and state forces clash at sea** ISM also remains active at sea. Local sources reported that militants landed on Matemo island on 2 June, where according to local sources they purchased food and destroyed a health center, having looted it of supplies. The following day, and 50 km north in waters off Quiterajo, ISM clashed with a Mozambican navy patrol. The clash occurred in an [exclusion zone](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-3-june-2026?ref=zitamar.com) around the mouth of the Messalo river that FADM is trying to enforce. ## Focus: IEDs as ISM’s first ring of defense ACLED first records ISM deploying an IED in 2021\. Since then, ACLED records 45 IED incidents involving ISM, of which 35 have been in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. Most deployments have been on roads that surround the Catupa forest, with the purpose of constraining the movement of FADM and Rwandan forces and discouraging approaches to ISM’s main camp (*see map below*). The IEDs in this way act as an outer defensive ring. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-ec046ca9-aad1-46c7-8d06-660a2722c4da.png) Still, ISM’s deployment of the three IEDs between 1 and 4 June, though the RDF identified and destroyed two, had impacts beyond the one successful detonation. Detection operations are defensive measures that tie up resources that could otherwise be involved in more proactive counter-insurgency operations. The impact of a successful IED deployment is much greater. This is seen first in the injury to soldiers in the vehicle struck, but also in the cost of recovery operations in the wake of such an attack. The vehicle struck in southern Mocímboa da Praia was operating from the RDF’s Mbau base, from which regular patrols to Limala are made. The RDF’s aim is to at least restrict movement to and from the Messalo river basin from the Mocímboa da Praia side. Since 2021, ACLED records eight IED incidents on that stretch of road. This is not surprising, given the conditions on the ground (*see graphic below*). Vehicles traveling on a poor road, with heavy vegetation on either side, and numerous turns are particularly vulnerable to attack. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-47124046-7d4d-4916-a89f-2cc1db5e1c03.png) Combating IED use will require continued detection efforts. More fundamentally, it demands stopping the supply of explosives. The bomb maker or makers are likely in Catupa, so degrading ISM’s technical capacity is not likely feasible in the short term. In the meantime, they present a direct threat to state forces and their ability to degrade ISM’s operations, rather than civilian traffic. As the IEDs are detonated by command wire rather than by pressure, the bomber can target military traffic precisely, while his companion captures the moment on his phone for use in IS propaganda. ## Roundup *Three people, including a priest, held over the killing of the Quelimane bishop* Osório Citora Afonso, the 54-year-old Catholic bishop of Quelimane and apostolic administrator of the Archdiocese of Beira, was [shot dead](https://aimnews.org/2026/06/06/bispo-da-diocese-de-quelimane-morto-a-tiro/?ref=zitamar.com) in the early hours of 6 June at the Episcopal Palace in Quelimane, Zambézia province. The investigative agency Sernic said he was killed with an AKM-type firearm, struck in the chest near the heart, and that the body was found in a corridor. Investigators have [arrested](https://cisanewsafrica.com/2026/06/mozambique-three-suspects-arrested-in-bishop-osorio-afonso-assassination-as-church-prepares-for-burial-in-nampula-on-june-13/?ref=zitamar.com) three people in connection with the killing, a Catholic priest of the Quelimane diocese, together with a guard and a gardener who worked at the bishop's residence. President Chapo, Pope Leo XIV, the European Union, and the United States all [expressed](https://360mozambique.com/development/pope-leo-xiv-eu-and-us-call-for-justice-over-the-murder-of-the-bishop-of-quelimane/?ref=zitamar.com) shock, condemnation, and called for swift clarification of the crime and accountability for those responsible. At the same time, the Mozambican bishops conference and African church bodies pressed for a swift, transparent investigation into both the perpetrators and any masterminds behind the killing. *Mozambique and DRC agree to share counter-terrorism and mining expertise* The governments of Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo [have agreed](https://360mozambique.com/development/governments-of-mozambique-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-agree-to-share-expertise-in-combating-terrorism/?ref=zitamar.com) to deepen bilateral cooperation by exchanging knowledge and experience in key areas, including counterterrorism, mining, energy, trade, and regional integration. Mozambican Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Maria Lucas said both countries face terrorist threats and can benefit from sharing lessons learned and strengthening the capabilities of their security forces, with support from international partners such as the EU. The DRC also committed to sharing expertise in the management of mineral resources and energy sectors. *Cost dispute strains ties between Chapo and TotalEnergies chief* Relations between TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné and Mozambican President Daniel Chapo appear to [have soured](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-salvation-will-come-at-a-price/?ref=zitamar-daily-briefing-newsletter) over the French major’s 4.5 billion USD claim for cost overruns tied to the force majeure that halted Mozambique LNG between April 2021 and October 2025\. A government-commissioned audit by the British firm Bayphase challenged part of that claim, finding much of the sum unjustified, and Mozambique is now resisting roughly $2 billion of the disputed costs. The two leaders are understood to have held at least one tense meeting recently, and Chapo has so far refused to amend the project's plan of development to absorb the new costs or revise the price of the two liquefaction trains. ### Bring the corridor economy home URL: https://www.zitamar.com/bring-the-corridor-economy-home/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T16:46:15.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique is preparing a new concession for the N4 and another phase of investment in the Ressano Garcia railway. Both projects concern one of the country’s most important economic arteries. The question is whether Mozambique can make prosperity move east along the corridor, bringing investment, production and jobs into the country, rather than letting value, consumers and opportunities keep flowing west into South Africa. The Maputo Corridor has done what transport corridors are supposed to do, moving people, goods and money. Between 1,500 and 2,000 trucks cross the border from South Africa every day, most heading to Maputo Port and the terminals at Matola. When post-election protests shut the border in 2024 and 2025, South African businesses complained of billions of rand in losses. The corridor is central to the regional economy. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ed0ab1c1-2bf0-40ed-bd1f-9052be862c69/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But too much of the value has been captured on one side of the border. Mbombela, formerly Nelspruit, grew into a significant city, largely off the back of providing retail and services for Mozambican consumers. Komatipoort, closer to the border, is becoming more useful as a last stop before Mozambique. Meanwhile, the Mozambican side has too often remained a place to pass through. Transport Minister João Matlombe is right to call for a correction in these imbalances, while announcing a competitive process for the N4\. But a new concessionaire will not solve that issue. Roads and railways create opportunity only when the state also makes it easier for businesses to invest, employ and produce around them. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Frelimo cannot take Gaza for granted URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-cannot-take-gaza-for-granted/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T16:00:17.000Z Good afternoon. Frelimo’s decision to dissolve its structures in Gaza is an unusual intervention in an unusually important province. The party has removed structures from the cell level up to the provincial leadership, including the first secretary and district bodies. It has promised reorganisation and new internal elections. It has not clearly explained why such a broad purge was necessary. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8508df62-6bcd-4ed1-94d1-7c9388f02cc3/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That leaves space for speculation. The most notable recent stories about Frelimo in Gaza have concerned alleged corruption in the distribution of flood relief goods. It is not clear that those allegations explain the Political Commission’s decision. But they form part of the recent political background in a province where Frelimo’s central leadership seems determined to impose order. Gaza is too important for Frelimo to allow local failures to fester. It is one of the party’s great electoral reservoirs: a province where Frelimo receives genuine support, and where it has also been able to conjure up more votes than there are voters.. If local corruption, factional disputes or arrogance begin to alienate voters there, or even worse, the party’s grass roots, the damage would go beyond one province. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Fuel is driving Mozambique’s inflation divide URL: https://www.zitamar.com/fuel-is-driving-mozambiques-inflation-divide/ Last updated: 2026-06-12T15:21:06.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s latest inflation numbers show that the pressure on prices is not being felt evenly across the country. The headline rate points to a national problem, but the geography of inflation reveals how the cost shock is moving through Mozambique’s transport networks and hitting provinces far harder than the capital. The May figures are already alarming. Prices rose 2.32% in a single month, pushing annual inflation to 7.22%. That is a sharp break from last year, when May recorded deflation and accumulated inflation for the first five months of the year was just 1.28%. The risk of double-digit inflation is now real. The cause is also clear. Transport alone contributed 1.80 percentage points to the monthly increase, compared with 0.32 percentage points from food and non-alcoholic beverages. This was not a localised rise in one agricultural product, but a shock to an input that enters almost every final price, directly or indirectly: fuel. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fcb2da3f-e81f-4361-8e86-dffcf08ff458/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Maputo recorded the lowest inflation of the eight cities covered by INE’s release. Prices in the capital rose by 1.36% in May, compared with 3.62% in Nampula and 4.26% in Quelimane. In Tete, annual inflation is now close to 12%, while in Maputo it remains below 4%. In one sense, Maputo ought to be suffering the greatest inflationary pressure. The public sector wage bill is estimated to have risen 45% with the implementation of the unitary salary scale (TSU), and much of the state wage bill is concentrated in the capital. But Maputo has characteristics that protect it better from inflation than much of the country. It has greater commercial density, more competition, better integration with import supply chains, and easier access to South Africa. That does not mean Maputo is immune, but it has more ways to absorb a shock before it reaches the consumer. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mototáxis reveal the real cost of Mozambique’s fuel crisis URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mototaxis-reveal-the-real-cost-of-mozambiques-fuel-crisis/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T14:54:11.000Z Good afternoon. Mototáxis are one of Mozambique’s most visible informal safety valves. They provide transport where buses and chapas are scarce, and work where formal jobs are even scarcer. In cities such as Nampula, Pemba, Lichinga, Quelimane, Tete and Chimoio, they are part of daily life in a way that Maputo still does not fully recognise. The fuel crisis has exposed how fragile that economy is. A mototáxi rider does not need much fuel at once, but he needs it often. Motorcycle tanks take only a few litres, so if filling it means spending three, five or eight hours in a queue, the day’s earnings disappear before the work begins. In Nampula, some riders have reportedly queued for hours and still failed to fill up. Others have simply parked their motorcycles. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7478aec2-f533-4c83-ac7f-477c9be6984b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The parallel market has filled part of the gap, at a price most riders cannot absorb. Half a litre of petrol has reportedly been selling for MZN80-MZN100 ($1.25-$1.56), implying as much as MZN200 ($3.13) per litre. At those prices, a business already operating on wafer-thin margins becomes unviable. The state’s response has created its own problems. During the shortage, some people bought petrol only to resell it at inflated prices, leading the authorities to ban the purchase of fuel in bottles and jerry cans. But the crackdown also hit people who use small quantities of fuel for real work: mototáxi riders, small farmers with irrigation pumps, and others whose livelihoods depend on informal access to petrol. In some cases, people have had to carry motor pumps or motorcycle tanks to filling stations because filling a bidon is no longer allowed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s salvation will come at a price URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-salvation-will-come-at-a-price/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T21:52:44.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo is trying to secure external support at a moment of acute economic pressure. This week, his government signed financing agreements with the World Bank worth about $455m, and is also asking the same institution for direct budget support. IMF talks in Maputo are said by several sources to be going well, with some form of agreement possible soon. Chapo has built a useful relationship with World Bank president Ajay Banga, and the simultaneous presence of World Bank and IMF delegations in Maputo is no coincidence. Mozambique needs liquidity, credibility and time. Floods, fuel costs, food prices and debt pressures have all tightened the fiscal position. Direct budget support would give the state more room to breathe than project financing alone. A new understanding with the IMF would help restore confidence after a difficult period in which the government has had to convince partners that it can manage spending, debt and reform. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3effd70a-3c1e-4307-9f80-22f99fcaee08/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [In Mozambique, the regime imposes a blackout on journalistsAcross Mozambique, journalists face pressure, intimidation, and disappearances![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-5075d0aa-6f74-43cf-bbe7-e859b4a587ac.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-06-10-15.46.33-5d965821-34c2-4876-8fce-d95c84972bd6.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/in-mozambique-the-regime-imposes-a-blackout-on-journalists/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Of the two Washington institutions, the World Bank is, as ever, playing the softer role. It has often been the institution that keeps money flowing when others become more cautious. After the hidden debts scandal, the Bank provided a lifeline while direct budget support from other partners collapsed. Today, it is offering emergency liquidity and political reassurance while the IMF tests the fiscal numbers. Any agreement with the IMF will still have conditions. They may be lighter than feared, and the government may present the outcome as a vote of confidence in Chapo’s administration. But Mozambique has not yet said what it is prepared to do on spending, subsidies, debt management, wage pressures or the pace of reform. If an agreement is announced this week, the devil will be in the details. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### In Mozambique, the regime imposes a blackout on journalists URL: https://www.zitamar.com/in-mozambique-the-regime-imposes-a-blackout-on-journalists/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T14:27:33.000Z By **Alexander Abdelilah** and **Mariana Abreu** > ***Mozambique Exposed*** is an international investigation consortium coordinated by Forbidden Stories, including Evident Media (United States), Expresso (Portugal), M28 Investigates (Rwanda), The Observers of France 24 (France), Papertrail media (Germany), RFI (France), SourceMaterial (United Kingdom), ZDF (Germany), and Zitamar News (Mozambique) It is a country largely overlooked by Western media. Yet, Mozambique is a place of extremes like few others. Home to a proliferation of mega-projects by major oil and gas companies, it is also the scene of a conflict that has already claimed more than 6,000 lives and displaced over a million people, as the Mozambican state battles insurgents from the Islamic State-affiliated Al-Shabab. It is the fifth-poorest country in the world. The same party has ruled unchallenged for half a century, and the last general elections in October 2024 were heavily disputed by the opposition and criticized by international observers, sparking a popular uprising. Since then, repression has intensified across the country, with opposition members and journalists continuing to face attacks amid widespread impunity. “Attacks on journalists are not addressed. There’s zero accountability and complete impunity,” said Angela Quintal, Africa regional director for the Committee to Protect Journalists, or CPJ. The list of unsolved cases involving journalists is staggering. Ibraimo Mbaruco, a reporter and presenter for Rádio Comunitária de Palma, sent a text message to a colleague on April 7, 2020, saying he was “surrounded by soldiers,” before disappearing without a trace. João Chamusse, editor-in-chief of the online newspaper Ponto por Ponto, was found dead at his home in KaTembe on December 14, 2023, his head wounded and his phones and computer stolen. He was known for his scathing editorials on corruption and poor governance. In December 2024, police shot and killed Albino Sibia, a 30-year-old blogger, while he was covering a protest live on Facebook, in the southern city of Ressano Garcia. [Arlindo Chissale](https://www.zitamar.com/a-campaign-of-disappearances-inside-the-killings-abductions-and-surveillance-of-mozambiques-government-critics/), a reporter for the online media outlet Pinnacle News and a member of the opposition, was dragged off a minibus between Pemba and Nacala on Jan. 7, 2025, by five armed men, two of whom were in police uniform. His body was never found. Selma Inocência, a television journalist, reported that she was poisoned with heavy metals — including mercury, cadmium, uranium and thallium — during a work trip to Maputo in March 2025, and now lives in Germany with lasting health problems. As the cases pile up, the authorities do little to nothing. Although the police arrested a man who reportedly confessed to Chamusse’s murder, they did not deem it necessary to investigate who may have orchestrated the killing. No charges were made public following Sibia’s death or Inocência’s poisoning, nor after the disappearances of Chissale and Mbaruco: both community journalists, both abducted by men in uniform, according to witnesses, and both active in Cabo Delgado, a region in northern Mozambique where Al-Shabab operates. “There have been no credible, thorough, impartial investigations on both cases,” said Carlos Quembo, researcher at Amnesty International. “And it’s unfortunate that the case of Ibraimo Mbaruco is closed without any explanation as to what happened.” For Arlindo Chissale, the authorities say they are investigating, but haven’t communicated on developments. The situation is most concerning in [Cabo Delgado](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/mozambiques-northern-insurgency/), where the authorities are attempting to impose a media blackout on the conflict. “The media haven’t really been able to cover the situation properly. Local journalists who attempt to do so are being targeted,” Quintal told Forbidden Stories. “The current system further closes the civic space in Mozambique,” said Wilker Dias, director of the NGO DECIDE, which specializes in supporting civil society. He claims to have been poisoned during a stay in Maputo in 2024\. The rare reporters who have ventured there, including Estácio Valoi and Alex Perry, have been attacked, threatened or expelled. According to a journalist at Zitamar News, one of Forbidden Stories’ partner publications, “the authorities are not transparent about what is actually happening in the province,” and adequate security conditions are not in place for the press. “In many cases, public and private institutions do not cooperate with journalists,” said the journalist. Forbidden Stories observed this reluctance firsthand: few NGOs agree to collaborate with the press, fearing reprisals from the authorities. To break this silence, Forbidden Stories is publishing “Mozambique Exposed”: the culmination of nearly 100 interviews and five months of work by 10 media outlets and 30 journalists. Part of the consortium traveled to Cabo Delgado to interview victims of the conflict, who have also experienced the collateral effects of the major gas projects reshaping the northeast coast of their traumatized region. Forbidden Stories worked alongside partners to reveal the inner workings of the machinery designed to silence opponents and journalists in the country. Further investigations will follow. “Often, foreign journalists have more freedom and security in covering these topics than local professionals,” said the journalist at Zitamar News. “It is important that the international media continue to show solidarity with Mozambican journalists.” ### Niassa row exposes growing threat to Mozambique’s conservation areas URL: https://www.zitamar.com/niassa-row-exposes-growing-threat-to-mozambiques-conservation-areas/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T19:18:17.000Z Good afternoon. The row over the Niassa Special Reserve should be read as more than a provincial secretary of state losing discipline. Silva Livone’s threats against operators and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) are the most visible sign of a wider change in Mozambique’s politics of conservation: protected areas are increasingly being spoken of as obstacles to development, mining and local control, rather than as national assets requiring careful management. Human-wildlife conflict is real. Communities around Niassa have legitimate grievances when elephants destroy crops, crocodiles kill people, or conservation rules restrict livelihoods. Any serious conservation policy has to take those grievances seriously. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4074ab6d-cadf-43f9-90c2-5424222093b5/)*.* 💡 Zitamar News is publishing stories about the disappearance and surveillance of reporters, activists, and critics of Mozambique’s government, as part of a consortium with Forbidden Stories and outlets in France, Germany, Portugal, and Mozambique. A second story will be out tomorrow. [A Campaign of Disappearances: Inside the killings, abductions and surveillance of Mozambique’s government criticsDozens of opposition members and journalists have been abducted or killed in Mozambique since the 2024 general elections![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-8eb33974-dba9-460b-9398-425de5144347.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/signal-2026-06-05-163918_002-d18ba273-0cad-4638-b43f-491f8b74e104.jpeg)](https://www.zitamar.com/a-campaign-of-disappearances-inside-the-killings-abductions-and-surveillance-of-mozambiques-government-critics/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But those grievances are now being raised in a political climate where conservation areas may be vulnerable to “redimensioning”, informal mining (garimpo), and formal mining interests. The new mining law adds to those concerns by creating more scope for extractive activity in protected areas. Niassa already has illegal mining inside the reserve. Weakening conservation management would not necessarily benefit communities. It could benefit those who want protected land opened to extraction. Livone’s statement shows how this mood can translate into action. He did not simply call for better community engagement or faster responses to dangerous wildlife. He declared operators banned, ordered security forces to occupy areas, threatened seizure of equipment, and said WCS representatives should be removed from Niassa. He then acknowledged that final authority rests with the minister and central government. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A campaign of disappearances: Inside the killings, abductions and surveillance of Mozambique’s government critics URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-campaign-of-disappearances-inside-the-killings-abductions-and-surveillance-of-mozambiques-government-critics/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T15:06:59.000Z Dozens of opposition members and journalists have been abducted or killed in Mozambique since the 2024 general elections _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The murder of a bishop cannot become just another killing URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-murder-of-a-bishop-cannot-become-just-another-killing/ Last updated: 2026-06-08T16:05:45.000Z Good afternoon. The Catholic bishop of Quelimane was shot dead in the early hours of Saturday at the Episcopal Palace in the Zambézia provincial capital. Sernic says he was killed with an AKM-type firearm, after an intrusion at the residence. President Daniel Chapo, the government, parliament, the Vatican, the EU and the US have all expressed shock or called for a clear investigation. The international reaction is understandable. A Catholic bishop shot dead in his own residence is not an ordinary crime. The motive is not yet known. Early speculation has pointed in several directions: internal tensions within the Church in Quelimane, possible disputes over property and diocesan management, common crime, or a private dispute. For now, these remain speculation, and the investigation should not be prejudged. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4251ce93-17a5-49c1-a55e-27d429eb6f10/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But the uncertainty over motive does not reduce the significance of the killing. Mozambique now has to explain how a bishop could be shot dead in his own residence with an assault rifle. The question is not only who pulled the trigger, or who ordered it, if anyone did. It is also what kind of society allows such a killing to feel possible. This is why the murder has landed so heavily. Catholic bishops in Mozambique are more than religious administrators. They are local public figures, moral authorities and, at times, voices on conflict, poverty and governance. Dom Osório was not the most outspoken bishop on Cabo Delgado or national politics, but that makes the killing no less disturbing. Its symbolism does not depend on whether he was targeted for a public position. It lies in the fact that even a figure with this kind of social and religious standing could be killed so violently. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Donor support cannot and will not replace state capacity URL: https://www.zitamar.com/donor-support-cannot-and-will-not-replace-state-capacity/ Last updated: 2026-06-05T16:44:09.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s international partners are still present. The European Union is continuing its military mission; France is training Mozambican forces through its Indian Ocean military mission; the UK is weighing in on how the crisis in Cabo Delgado should be tackled; and Sweden is reaffirming its cooperation, even after deciding to wind down the bilateral development model that shaped its relationship with Mozambique for decades. But taken together, these are not routine diplomatic signals. They show a donor landscape being recalibrated. Mozambique’s partners are not walking away, but they are changing the terms of engagement. They still want influence, access and results, but they are not willing to keep filling the same gaps indefinitely. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5bc7be00-c879-4b74-a457-5da2d71166c3/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The clearest case is Cabo Delgado. EU ambassador Antonino Maggiore was careful, in his interview with weekly newspaper *Savana*, to say that European defence and security cooperation with Mozambique “will not cease”. EUMAM has trained Mozambican soldiers, supplied non-lethal equipment and moved into strategic mentoring. More material support, including armoured vehicles and drones, is under discussion. France’s mobile training teams fit the same pattern: technical support, maintenance, training and capacity-building, rather than direct responsibility for the war. But Maggiore was also clear that further EU support for Rwanda is not on the table. The EU praises Rwanda’s role and recognises that Maputo still sees it as fundamental. Yet Brussels now wants scarce security funds to strengthen the Mozambican armed forces, not to keep paying for a foreign force. Understandably, the EU view is that Cabo Delgado cannot be secured permanently by Rwanda, the EU or any other outside actor. At some point, responsibility has to return to FADM and the Mozambican state. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique enters IMF talks from a weak position URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-enters-imf-talks-from-a-weak-position/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T19:51:04.000Z Good afternoon. The IMF delegation due in Maputo next week will arrive with a much gloomier view of Mozambique’s economy than the African Development Bank offered only days ago. The AfDB’s forecast of 2.1% growth in 2026 already looked optimistic after last year’s post-election disruption. The IMF’s new projection of just 0.5% now exposes how much of an outlier it was. And Mozambique is not just arguing over a growth forecast. It is preparing for negotiations that it hopes will lead to a new IMF programme, at a moment when the government has little fiscal space, the external account is expected to deteriorate, and global conditions are turning less favourable. The IMF’s regional outlook points to pressure from higher oil and fertiliser prices, uncertainty linked to the Middle East, tighter financing conditions and falling aid. Mozambique is badly placed to absorb those shocks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9d0490b8-0fbe-4ba4-b0bc-8a49c8b198ed/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That is partly because the economy has still not recovered properly from the political and social disruption that followed last year’s elections. Business confidence remains weak, imports linked to large projects can widen the current account deficit before they generate export earnings, and the state still faces heavy spending pressures. LNG may transform Mozambique’s balance of payments later, but it does not solve the immediate problem of weak growth, costly imports and strained public finances. The politics may be even harder than the numbers. As the IMF mission approaches, public commentary is already turning against familiar Fund themes: public-sector wages, elite salaries (including that of the Bank of Mozambique governor), and fears of a possible metical devaluation. Some of those concerns are legitimate. Mozambique’s wage bill has been a structural problem for years, and public anger over high salaries at the top of the state is understandable in a country where services are weak and real incomes are under pressure. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Anamola is ready to replace Renamo URL: https://www.zitamar.com/anamola-is-ready-to-replace-renamo/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T18:05:45.000Z Good afternoon. Anamola’s decision to hold its first national convention in Nampula later this month is more than a logistical choice. Venâncio Mondlane’s new party already has far more momentum than traditional opposition parties like Renamo, and it is now trying to turn that energy into a national organisation with roots beyond the south. By choosing Nampula — the home province of Renamo president Ossufo Momade and a province Renamo should still be able to claim as part of its political heartland — Anamola is parking its tanks on Renamo’s lawn. In this context, António Muchanga’s new legal challenge against his suspension from Renamo is far less relevant to the national political conversation than it might once have been. Muchanga wants the courts to overturn the disciplinary measure imposed after he criticised Momade’s leadership, and says he does not rule out running for the Renamo presidency. But his lawsuit now looks less like a serious threat to the balance of opposition politics than another sign of a party still consumed by internal grievances while the opposition’s centre of gravity moves elsewhere. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7588da73-55e0-45c6-a3a3-4320b1ea951b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (18-31 May 2026)On 25 May, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) was able to fire mortars at a Mozambican military position on the edges of Macomia, illustrating how fragile the town’s security is![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-55fbc675-3505-4a31-a7e5-9a60aa1146f4.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Overview---MCM---18-31-May-2026---EN-ba5ebd7b-07a9-450e-8578-4bc5219404a3.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-may-2026/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Muchanga once had a claim to some of that energy himself. He was a loud, combative and charismatic critic of Frelimo and the government, able to appeal to Mozambicans frustrated with the ruling party and with Renamo’s caution. That space is now occupied by Venâncio. Whatever support Muchanga still has inside or around Renamo, he is no longer the obvious voice of disaffected opposition voters. Nor is he likely to become Renamo’s next leader. Renamo’s political identity remains rooted in central and northern Mozambique, not in Maputo. Muchanga has often been effective as an ally or spokesman for others, but he does not look like a figure who can rebuild the party’s national base. The problem is that there are few obvious alternatives. Elias Dhlakama carries the family name but not the political force of his brother. Manuel de Araújo has been weakened by his record in Quelimane and by his uncertain positioning during Venâncio’s rise. Ivone Soares has drifted away from the insurgent opposition space Renamo needs to recover. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (18-31 May 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-may-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T12:52:53.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (18 - 31 May 2026) At least **8** political violence events (**2,397** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **8** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,624** since 1 October 2017) At least **6** reported civilian fatalities (**2,768** since 1 October 2017) At least **6** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,214** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview On 25 May, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) was able to fire mortars at a Mozambican military position on the edges of Macomia, illustrating how fragile the town’s security is. At least three other violent incidents occurred in the town, with some residents blaming the security forces, who in turn blame ISM. To the south, ISM militants remain in Chiúre, though their motivation to be there remains unclear. On the coast, insurgents hijacked at least 12 boats in waters off Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia, illustrating the inability of the Mozambican navy to provide security to boat owners and operators. ## Situation summary **Insecurity threatens state control of Macomia town** Despite a significant military presence, with both Mozambican and Rwandan troops deployed in the town, Macomia remains [unsafe](https://www.zitamar.com/armed-men-target-villagers-and-traders-in-macomia-attacks/) for both residents and the military. Overall insecurity and a looming ISM presence threaten the state’s control of the town. On 20 May, unidentified armed men shot and killed a man in the Napulubo area of town. The victim, known as Mussa, dealt in fish from the coast. Sources say that armed men had entered the man’s home looking for him one week earlier. Sources differ on the identity of the killers. A security source claimed it was ISM, though local residents say it was the security forces. Also on 20 May, unidentified armed men raided another businessman’s house in the Nanga A area. The target was not home, and the attackers seized some goods. On 31 May, shots were heard again in the area, with a source saying that the attackers were targeting the same businessman again. On the southern side of the town, on 25 May, ISM fighters fired five mortars at a Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) camp in the CETA area along the road connecting the Macomia town and the Xinavane area to the southwest, according to a claim released by the Islamic State (IS) the following day. No damage or fatalities were reported. Suspected ISM fighters killed a man in Litamanda village, about 40 kilometers north of Macomia on the N380 road on 21 May. Global Islamic State (IS) media issued a claim for the attack, describing the victim as a “Christian fighter,” though a local source says he was with his family at the time. **Insurgents reach the Lúrio river in Chiúre** ISM has remained in regular contact with IS media managers as it has moved south toward the Lúrio river. IS issued four claims for attacks by its Mozambique affiliate in Chiúre and Namuno districts between 19 and 27 May. As is normal during such sorties, there was minimal reaction from state forces. For an attack on Namoro village in Chiúre district, IS media claimed that ISM killed a member of the “infidel militia,” likely a civilian or Naparama militia member, and burned a church and other property. IS also claimed that the insurgents killed one Mozambican soldier in a clash with a patrol on 27 May, also in Chiúre district. The objective of this move south is not clear. By 21 May, the group was close to the Lúrio river when they attacked Ingonane village, burning a church. According to one local source, the group wanted to cross to Nampula in order to sell gold they had taken from the [Ravia mines in Meluco in April](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-6-may-2026?ref=zitamar.com). They may also have wanted to collect recruits from Nampula. There is no evidence yet that they crossed the river. **ISM hijacks fishing boats** In the past fortnight, ISM has targeted Mozambican boat owners. On the night of 20 May, ISM fighters in seven boats surrounded a group of five fishing boats off Pangane, Macomia district. After negotiations with the boats’ owners, a ransom of 60,000 meticais was paid for two boats, and the hijackers seized the remaining three, along with their equipment. The boats were likely taken north to the Messalo river (see the Focus section below). Four days later, on 24 May, ISM seized seven boats at Ncomangano just north of Mocímboa da Praia town. A source said that the boats were taken south, likely toward the Messalo river. Such activity at Ncomangano is not unprecedented. In July last year, the insurgents [seized two boats](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-14-july-3-august-2025?ref=zitamar.com) in the area. **Pundanhar attack sparks uptick in security activity in Palma** Insurgents killed at least three civilians and abducted another three around 17 May in the Pundanhar area, to the west of Palma district. The movement of insurgents in the area may have sparked concerns in Palma town. The following day, restrictions were imposed on vehicles entering the liquefied natural gas project site at Afungi, and a source reported a heightened security presence in the town that day. ## Focus: Both ISM and FADM squeeze marine traffic ISM’s hijacking of at least 12 boats illustrates the pressures on boat crews and boat owners operating off the coast of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. Since at least March, FADM has attempted to establish an exclusion zone closed to all civilian marine traffic. According to local sources, the zone stretches from Calugo in Mocímboa da Praia to Pequeue in Macomia district (*see map below*). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/06/data-src-image-5245381c-af33-41dc-a025-9c0d9ba9f29c.png) At the heart of the exclusion zone is the mouth of the Messalo river, which acts as a harbor of sorts for ISM marine operations. The purpose of the zone is, presumably, to minimize marine traffic and thus more easily identify ISM movement to and from the Messalo. The river itself is navigable in the rainy season, facilitating access to ISM’s base in the Catupa forest, on the southern bank of the river. The river mouth itself is characterized by mangroves, a significant obstacle to any military operations. The Mozambican navy sometimes operates on the assumption that any small vessels in the waters off Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia are connected to ISM. For fishers, this has proven deadly. In March, a FADM navy vessel opened fire on a group of fishing boats close to or in the exclusion zone, [killing 13](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-25-march-2026?ref=zitamar.com). The recent hijackings at Ncomangano and Pangane, with the hijacked boats to be brought to the Messalo, demonstrate that this approach has not deterred ISM. Recent ISM activity demonstrates that FADM does not have the capacity to patrol waters within or beyond the exclusion zone. We understand that just one boat patrols these waters. If FADM continues to restrict coastal communities’ access to the sea without a significant improvement in naval capacity, counter-insurgency operations will suffer from declining cooperation and worsening access to intelligence. ## Roundup *Maputo confirms it will fund Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado* The Mozambican government has officially [confirmed](https://opais.co.mz/governo-confirma-que-vai-financiar-as-forcas-ruandesas-em-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com) that it will finance the continued presence of Rwandan security forces in Cabo Delgado. Government spokesperson Inocêncio Impissa confirmed the decision, though without disclosing the amounts involved or the duration of the mission. The confirmation aligns Maputo's position with that of Rwanda, whose foreign minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, [announced](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-says-mozambique-has-secured-funds-it-continue-cabo-delgado-mission-2026-05-19/?ref=zitamar.com) last month that his government had decided to deal directly and exclusively with the Mozambican government on funding the Rwandan deployment. The diplomatic groundwork was laid through a series of high-level engagements. President Daniel Chapo [met](https://aimnews.org/2026/05/14/chapo-e-kagame-debatem-cooperacao-em-materia-de-seguranca-em-kigali/?ref=zitamar.com) Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 13 May, on the margins of the 13th Africa CEO Forum, where the two heads of state discussed bilateral cooperation on security, trade, and investment. Days earlier, Mozambique Defense Minister Cristóvão Artur Chume paid a courtesy [visit](https://taarifa.rw/2026/05/30/rwanda-shifts-to-exclusive-bilateral-security-deal-with-mozambique-in-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com) to Rwanda’s headquarters in Mocímboa da Praia, where Joint Task Force Commander Brigadier General CM Mujuni briefed him on operations across the province. Mozambique's government has framed the foreign troops’ continued presence as a way to buy time and space to reorganize, train, and equip its own forces to eventually take the front line. Mozambique has simultaneously reinforced its broader regional defense ties. In late May, during a visit to Dar es Salaam, Chume [held talks](https://www.modans.go.tz/news/1165?ref=zitamar.com) with Tanzanian Minister for Defense and National Service Dr. Rhimo Nyansaho, resulting in the signing of defense and security agreements. The discussions centered on strengthening bilateral cooperation, with emphasis on improving coordination mechanisms, intelligence sharing, and joint responses to evolving security challenges affecting both countries and the wider region. *Mozambique challenges TotalEnergies over $2 billion LNG cost recovery claim* The Mozambican government is reportedly [disputing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-27/mozambique-disputes-2-billion-claims-for-total-lng-project?embedded-checkout=true&ref=zitamar.com) a $2 billion claim by TotalEnergies and its partners linked to cost overruns incurred during the Mozambique LNG project suspension that followed the 2021 force majeure declaration. According to Bloomberg, Maputo is reluctant to accept the estimate, creating a standoff over how the additional costs should be shared. TotalEnergies is said to estimate its total shutdown-related losses at around $4.5 billion and wants to recover these expenses before paying taxes to the state. ### Nampula’s governor needs help to take on drug networks URL: https://www.zitamar.com/nampulas-governor-needs-help-to-take-on-drug-networks/ Last updated: 2026-06-02T16:23:20.000Z Good afternoon. Nampula governor Eduardo Abdula’s claim that he has received death threats from drug traffickers has put his anti-drug campaign back in the headlines. But the more important detail may be that the operation has reportedly led to the arrest of members of the defence and security forces, including from Sernic and the riot police UIR. If that is the case, Abdula is not only confronting drug use among young people or small-scale dealing around schools, nor even just the criminal networks operating in his province, but is challenging parts of the state security apparatus that have been co-opted by those networks. That makes the campaign more significant, but also more difficult. Abdula has chosen to put himself personally at the centre of the fight, declaring “zero tolerance” for drug trafficking and consumption and launching a 90-day plan that combines police action with school patrols, religious leaders, youth activities, psychosocial support and a provincial map of affected schools, neighbourhoods and selling points. The plan presents the governor as the visible face of the campaign and gives him the role of chairing a provincial anti-drugs forum. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/510b16d8-04db-43e5-97d4-1684f6304925/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That is an unusual place for a provincial governor to be. Drug enforcement should normally be led by the police, Sernic, prosecutors and the courts, with political leaders providing backing rather than directing the campaign themselves. Abdula’s prominence may therefore be a sign of determination, but it may also reflect the weakness or reluctance of the institutions that should be carrying this work forward. His own plan hints at that problem, promising to demand public reports from the secretary of state, prosecutors and courts on drug sale points closed and traffickers brought to trial. Nampula’s drug problem cannot be reduced to youth behaviour or public morality. The province occupies a strategic position on international trafficking routes and has for years been a place where organised criminal networks can operate, move goods and launder profits. Its coastline, transport links and commercial centres have made it attractive not only to drug traffickers but also to wider mafia-style networks that depend on weak oversight and local protection — and which support the ruling party, Frelimo, in return. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The cost of a scattered countryside URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-cost-of-a-scattered-countryside/ Last updated: 2026-06-05T12:14:08.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s target of universal access to electricity by 2030 has always looked ambitious. The country has made real progress, with national access rate now reported at 66.4%, but the remaining gap is the hardest part. It is not only a question of generating enough power, or even of building enough transmission lines. The harder problem is how to deliver affordable, reliable electricity to a population that remains widely dispersed across rural areas. That is a technical challenge for the energy sector, but it is also a broader development problem. Rural Mozambique is expensive to serve because many households live far from one another, far from markets, and far from the dense population centres where infrastructure begins to pay for itself. The same problem affects electricity, roads, water, sanitation, schools, health posts, telecoms, agricultural extension and policing. A state can promise universal access, but each extra kilometre of infrastructure becomes harder to justify when it reaches only a small number of people with limited ability to pay. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7940babd-2648-43a5-8edf-fab04d2bed49/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is why a suggestion reportedly made at an energy conference last week — that Mozambique might need to think again about something like the old *aldeias comunais* model — is provocative and unrealistic but not entirely unserious. The phrase itself is politically loaded. After independence, communal villages were associated with Frelimo’s attempt to reorganise rural life around collective production, ideological mobilisation and state control. In Cabo Delgado, large villages also carry memories of colonial-era settlements created along roads as part of military efforts to control the population during the liberation war. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Getting Mozambique moving URL: https://www.zitamar.com/getting-mozambique-moving/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T17:43:51.000Z A new plan to open Mozambique’s national rail network to private fleets, alongside the revival of coastal shipping and proposals for new urban rail links in Maputo and Matola, mark a hopeful shift in government thinking: a greater willingness to work with private operators and investors to expand transport services and infrastructure. The proposed railway regulation would allow private operators to use the national rail network with their own rolling stock, under licence, for passenger transport, freight and dangerous goods. This does not remove CFM from the centre of the system, but it does dilute its monopoly. That is a healthy development if it brings more rolling stock, better services, and more disciplined use of existing infrastructure. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4dc06b13-1fb4-4642-89a3-5f5fa3aaa0a9/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique is not alone in moving this way. South Africa is also opening parts of the Transnet network to private operators, after years of declining rail performance damaged exports and pushed more freight onto roads. Beyond being an example for Mozambique, South Africa’s could also have a direct impact because some of the companies gaining access there already operate heavily in Mozambique. Grindrod, for example, is among the private operators selected for access to Transnet’s network and is also a major player in the Maputo corridor, including at Matola and Maputo. If Mozambique opens its own rail system properly, operators with regional logistics networks may be able to connect South African rail capacity more directly with Mozambican ports. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s grey-list risk now sits in the courts URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-grey-list-risk-now-sits-in-the-courts/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T14:58:24.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force grey list was an important achievement, especially for a country trying to restore its financial reputation, attract investment, and remain connected to international banking channels. The warning this week that it could return to the list is an important reminder of how fragile that achievement still is. Luís Cezerilo, national coordinator of the government’s committee on anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing policy, told a training session for magistrates and SERNIC investigators in Beira that Mozambique risks being grey-listed again if it fails to keep strengthening law enforcement, supervision, and compliance by financial and non-financial institutions. The next mutual evaluation is expected between 2028 and 2030, but preparatory work starts in September 2027. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2b16e845-60d1-4bac-a460-1c8cc37a4ee7/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Armed men target villagers and traders in Macomia AttacksFour incidents in the Macomia district over the last two weeks have exposed state failure to provide security![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-05-28-11.25.40-41656ca7f384c4a91283dc30bbb13e1e2d73261d1533337289f879423f4f6496.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/armed-men-target-villagers-and-traders-in-macomia-attacks/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That gives Mozambique little time to show that the reforms which helped it leave the grey list are more than formal compliance. The country has made visible progress. Prosecutors and investigators have shown more willingness to pursue white-collar crime, money laundering, drug networks and other organised-crime cases. There have been high-profile arrests and extraditions. The state can point to real activity. Activity is not enough. FATF-style assessments look for evidence that the system works from beginning to end. Investigations and arrests count, but trials, convictions, asset recovery and credible sentencing carry greater weight. That is where Mozambique remains vulnerable. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Armed men target villagers and traders in Macomia Attacks URL: https://www.zitamar.com/armed-men-target-villagers-and-traders-in-macomia-attacks/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T09:51:32.000Z A series of armed attacks in the Macomia district has intensified concerns among rural villagers and urban traders alike about the state's capacity to provide protection. At least four violent incidents were recorded between 10 and 24 May. Suspected insurgents attacked two rural villages, while in Macomia town, two attacks, apparently motivated by money, have been attributed to insurgents, though in one case, some are blaming Mozambique’s defence and security forces. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique needs more from its megaprojects URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-needs-more-from-its-megaprojects/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T21:39:10.000Z Mozambique’s megaprojects are meant to be the engine of the country’s fiscal future. The latest state accounts show why that engine is still unreliable. Excluding concession fees, large-scale projects contributed MZN11.68bn ($184.6m) to state revenue in 2025, down 40.56% from MZN19.65bn ($310.6m) the previous year. Fiscal benefits granted to the same category of projects reached MZN30.94bn ($489m), up 12.5% in nominal terms. Those benefits are not direct spending, but they are revenue the state gives up through exemptions, incentives and preferential tax treatment. The country’s production of gas, aluminium, coal, heavy sands, graphite and other minerals will remain central to exports, foreign exchange and public revenue. The government’s latest budget amendment, incorporating an additional MZN3.5bn ($54.7m) in natural gas revenues for public investment and reconstruction, already shows how useful these revenues can be. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/82010d26-4436-4e23-81c5-9cd9773f0a01/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But the general state account (Conta Geral do Estado, CGE) also shows the weakness of depending too heavily on large projects as export and tax machines. Their contribution rises and falls with commodity prices, production cycles, cost structures, fiscal incentives and project-specific disruptions. A country that waits for taxes and royalties from raw or lightly processed exports remains exposed to decisions and prices set largely outside its control. Mozambique has long talked about adding more value to its resources before they leave the country. The argument is easy to make and hard to deliver. Graphite can feed battery supply chains, heavy sands can support more advanced mineral processing, gas can supply power, fertiliser, transport and industry, and electricity can make new processing possible. But none of that follows automatically from having the resource underground or offshore. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Monetary policy actions speak louder than words URL: https://www.zitamar.com/monetary-policy-actions-speak-louder-than-words/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T17:22:48.000Z Good afternoon. Rogério Zandamela wants Mozambique and the wider world to believe that the Mozambican economy remains under control. But the Bank of Mozambique’s latest monetary policy decisions suggest a more fragile picture. The central bank governor this week defended the government’s early repayment of around $700m to the International Monetary Fund — a striking use of scarce foreign exchange at a time of fuel shortages — saying Mozambique’s external reserves remain robust and cover around five months of imports. He also sought to reassure the market that commercial banks still have enough foreign-exchange capacity to issue letters of credit to fuel companies. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0789e6bf-a4e2-471d-88df-e6a8ef985e27/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The repayment was also a signal to the IMF. Mozambique is trying to negotiate a new programme with the Fund, which is expected to return to Maputo in June for talks. Paying off the arrears was one of several moves designed to reopen the door to external financing, alongside the government’s hiring of international advisers on sovereign debt and its apparent willingness to accept greater exchange-rate flexibility. That gives Zandamela’s message a clear purpose. A new IMF programme would give Mozambique access to concessional financing, help unlock other multilateral support, and reassure creditors at a moment when liquidity is tight and foreign exchange remains scarce. The government needs to show that it has restored discipline after the previous programme stalled amid concerns over fiscal slippage, debt pressures, and exchange-rate policy. But confidence cannot rest on reassuring language alone. The Bank of Mozambique's monetary policy committee, the CMPO, kept its policy interest rate unchanged, but raised mandatory reserve requirements on metical deposits back to 39%. That is a significant withdrawal of liquidity from the banking system. It comes as the central bank itself acknowledges the risk that inflation could return to double digits. A central bank relaxed about the outlook would have little reason to squeeze liquidity so hard. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s bread protection test URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-bread-protection-test/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T18:57:53.000Z Mozambique’s latest turn towards economic nationalism has reached one of the most politically sensitive products in the country: bread. The government is preparing restrictions on bread imports, arguing that domestic bakeries can already produce bread of comparable quality and should not be undercut by better-financed foreign suppliers. Vitor Miguel, head of the bakers’ association Amopão and himself a bakery owner, supports the measure. Mozambican bread, he says, is of good quality and competitively priced; the problem is partly habit, with some consumers preferring South African-style sliced bread. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/35c5c589-e4b1-48b1-9638-2ed41a300ddb/)*.* In that sense, the policy fits a broader pattern. Similar protective measures have already been used in ceramics, rice, and wheat, and there is a defensible argument that Mozambique should not spend scarce foreign exchange importing products that can be made locally. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Mozambique’s missing agricultural strategy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-missing-agricultural-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-05-22T17:07:38.000Z Mozambique cultivates just 17.8% of its available arable land, according to the latest agricultural census presented this week in Maputo. More than 84% of the country’s farms are smaller than two hectares, while low productivity, weak irrigation, limited mechanisation and poor value-chain integration continue to constrain production. The country possesses vast agricultural potential, a relatively low population density and a rapidly growing labour force. Yet despite decades of policy programmes, agriculture still struggles to command the attention and focus that the government gives to pushing extractive industries. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/cfc39e5b-0a8d-420c-951a-31086c840b1b/)*.* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [42 Naparama fighters buried in mass grave after Chiúre massacreTraditional militia without firearms pursued insurgents who had attacked a village in Chiúre district![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-05-22_183933792-bc6098ccc3d506e48ca41fce0bb1063de47aa428517ad08f6409f94b74837dd4.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/42-naparama-fighters-buried-in-mass-grave-after-chiure-massacre/) --- [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The contrast is increasingly striking. New mining and petroleum laws were treated as a strategic priority by the government and rushed through parliament as part of a broader effort to accelerate investment and expand extractive activity. Mining, gas and other resource sectors continue to dominate official economic ambitions. Yet extractives alone are unlikely to provide jobs for the roughly half a million young Mozambicans estimated to enter the labour market every year. Agriculture might. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### 42 Naparama fighters buried in mass grave after Chiúre massacre URL: https://www.zitamar.com/42-naparama-fighters-buried-in-mass-grave-after-chiure-massacre/ Last updated: 2026-05-22T16:42:52.000Z Local people in Chiúre district, southern Cabo Delgado province, have buried 42 members of the traditional Naparama militia in a mass grave after they were killed in clashes with Islamist insurgents earlier this week. The fighters died after pursuing insurgents who had attacked Messanja village, in Katapua administrative post, before dawn on Sunday. The raid triggered panic among residents, forcing many to flee to safer areas. Messanja lies less than five kilometres from Katapua village. ### SEE ALSO: [Who are the Naparama? - ZitamarA local militia called the Naparama emerged last year to fight insurgents in Cabo Delgado, rooted in an infamous predecessor of the same name, which formed in the late 1980s to fight on the Frelimo side of the Mozambican civil war![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsTom Gould![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2023-02-20_155732337-1024x576-31ccf2b2a161e92ff1cfd51397ca96167ee4f4b8fd6317f570185bd93c883aac.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/who-are-the-naparama/) _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The fuel crisis behind the fuel crisis URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-fuel-crisis-behind-the-fuel-crisis/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T17:05:13.000Z Good afternoon. The government says fuel queues are easing. The state-owned fuel company Petromoc has expanded its role in supplying the market, while the energy regulator Arene has approved tough new penalties targeting speculation, hoarding and supply manipulation. On the surface, the response suggests authorities are bringing a difficult situation under control. The Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy this week said a special financing mechanism had enabled additional fuel deliveries through Petromoc, which now accounts for around 42% of market supply. The intervention appears to have had an immediate effect. Long queues outside fuel stations in Maputo have reportedly shortened significantly in recent days. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/19537fe0-77eb-456b-98e0-d7e671b94fda/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But buried within the ministry’s own explanation was a more revealing phrase: “challenges associated with financing imports.” That matters because speculation and hoarding may distort markets, but they do not create shortages on their own. Fuel only disappears when importers struggle to secure supply. And increasingly, the evidence points not toward a physical shortage of fuel but toward a shortage of foreign currency. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Rwanda says Mozambique will pay; Mozambique says nothing URL: https://www.zitamar.com/rwanda-says-mozambique-will-pay-mozambique-says-nothing/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T06:54:37.000Z Rwanda’s foreign minister appears to have settled one immediate question about Cabo Delgado: Rwandan troops are not leaving Mozambique. Olivier Nduhungirehe [said](https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/2056762540990873822?s=46&ref=zitamar.com) this week that, instead of seeking further funding from the European Union, Rwanda will now deal directly with the Mozambican government, which he said “has secured and will continue to secure the necessary funding for the Rwandan security forces in Cabo Delgado.” SEE ALSO: [Rwanda isn’t going anywhereThe formalisation of the Rwandan military mission in Cabo Delgado will reassure some and disappoint others![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-c8027d0ead23141c59c557f2141234b200c614b8610d081747ab0813732b7f5c.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-29-11.02.08-574116e714e6f03f360b99ea1efd8976cb4e70acf2841e1fff994a48ab1ce077.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/rwanda-isnt-going-anywhere/) For communities in northern Cabo Delgado, that will come as a relief. The prospect of a Rwandan withdrawal had caused anxiety in areas where Rwanda’s forces are seen as far more effective and disciplined than Mozambique’s own Defence and Security Forces. Renewed insurgent activity in Chiúre, Ancuabe, Nangade, Mueda and Macomia has only reinforced the sense that Rwanda’s presence remains central to the province’s security architecture. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/149ffcdb-463e-4453-8f09-6e5162a21681/)*.* But Nduhungirehe’s statement raises as many questions as it answers — starting with what has actually changed. European Union support for the Rwandan deployment has always come via Mozambique. The mission operates on Mozambican territory, at Mozambique’s request, and previous EU funding was awarded in support of Mozambique’s stabilisation efforts in Cabo Delgado. If Rwanda now says it will deal “exclusively” with Maputo, that does not by itself prove that European money has disappeared from the equation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### New fault lines in Mozambique’s security establishment URL: https://www.zitamar.com/new-fault-lines-in-mozambiques-security-establishment/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T17:16:43.000Z Good afternoon. The arrest of Quissanga district administrator Sidónio José over allegations of diverting humanitarian aid is, on its face, a local corruption story. But it may also offer an early glimpse of a changing dynamic inside Mozambique’s security establishment. According to reporting around the case, the allegations emerged not from a major anti-corruption operation but from a routine inspection at a checkpoint near Pemba. Officials reportedly became suspicious after intercepting a large consignment of food and tracing it back to the district administrator. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5d32c88a-f212-491e-8092-d160c9536f4d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The arrest of a politically connected figure in a conflict zone points to a broader trend. Since Sernic was moved out of the police force and into the authority of the Attorney General, it increasingly appears willing to pursue politically sensitive figures and cases that may once have faced greater institutional obstacles. The first signs of this shift appeared in Gaza province, where arrests of state officials accused of diverting humanitarian aid marked a new willingness to pursue politically sensitive cases. Quissanga therefore looks less like an exception than the continuation of a trend — and one that now appears to reach into territory historically associated with the intelligence service SISE. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo’s agriculture vision provokes déjà vu URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapos-agriculture-vision-provokes-deja-vu/ Last updated: 2026-05-18T16:38:31.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo used the launch of the 2026 Agricultural Marketing Campaign in Ribáuè this weekend to set out an ambitious vision for Mozambique’s rural economy: one in which farmers receive fairer prices, agricultural markets become more organised, and no viable surplus is left without a buyer. He called for a stronger role for the Mozambique Commodity Exchange (BMM) and the Cereals Institute of Mozambique (ICM), including as a buyer of last resort, and promised legal reforms aimed at giving producers greater protection and bargaining power. Just days earlier, the government announced a 22.7% increase in minimum cotton purchase prices after a difficult season in which many farmers reportedly abandoned the crop. The increase is welcome. But for small producers, predictability can matter almost as much as price. A farmer deciding what to plant next season is responding not only to this year’s market, but to expectations about what happens after that. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3af86c4a-2344-4e42-8f30-d21940fc3164/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chapo’s diagnosis is not difficult to understand. Smallholders remain highly exposed to risks they can do little to control: international commodity prices, climate shocks, transport costs and weak bargaining power. His speech repeatedly returned to the idea that the producer should no longer be “the weakest link” in the agricultural chain. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s banks start to feel the pain URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-banks-start-to-feel-the-pain/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T15:57:00.000Z Good afternoon. For years, banking has occupied a privileged position in Mozambique’s economy. Political crises, economic slowdowns and periods of instability have come and gone, yet the country’s major lenders have generally remained profitable. Portuguese and South African shareholders have often viewed their Mozambican operations as dependable contributors to earnings, while domestic banks benefited from operating in a relatively protected and profitable market. Recent results suggest that remains true — but perhaps less uniformly than before. Moza Banco reported losses of MZN3.9bn ($61m) last year after writing off impairments and credit exposures as part of what it described as a balance-sheet clean-up. Perhaps more significantly, FNB Mozambique was also in the red, recording losses of MZN859m ($13.4m), which it attributed largely to impairments on sovereign exposures — that is, lending to the Mozambican government. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5ad0edbd-fcff-419f-961b-2fd892e65990/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Portuguese newspaper *Jornal de Negócios* reported this week that Mozambique continues to make a meaningful contribution to the profits of Portugal’s largest banking groups. BCI contributed €24m to the results of Caixa Geral de Depósitos in the first quarter, while Millennium BIM’s contribution to BCP rose by more than two-thirds to €5.5m. Mozambique, the newspaper suggested, helped offset weaker performances elsewhere in those groups’ international operations. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Delgado’s insurgents are moving again URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgados-insurgents-are-moving-again/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T17:26:13.000Z Good afternoon. After a relatively quiet first quarter, insurgent activity in Cabo Delgado is once again spreading across the province. Attacks have recently been reported in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Mueda, Meluco, Ancuabe and Chiúre, while roads, villages, artisanal mining sites and Catholic churches have all been targeted. The pattern does not necessarily suggest a major guerrilla resurgence. If anything, the renewed reports of decapitations and church burnings point more toward a campaign of intimidation and propaganda than a conventional territorial offensive. Earlier phases of the conflict also relied heavily on symbolic brutality designed to project strength, spread panic and remind local populations that the insurgents remained present despite military pressure. That appears to be happening again. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/229566f8-f366-488a-8e5b-689c59821e1b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Recent attacks on Catholic churches in Ancuabe and Chiúre fit that logic. So do raids on roads and civilian transport routes, including around Mucojo and Mueda. The objective appears less about holding territory than demonstrating mobility and forcing security forces into a permanently reactive posture. The insurgents also continue to pursue economic and logistical objectives. In Meluco and Ancuabe districts, fighters recently moved through artisanal gold mining areas, including the Ravia and Muaja mining sites. The Mozambique Conflict Monitor, produced by Acled and Zitamar,[ points out](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-22-april-2026?ref=zitamar.com) that insurgents briefly occupied the sites, prompting miners to flee, before later capturing dozens of miners for ransom after Mozambican forces withdrew following clashes. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas is not a development strategy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-is-not-a-development-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T15:32:53.000Z Good afternoon. For more than a decade, Mozambique’s vast offshore gas reserves have been presented as the foundation of the country’s future prosperity. Governments, investors and much of the country’s political elite have spoken of transformation, industrialisation and fiscal stability built on LNG exports from the Rovuma Basin. Yet Mozambique today remains heavily indebted, fiscally constrained and economically fragile. That contradiction is at the heart of a new study by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) examining the fiscal returns generated by the country’s gas sector. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ccc5ae9e-97a4-41e0-99e9-499adc61d9f8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The report focuses on the Coral Sul floating LNG project, the one LNG project already in operation in Mozambique, but its implications reach beyond that single concession. Its central argument is that Mozambique has gradually built an economic model around anticipated LNG wealth that will arrive slowly, unevenly and under increasing global uncertainty. That matters because Mozambique has not treated gas simply as a resource. It has increasingly treated LNG as the country’s development strategy itself. Coral Sul already generates exports and tax revenues. But the CIP study points out that the state’s own participation through ENH produces limited immediate gains because much of the company’s revenue is absorbed by debt servicing linked to its stake in the project. Under current arrangements, ENH’s net dividends from the project will remain zero until 2034. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Goodbye, my love? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/goodbye-my-love/ Last updated: 2026-05-12T14:34:54.000Z Good afternoon. The fuel price crisis paralysing parts of Maputo and Matola this week was triggered by a sharp rise in diesel prices. But it was not fundamentally caused by it. What the chaos on the streets has really exposed is the extent to which Mozambique has allowed urban transport to become dependent on an informal system that the state neither properly controls nor truly trusts — yet cannot function without. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fdcdfb16-0ee9-47f7-b7af-18678dd1601b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [FADM convoy hit in an insurgent ambush on Mucojo roadAttack in Macomia district destroys military vehicle as insurgents intensify operations across Cabo Delgado![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-334.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-05-12-16.16.35.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/fadm-convoy-hit-in-an-insurgent-ambush-on-mucojo-road/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For years, the country’s minibuses, or chapas, have filled the vacuum left by weak public transport provision. They are simultaneously indispensable and deeply dysfunctional: poorly regulated, often uninsured, overcrowded and dangerous. Yet every attempt to discipline or reform the sector quickly collides with a simple reality: if the chapas stop, the cities stop too. Operators protesting rising fuel costs have demonstrated just how much leverage the sector possesses. Reports of strikers intimidating other drivers into joining stoppages underline how fragmented and informal the system has become. Meanwhile, commuters have been left stranded at overflowing bus stops, walking long distances or simply staying home. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### FADM convoy hit in an insurgent ambush on Mucojo road URL: https://www.zitamar.com/fadm-convoy-hit-in-an-insurgent-ambush-on-mucojo-road/ Last updated: 2026-05-12T14:21:09.000Z Mozambican armed forces sustained injuries and lost at least one vehicle after insurgents ambushed a military convoy on Monday travelling between two major towns in the district of Macomia, Cabo Delgado province, local sources told Zitamar News. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Murder is Frelimo's continuation of politics by other means URL: https://www.zitamar.com/murder-is-frelimos-continuation-of-politics-by-other-means/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T16:25:55.000Z The fatal shooting of Anselmo Abílio, a local coordinator for Venâncio Mondlane’s Anamola movement in Chimoio, immediately triggered a familiar cycle in Mozambican politics: suspicion, accusation and, most likely, eventual silence. Police say they are investigating. They have said the same after numerous politically sensitive killings and attempted killings over the years. Yet the public has little reason to expect answers. Again and again, cases involving opposition figures, critics of the state or politically connected interests drift into obscurity, leaving behind only speculation and competing narratives. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a71c87e9-dbe6-4f87-ac1e-b5f3034853b5/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Islamic State insurgents kill civilians and burn homes in latest Cabo Delgado attacksRaid on Namacuili leaves at least four dead as armed groups strike Ancuabe and Macomia districts![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-05-11-18.04.49.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-insurgents-kill-civilians-and-burn-homes-in-latest-cabo-delgado-attacks/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That persistent impunity is one reason many Mozambicans instinctively interpret such killings politically, even when direct evidence is absent. In Abílio’s case, the atmosphere had already been charged. Pro-Frelimo commentator Dércio Alfazema had repeatedly associated him on social media with efforts to mobilise unrest during the post-election protests. After the killing, Alfazema circulated an old video allegedly showing Abílio encouraging members of the security forces to turn against the state. None of this proves involvement in the attack. But in a country with Mozambique’s history, such rhetoric inevitably raises questions about whether some individuals are being publicly marked out as enemies. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State insurgents kill civilians and burn homes in latest Cabo Delgado attacks URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-insurgents-kill-civilians-and-burn-homes-in-latest-cabo-delgado-attacks/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T16:10:10.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents killed five people and burned a large number of homes in two attacks in Ancuabe and Macomia districts. The dead included the secretary of Namacuili village in Ancuabe district, where insurgents attacked on Friday afternoon, 8 May, according to residents. The village lies less than 10 km from the military base at Macarara. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A chilling effect URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-chilling-effect/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T17:03:27.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s mining and its oil and gas sectors look set to be plunged into uncertainty, in the wake of the forthcoming new laws on mining and on oil and gas projects. For one thing, the wording of the laws on various crucial issues (such as whether the state has to pay for domestic gas, or the conditions that apply when projects are suspended) is frustratingly unclear, as the NGO Budget Monitoring Forum has noted in a new report. But the major issue with the new laws is the increased costs they place on investors, and how realistic its provisions are. Under the laws which are currently passing through parliament (see below), the state expects to take a 25% share of production from oil and gas projects; it will not compensate private investors for the costs they incur during so-called “force majeure” events, when a project is halted for reasons beyond anyone’s control; and it also will take a 15% shareholding in all projects on a “free carry” basis; that is, it will not have to contribute towards the project’s investment costs until production begins, and at that point, it will not be charged a commercial rate of interest on its bill. This will basically mean that state-owned companies get a bigger share of revenues than they otherwise would. Currently, when oil and gas firm ENH takes a stake in a gas project, it does not contribute upfront to investment costs, but has to pay commercial rates of interest on top of its contribution. That gets deducted from its revenues. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8bbdba3d-d158-465a-9587-e873548236c1/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) These laws demonstrate how much the economic nationalist movement has penetrated into government policy. Rightly or wrongly, the government has accepted the argument (which originally came from outside, including from NGOs) that private investors have been taking too much wealth out of the country and not leaving anything for Mozambicans, and that it is time to radically change the rules of the game. It is not just the ruling Frelimo party that endorses this view: the laws were passed with the support of all four parties in parliament. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The veneer of jihadism URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-veneer-of-jihadism/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T17:18:29.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday saw the Islamic State-backed insurgents in Cabo Delgado province burn their second Catholic church in two weeks. On Thursday, a Catholic mission in the village of Minhuene in Ancube district was destroyed. This time the church was in the Ancuabe village of Nacoja (see story below). In the meantime, the religious aspect of the war have come more into the foreground, with statements from the Catholic archbishop of Nampula and from the Islamic Community of Mozambique condemning the violence. As this newsletter noted on Monday, it suits the insurgents to play up the religious dimension; their supporters in Islamic State will approve, and it attracts a lot of attention and alarm. Burning a church generates headlines in a way that burning a hundred houses does not. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/16752dd6-0795-47b0-8ca8-039147f8f12b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) However, it would be a mistake to overstate this aspect. It is very rare for the insurgents to attack religious buildings or symbols (as previously noted, the Meza attack was the first time they had burned a Catholic church since 2024), and although they sometimes challenge their captives to recite some verses from the Koran, they do not target Christians systematically. Insurgent commanders vary widely in whether and how they enforce sharia law in areas they control. Some of them are not very observant Muslims. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Frelimo tries to defuse the drugs bomb URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-tries-to-defuse-the-drugs-bomb-2/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T16:07:28.000Z Good afternoon. With the arrest last week of the businessman Umberto Sartori and others, the Mozambican authorities are holding a wolf by the ears. Letting go of the wolf would be dangerous, but neither can they hold onto it indefinitely. As the newspaper *Savana* reports, Sartori (sometimes called Sartone) and the others were arrested in response to an intervention from the United States’ Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which has been interrogating Nurolamin Gulam, arrested by US authorities in 2024 and suspected of drug trafficking. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0030cc4f-b766-4e80-ac7a-e664d97a30a8/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (20 April-3 May 2026)Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) clashed with Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Nangade and Mocímboa da Praia districts![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Overview---MCM---20Apri-3May2026-EN.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-6-19-april-2026-2/) [Insurgents target missionaries and miners in southern Cabo Delgado offensiveRenewed insurgent offensive in southern Cabo Delgado hits villages, church and mining sites in Ancuabe![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-05-06-15.52.25.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-target-missionaries-and-miners-in-southern-cabo-delgado-offensive/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Gulam is reported to have provided the DEA with a list of 29 names of Mozambicans of South Asian origin, which the DEA then wanted the Mozambican authorities to proceed against, failing which it would take action itself. The list included businesspeople involved in property development, construction and hospitality, and with links to the government and the ruling Frelimo party. Pivotal among them is Sartori, the Italian-born, Mozambican-naturalised managing partner of the Kaya Kwanga residential complex and tourist resort in Maputo. Sartori is known to have been close to many powerful and influential people in political and administrative circles: politicians, journalists and members of the security forces among them. Many of them have visited the Kaya Kwanga complex and held meetings there, supposedly free of charge. In fact, when Sartori was arrested on 21 April, there were plans to hold a Frelimo meeting there, which had to be changed at the last minute. He and others are charged with crimes including making and using false documents, money laundering and tax evasion. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (20 April-3 May 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-6-19-april-2026-2/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T15:30:59.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (20 April - 3 May 2026) At least **15** political violence events (**2,371** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **15** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,542** since 1 October 2017) At least **8** reported civilian fatalities (**2,747** since 1 October 2017) At least **7** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,191** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) clashed with Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Nangade and Mocímboa da Praia districts, killing at least seven Mozambican soldiers and seizing weaponry. In the south of the province, a group of up to 100 fighters took over two artisanal gold mining sites, looking for gold in one and money in the other. At one site, they repelled a detachment of Mozambican soldiers before moving south, where they burned a well-known Catholic church, sparking considerable displacement. The group remains in the area, presenting a threat to civilian communities, as well as to artisanal and commercial mining operations. ## Situation summary **ISM kills seven and displaces hundreds in northern Cabo Delgado** Islamist insurgents remain active close to the Tanzanian border, adding weight to [ongoing concerns](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-22-april-2026?ref=zitamar.com) that links with support networks across the border are currently operational. At least two groups of ISM militants have been active across the Mueda and Nangade districts bordering Tanzania. On 20 April, a group of about nine fighters entered Nkonga village in Nangade. As they often do, the fighters fired their weapons as they approached, prompting people to flee and clearing the way for the group to take supplies. Those who fled Nkonga were among the more than 700 people who, fearing attack, left villages in that part of Nangade district between 17 and 25 April, according to the [International Organization for Migration](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-154?close=true&ref=zitamar.com). Three days later, a group of ISM fighters, likely those who appeared in Nkonga, attacked a Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) outpost at Mitope, just over the district boundary in Mocímboa da Praia. Islamic State (IS) media channels claimed that militants killed seven FADM soldiers in the attack. Photos released by IS showed soldiers clad in T-shirts, clearly not ready for combat. The group also seized weapons and ammunition. An image published in IS’ weekly al-Naba showed two incomplete mortars with ammunition, three medium machine guns, up to 25 other weapons including automatic rifles and small machine guns, and various types of ammunition. A second group was active in Mueda district before returning to Nangade. On 23 April, armed men opened fire on a passenger bus running from Mueda town to Tanzania. The attack took place near Roma village, approximately 60 kilometers from Mueda town. According to a witness, insurgents dressed in military gear appeared on the road and tried to force the bus to stop, firing on the vehicle when the driver refused. Though the driver was hit, others took the wheel in turn, and the bus reached Tanzania, where it was met by Tanzanian security forces. According to a Mozambique Conflict Monitor source in the district, the group returned to Nangade and was spotted near Samora Machel village on 25 April. **RDF and FADM clash with ISM in southern Mocímboa da Praia** State forces clashed twice with ISM in southern Mocímboa da Praia. On 29 April, Rwandan forces clashed with ISM on the road between Mbau and Naquitengue, incurring an unknown number of fatalities, according to an IS claim released on Telegram. The same day, according to a subsequent IS claim, militants clashed with Mozambican forces at Mbau village, with no fatalities. A source in Mocímboa da Praia confirms that clashes occurred that day in broadly the same area as IS claims. According to the source, on 29 April, two former insurgents led army soldiers to a supposed hiding spot, then fired on it. According to this source, the military withdrew and was later ambushed by ISM. The military killed an unknown number of insurgents in that clash. The Mbau area holds some strategic importance for the insurgents. It is close to the Messalo river and their main base in Catupa forest, and it provides access to Mocímboa da Praia town and villages on the coast. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) has had a base at Mbau since at least November 2022\. ### ISM raids gold mines and burns a church in Ancuabe district Up to 100 militants have been active in southern Cabo Delgado since around 20 April. While the burning of a Catholic church on 30 April has attracted most attention, ISM’s primary focus there has been on gold and money. Groups still present in the area pose a risk to civilian communities, as well as to artisanal and large-scale mining operations in the area. As forecast in our most recent [Mozambique Conflict Monitor](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-22-april-2026?ref=zitamar.com) report, a group of up to 100 men made their way to the Ravia artisanal gold mining site in Meluco district, arriving on 20 April. The group spent up to six days at the site, according to a source. In the early morning of 26 April, militants, likely the same group, arrived at the Muaja artisanal gold mining site, about 30 km south of Ravia in Ancuabe district. According to a source, their arrival prompted miners and others to flee. Later in the day, a FADM detachment arrived and engaged the insurgents, but it soon withdrew. The militants then captured up to 80 miners, holding them for ransom of 50,000 meticais each (*see map below).* ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/05/data-src-image-b4470ec2-4981-4f2c-85ed-5d9b132ce180.png) The group then moved further south to Minheuene village, where on 30 April they burned a Catholic church, a small school, and some church housing. There were no fatalities, most of the population having fled. The military arrived the following day to conduct searches in the surrounding area, a Minhuene resident reported. According to a resident contacted by Zitamar News, 80 to 100 militants came to the village. They have now split into two groups, sparking further displacement. One group is said to be west of Minheuene, not far from the Montepuez Ruby Mining and Gemrock Mozambique mine sites. Following the Minheuene attack, Gemrock evacuated its staff from its mine site, which is approximately 16 km south of the town. The other is said to be at an artisanal gold mining site near Ntutupue, over 50 km east of Minheune, close to the N1 highway to Pemba town. ## Focus: What does ISM want in Meluco and Ancuabe? ISM’s current foray into southern Cabo Delgado tells us something about the relative importance of gold and religion to the group. Militants took over two mining sites seeking gold and money, and have since moved to a third. They also destroyed a church in Minheuene. Archbishop Inácio Saúre condemned the destruction at Minheuene, saying it sent “[clear and strong messages of hatred against Christians](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2026-05/mozambique-archbishop-condemns-attack-on-catholic-mission.html?ref=zitamar.com).” These messages will likely be amplified with images of the church in the coming days through IS media channels, such as al-Naba, published on Thursdays. However, activities at mining sites were clearly of greater importance to the group. From recent activity, we have learned three things about the group’s relationship with gold. First, we see that gold remains a significant source of income for ISM. The group’s activities around artisanal gold mining sites [increased exponentially](https://acleddata.com/report/ransom-gold-and-spoils-war-islamic-state-mozambiques-new-cash-flow?ref=zitamar.com) in 2025\. Their recent activity at the Ravia and Muaja mining sites indicates that gold remains a strategic concern for the group. Second, ISM’s actions at the Ravia artisanal mines suggest the group can get gold to market itself and is not solely reliant on cash payments from miners. According to a source in the artisanal mining sector in the province, while at Ravia the group was involved for some days in milling sand and gravel in order to extract gold ore. ISM can likely trade the gold it mines through Mozambican channels connected to overseas elements of the value chain, which reach as far as the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. ISM took a markedly different approach in Muaja, indicating that the quality of its relations with miners varies from site to site. In Ravia, ISM was able to actively engage in mining for some days. It is unclear if this indicates that ISM exercises coercive control over the miners, or if they collaborate. In Muaja, meanwhile, the militants forced miners and other workers to flee from the site, before clashing with FADM troops stationed near the mine and kidnapping mine workers for ransom. For the state security apparatus, these incidents imply a need for improved intelligence gathering and more timely incident response. For community leaders, much work will need to be done to shore up interreligious relations in the wake of the Minheuene attack. Large-scale commercial miners will, in the short term, need to intensify intelligence gathering, strengthen relations with state forces, and reevaluate risks to workers. ## Roundup *China and Mozambique strike deals on critical minerals and security* China and Mozambique have [agreed](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3351346/china-and-mozambique-map-critical-minerals-insurgency-hit-cabo-delgado?ref=zitamar.com) to map major untapped deposits of critical minerals in the country’s north, following talks between President Xi Jinping and President Daniel Chapo in Beijing on 21 April 2026\. The joint geological survey will target high-value resources such as graphite, lithium, and rare-earth elements — minerals seen as vital for the global transition to clean energy. Alongside the minerals agreement, the two countries also strengthened security ties. Under a new memorandum of understanding, China will support Mozambique’s counter-terrorism efforts through expanded military and law enforcement collaboration. The agreement includes training for personnel, as well as the provision of equipment, technology, and joint exercises. *Mozambique flags used fraudulently by oil tankers* At least 10 oil tankers have been operating under fraudulent Mozambican registration, the country’s Maritime Transport Institute (Intrasmar) has [reported](https://jornalnoticias.co.mz/?ref=zitamar.com). According to Unaite Mustafa, head of Intrasmar, the vessels include the Deyna, which is suspected of being linked to a Russian “shadow fleet” used to bypass international sanctions. Mustafa said the ships were using falsified documents and unauthorized websites to pose as officially registered under Mozambique’s flag. The case has been referred to the attorney general’s office for investigation. ### Insurgents target missionaries and miners in southern Cabo Delgado offensive URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-target-missionaries-and-miners-in-southern-cabo-delgado-offensive/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T14:02:46.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents have escalated attacks across southern Cabo Delgado, targeting mining sites, abducting civilians and clashing with security forces in a renewed push south that has sent thousands fleeing. The surge began on 26 April with clashes in Muaja, a gold-mining area in Ancuabe district, where fighters took positions near mining sites and prompted a response from Mozambican armed forces (FADM). After the confrontation, insurgents abducted dozens of miners — reports suggest up to 80 — and demanded ransoms of 50,000 meticais per person. Some captives have since been released after payments; others remain held. The same group, believed to have moved from the Ravia mining area in Meluco district, is also reported to have occupied a gold mine north of Intutupwe village. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The cost of a fuel price increase URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-cost-of-a-fuel-price-increase/ Last updated: 2026-05-05T15:56:13.000Z Good afternoon. Why is it so hard to find petrol and diesel in Mozambique this week? Why are so many petrol stations running out of fuel? Not because there is no fuel in the country. Of fuel there is plenty: so much so that, when a fuel tanker tried to unload its cargo at the port of Nacala yesterday, it was difficult to find a storage tank with spare room. The problem is that fuel distributors are unwilling to distribute the fuel to retailers. Fuel prices in Mozambique are regulated, and the price is adjusted periodically based on the last two months’ wholesale prices. That means that the sharp increase in oil prices resulting from the war in the Middle East has not yet been factored into fuel prices. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/d035251e-e976-425d-9b9d-165b29d69b97/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Up to now, the government has persuaded distributors to keep buying fuel, and the Bank of Mozambique quietly made some extra US dollar financing available to commercial banks two weeks ago, to help finance fuel imports. But distributors are increasingly reluctant to keep buying, when the retail price is not high enough to repay them. Petrol is currently being imported by Vitol, the contracted fuel importer, for about $1600 a tonne, when the price at the pump is more like $730 a tonne. So, less and less fuel is moving from storage tanks to pumps. Meanwhile, fuel prices have risen in neighbouring countries, which has encouraged foreigners to cross the border to fill up their cars and lorries into Mozambique. According to the government, petrol stations have been selling fuel at record speeds, sometimes a week’s worth in 24 hours. The country has been living in a bubble, insulated from the price rise that has been hitting consumers and businesses in the rest of the world. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The insurgents’ burning publicity stunt URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-insurgents-burning-publicity-stunt/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T16:14:42.000Z Good afternoon. Parts of Cabo Delgado province’s Ancuabe district are in turmoil after an insurgent attack on the village of Minheuene on Thursday, in which several buildings including a Catholic church were burned. The church belonged to the parish of Saint Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort, a parish with a long history of association with Catholic missionary work in Cabo Delgado. The mission there has recently been in the hands of a Catholic religious order that prioritises free Christian education of children and young people. Perhaps that is why the insurgents also burned the local school. This is the first time a building belonging to the Catholic Church has been attacked by insurgents since an attack in Chiúre district in 2024\. There are no deaths confirmed. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/30224326-a2e4-4359-bf9a-6f10f7300d07/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The violence has prompted an upset response from the bishop of Pemba, António Juliasse, who complained that the Mozambican security forces did nothing to stop the attack, despite the fact that, according to Juliasse, there had been an insurgent attack nearby recently. It is unusual for Catholic figures like him to speak out in this way about the insurgency: generally their comments are quite reserved, as the Vatican does not like to play up the idea of religious wars. It seems that the insurgents knew not to expect resistance: the attack was carried out by children and young people who looked under 18, according to reports. It is unusual for insurgents to send children into battle, although they are known to train child soldiers. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Resource robbers won’t be ignored URL: https://www.zitamar.com/resource-robbers-wont-be-ignored/ Last updated: 2026-04-30T16:01:33.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday saw the latest attack in the war being waged by the economic nationalists in the ruling Frelimo party and their friends in the media, about control of the country’s natural resources. The academic, businessman and Frelimo politician José Chichava told student officers at the Higher Institute of Defence Studies that multinational companies extracting natural resources were robbing the country and taking advantage of the weakness of the state. He also, alarmingly, argued that “military generals, military specialists need to take part in the groups that discuss the contracts”, according to newssheet *Mediafax.* He also said in reference to the Coral South offshore gas platform that “they say that nobody can enter”, apparently implying that state authorities are being denied access. This is not true: officials have visited the platform, including to inspect employment contracts, and journalists have also visited, including from *Zitamar News.* *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/820fe2fe-2d03-401c-b118-02dce9d32d16/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chichava is not one of the ordinary Mozambicans who is “becoming poorer”, as he put it, as a result of contracts with multinationals being allegedly mismanaged. He is a former government minister and a member of Frelimo’s Central Committee who owes his success in business to his political connections. When he and people like him argue that multinationals are stealing Mozambique’s wealth, what they really mean is that Frelimo elites should be allowed to steal it instead. A good example of this is the dispute over an early works contract for the liquefied natural gas project led by US oil company ExxonMobil. The state-owned Mozambican oil and gas firm ENH is demanding to participate in the contract, despite not having bid for it. Other Mozambican companies are reported to have been using their political connections to lobby for contracts. Such contracts are unlikely to bring much benefit for ordinary Mozambicans. They are an opportunity for elites to pocket money while outsourcing the hard work to foreign companies who have the necessary skills and capacity. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Rasaque Manhique’s real crime URL: https://www.zitamar.com/rasaque-manhiques-real-crime/ Last updated: 2026-04-29T15:55:56.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday was a remarkable day in the Mozambican courts. Rasaque Manhique, the mayor of the city of Maputo and a member of the ruling Frelimo party, was fined by a district court for disobeying a previous court order. He was originally sentenced to four months in prison, but this was converted into a fine, as is usual for minor offences, calculated at MZN500 ($7.80) a day over the period of the sentence, or about MZN60,000 in total. That is over one-quarter of his expected monthly earnings. Does this punishment mean that judges now feel more confident about standing up to Frelimo politicians? Is it a victory for the rule of law? Not really. In normal circumstances, this case would not have got so far. For example, when in the past a prosecutor tried to bring charges against Carlos Portimão, Frelimo’s candidate for mayor of the city of Moatize in Tete province, the charges were dropped and the prosecutor was dismissed. And it seems that Manhique did not expect it to get so far either: he ignored repeated messages from the court. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8f3d2987-14b4-4ce5-9a20-960eb1406a47/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The reason Manhique was convicted by the court this time, according to *Zitamar News*’ssources, is that the local Frelimo officials did not want to prevent his conviction. They are understood to be unhappy that Manhique has been too upright as mayor. He has not handed out jobs and favours to party figures in the way that mayors are expected to do. As such, Frelimo has decided to teach him a lesson. Rather than a sign of the rule of law, this court sentence is a sign that corruption still rules in local politics. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Return of the dragon URL: https://www.zitamar.com/return-of-the-dragon/ Last updated: 2026-04-28T17:19:09.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo is back from a marathon seven-day visit to China, longer than any other foreign visit the president has undertaken. During his trip, Chapo visited two provinces and came away with an ambitious cooperation deal. If the promise of the deal is fulfilled, it could mean that China is back as a development partner of Mozambique in a big way for the first time since the 2010s, when the Chinese government financed the construction of the Maputo ring road and the Maputo-Katembe bridge with Chinese labour. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6f6f0bae-11ba-48b7-8ad3-d284bb664530/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Six soldiers killed in insurgent attack on Mocímboa da Praia positionSecurity forces regain control in early-morning counterattack as Islamic State-linked media claims higher toll![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-04-28-14.56.00.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/six-soldiers-killed-in-insurgent-attack-on-mocimboa-da-praia-position/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) According to reports, the Chinese government has promised to support the repair of the N1 north-south highway and to finance feasibility studies into a gas pipeline and a railway, which would also span the length of the country. It has also, importantly, committed to providing training and equipment to help fight the insurgency in the north. A new industrial park has been promised for Moamba district in Maputo province. Exactly what the Chinese government will get in return is unclear, but appears to involve greater access to natural resources. The Chinese have promised to carry out a geological survey to map the location of deposits of critical minerals used in electronics and batteries. Importantly as well, they are supposed to invest in industries to transform natural resources. This is a goal which the Mozambican government has been talking about for a long time, but has never quite achieved. Currently, minerals and gas are exported largely raw from Mozambique, and the processing work that would create jobs and add value is done elsewhere. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Six soldiers killed in insurgent attack on Mocímboa da Praia position URL: https://www.zitamar.com/six-soldiers-killed-in-insurgent-attack-on-mocimboa-da-praia-position/ Last updated: 2026-04-28T13:10:37.000Z At least six soldiers from the Mozambican Armed Defence Forces (FADM) were killed in a surprise insurgent attack on 23 April in Mitope village, about 11 km north of Awasse in Mocímboa da Praia district, Cabo Delgado. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Nowhere to live URL: https://www.zitamar.com/nowhere-to-live/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T15:41:12.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s next big human tragedy is to be found in the blocks of flats in its major cities. These buildings, many of which date back to the colonial period, were quickly nationalised after Mozambique became independent in 1975\. With the introduction of market reforms in the 1990s, people gained the ability to buy their homes from the state, or to buy flats and displace their existing tenants. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3d070bf8-2740-4741-b6e8-b131e7ed9353/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Since then, the cost of maintaining and renewing property has increased, and the housing stock has got older, driving up its maintenance bill. Blocks of flats need redecorating, new wiring, plumbing repairs, light fittings replaced, new lifts and so on. All this costs a lot of money, money which the residents mostly do not have. And so the condition of the buildings steadily deteriorates, as has been highlighted by a new report from the housing ministry (see below). Water infiltration is a particularly worrying problem, as it threatens the structural integrity of buildings and residents can be unwilling to agree on who is responsible. It is only a matter of time before a building collapses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The explosive case of Manuel Chang URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-explosive-case-of-manuel-chang/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T15:47:24.000Z Good afternoon. Last year, attorney-general Américo Letela was suggesting that former finance minister Manuel Chang would be a free man when he came back to Mozambique after serving his prison sentence in the United States. Chang was convicted by a US federal court of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering, in connection with the so-called “[hidden debts](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/hidden-debts-dossier/)” or “tuna bond” corruption scandal. Readers at the time will remember how Chang was convicted of taking bribes to facilitate the $2bn of illegal state borrowing which wrecked the Mozambican economy. The hidden debts scandal was an explosive issue for Mozambicans for many years, combining massive corruption by the ruling elites together with even more massive damage to the economy. Although several people were jailed in Mozambique for their role in the crimes, two key people who were involved in the deals that enabled that corruption, then-president Armando Guebuza and then defence minister and later president Filipe Nyusi, have never been properly investigated. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/860f0cff-45f4-4f5b-9652-c5a80a3329c9/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Gunmen ambush a passenger vehicle in MuedaArmed men open fire on a public transport vehicle in Cabo Delgado’s Mueda district, while insurgent activity is also reported in Meluco and Mocímboa da Praia![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-04-24-16.28.53.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/gunmen-ambush-a-passenger-vehicle-in-mueda/) ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogMaria Fernanda Camba has been appointed as the new head of the National Social Security Institute (INSS), succeeding Joaquim Siúta, who was recently arrested in connection with a corruption case, Zitamar News has learned. Siúta, along with six other defendants, is accused of rigging bidding processes, which resulted in the embezzlement of MZN433m ($6.7m), the attorney general Américo Letela told parliament on Wednesday.![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/FFu3Clq3LyuEuy7z5Da6ljYpAfft7hOnkXcKCH253yU7QpZn0fbRwRbJISYWf_rqUOV_3-KJMqUzatuGiYgNbi4TOxSWElySahL2f0WdWytIQgrnWhxPYddCx_UpzkNKFlmKvr7r5wGQ3jab0eOKP3mdMrf2Sf8iX3NwBGa32dkkJl2A8NCWy76jUOdg4KmPu2VbFPUJ_zBGDFTTR_yVl4mX0QE0eroGqi30W-XF4Xh1ht1HTL9gKaMi0WU63NQpFkVfq3p6II46t-DHnJUOOOyvK_Jg1V1bCK_XcnnbUKY6JNCB2UYmZ8W-NflJ6ZTTBcqaymPz8hk-p_S3X5KOFg.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4721?ref=zitamar.com) There was no hint in the Attorney-General’s Office’s annual report last year that Chang would face another trial back in Mozambique, only some grumbling that the US conviction had not led to any compensation for the Mozambican state that he helped to defraud. Fast forward to this year, and Letela is now saying that his office is investigating the possibility of putting Chang on trial for crimes which he was not charged with in the US. Last year, Letela was sticking to the line that Chang couldn’t be tried twice for the same offence, but this was not a convincing excuse, since only one of the crimes he was charged with in the US, money laundering, was listed among the charges against him in Mozambique. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gunmen ambush a passenger vehicle in Mueda URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gunmen-ambush-a-passenger-vehicle-in-mueda/ Last updated: 2026-04-24T14:39:51.000Z Suspected Islamic State-backed fighters attacked a public transport vehicle on 23 April, shooting and wounding the driver after he refused to stop at their command on a remote road in Mueda district, Cabo Delgado province. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The trauma that feeds panic URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-trauma-that-feeds-panic/ Last updated: 2026-04-23T18:30:24.000Z Good afternoon. Alarming videos have been shared on social media from Cabo Delgado province in the last week about a new scare story that has been spreading across the province. One of them shows a mob of young men confronting an older man and beating him with long sticks; it is not clear from the video if he got away. An elderly man was also treated for being beaten at the rural hospital in Mocímboa da Praia district on Sunday. The reason for these attacks is a rumour that people, specifically men, are losing their biological sex after being touched by the hand of another man. Supposed victims complain that they have lost their genitals, even though it is easy to prove that they have not. The superstition has spread southward from Tanzania, where there are reports from all over the country about people complaining that they have been afflicted. Starting in the northernmost districts of Cabo Delgado, it has now reached the southernmost ones and crossed over into Nampula. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8e71a56b-34c7-4b2b-a77c-a1e8e78442f1/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (6-19 April 2026)Logistics corridors to Tanzania for the insurgents remain open on both land and sea![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-04-22-19.08.58-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-6-19-april-2026/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Not everyone who believes in this rumour is an illiterate peasant. One video shows teachers in the town of Chiúre discussing it, apparently believing the claims to be real. The people accused are all elderly men, suggesting that this might be a twist on traditional accusations of witchcraft. There is a danger, and it is reasonable to suspect, that some people are taking advantage of this superstition to victimise their enemies or to rob neighbours who are envied for their relative wealth. Reports of this panic in Mozambique have only emerged in the last week, and so far, there has been no coherent response from the authorities. Indeed, there has been no response at all except for the police, who have taken the accusations at face value. This week the provincial youth council (an organisation generally dominated by the ruling Frelimo party) issued a statement urging calm and condemning vigilantism. Notably, however, it made no attempt to point out that the superstition is false. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (6-19 April 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-6-19-april-2026/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T17:13:52.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (6 - 19 April 2026) At least **11** political violence events (**2,356** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **9** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,527** since 1 October 2017) At least **4** reported civilian fatalities (**2,739** since 1 October 2017) At least **10** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,184** since 1 October 2017) ## Situation summary **Tanzanian fighters captured in Nangade** Insurgents have been active in Nangade district for the first time since December. On 14 April, Mozambican security forces captured 10 Tanzanians, suspected insurgents, close to Mandimba in the north of Nangade region. The following day, another group of ISM militants attacked Machava, a farming settlement less than 20 kilometers further south, with no reported fatalities. On 20 April, they entered Nkonga, a village in central Nangade, looking for food. According to a local source, these attacks were undertaken by ISM recruits who had crossed from Tanzania, and the attacks were attempts to procure food for the journey south toward Macomia. According to the source, the group captured at Mandimba had regrouped there after failing to find a route south. **Tanzanian boat intercepted by navy, then ISM** The Tanzania connection was also evident on the coast, where a Tanzanian fishing boat had the misfortune of being targeted first by a Mozambican navy patrol, and days later by ISM. On 12 April, a navy patrol stopped the boat as it was moving north between Matemo and Rolas islands, in Ibo district. According to two sources, the boat, which was carrying shellfish, was taken to Rolas Island where the Tanzanian captain was forced to pay a bribe of up to 20,000 meticais to continue the journey. Two days later the boat was stopped by ISM at the mouth of the Messalo river. The captain had taken that route hoping to avoid navy patrols operating from Quilanhune Island. ISM held the boat overnight until a ransom was paid. The insurgents also seized the cargo before allowing the boat to continue its voyage back to Tanzania. On land, ISM militants were active in Mocímboa da Praia. On 8 April, near Nachiji village south of Mocímboa da Praia town, a group of insurgents stopped a trader on a motorbike and stole her goods and 7,000 meticais in cash. They continued to Nabaje village, just 14 km south of Mocímboa da Praia on the coast. There they took foodstuffs, then left in a stolen boat. **ISM kills six in village attacks west of Macomia** Between 10 and 14 April, a group of ISM fighters attacked four villages west of Macomia town, killing at least six civilians and abducting two. The first attack was on Nkoe village, over 22 km northwest of Macomia town. The attacks illustrate how the N380 is emerging as a demarcation line between communities: ISM takes a more violent approach to the west of the road, where the Frelimo-associated Local Force is strong. To the east, where they exert greater control, their engagement is much less violent. The group then moved south, hitting Nguida and Chicomo, directly west of Macomia town, before attacking Iba village in neighboring Meluco district. According to one source, the group, made up of 100 well-armed men, made its way west toward the mines at Minhanha and Ravia. ## Focus: Transit corridors from Tanzania remain active Events in Nangade and off the Ibo and Macomia coasts last week are a reminder of how open the border with Tanzania remains, over eight years since the insurgency began. ISM relies on connections with Tanzania to receive new recruits from Tanzania and elsewhere in the region, to receive supplies, and to maintain relations with support networks north of the Ruvuma river. Mandimba, where 10 Tanzanians were discovered on 14 April, lies just 8 km from Tanzania’s Mtwara region. It is a critical part of the Tanzania corridor that extends south to Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe districts, and finally to ISM strongholds in Macomia district. That the 10 were unable to find their way south is evidence that, though the Nangade route is still active, the insurgents do not have a strong foothold or support network in the district. With a primarily Makonde population and with relatively strong Frelimo structures, it was one of the first districts to establish the communal defense militias that would later become [the Local Force](https://acleddata.com/actor-profile/local-forces-communal-militias-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com). Consequently, ISM has never established itself in the district, although a mosque in Nangade town was [identified](https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-151e-schichava/?ref=zitamar.com) as a site of radicalization in the insurgency’s formative years, prior to 2017\. ISM’s ability to hold a Tanzanian vessel for ransom and seize its cargo on 14 April indicates that Mozambique does not have control of its littoral waters. That the navy itself held the same boat for ransom two days before demonstrates that the authorities are not focused on addressing the insurgent threat. Consequently, the littoral waters are likely an important logistical corridor for the insurgents. The navy’s continued patrols along the Macomia coast appear to be targeting local marine traffic — [sometimes fatally](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) — while larger vessels continue to ply between the two countries. The continued traffic of commercial vessels, despite the risks, presents clear opportunities for the insurgents to move personnel and arms to Mozambique, and for others, potentially including leaders, to move to Tanzania when needed. Policing marine traffic will remain Mozambique’s responsibility. Tanzania has traditionally maintained a policy of containment toward armed groups in neighboring countries, tolerant of their presence within its borders if their actions are targeted elsewhere. For instance, Jamal Mukulu, founder of the Allied Democratic Forces, which became Islamic State Central Africa Province, [lived in Dar es Salaam](https://jamestown.org/the-road-comes-to-an-end-for-ugandan-islamist-leader-jamil-mukulu/?ref=zitamar.com) for some years before his arrest in 2015\. This approach is unlikely to change. Though the United States is [exerting pressure](https://thechanzo.com/2025/12/08/tanzania-president-holds-talks-with-u-s-charge-daffaires-amid-diplomatic-pressure-following-october-29-protests/?ref=zitamar.com) on Tanzania to expedite an ExxonMobil-backed liquefied natural gas project in southern Tanzania, contractual rather than security issues have impeded the project’s progress over the years. Therefore, Tanzania will be under little external pressure to clamp down on these networks. ## Roundup *Frelimo divided as Mozambique’s unpaid bill strains Rwanda ties* Relations between Maputo and Kigali have [deteriorated](https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2026/04/15/exxonmobil-and-totalenergies-take-a-hit-as-payment-to-rwandan-troops-stops,110704083-eve?ref=zitamar.com) due to Mozambique’s failure to pay the RDF deployed in Cabo Delgado, according to Africa Intelligence. The debt has exceeded 22 million US dollars, equivalent to roughly a year of missed payments under an agreement that Mozambique provides monthly transfers of about $2 million. The situation reflects the state’s financial strain, marked by high public debt and limited revenues, which constrains its ability to meet external obligations of this kind. The payment delays also expose divisions within Frelimo over the continued presence of Rwandan troops. According to the [Savana newspaper](https://savana.co.mz/?ref=zitamar.com), one faction argues for their withdrawal, while another sees the RDF as essential to containing the insurgency and securing areas linked to gas projects. Companies such as TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil have pushed for their continued deployment through the construction phase. Still, the failure to pay the troops raises doubts about the arrangement's sustainability in the medium term. *Soldiers arrested over attempted sale of 2,000 weapons* Mozambican authorities have [detained](https://aimnews.org/2026/04/10/three-detained-for-possession-of-over-2000-weapons/?ref=zitamar.com) four individuals in Beira over the possession of more than 2,000 weapons, including members of the Defense and Security Forces and a Chinese national. Prosecutors say the soldiers intended to sell obsolete weapons to a foundry owned by the Chinese citizen, in violation of regulations requiring their destruction. The suspects reportedly transported the weapons in a Mozambican military vehicle to the foundry, where they were to be received. The case has been referred for judicial proceedings and highlights broader weaknesses in the military’s arms disposal processes. ### White collars and dirty justice URL: https://www.zitamar.com/white-collars-and-dirty-justice/ Last updated: 2026-04-22T15:36:24.000Z Good afternoon. The government would like everyone to know that it is on a mission to stamp out white-collar crime. There have been quite a lot of arrests recently at state institutions like the finance ministry, the Tax Authority, the National Social Security Institute, and the state-owned airline LAM. The media have been invited to watch and take pictures while suspects are paraded in handcuffs and loaded into vans to go to prison. Some of the facts are laid out in the report that attorney-general Américo Letela is presenting to parliament today. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/66ddd40e-800d-45e6-8940-5cfa19cb12b3/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But once they reach prison, things go quiet. Suspects can go for weeks or months without being told what they are being charged with or what evidence there is against them. *Zitamar News* is aware of people who have been in this state since November. Sometimes they are eventually released due to lack of evidence; but by then they have already effectively served a prison sentence without being charged, never mind tried. If their case does go to trial, they are often denied bail, and have to spend even more time behind bars in grotesquely overcrowded prisons, whether they need to be there or not. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Turning fighters into farmers URL: https://www.zitamar.com/turning-fighters-into-farmers/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T16:29:34.000Z Good afternoon. In the fight against the Islamic State-backed insurgency in northern Mozambique, the justice system is conspicuous by its absence. A mere 32 cases were launched for terrorism offences last year, and only 26 the year before, according to a new report from the Attorney-General’s Office. This is not for a lack of people to charge. The insurgents have many collaborators among their friends and families in the insurgent heartlands of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. But they are not being brought to justice. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e51590c6-cc7e-4a68-9036-05e7e4543b6b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Return of insurgent attacks leaves two dead and hundreds displacedA wave of attacks across central Cabo Delgado has displaced hundreds of civilians and killed at least two people, marking a sharp escalation after a prolonged period of relative quiet![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-04-20_172359303.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/return-of-insurgent-attacks-leaves-two-dead-and-hundreds-displaced/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Suspected insurgents caught in war zones with a gun in their hand do not tend to face prosecution anyway: the security forces just kill them, war crime though that may be. Those who are arrested outside war zones and who do not seem to be combatants may be referred for prosecution, but the security forces are badly equipped to collect evidence of terrorism offences, so that by the time prosecutors are referred to them, a lot of evidence has been lost or spoiled. In the past, this did not matter so much: prosecutors handed suspects over for trial and courts convicted suspects in large numbers, even if the case against them was weak. But in the last few years, attitudes have changed and judges now throw out cases a lot more. Thus fewer cases are being opened, as prosecutors are now less willing to begin cases that don’t have much of a chance. While innocent people were convicted in the past, today it is likely that guilty people are going free. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Return of insurgent attacks leaves two dead and hundreds displaced URL: https://www.zitamar.com/return-of-insurgent-attacks-leaves-two-dead-and-hundreds-displaced/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T21:07:16.000Z Insurgents have killed at least two people and displaced hundreds in a series of incidents across central and northern Cabo Delgado, ending weeks of relative calm. ✉️ Zitamar News has set up a new channel on Telegram for all our updates from the conflict in northern Mozambique, and a separate newsletter to collate those posts twice a week. Subscribe to the [Telegram channel here](https://t.me/zitamarconflictupdates?ref=zitamar.com), and to the dedicated newsletter in your [account settings](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/account). Between 10 and 15 April, fighters carried out raids in Macomia, Meluco, and Nangade districts, targeting villages, ambushing civilians, and disrupting fishing and agricultural activity. The surge suggests a renewed offensive after a lull that coincided with the holy Muslim month of Ramadan, and the rainy season. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Opposition lives don’t matter URL: https://www.zitamar.com/opposition-lives-dont-matter/ Last updated: 2026-04-21T02:31:01.000Z Good afternoon. On the one hand, President Daniel Chapo is presiding over a process of political and constitutional reform, known as “inclusive national dialogue”, in collaboration with opposition political parties. On the other hand, his government has done remarkably little to stop supporters of one opposition party, Anamola, from being killed (see below). The killings of Anamola activists resemble the killings of opposition figures Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe just after the October 2024 elections, along with other killings of police officers and opponents of the ruling Frelimo party over the years. They are clean, professional jobs, and the culprits get away neatly. The exception to this is the killing of election observer Anastácio Matavel in 2019, whose killers crashed their car as they were trying to escape the murder scene. But even in that case, the people who directed the killing were never identified. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/820b004f-0687-4591-a7e3-c8256e4d4101/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) There is therefore little reason to doubt that all these killings are carried out by the security forces on the orders of people in Frelimo or the government. It does not look like the sort of thing Chapo would order: unlike his predecessors, he does not have a background in the armed forces or as a fighter in the Mozambican war of independence, and so does not tend to view political opponents as enemies to be eliminated. But in any case, as president of both Mozambique and of Frelimo, he is responsible for the people who are most likely involved. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### State takes centre stage in gas strategy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/state-takes-centre-stage-in-gas-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-04-17T17:13:27.000Z Good afternoon. The decision to entrust a new LNG terminal at Inhassoro to a consortium of state-owned companies signals a change in how Mozambique is approaching its gas sector. The agreement signed last week (but only announced yesterday) between national oil and gas company ENH, national electricity utility EDM, the ports and rail company CFM, and the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric company HCB brings together the country’s most significant public enterprises into a single vehicle with exclusive rights to develop, finance and operate a new segment of the gas value chain. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f9306918-1278-4423-a2d2-506934dde408/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogThe authorities today carried out search and seizure operations at the home and offices of Humberto Sartone, owner of the Kaya Kwanga tourist resort in Maputo, extending the operation to four people linked to the businessman. The operation is based on strong evidence that the group is part of an organised crime network involved in trafficking, money laundering and document forgery, according to a spokesman for the criminal investigation service Sernic. Although no arrests have been made so far, the authorities have seized a considerable amount of material that will be subjected to forensic analysis, including computers, mobile phones, documents, firearms and ammunition.![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/tJb8uKYf4l_HL4g1rXYULMduF1wfqa35DgtiHjwuwO0JsEyVlqGW8UuszFZqn1AEzZokuXbgOjN7lLZDOOVXagYOjFPcyANXLtgxDm5H4pcV3mRgY0_MEu7DH1_hLeJkTGyl7A2yVHVNUeF3WC2hlID9piTnZXNRR0RbqeKv4GQzv_U5bs4Pl5Kh9w3e2JyJqOtPwmN06vypwbQC35hf1uVZJFKqmm6FiW3PK-CTm56kYE5tQUX59qJebZe6-MtlhYvELdEW53WuTGMkmdU4ayEDO29cjhyhnquhxZG9QQ5BQ2U104M8qPt3P0CQFbMUaov2KB-PszPF2g4e6MIUXg.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4712?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That level of coordination is new. Mozambique’s state companies have long held stakes in major projects within their respective sectors. What they have not typically done is act in concert as the principal drivers of new ventures. In this case, the state is positioning itself not just as regulator or minority partner, but as organiser and gatekeeper. Whether the project itself makes economic sense is less clear. Mozambique has long faced a choice between extending pipeline infrastructure from the Rovuma Basin or moving gas south by sea. Over the 2,000km between Palma and Inhassoro, pipelines would normally be the cheaper option. The decision to rely instead on LNG transport and regasification suggests that other constraints are at play, not least the security risks and practical challenges of building infrastructure across Cabo Delgado. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Fuel crisis exposes deeper financial fault lines URL: https://www.zitamar.com/fuel-crisis-exposes-deeper-financial-fault-lines/ Last updated: 2026-04-16T18:05:33.000Z Good afternoon. The fuel shortages this week in Maputo and other cities may look like an inevitable symptom of the global energy supply shock caused by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran. But Mozambique's crisis is not quite what it seems. Beneath the surface, it is exposing a more fundamental constraint in the country’s economy. At the heart of the crisis is a foreign exchange squeeze that is now biting into essential imports. Fuel distributors must secure bank guarantees, typically via letters of credit, in order to release fuel delivered to Mozambican ports. Yet commercial banks, facing a shortage of foreign currency, are struggling to provide those guarantees. The result is a bottleneck at the point where fuel should be entering the domestic market: cargoes arrive, but cannot be released at scale. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ce420707-32e5-4408-b5da-6511682ef4a1/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogSeven officials from the Ministry of Finance were arrested today on suspicion of involvement in a corruption and extortion scheme within the Treasury. According to the website Integrity, the individuals are accused of demanding commissions of up to 10% from businesses in exchange for facilitating the full payment of outstanding invoices for goods and services supplied to the state. In December last year, other staff members at the ministry were arrested for similar practices, including illicit schemes relating to VAT refunds.![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/B2jtPqguJUcYf380I1gCEAqh37TrAL19IngKbjVfWiLTQ8jVcn9FDm9tpMxUeuWb1CD-gS42fQV2On3bA2Te8nMVnlbk4NHaPMJgWIt-Eb_x7c7ZB1r90j5fQdF1cRKwXmbW3nr_PTIwbDe0cr_kJ1hh4834pb3XAQ7RrOgjiRZAg6ZX65fzWg_xHh8cuNnXlVUON9YxwvYnBKrgQCVufJl0reNXkVO6X4X-epLWwF0dq9XeIV-l4AV1D8Fla53bFjz5NHnVH__y7GDNagUsQPsxj1RT6GQAz2RpmM8kPldLFBgqJ5LmNfo_oyFMd7MynB-kFJ8xxfCuOJkZUPNuNQ.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4710?ref=zitamar.com) This is not a marginal technical issue. It is a systemic constraint. Mozambique’s import model, coordinated through Imopetro, effectively centralises risk: when financing fails, it fails for everyone at once. The system is efficient in normal times, but brittle under stress. There is, of course, a broader context that cannot be ignored. Global fuel markets are under strain, with supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions tightening availability and pushing prices upward. Mozambique is not insulated from this. In a constrained global market, smaller and less liquid buyers inevitably find themselves at a disadvantage. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s IMF push runs up against reform reality URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-imf-push-runs-up-against-reform-reality/ Last updated: 2026-04-15T16:01:32.000Z Mozambique’s government is stepping up its effort to secure a new programme with the International Monetary Fund, pointing to a series of recent moves as evidence of renewed credibility. Speaking after Tuesday’s Council of Ministers meeting, government spokesman and economic planning minister Salim Valá highlighted the decision to make an early repayment of IMF debt as proof that Maputo is serious about honouring its commitments and opening the door to new agreements. With Finance Minister Carla Loveira in Washington for the Spring Meetings, and efforts underway to renegotiate debt with the support of American financial consultants, the message is one of active re-engagement with international partners. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ad60bf52-05bd-4a19-90c6-219f4b160184/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live Blog![](https://static.ghost.org/v5.0.0/images/link-icon.svg)Telegram![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/VHoXPgkiGNyXkcFlRajieeu3UYsRNxuPnap2oJIHt5hh33sfxfGPmB-JbqARlhrI1jqgjv0WwFOa3rSQmI7e-7YD9a6AMLxEZjaNcsyrJZgkszqgs4dmFbBSppfFld44HYSFO93mJjDXlQrdo_GrZ62Ov4N5adpLDDOooPkGeDM_8cl7eXE6Dsn5orWtRCvhQfBonntVAMksXHJ9-94gSr4ZtYdnIbXhTeJZ04XRXjwv5vYpX9e61JSthxxEOzGo5D7EMrKtIn9XUJM9b7Hdq-jd0JTFrG4RN-5MgiL_9gy_biF2w6uCvXFkIpqp_beumCa-7jx707vOY1DKG9qGuQ.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4703?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But the question is not just whether Mozambique will implement IMF-backed reforms, but whether it is currently in a position to do so. The Fund’s diagnosis of the economy is by now familiar. Growth has remained subdued since the hidden debts crisis, poverty has risen, and external financing has yet to recover. The government’s recent steps, including repaying IMF debt ahead of schedule when it was not strictly required to do so, are intended to signal discipline. Yet they also come at a time when financing conditions are tightening. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### From fuel queues to energy strategy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/from-fuel-queues-to-energy-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-04-14T18:34:02.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique does not have a fuel crisis. Ships are arriving, supply chains are functioning, and, by all credible accounts, there is no immediate shortage. But prices will rise. Existing fuel stocks were procured at earlier, lower prices, but new shipments are already being ordered at significantly higher rates. That increase will soon feed through to consumers. The queues that periodically form at filling stations are a reminder of how exposed the economy remains to imported fuels, even as the country sits on significant domestic energy resources. That contradiction is getting harder to ignore. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/10544591-ad19-4112-8960-b7e916087d16/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In principle, Mozambique has two clear alternatives for its transport sector: gas and electricity. Both are available domestically. Both could, over time, reduce the country’s dependence on imported petrol and diesel. Yet in practice, neither has moved beyond the margins. Gas is the more immediate case. Mozambique has long had the technical possibility of using compressed natural gas in vehicles, and in Autogás has a company that in principle stands ready to build out the infrastructure and the market. But progress has been limited. The economics, on the surface, are compelling. Gas can cost roughly half as much as petrol at the pump, and around 4,000 vehicles are already using it, including commercial fleets of drinks companies Coca-Cola and the distributor Handling. But scaling beyond that has proved difficult. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The elephant in the room URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-elephant-in-the-room/ Last updated: 2026-04-13T16:39:43.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s elephants have returned to the centre of policy debate, following last week’s conference on the “wildlife economy” in Maputo. That is welcome in principle. But some of the claims now circulating risk distorting both the problem and the response. There is no credible case for elephant overpopulation in Niassa. The most recent census by the Wildlife Conservation Society puts the reserve’s population at 4,471 animals in 2024\. Across Africa as a whole, the population is estimated at roughly 450,000, and less than 13,000 in Mozambique as a whole. Against those figures, suggestions that Niassa might host millions of elephants are not serious. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f2cf2887-6a05-4a42-a4b3-708273f05711/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Insurgents kill one in Macomia, loot homes in Cabo Delgado attacksGunmen raid villages in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia, killing a resident, abducting civilians and stealing goods![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-332.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-04-13-15.45.51.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-one-in-macomia-loot-homes-in-cabo-delgado-attacks/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Nor is the picture on the ground one of simple, escalating conflict between people and wildlife. Human–elephant conflict is real, but it is not intractable. In several parts of the country, mitigation measures have shown tangible results, reducing crop losses and limiting encounters without resorting to lethal means. These experiences point to a practical path forward, grounded in better land-use planning and community engagement. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents kill one in Macomia, loot homes in Cabo Delgado attacks URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-one-in-macomia-loot-homes-in-cabo-delgado-attacks/ Last updated: 2026-04-13T14:11:49.000Z Armed attackers killed one person on Friday, 10 April, in a village in Cabo Delgado’s Macomia District, as the Islamic State-linked insurgency carried out a series of raids across the province, looting homes, abducting civilians and heightening fears of a new wave of violence. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Will rising prices fuel more protests? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-rising-prices-fuel-more-protests/ Last updated: 2026-04-10T15:55:29.000Z Good afternoon. The scale of the fuel crisis facing Mozambique as a result of the war in the Middle East is laid bare in the latest figures for fuel imports. Imported fuel for this month cost $230m, nearly three times the cost in recent months, according to government figures (see below). Part of the cost increase is due to a rise in the basic price of fuel: petrol went up by nearly 50% and diesel, the backbone of the economy which powers everything from lorries to water pumps, doubled in price. But a substantial chunk of the increase was due to other costs, such as insurance and transport. The government confirms that some 80% of the country’s fuel imports have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Even if the strait is now going to reopen to shipping, which is not yet clear, the risks, and therefore the costs, of shipping fuel through it are likely to remain elevated for some time. As this newsletter noted [yesterday](https://www.zitamar.com/dollars-are-drying-up/), the spike in fuel prices comes amid a shortage of foreign currency, which means that fuel importers will find it particularly hard to pay these elevated prices in US dollars. The Bank of Mozambique is refusing to provide foreign currency to pay for the imports, as it has done in the past. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3879661b-17cf-40fe-80e8-9f2148ace1e6/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Quite what all this means for the economy and society remains unclear, not least because it is not clear what the government’s response is going to be. The rise in transport costs is going to hit people hard: it is usual for a Maputo resident earning about MZN10,000 ($156) a month to spend about MZN3,000 on transport. President Daniel Chapo has promised subsidies for public transport, but has not said if this will cover only publicly run bus services or also the minibuses (*chapas*) used by the majority of urban residents. And then there is the inevitable rise in food costs. Potentially the government could mitigate this by removing VAT on food items that currently carry it. But at the end of the day, the government does not have the money to subsidise the cost of living in a big way. It cannot even repay all its debts on time as things stand. A rise in living costs seems inevitable, which could well fuel social unrest. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Dollars are drying up URL: https://www.zitamar.com/dollars-are-drying-up/ Last updated: 2026-04-09T15:12:15.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambican businesses will not be pleased to hear about the latest news that points to ever-falling inflows of foreign currency (mainly US dollars) into the country. As a net exporter of electricity, sales of power form a significant part of its exports, over 5% last year. Electricity exports fell by almost 37% in 2025 compared to 2024, according to the latest figures from the Bank of Mozambique, a drop of just over $230m. Total exports also fell 5%. Much of that fall is a fall in government revenue, through the government’s majority ownership of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam. It has been clear for some time now that drought conditions have had a severe effect on electricity generation at Cahora Bassa, whose reservoir is fed by the Zambezi river. What is happening now, however, is that that trend is combining with other trends to compound the pressure on the country’s net exports, and therefore how much foreign currency is coming in. Electricity generation is expected to pick up now that water levels are rising in the rainy season, but that does not necessarily affect the long-term trend, which could well be one of declining water levels. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/839a298b-8faf-4235-ab50-e08ff9118fe7/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 March - 5 April 2026)The past two weeks have been quiet. Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has maintained a presence in Macomia and visited mine sites in Meluco, likely for extortion purposes![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-331.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-04-09-08.45.41.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-march-2026-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique’s current account deficit, the amount by which the cost of its imports exceeds the cost of its exports, has been on a downward trend since the end of 2023\. If we exclude the periods when the figures were affected by the covid-19 pandemic and by the import of the multi-billion-dollar Coral South floating gas platform in 2022, then the current account deficit in the fourth quarter of last year was the worst since 2019, according to figures from Trading Economics. One industry that exported more last year compared to 2024 was aluminium production, in the form of the Mozal aluminium smelter. But the smelter was shut down last month, with no chance of it restarting this year even if a new buyer is found. Meanwhile, heavy mineral sands exports are being hit by a fall in global prices. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 March - 5 April 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-march-2026-2/ Last updated: 2026-04-09T07:19:47.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (23 March - 5 April 2026) At least **3** political violence events (**2,345** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **3** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,518** since 1 October 2017) At least **3** reported civilian fatalities (**2,735** since 1 October 2017) At least **2** political violence event involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,174** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview The past two weeks have been quiet. Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has maintained a presence in Macomia and visited mine sites in Meluco, likely for extortion purposes. On the coast, the Defence Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy continues to patrol, seeking to block the mouth of the Messalo river, though relations with communities remain tense after the 15 March killing of fishers. In the political sphere, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has challenged oil companies and the Mozambican government to pay for Rwanda’s military presence or face withdrawal. ## Situation summary **ISM maintains Macomia presence** Despite [recent operations](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-25-march-2026?ref=zitamar.com) by Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Catupa forest, ISM maintains a presence in Macomia and Muidumbe district on both sides of the Messalo river. On 31 March, a group of up to 30 militants, according to one source, attacked a group of fishers at Nguri lake in Muidumbe district. The insurgents had come to the area by boat, moving along the Messalo river from the coast. According to a separate source, they have been unable to return to the coast, their boat having been swept away. According to another source, a separate group of insurgents remains in northern Macomia district on the southern side of the Messalo river, presenting a threat to Chai and environs. **Insurgents visit mine sites in Meluco** South of Macomia district, a large group of insurgents visited gold mine sites at Minhanha and Ravia on 30 and 31 March. They first visited Matandane mine at Minhanha, approximately 30 kilometers north of Meluco town, where one source said there were over 100 militants. According to another source, the militants said they intended to attack Macomia town soon. The following day, they appeared at the Ravia mines, approximately 30 km southwest of Meluco. In the following days, they moved back northward. The group was likely extorting artisanal miners at both locations, for either cash or gold, an [increasingly important](https://acleddata.com/report/ransom-gold-and-spoils-war-islamic-state-mozambiques-new-cash-flow?ref=zitamar.com) source of income for ISM. **Clash heard near Silva Macua** Further south, on the morning of 1 April, people heard gunfire coming from forests between Silva Macua and Metoro. In the afternoon, they heard two rocket-propelled grenade bombardments and saw smoke. This prompted people in neighboring areas to flee to Silva Macua. Those fleeing could not say who was responsible for the gunfire and bombardments. **Suspected soldiers block road** An unidentified armed group stopped a vehicle near Litingina on 26 March and extorted money from those aboard, according to local sources. Litingina is on the main road, 18 km south of Nangade town. Locals believe members of FADM, which has a position less than 100 meters from the incident, are responsible. Sources disagree on the ownership of the vehicle. One said it belongs to a private company, while another said it belongs to a Mozambican nongovernmental organization. **Unfulfilled capulana promises spark violence in Nampula** Officers of the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) fired on women demonstrating in the Anchilo area outside Nampula town on 4 April, injuring one. A child was also injured, reportedly trampled. According to [reports](https://opais.co.mz/mulher-baleada-em-protesto-por-falta-de-entrega-de-capulanas-em-nampula/?ref=zitamar.com), women were protesting Frelimo’s failure to provide them with capulanas, as had been [promised](https://www.zitamar.com/gueta-antoinette-trips-on-her-capulana/) by Gueta Chapo, the president’s wife, ahead of the 7 April Women’s Day holiday. Protesters [vandalized](https://www.tiktok.com/@mhlanga700/video/7624921794683669781?ref=zitamar.com) a Frelimo office and blocked the N1 road running to Nampula. The intensity of the protests suggest that the women were motivated by more fundamental grievances. Gueta Chapo’s [statement](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=700779369758999) on 2 April that capulanas are in the shops, and that she does not own the factories, could only have exacerbated their frustrations. ## Focus: State relations with coastal communities remain tense Since the [15 March killing](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-25-march-2026?ref=zitamar.com) of at least 13 fishers off the coast of southern Mocímboa da Praia, FADM appears to be pulling back, for now, from its confrontational approach to any sea traffic, whether civilian or ISM. According to a source in Mucojo, daily FADM navy patrols continue along the Macomia coast. The patrols engage civilly with fishers they encounter, warning them to go further north than Pequeue on the coast and Mejumbe island, saying there are ongoing operations. North of Pequeue and Mejumbe (also known as Dejumbe) lies Quiterajo, which has [remained outside the state’s control](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-28-january-2026?ref=zitamar.com) for some time. The FADM navy’s principal concern is with ISM’s use of the Messalo river as a route to and from their operational areas inland. Calugo, where the 13 fishers were killed, lies less than 10 km north of the broad, mangrove-dotted mouth of the Messalo river. Countering ISM on land and sea in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia requires a more fundamental shift in approach. FADM’s [apology](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-security-forces-apologise-for-killing-13-fishermen-in-cabo-delgado/) for the 15 March killings, delivered at a public meeting in Mocímboa da Praia, was, according to witnesses, not part of the agenda, but a response to the discontent that FADM officers encountered at the meeting. Further south on the Macomia coast, reports of a possible withdrawal of Rwandan forces raised concerns. The Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) assured locals that no pullout is planned, and that any future withdrawal would be well-signaled. Rwandan forces remain the preferred point of contact for the community in Macomia. On 29 March, four people who had left ISM, three men and a woman, appeared in the Mucojo area. Residents took them to the Rwandans where, according to a source, they can expect to be treated well. ## Roundup *Kagame threatens to withdraw troops from Mozambique* President Paul Kagame has called on the government of Mozambique, TotalEnergies, and Exxon to “figure out how to pay for the security they need,” estimated at 100 million US dollars per year. In an [interview with Jeune Afrique](https://youtu.be/jBTZKT2uTe4?si=a9ZQs9h-XhV2xKda&t=1321&ref=zitamar.com) published 3 April on YouTube, Kagame said Rwanda could “pack our bags and go” if security is not needed. Rwanda has over 6,300 personnel, mostly RDF, but also police, according to government [spokesperson Yolande Makolo](https://x.com/YolandeMakolo/status/2039646432857059355?ref=zitamar.com). Kagame’s remarks on Mozambique should be read in the context of the United States Treasury placing[ sanctions on the RDF](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411?ref=zitamar.com), a connection made explicit by Minister for Foreign Affairs Oliver Nduhungirehe in March. In a 14 March[ comment](https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/2032858051502375053?ref=zitamar.com) on social media, he objected to seeing “our valiant soldiers being constantly questioned, vilified, criticised, blamed or sanctioned by the very countries that greatly benefit from our intervention in Mozambique." Kagame’s ultimatum puts the companies and the US government in a difficult position. Companies working in extractive industries are required by[ US](https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020-318?ref=zitamar.com) and[ European](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/public-country-country-reporting%5Fen??ref=zitamar.com) law to disclose payments to governments. Any payments to Rwandan forces are likely to be through the[ existing mechanism](https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-new-security-deal-between-mozambique-and-gas-project-investors/) by which companies pay Mozambique’s finance ministry to support Mozambican forces deployed at the project site. If adopted, this could be interpreted as a means of avoiding sanctions and evading payment transparency requirements, potentially leading to significant reputational, political, and legal risks. *HRW calls for an urgent investigation into the killing of fishers by the Mozambican navy* Human Rights Watch (HRW) has [called](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/30/mozambique-navy-linked-to-killing-of-fishermen?ref=zitamar.com) for a transparent and urgent investigation into the [killing](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) of at least 13 fishers off the coast of Mocímboa da Praia on 15 March, reportedly by Mozambican naval forces enforcing coastal restrictions. The organization also urged accountability and compensation for the victims. The incident occurred as part of efforts to restrict insurgent movement along the coast and highlights the continued risks faced by civilians whose livelihoods depend on fishing. HRW warned that such abuses could exacerbate local grievances and undermine broader counterinsurgency efforts. *UN faces major funding gap for humanitarian response in Northern Mozambique* The UN has [appealed](https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-un-needs-us348-million-for-2026-humanitarian-plan-only-a-third-raised/?ref=zitamar.com) for $348 million to support 1.1 million people affected by conflict in northern Mozambique in 2026, but has secured only around one-third of the required funding. The response prioritises high-severity districts in Cabo Delgado, while also covering parts of Nampula and Niassa, and has already reached over 300,000 people with food aid and basic services. However, a widening funding gap — compounded by additional needs linked to recent flooding — is raising concerns about the sustainability of humanitarian operations in affected areas. ### An SOS for the INSS URL: https://www.zitamar.com/an-sos-for-the-inss/ Last updated: 2026-04-08T16:22:43.000Z Good afternoon. Another head of the National Social Security Institute (INSS) is engulfed in scandal. Joaquim Siuta is currently under arrest, accused of involvement in schemes to divert money from the institute, which manages pension funds on behalf of Mozambicans in employed work. At least two other members of staff are also suspected of involvement. The labour ministry has issued a statement promising that the INSS continues to function normally and the pensions system remains solid and stable. But can a pensions system be solid and stable if the people in charge are looting and mismanaging it? Without prejudicing the current investigation, we already know that the INSS has a corruption problem, and one which extends beyond the behaviour of its current staff. In 2022, for example, the former labour minister Helena Taipo was convicted of corruption offences including receiving bribes from companies in exchange for getting the INSS to invest its funds in their property development projects. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e2854e70-632e-411f-9834-2daf6bb80268/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Dubious investments are something of an INSS speciality. In 2014, MZN84m ($1.3m) was diverted from INSS funds to buy four aircraft from the company CR Aviation, according to prosecutors. The INSS’ then director general, Baptista Machaieie, was jailed for eight years in 2020 over the scandal. But that case is dwarfed by the MZN3.5bn ($55m) which the INSS sank into Nosso Banco, the commercial bank which collapsed in 2016\. The INSS owned over 77% of the bank, even after the central bank had found it to be poorly managed and under-capitalised. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Who will pick up Rwanda’s bill? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-will-pick-up-rwandas-bill/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T15:24:29.000Z Good afternoon. Is the Rwandan government going to pull its troops out of northern Mozambique? Probably not for now is the short answer; but it is still determined to make people believe that this is a credible threat. That is the explanation for Rwandan president Paul Kagame’s interview last week with the magazine *Jeune Afrique*, where he went further than before in discussing the cost of the Rwandan military mission. This mission sees 6,300 soldiers and police, according to newly disclosed Rwandan figures, help to fight the Islamic State-backed insurgents in the north. According to Kagame, the mission has cost Rwanda four to five times the funding that the European Union (EU) has provided for it in each of its funding packages. The EU has provided two funding packages, in 2022 and 2024, of €20m (about $23m) each; that implies that the Rwandan government is spending around $92-115m a year out of its own pocket. Kagame’s interview comes in the wake of media reports saying that the EU will not renew the funding it has been providing for the Rwandan mission via the European Peace Facility. According to a recent article in French newspaper *Le Monde*, the reason is not really United States sanctions on the Rwandan armed forces, but more likely opposition from some EU member states due to Rwandan military support for the M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b295b6a9-e476-4e73-b5e9-5114374da7f0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As *Le Monde*’s sources in Brussels point out, the end of EU funding would not be catastrophic for the Rwandans, since it represents a minority of the cost of the mission anyway. So that in itself does not explain this tough new negotiating line from the Kagame regime. What it cares about most is probably the US sanctions. As this newsletter [noted](https://www.zitamar.com/the-rwandans-arent-leaving/) recently, the sanctions applied to the Rwanda Defence Force and some of its commanders risk damaging Rwanda’s reputation as a provider of peacekeeping forces and its ability to continue carrying out that role across Africa, something very important to Kagame. It may be that securing external support for the Rwandan mission in Mozambique, as well as being financially welcome, would also help to restore its credibility internationally. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### LAM, João Pó, and a questionable case URL: https://www.zitamar.com/lam-joao-po-and-a-questionable-case/ Last updated: 2026-04-02T16:23:02.000Z Good afternoon. When public figures go on trial in Mozambique for corruption or other abuses of their position, they tend to face a trial by public opinion first. Curiously, that does not seem to be happening in the case of João Pó Jorge, commonly known as João Pó, the former director-general of state-owned airline LAM. Pó is one of several LAM executives who have been arrested as part of what looks like a wide-ranging investigation into corruption and mismanagement at the airline. He has been in prison for 36 days now without any charge, but weekly newspaper *Canal de Moçambique* suggested yesterday that prosecutors believe he was involved in alleged undue payments to [Fly Modern Ark](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/fly-modern-ark), the consultancy brought in to rescue the struggling LAM. For about a year and a half between 2023 and 2024, Fly Modern Ark (FMA) effectively ran LAM. According to Canal, prosecutors think that, because LAM continued to lose money, this shows that the contract was not fulfilled. If that really is their argument, it might be difficult to argue in court. But in any case, it would be difficult to pin the blame for any failings by FMA on Pó. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0d766643-f9af-4cb6-885b-7843c544e24d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That FMA’s management of LAM was a disappointment is clear. Some of its decisions, like the acquisition of a cargo plane and the resumption of the loss-making flights between Lisbon and Maputo, have now been reversed. Whether FMA’s behaviour rises to the level of a crime is another matter. Regardless, *Zitamar News* understands that Pó maintains he had nothing to do with FMA’s decisions, nor with the payments made to it. In fact, we are told, he objected to several of them, like the acquisition of the cargo plane, the Lisbon-Maputo flights and the discounting of domestic plane tickets by 30%. But they went ahead anyway. In fact, Pó offered to resign when FMA was brought in, but he remained at the request of then transport minister Mateus Magala. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents play the peace card URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-play-the-peace-card/ Last updated: 2026-04-01T15:34:47.000Z Good afternoon. While the rest of the world seems to get only more warlike, a kind of peace has descended on Cabo Delgado province recently. There have not been any major attacks by the Islamic State-backed insurgents recorded in the last two months, with the exception of an insurgent [raid](https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-attack-military-escorted-convoy-in-macomia/) on a convoy transporting food near the village of Quinto Congresso in February. The object of that attack was apparently to get hold of food to address a food shortage the insurgents must have had. Of attacks on civilians (which insurgents are happy to do generally) there has been no sign since about January. Kidnappings have also reduced, although they have not ended completely. In the past, a drop in insurgent violence was sometimes attributed to the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. However, the violence has not resumed since Ramadan ended on 18 March. It has been evident across the province, not just in the insurgent heartlands of Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts, the two places where the insurgents enjoy local support due to their extensive family ties. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/21f350b3-0e09-46dc-90ac-01b038a38f0c/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Instead, when insurgents have been on the move in the last two months, they have shown signs of adopting a renewed emphasis on a “hearts and minds” strategy. On meeting villagers, they have urged them not to be afraid and promised that they have not come to kill them. They have sometimes offered to pay for the food they take, and have talked to locals about Islam. Two days ago in Meluco district, insurgents passed through a mining area without violence (see below). Insurgents often visit areas where informal mining goes on, in order to charge protection money. None of this is unprecedented, to be sure, but it is notable that it comes amid a pause in violence against civilians. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A sick country in an economic pandemic URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-sick-country-in-an-economic-pandemic/ Last updated: 2026-03-31T15:27:08.000Z Good afternoon. Government ministers are going to be practising their lines ahead of attending the “spring meetings” of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington DC in two weeks’ time. It will be their first chance to sit down with IMF executives since their visit to Mozambique at the end of last year. That meeting, of course, failed to result in a loan deal from the IMF, to the government’s disappointment. And in the meantime, an increasing number of red lights have started flashing on its dashboard. As the war in the Middle East drags on, the picture of the damage it is doing to Mozambique’s economy is only getting worse. Mozambique’s external public sector debt is now considered the most risky in Africa by the bond market: yesterday, the yield on the state’s sole eurobond hit 16.29%, or more than 14 percentage points above US treasury bonds. Anything above a 10 percentage point margin over US treasuries is considered distressed debt territory. The *Bloomberg* news service reported yesterday that the war had led to a rise in the pricing of emerging market risk, especially for those countries that import energy. But even by those standards, it added, Mozambique had performed particularly badly: its debt has gone up in yield more than the African average. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/aa98ad89-549c-4d3c-a776-e69cb9a6e87d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) To repeat a point that this newsletter made last week, while just about every country is being harmed by the Middle Eastern conflict, Mozambique is particularly exposed. Not only does it import fuel, but fuel imports make up a significant proportion of imports by value, and a lot of that fuel (notably fuel from oil produced in the United Arab Emirates) comes from shipments that have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, where oil tanker traffic has collapsed due to the threat of Iranian drone attacks. The secretary of state for the treasury, Amilcar Tivane, has said that the country can deal with oil prices up to $120 a barrel, but yesterday, the Brent crude oil benchmark price hit $117\. In addition, the rise in fertiliser prices is set to drive up the cost of food in a country that imports a lot of foodstuffs. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Renamo’s survival instinct URL: https://www.zitamar.com/renamos-survival-instinct/ Last updated: 2026-03-30T17:18:12.000Z Renamo’s leader Ossufo Momade appears finally to be edging towards the exit. After years of internal dissent, public embarrassment and electoral decline, even his allies now speak openly of a transition. But to frame this as a simple leadership change would be to miss the point. Renamo’s problem is not just Momade: it is survival. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bf42d84d-4e6a-4d2b-bc09-420ac8c05c6d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For all its organisational weakness, the party retains a national constituency. Its voters have not disappeared — they have simply drifted, become disengaged, or lent their support elsewhere. In the next electoral cycle, they may well coalesce again, if Renamo is reenergised by a new leader. That explains the current manoeuvring for the leadership of a party that had already been declared dead by some observers. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A difficult changing of the guard at the Bar URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-difficult-changing-of-the-guard-at-the-bar/ Last updated: 2026-03-27T18:30:39.000Z Elections for the leadership of Mozambique’s Bar Association (OAM) rarely attract much public attention. This time, they should. Four candidates are contesting the position of bastonário. On paper, that might suggest a healthy democratic process. In practice, it raises a more troubling question: whether any of them are prepared to do what the role increasingly demands. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4d3d4c92-928f-4a9e-abe7-b25514c6ecea/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique-flagged tanker seized off MarseilleA Russian oil tanker sailing under a Mozambican flag of convenience has been detained in the French port of Marseille since Monday![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-328.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-27-09.47.08.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-flagged-tanker-seized-off-marseille/) [Mozambique security forces apologise for killing 13 fishermen in Cabo DelgadoMilitary admits role in deadly shooting at sea but faces public anger and mistrust amid rising civilian casualties![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-329.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-27-14.17.39.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-security-forces-apologise-for-killing-13-fishermen-in-cabo-delgado/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The outgoing president, Carlos Martins, has set a high bar. Elected on an independent ticket against a candidate seen as aligned with Frelimo, he has used his mandate to position the Bar as a rare institutional voice willing to confront abuses of power. His tenure has been marked less by technical legal interventions than by public stands on issues that many others have preferred to avoid. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique-flagged tanker seized off Marseille URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-flagged-tanker-seized-off-marseille/ Last updated: 2026-03-27T17:51:19.000Z A Russian oil tanker sailing under a Mozambican flag of convenience has been detained in the French port of Marseille since Monday. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique security forces apologise for killing 13 fishermen in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-security-forces-apologise-for-killing-13-fishermen-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-03-27T12:26:41.000Z Mozambique’s defence and security forces have apologised for [killing at least 13 fishermen](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) at sea off Mocímboa da Praia, admitting responsibility for the massacre carried out by the navy. At a community meeting on Wednesday, 25 March in Nabubussi, in the district capital of Mocímboa da Praia, military and police commanders acknowledged their role in the 15 March incident, when naval troops opened fire on six fishing boats near the village of Calugo, killing at least 13 fishermen. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### World Bank lays a wreath on the economy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/world-bank-lays-a-wreath-on-the-economy/ Last updated: 2026-03-26T16:18:17.000Z Good afternoon. The World Bank did not pull its punches in its latest report on Mozambique’s economy, published last week (see below). The problems it identified will not be new to *Zitamar News* readers, but it is unusual to hear such a wide variety of criticisms - which verge on political statements at times - coming from such a conservative institution as a development bank. The World Bank repeated many of the points which the International Monetary Fund has been making repeatedly (IMF). Public sector wages and debt interest payments take up too much of tax revenue (87% last year). This limits the ability of the government to spend money on pressing social needs like improving education and healthcare. Public sector debt is getting bigger and more unsustainable. The tax base needs to be broadened to raise additional revenue. All familiar from the IMF. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1ede7313-9861-45e6-bd3d-ce14cd712345/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But it went further. It illustrated, with a remarkable graph, how public sector earnings are wildly out of proportion with gross national income, compared to the rest of the world. The public sector is not exceptionally large, the report finds; but it is exceptionally highly paid for such a poor country. Measures to control the wage bill since the disastrous salary reform of 2022 have not been effective enough, it found. There is hardly an aspect of the economy that the World Bank is not concerned about. Ballooning public sector debt has been crowding out lending to the private sector, as commercial banks have bought more and more government bonds. The foreign currency shortage means there is an estimated backlog of $800m of payments waiting to leave the country. Government controls on rice and wheat imports are “expected to cause several economic distortions”. Agricultural productivity is too low, and contributes to severe economic inequality across the regions. The currently projected economic recovery will be too weak to reduce the number of people living in poverty, as it will not keep up with population growth. “Poverty is projected to remain stubbornly high, with limited progress in job creation or improved service delivery. Every year, 500,000 Mozambicans enter the labor market, but only 30,000 formal jobs are created”, the report says. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The land of fake news URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-land-of-fake-news/ Last updated: 2026-03-25T16:44:33.000Z Good afternoon. This week, the Mozambican media has been keenly reporting a letter from aluminium maker Mozal to the Attorney-General’s Office, rejecting any suggestion that its decision to shut down its aluminium smelter was not taken lawfully. The letter was reported in state-controlled daily newspaper *Notícias*, before being picked up by website *Diario Econômico* and newssheet *Mediafax.* The only problem is that the letter was fake. A good look at it should have at least alerted a sensible person, never mind a journalist, to this possibility. The logo used was not Mozal’s logo and the formatting was odd. Nevertheless, the letter was reported on as if it were genuine. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0bdd128b-4a1c-408f-80ac-40f3c9a9847f/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (9 - 22 March 2026)A Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy patrol fired on six fishing boats off Mocímboa da Praia on 15 March, killing at least 13 people![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-327.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-25-18.18.47.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-march-2026/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is another embarrassing episode for the Mozambican media, which in general is not known for its high editorial standards. Quite often this newsletter has to correct, if not completely reject, stories published by Mozambican news outlets which contain inaccuracies or are based on briefings from unreliable people. There are some good journalists out there, but news outlets generally suffer from a lack of resources, so that there are not many people and not much time to check stories. *Notícias* did not check the letter with Mozal before publishing the story. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (9 - 22 March 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-march-2026/ Last updated: 2026-03-25T16:29:42.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (9 - 22 March 2026) At least **2** political violence events (**2,342** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **13** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,515** since 1 October 2017) At least **13** reported civilian fatalities (**2,732** since 1 October 2017) At least **1** political violence event involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,172** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview A Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy patrol fired on six fishing boats off Mocímboa da Praia on 15 March, killing at least 13 people. This continues a trend of FADM attacks on civilian boats in Cabo Delgado’s nearshore waters that has increased significantly since 2024\. Elsewhere in the province, operations against Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) militants continued in Catupa forest. Further south, in Meluco district, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) established a new outpost on the N380, even as Rwanda’s foreign minister raised the prospect of withdrawal from Cabo Delgado. ## Situation summary **FADM kills at least 13 fishers off Mocímboa da Praia** On the morning of 15 March, in waters near Calugo village in southern Mocímboa da Praia, soldiers on a FADM navy vessel [opened fire](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) on six fishing boats, killing at least 13 young men, according to Zitamar News. The men were from the Ntende area of the Nabubussi neighborhood of Mocímboa da Praia town. The killings came in the wake of a similar incident on 6 March, when soldiers of FADM’s navy opened fire on a boat near Lucete, north of Calugo. There were no casualties. Such incidents have increased significantly since January 2024 (see the Focus section below). FADM is aiming to assert maritime control, but the effectiveness of its aggressive approach is questionable. Six days later, according to sources in the village, a group of ISM militants celebrated Eid al-Fitr in Ulo village, further up the coast and just 12 kilometers from Mocímboa da Praia town. Clearly, coastal communities are not turning their backs to the insurgents. The continued killings at sea are unlikely to sway public sympathies toward FADM. **Clashes continue in Catupa forest** Even as some militants spent a peaceful Eid in Ulo, others were engaged in clashes in Catupa forest. According to multiple sources, on 20 March, people in Quinto Congresso heard heavy gunfire from the direction of Catupa forest. The fighting likely involved FADM, possibly with Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) support, trying to take ISM positions in the forest. ISM’s headquarters is thought to lie deep in the most wooded part of the Catupa area, though surrounded by a number of outposts that ISM refers to as “ribats.” There has been intermittent fighting in the area since ISM [overran two FADM positions](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-11-february-2026?ref=zitamar.com) in Catupa forest on 31 January. One of those outposts may be close to the Messalo river, approximately 6 km to the east of the N380 road, according to a reliable source, who reported that a large number of fighters were on site. **RDF establishes position in Meluco district** The RDF has set up an outpost at the 19 de Outubro village, popularly known as ADPP, in Meluco district, about 35 km south of Macomia town on the N380, according to a source in the area. The position is located at the junction with the R767, allowing access to Quissanga to the east, Meluco to the west, and Ancuabe to the south. ## Focus: A deadly fishing embargo Data suggest that FADM’s terms of engagement at sea changed in early 2024, leading to a significant increase in civilian fatalities (*see chart below*). Since January 2024, FADM’s navy has targeted fishers at least 10 times between Muisunne island off Mocímboa da Praia town in the north to Matemo island in the south. The most deadly event was in January 2024, when FADM killed 30 fishermen close to Muissune Island (also known as Suna Island), approximately 20 km out from Mocímboa da Praia town. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/03/data-src-image-fe12ca74-20f7-4f00-964b-66eb2b28900e.png) From 2019 to 2023, FADM targeted fishers five times, resulting in 13 fatalities. In the less than two and half years since, there have been 10 such events resulting in at least 85 deaths, with most concentrated in Macomia (*see map below*). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/03/data-src-image-8d74bf77-f23b-4846-b8c6-403b08655e4d.png) FADM’s restrictions on fishing stem from its concerns that ISM can move supplies and personnel in the guise of civilian boats. There is, effectively, a current ban on small boat traffic close to shore. But it is unclear how FADM defines these restrictions, and it does not clearly communicate which areas are affected. Fishers in Macomia district[ complained](https://moztimes.com/en/military-patrols-keep-fishermen-ashore-in-macomia/?ref=zitamar.com) of the risks the restrictions pose in September 2025, saying they had been able to perform their work. But with economic opportunities scarce in Cabo Delgado, many young men continue to go to sea. The fishers targeted in the most recent incident were [reportedly](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) aware of ongoing restrictions, but chose to fish anyway. FADM’s indiscriminate targeting of civilian boats likely builds resentment toward the state in coastal communities and potentially encourages support for ISM. ## Roundup *Rwanda threatens to withdraw troops from Mozambique* Rwanda has [warned](https://aimnews.org/2026/03/16/rwanda-warns-that-it-may-withdraw-its-troops/?ref=zitamar.com) it may withdraw its troops from Cabo Delgado if international partners fail to provide reliable funding. Officials from Kigali say Rwanda has borne most of the costs since deploying forces in 2021, receiving only limited support from the European Union. They argue the mission’s future depends on “adequate and predictable” financing and respect for Rwanda’s contribution, noting that their forces have helped secure key areas and protect major gas projects. Despite the strong rhetoric, a withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Cabo Delgado appears unlikely. The mission remains central to security in Cabo Delgado and to the protection of major liquefied natural gas investments, making Rwanda’s continued presence strategically important. EU funding covers only limited logistical costs and is unlikely to be the main issue. Instead, the warning appears to be tied to wider geopolitical pressures, including recent US sanctions linked to Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 rebels in eastern DRC. The statement may also be intended for key beneficiaries of Rwanda’s presence, notably TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, as well as their government backers. *UN experts warn AfDB that LNG funding risks human rights and climate harm* Four United Nations human rights experts have [expressed](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/mozambique-un-experts-concerned-african-development-bank-funding-floating?ref=zitamar.com) serious concerns over the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) 150 million USD loan for the Coral North floating LNG project in northern Mozambique, warning that it could worsen human rights abuses, environmental damage, and climate risks. They say the project could exacerbate existing problems in Cabo Delgado, where past gas developments have displaced communities, disrupted livelihoods, and provided few local benefits due to inadequate consultation and limited job opportunities. The experts also caution that expanding fossil fuel infrastructure will increase greenhouse gas emissions, undermine global climate targets, and divert scarce public funds from renewable energy. *ExxonMobil expects to make a final investment decision in the second half of 2026* President Daniel Chapo [announced](https://mznews.co.mz/en/exxonmobil-preve-decisao-final-de-investimento-no-segundo-semestre-de-2026/?ref=zitamar.com) that ExxonMobil plans to make a final investment decision on the Rovuma LNG project in Cabo Delgado during the second half of 2026\. He announced this during his visit to Brussels, where he met with company leaders. Chapo said the government approved two resolutions to establish multi-sector teams dedicated to the TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil projects. The aim is to improve coordination and accelerate technical and operational processes. ### A bad time to ask for a pay rise URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-bad-time-to-ask-for-a-pay-rise/ Last updated: 2026-03-24T16:35:31.000Z Good afternoon. Last year, this newsletter [noted](https://www.zitamar.com/minimal-expectations-for-minimum-wages/) that the prospects for a minimum wage increase did not look good for Mozambique’s lowest-paid employees. Much the same could be said about this year. Last year, the country was emerging from months of protests which shut down large parts of the economy. This year, the challenges are different, but equally severe. Last year, the government still managed to increase minimum wages by around 5% for most sectors. Will that be possible this time around? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0b5dcb7e-a83e-4278-9cdb-c31f41ba2ac3/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Southern Mozambique is about to be hit by a second wave of floods, which will damage crops and infrastructure and cut transport links all over again. The war in the Middle East is of course causing economic shock waves all over the world; however, those shocks are likely to be particularly big in a country like Mozambique that relies so heavily on imports for basic necessities; not just fuel, but food as well. The predicted rise in fertiliser prices is going to make that imported food more expensive. The Bank of Mozambique is going to struggle to control inflation. Yesterday, it announced that the Mimo policy interest rate would remain at 9.25% for the next month, the first time in about two years that it has not reduced the rate every month. Soon the bank may feel obliged to increase interest rates, further restricting growth. Meanwhile, many businesses remain in a defensive posture, unwilling to invest or expand operations without more reasons for optimism. Recent government interventions in businesses and the economy, from controlling rice and wheat imports to taking legal action against aluminium maker Mozal, have destabilised the business climate and will do nothing for confidence. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo does God URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-does-god/ Last updated: 2026-03-23T16:34:57.000Z Good afternoon. Visitors to a Mozambican government department may be surprised to find that Christian prayers are commonly held at internal meetings. Prayers also take place at public government events. But, as if to avoid accusations that he is favouring Christians, President Daniel Chapo is a regular visitor to mosques. There he can be seen wearing a thawb, the traditional Arabic long robe by Muslim men worldwide, while his wife Gueta wears a headscarf. Chapo also makes frequent references to God’s will in his speeches. All this might seem odd for what is supposed to be (according to the Mozambican constitution) a secular country. But Chapo seems to have chosen his targets carefully. Christians are the majority in Mozambique, and evangelical churches are particularly popular, and also highly influential on people’s social and political attitudes. One of them, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, owns the broadcaster TV Miramar. Chapo and his wife are both Catholics. After the disputed and fraud-ridden elections of 2024, the ruling Frelimo party tried to dampen down opposition by using evangelical churches to influence popular opinion. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6301c6e4-a44a-45b5-a78a-822f23a16d5a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Zitamar Week in Review, 15-22 March 2026 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-week-in-review-15-22-march-2026/ Last updated: 2026-03-23T16:06:55.000Z Good afternoon! Ahead of today’s Zitamar Daily Briefing, due out shortly, here’s a look back at last week in Mozambique — for paying and free subscribers alike. The week saw President Daniel Chapo travel to Brussels for important meetings with politicians and business leaders. He met with the heads of both TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, and senior European politicians. He is working to keep the LNG projects in the far north-east of the country on track, and that includes keeping the Rwandan military engaged in containing the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. Reports that the European Union will stop providing its subsidy for that deployment has led Rwanda to threaten to pull out, which could have disastrous consequences for the gas projects, among other things. But our assessment is that the threat is largely empty. [The Rwandans aren’t leavingDespite dragging Mozambique into its dispute with Donald Trump, the Rwandan government shows no real sign of withdrawing its security forces from Cabo Delgado province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-326.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-17-11.05.37.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/the-rwandans-arent-leaving/) Total and Exxon apparently provided assurances that their projects will definitely proceed. But Chapo is not pulling out quite all the stops to ensure that; he also said this week that the TotalEnergies-led consortium will have to wait until the end of its 30-year concession to see if it will be granted the extension it demanded in return for lifting force majeure and restarting the project. Its other demand, that a further $4.5bn be ruled tax deductible, is still being haggled over. [Mozambique needs sunlight to growGiving state-controlled media more independence would be good not just for journalists, but the whole country![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-325.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-19-10.43.13.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-needs-sunlight-to-grow/) Chapo's government is playing hardball with other foreign investors, too. Kenmare, the operator of a heavy sand mine on the Nampulal coast, wants its tax deal to be renewed, and believes it has the law on its side; the government says the tax breaks it was given decades ago are no longer necessary since the project is a profitable concern. Kenmare says it is willing to go to international arbitration over the issue. [Zitamar Daily Briefing, 16 March 2026Rwanda threatens to withdraw from Cabo Delgado; Kenmare profits justify a new tax regime, says government; New coal mine to produce 3.5mt per year; govt seeks Boeing’s help restructuring LAM![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-324.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2026-03-18_105606521.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/will-jindal-play-dirty-again/) And South32, the majority owner of the Mozal aluminium smelter near Maputo, has been told its move to shut down the plant was illegal, since it didn't have formal agreement from all the shareholders - which include the Mozambican government. The Attorney General has ordered South32 to reopen the plant - something which would take 12 months to achieve, now that it's been put on care and maintenance. Mozal is due for an AGM this week, where the issue of shareholder alignment should be resolved. [Losing skillsThe state is not providing the kind of vocational training the country needs![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-323.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-20-09.50.35.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/losing-skills/) Other foreign investors are receiving kinder treatment. The Chinese-owned tile factory looks set to be the main — if not the only — beneficiary of tariffs that the government is proposing to put on tiles. Similar protection for food production, such as chickens, could have wider benefits for producers; but the government will need to be careful of the negative impact it would have on consumers. [The ceramic wall of protectionismThe government is keen to protect domestic industry across the board, even if that means causing prices to rise![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-322.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-18-11.02.38.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/the-ceramic-wall-of-protectionism/) In other news, a major new coal mining project was launched in Tete province, and a new media law, years in the making, was passed in parliament. And in today’s Daily, paying subscribers will read about UN warnings over the Afungi LNG projects, Russia’s shadow fleet sailing under the Mozambican flag, and the suspension of an international broadcaster in Mozambique. It promises to be an eventful week ahead. Sign up to keep up — and support independent journalism on Mozambique. [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) ### Losing skills URL: https://www.zitamar.com/losing-skills/ Last updated: 2026-03-20T17:26:00.000Z Good afternoon. On the front of the 1st of May Industrial Institute in the city of Maputo you can find a compass symbol, the ancient sign of the stonemasons’ profession. This tradition of skilled manual work, and the professional pride that goes with it, seems to have been left behind, judging by the institute's recent decision to close its courses for mechanics and for machinists, who produce metal parts using lathes and milling machines. According to the state-controlled newspaper *Notícias*, the reason the courses were closed was due to a lack of “teaching resources”. This usually means that there are not enough materials available to teach the course such as car parts or specialised machines. Instead, classrooms have been rented out to the Higher School of Journalism, which trains over 1000 people in professions like journalism, marketing and public relations. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Does this change reflect a transition in Mozambique from an economy built on farming, mining and other natural resources to a service economy? Is demand for journalists and marketing executives overtaking demand for machinists and mechanics? Certainly not. On the contrary it is scandalous that so many people are being trained in professions for which there are not enough jobs available when they graduate. Many of those young Mozambicans who have acquired these qualifications will join the growing ranks of the unemployed. (They are not ignorant of that fact: a lot of them are only on those courses because they were unable to secure places on other courses with better job prospects, but their families still expect them to get a qualification.) On the other hand, there is a shortage of skilled mechanics. It is simply a lack of funding which has forced the closure of the mechanics’ and machinists’ courses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique needs sunlight to grow URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-needs-sunlight-to-grow/ Last updated: 2026-03-19T17:30:37.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican media will no doubt be keenly discussing the new media laws which are going through parliament. Previous versions of these laws would have increased the restrictions on media freedom, for example by limiting the number of foreign journalists in the country and by requiring licensing of individual journalists. But the content of the media law (and the precise content of the new laws is still emerging) is only one aspect of media freedom in Mozambique. Another and perhaps more important one is the attitude the government takes towards the media - including the media it controls. The government enjoys a dominant position in the country’s media landscape through the three state-controlled media organisations: the broadcasters TVM and Rádio Moçambique and the newspaper *Notícias.* It is true that there are also private sector media outlets, some of whom can be fiercely critical of the government. However, the state-controlled media is better resourced than them, and it is present all over the country. Not only does it generally turn a blind eye to stories that embarrass the government, but it is also guilty of producing propaganda for ministers and for the ruling Frelimo party. Frelimo deserves praise for its admirable leadership of the country. Government policies are a great idea. And so on. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1d581a60-2752-4f62-bfea-f0d96ed3c307/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is easy to be cynical and say that this sort of propaganda does not matter, but that would be wrong. When there is a lack of scrutiny of the people in power, it is much easier for those people in power to be incompetent, malicious or corrupt. It is not just a matter of exposing criminal activity. Government policies are not sufficiently examined, so that, for example, ministers are able to take control of rice and wheat imports with little in the way of media pushback, despite the [dangers of the policy](https://www.zitamar.com/a-bull-in-a-rice-shop/). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The ceramic wall of protectionism URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-ceramic-wall-of-protectionism/ Last updated: 2026-03-18T16:43:57.000Z Good afternoon. Does domestic tile production matter to Mozambique? It matters to the government. Secretary of state for trade António Grispos is talking about increasing the duty charged on imports of tiles and other goods in the same category, as well as introducing a specific import duty for the product, possibly at 20% according to newspaper *Canal de Moçambique.* This seems like a big move considering that Mozambique appears to have only one tile factory, run by majority Chinese-owned company Safira Mozambique Ceramic (and that factory only opened in 2024). There will inevitably be suspicion that the desire to protect Safira is linked to the minority shareholding in the business linked to the ruling Frelimo party (something which already caused the factory to be attacked during the post-election protests of 2024-5). But even if that is a factor, there is a wider issue in play here. The government believes in using import duties to protect domestic production, just for tiles but generally. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/79fcc8c7-6112-459e-bc45-6416f27d0eb0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique relies heavily on imports of just about everything. The Safira factory, which was built with a capacity to produce 100,000 square metres of tiles a day, currently produces only 27,000 a day, according to *Canal*, and production has been reduced due to competition. Part of the problem is that so many goods are imported across the border by informal traders, *mukheristas*, who dodge paying import duties. President Daniel Chapo’s government has made it a priority to support domestic production and reduce reliance on imports, in order to create jobs and generate tax revenue for the government, which constantly struggles to pay its bills. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The Rwandans aren’t leaving URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-rwandans-arent-leaving/ Last updated: 2026-03-18T10:09:36.000Z Good afternoon. The Rwandan government attracted coverage from Reuters and Bloomberg yesterday with its threats to withdraw security forces from Mozambique. The immediate reason for its statements was the fact that European Union (EU) funding for the mission is going to run out in May, and EU officials have given the impression to journalists that they do not plan to renew it. But that is not the whole story, or even half the story. When Rwanda’s foreign minister Olivier Nduhungirehe complained (in the same breath as threatening to withdraw) about Rwandan armed forces being sanctioned and “vilified”, he was really talking about the sanctions imposed on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and some of its commanders by the government of US president Donald Trump. Those sanctions are in response to the Rwandan military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in particular its alleged support for the M23 rebels there. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c209c60c-7773-48f1-9cf8-44b489763485/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Let’s deal with the main issue first, at least from Mozambique’s point of view. Despite Nduhungirehe insisting in a post on X that “Rwanda WILL withdraw its troops from Mozambique, if sustainable funding is not secured for its counter-terrorism operations in Cabo Delgado”, Rwandan troops are not likely to withdraw from Cabo Delgado, even if EU funding is not renewed, although in fact, the EU may well renew it. So why is the Rwandan government threatening to pull out? The US sanctions are very upsetting to the Rwandan government, because they are a practical and a political threat to the work of the RDF, which carries out peacekeeping operations all over Africa. Rwanda is a tiny country with relatively large, and very important, armed forces. Under Rwanda’s authoritarian president Paul Kagame, the RDF has become economically significant, bringing in revenue through United Nations-funded peacekeeping missions. The RDF also acts as an ambassador for Rwanda, helping to build its reputation and profile worldwide, which brings wider economic and political benefits. Being sanctioned by the world’s most powerful country naturally threatens all that. Not only will it make it harder in practical terms for the RDF to carry out missions across the world, but it may also affect its reputation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Zitamar Daily Briefing, 16 March 2026 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-jindal-play-dirty-again/ Last updated: 2026-03-22T13:13:40.000Z ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican navy accused of killing 13 fishermen off Mocímboa da PraiaThis incident follows earlier reports of the navy firing on fishermen as security forces tighten coastal controls![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-321.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-16-15.28.11.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) --- # Agenda: - **Today-Thursday:** President Daniel Chapo visits Brussels - **Tomorrow**: Council of Ministers’ weekly meeting --- # Also in the news: _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican navy accused of killing 13 fishermen off Mocímboa da Praia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-13-fishermen-off-mocimboa-da-praia/ Last updated: 2026-03-16T13:35:12.000Z At least 13 fishermen were killed on Sunday morning after the Mozambican navy allegedly opened fire on a group of small fishing boats off the coast of Mbau in the southern Mocímboa da Praia district, north-east Cabo Delgado. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Frelimo looks for excuses URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-looks-for-excuses/ Last updated: 2026-03-13T17:48:31.000Z Good afternoon. It has been about a year since the end of the nationwide protests triggered by the disputed elections of October 2024 that brought President Daniel Chapo to power. However, members of the government and ruling party Frelimo still feel the need to fight back against those protests, judging by speeches delivered over the past seven days. Francisco Mucanheia, a senior member of Frelimo’s Political Commission, has said that the protests were organised by foreign intelligence agencies intent on removing from power Africa’s so-called liberation parties. Justice minister Mateus Saize has told parliament that human rights abuses said to have been carried out by the armed forces were actually done by protesters who had stolen their uniforms. Health minister Ussene Isse has blamed the constant shortage of medicines and other supplies in hospitals on the protesters who, incredibly, he says stole four years’ worth of supplies. The idea that there were four years’ worth of supplies lying around, and that protesters had somewhere to put a vast amount of stolen goods, is very difficult to believe. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b9f02af5-27af-4f1f-a84d-824f81af361a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is a little late to be invoking the protests now, so why do it? The most likely-looking reason is that Frelimo needs someone to blame for the problems facing the country. Now that Chapo has been president for over a year, people are less inclined to blame his predecessor and more expectant for him to deliver solutions. But it does not feel like the country is doing much better under Chapo’s leadership. Despite the deep economic slump caused by the protests, there has been no bounceback: economic growth has been very weak, mainly due to low business confidence, and given the government’s surprise and arbitrary-looking [interventions](https://www.zitamar.com/economic-policy-socialism-populism-or-chaos/) in the economy, it is not hard to see why. Meanwhile, the shortage of medical supplies is constantly being reported about on the TV news. So, a scapegoat must be found. In a similar way, the government points the finger at opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane for the state of the country. It looks like Frelimo has decided to put Mondlane on trial, which as this newsletter [noted](https://www.zitamar.com/mondlane-and-the-double-edged-sword-of-justice/) recently will give the party a chance to try and attack his reputation and get people to blame him instead. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Economic policy: socialism, populism or chaos? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/economic-policy-socialism-populism-or-chaos/ Last updated: 2026-03-12T15:59:13.000Z Good afternoon. News that the government has ordered cement producer Cimentos de Moçambique to lower its prices forms part of a pattern in recent state interventions in the economy. It is not clear if ministers have a legal basis for trying to dictate the price at which the company sells its cement. Officially, businesses’ profit margins are regulated, so the government could argue that it has found that Cimentos de Moçambique’s margins are too high. But it has not made this clear. The intervention could cause significant economic damage, since the cement industry is investing in growth at the moment. There is something of a housebuilding boom, and cement producers including Cimentos de Moçambique are expanding production. The company has warned that the price control the government is trying to enforce would make its production unviable, and it would have to shut down. Whether that is true or not, this unexplained intervention could threaten the current investments. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/21785690-81af-46da-9cd8-3186cef6e430/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Suspected insurgents move across three districts in Cabo DelgadoSmall groups of suspected insurgents have been reported moving through three districts of Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in recent weeks![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-319.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-12-13.11.46.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-move-across-three-districts-in-cabo-delgado/) [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 February - 8 March 2026)Fighting continued in the Catupa forest area as Mozambican and Rwandan forces fought back against Islamic State Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-320.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-12-01.48.30.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-february-2026-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Some might see this as a return to the socialist roots of the ruling Frelimo party; that would also explain the government’s plans to control rice and wheat imports. But populism is another explanation. During the protests of 2024-5 sparked by the disputed election results of October 2024, protesters went around demanding that shopkeepers lower their prices. One of their demands was for cheaper cement, to make it easier to build housing (a lot of housebuilding is carried out by households, not construction firms). Popular pressure also explains the government’s suspension of VAT on sugar, soap and cooking oil, a measure which was passed in the wake of the protests and which certainly responded to popular agitation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Suspected insurgents move across three districts in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-move-across-three-districts-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-03-12T11:28:57.000Z Small groups of suspected insurgents have been reported moving through three districts of Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in recent weeks, prompting fear among residents but undertaking no confirmed attacks, according to local sources. The sightings follow an ambush on a military escort along the Macomia–Awasse stretch of the EN380 highway in late February that forced authorities to close the road for a week. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (23 February - 8 March 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-february-2026-2/ Last updated: 2026-03-12T07:07:52.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (23 February - 8 March 2026) At least **5** political violence events (**2,338** in total since 1 October 2017) At least **30** total reported fatalities from political violence (**6,498** since 1 October 2017) At least **2** reported civilian fatalities (**2,721** since 1 October 2017) At least **4** political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (**2,168** since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Fighting continued in the Catupa forest area as Mozambican and Rwandan forces fought back against Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) insurgents, following a 22 February ambush on a commercial convoy. While both sides took casualties, there is no evidence that state forces have regained any control of Catupa forest or the N380 road that runs alongside it. More broadly, Mozambique is not well-positioned to withstand the current oil price shock arising from US and Israel’s actions against Iran. The scale of the shock may help President Daniel Chapo withstand pressure to enact deep economic reforms, but hardship and possible unrest may nevertheless result. ## Situation summary **N380 reopened after a week of fighting at Quinto Congresso** Further information has emerged on the fighting that followed the 22 February [ambush on a commercial convoy](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-25-february-2026?ref=zitamar.com) at Quinto Congresso on the N380 highway. New details confirm a higher number of fatalities than previously recorded and illustrate the scale of the clashes. Fighting over the following three days involved Mozambican military and police, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), and the Local Force. On 24 and 25 February, helicopters — likely Mi-24s belonging to the RDF and based in Mocímboa da Praia — were deployed to bomb ISM positions. Over 22 and 23 February, state forces suffered at least 14fatalities. In the subsequent two days, ISM lost at least 15 fighters in airstrikes, and multiple sources speak of people being buried at the site. Ambushing a commercial convoy is not unusual for ISM. However, the resources that the group dedicated to this attack were considerable. Three sources estimated 300 ISM personnel, both fighters and porters to carry looted goods, were present, though this number may be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, knowing that reinforcements would likely arrive, insurgents were confident enough to send out a force capable of taking on four separate state forces, while their comrades made off with a truckload of rice. The food was likely destined for ISM’s base at Namurussia in Catupa forest, where it would either be stored or moved onward for distribution to other sites. Following the successful attacks on the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM)’s [Namabo and Catupa positions](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-11-february-2026?ref=zitamar.com) in Catupa forest at the end of January, ISM likely retains control of Catupa forest. This leaves traffic on the N380 at continuing risk. Control of territory in Catupa will also allow ISM to continue attacks against state forces in the Quiterajo and Mucojo Administrative Posts. The situation presents a significant challenge to Mozambique’s security forces and the RDF. According to a source, RDF and Mozambican commanders held a meeting in Macomia to review the incident. **FADM navy signal “no-sail” zone in Macomia** Continued ISM movement on the Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia coast, as reported by the [Mozambique Conflict Monitor](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-25-february-2026?ref=zitamar.com) recently, is being met by an aggressive response from the navy. Multiple sources say that on 5 March, a FADM vessel fired on a fishing boat in waters near Luchete village on the coast of southern Mocímboa da Praia close to Macomia district. According to sources, there were no casualties, and the shots were fired to maintain a “no-sail” zone along the Macomia coast. FADM has increased patrolling on the Macomia coast recently, according to a [Mozambique Times](https://moztimes.com/marinha-da-guerra-intensifica-patrulha-na-costa-de-mocimboa-da-praia-e-macomia/?ref=zitamar.com) report. A complete ban on marine movements in the area is at best impractical for communities in coastal villages and offshore islands who rely on marine transport. At worst, it can be deadly when FADM fires on civilian boats, as [they have done](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-1-14-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com) in the past. **ISM fighters roam Quissanga and Ancuabe** Beyond Macomia, between late February and into the first week of March, small groups of likely ISM fighters have been seen in Quissanga district, moving south toward Ancuabe. One of these groups approached an artisanal gold mine at Muaja in Ancuabe district on 5 March. Miners fled the site, and it is not known what damage, if any, ISM did to the mine. The Mozambique Conflict Monitor has [documented](https://acleddata.com/report/ransom-gold-and-spoils-war-islamic-state-mozambiques-new-cash-flow?ref=zitamar.com) how ISM has been targeting artisanal mining operations in recent years. ISM’s appearance at the mine follows a well-established pattern that is likely to continue. **Dialogue in Zambezia brings some Naparama fighters in from the cold** A ceremony to [demobilize over 150 members](https://www.facebook.com/reel/1218934880413704) of an armed group active in Zambezia province was held in Morrumbala district on 5 March. The Zambezia authorities characterized the group as a Naparama militia and as supposed disaffected Renamo fighters. Though the group is said to be associated with Renamo, that party has [denied](https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/58850?amp=1&ref=zitamar.com) any connection to them. Contemporary Naparama activity had not been seen in Zambezia prior to December 2024\. The group emerged during the unrest that followed the 2024 election. The group had presented such a threat to the state that FADM deployed up to 300 special forces troops against them in a [two-week operation](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-21-april-4-may-2025?ref=zitamar.com) in April 2025\. The deployment had some success. Prior to the operation, ACLED records 14 political violence events and at least 37 related fatalities involving Naparama across Nampula and Zambezia provinces between December 2024 and July 2025\. None have been reported in those provinces since. Nevertheless, the group was not demobilized and disarmed for almost another year after the operation, remaining a credible threat and underscoring the limits of security operations alone. The event was significant in illustrating the potential for dialogue in dealing with nascent armed groups. Though President Daniel Chapo has twice pointed to dialogue as being the solution to the conflict in Cabo Delgado, the two situations are quite different. The group that demobilized in Morrumbala identified itself as Naparama, an identity now adopted by seemingly unconnected groups of alienated young men across northern Mozambique. Though symptomatic of fraying social cohesion, they are not united by any clear agenda. ISM, in contrast, has more far-reaching demands that are rooted in jihadist ideology and has the means to sustain and develop the conflict in pursuit of them, as it illustrated at Quinto Congresso recently. ## Focus: US-Israel-Iran war increases pressures on Chapo While governments worldwide will need to respond in some way to the consequences of the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran, President Chapo’s task is harder than most as he faces increased potential for unrest and further unraveling of social cohesion. In a[ February report](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/02/19/republic-of-mozambique-2025-article-iv-consultation-press-release-staff-report-and-574050?ref=zitamar.com), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed to Mozambique’s bloated public-sector wage bill, an overvalued currency, and poor public financial management as necessitating “fiscal consolidation,” a euphemism for deep cuts to pave the way for profound economic reform. At the best of times, the measures required would demand significant cutbacks in public expenditure and a significant rise in import costs. They would also require tackling practices that reward businesses for loyalty to Frelimo, as seen in the [award of export licenses](https://www.zitamar.com/agri-trader-etg-threatens-to-sue-mozambique-over-export-war-with-royal-group/) to companies close to the ruling party. In the circumstances following the attacks on Iran, the IMF’s recommendations may at once become not only more relevant, but also potentially destabilizing. Given Mozambique’s importance as a potential energy supplier, Chapo may now have some more room to negotiate further debt financing. President Chapo wants to strike a deal with the IMF to release more debt funding for Mozambique, but the oil price shock gives him little room for maneuver, while heightening the country’s need for external support. As the IMF report was published, southern and central Mozambique had been hit by floods that affected over[ 700,000 people](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-floods-flash-update-6-5-february-2026?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) and destroyed critical infrastructure. Less than two weeks after publication, oil prices spiked. Chapo and Frelimo therefore face significantly heightened political risk. Last year’s election sparked five months of opposition mobilization across Mozambique that often turned violent. The measures the IMF demands could strain the government’s legitimacy in the short term, threatening social cohesion. Devaluation alone will increase costs across all sectors and classes. Faithful implementation of the IMF’s recommendations, even if they led to new debt finance, would meet resistance. This would be amplified significantly in the new global context. ## Roundup *US sanctions RDF over support to M23* The United States has [imposed](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0411?ref=zitamar.com) sanctions on the RDF and four of its senior military officials, accusing them of supporting the M23 rebel group operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The US Treasury said the RDF had provided operational support, equipment, and training to M23 fighters and that Rwandan troops have been deployed inside eastern DRC, helping the group capture strategic locations, including the provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu as well as mineral-rich areas. The sanctions freeze any assets under US jurisdiction and prohibit “US persons,” which includes residents and entities, from engaging in transactions with the designated individuals and entities. RDF operations in Mozambique are unlikely to be affected, given the strategic importance of their presence to US commercial interests and the US’ national security interest in Islamic State activity. Any payments related to the RDF in Mozambique are likely exempt from the sanctions. *Syrah to supply Mozambican graphite to Japan* The Australian mining company Syrah Resources has signed an [agreement](https://aimnews.org/2026/03/03/syrah-resources-to-supply-graphite-to-japan/?ref=zitamar.com) to supply natural graphite from its Balama mine in Cabo Delgado to a global battery supply chain linked to Japanese manufacturers. The seven-year contract, signed with the battery materials firm NextSource, covers the delivery of between 34,000 and 68,000 tonnes of graphite, starting in June. The graphite will first undergo processing at an anode facility in Abu Dhabi before reaching its Japanese customer. *AfDB funds $27.8 million reconstruction project in Cabo Delgado* The African Development Bank (AfDB) has [approved](https://opais.co.mz/bad-financia-projecto-de-278-milhoes-de-dolares-para-apoiar-reconstrucao-de-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com) 27.8 million US dollars to support reconstruction and economic recovery in Cabo Delgado province. The project, implemented by the UN Development Programme in partnership with the Mozambican government and the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), aims to strengthen community resilience in areas affected by the insurgency. It will focus initially on Palma and Ancuabe districts, rehabilitating social and economic infrastructure and supporting livelihoods. The program is expected to rehabilitate about 150 facilities and create around 5,000 jobs, while promoting local economic recovery and stability in northern Mozambique. ### ADIN shows signs of life URL: https://www.zitamar.com/adin-shows-signs-of-life/ Last updated: 2026-03-11T16:54:13.000Z Good afternoon. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) is showing signs of resurrection, after six years of being largely ineffective and invisible. The agency announced the formal launch last week of a project, announced last year, to rebuild some 150 buildings damaged by the Islamic State-backed insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. At a cost of nearly $28m, funded mostly by the African Development Bank, it is bigger than projects ADIN has delivered (or rather, taken the credit for delivering while other organisations do the hard work). For donor agencies to show faith in ADIN is a new development. What has changed? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2f864fb5-244a-40bb-897a-f97d2714c767/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For most of its existence, ADIN has been plagued by two problems: incompetent management, appointed as a result of internal politics rather than on grounds of merit, and a fundamental disagreement between the government and development agencies about the causes of the war in Cabo Delgado. Basically, the government has always insisted that the war is something brought to Mozambique by foreigners, and refuses to accept that it has internal causes like the relative poverty, social and economic inequality, and lack of opportunity in the north. This has blocked the delivery of development projects. An initial plan put together by the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, European Union and African Development Bank and submitted to President Filipe Nyusi’s government in 2021, was rejected for this reason. A later version was approved the following year, but despite the approval, the government did not really change its mind, and in any case, ADIN did not inspire trust among donors. As a result, they refused to provide funding. ADIN was reduced to inserting itself into smaller projects run by NGOs and acting as an unnecessary middleman, so that it could claim to be doing something. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cursed by superstition URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cursed-by-superstition/ Last updated: 2026-03-10T16:24:57.000Z Good afternoon. News that a bald man was beheaded in Zambézia province last week is a sad reminder of the superstitious beliefs which persist in rural parts of central and northern Mozambique (see below). In this case, the belief is that bald men have mercury in their heads, which can be used in gold mining. Several such beliefs drive people to murder. Old women are killed on suspicion of being witches, and people with albinism are killed in the belief that their skin and bones can bring good luck. Since these killings happen in areas remote from the big cities, it is likely that more happen than are reported. Other traditional practices, while less violent, are still damaging, such as child marriage and the insistence on *lobola* (a payment from a bridegroom’s family to a bride’s). Failure to pay it means that the bride’s family refuses to register the child’s father’s name at birth, which is stigmatising for the child. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1cb3ad82-1d8f-499a-9854-d5b9966896b9/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) These practices are not just driven by a lack of education. For one thing, superstitions can persist among people even when they have received a basic education. For another, the killings tend to be carried out by people who are not just uneducated but poor, and who are paid by others. Poverty breeds desperation which leads to murder. It also leads to child marriage: giving away an underage girl means one less mouth to feed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Online shoppers face the currency crunch URL: https://www.zitamar.com/online-shoppers-face-the-currency-crunch/ Last updated: 2026-03-09T17:07:50.000Z Good afternoon. The few Mozambicans who can afford a taste for retail therapy may want to accelerate any online shopping they were planning on doing in the coming months. Commercial banks have been lobbying the Bank of Mozambique for limits to be placed on transactions through online shopping platforms. If the reports on social media are correct, the measures would include a temporary ban on certain platforms, including popular shopping websites like Shein and Aliexpress. Those reports might not be accurate, but what is certain is that banks want limits placed on spending through credit cards. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e073989a-8446-4a05-a4b1-05241d07fb7b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is yet another symptom of Mozambique’s chronic foreign currency shortage. Businesses struggle to get US dollars or South African rand from commercial banks in order to import goods, so they (illegally) use credit cards to import them instead. Consumers who have difficulty obtaining foreign currency in Mozambique use cash machines abroad to make withdrawals in foreign currency. As a result, credit card spending has quadrupled in the past year. Commercial banks have found it increasingly difficult to settle their bills with payment services companies like Visa. The Bank of Mozambique did impose a spending cap of MZN6m ($94,000) a year on credit cards last year, but this did not make much difference, since hardly anyone has that kind of money to spend on a credit card. So the banks want tighter restrictions. Already, commercial banks have been blocking payments which they think are inappropriate, such as credit cards being used repeatedly to pay the same amount of money in order to get around the limits on payment amounts, to buy goods for import. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mondlane and the double-edged sword of justice URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mondlane-and-the-double-edged-sword-of-justice/ Last updated: 2026-03-06T16:32:00.000Z Good afternoon. It looks like the authorities are serious after all about putting opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane on trial (see below). Mondlane has been charged with crimes including incitement to collective disobedience and terrorism, in connection with the protests that took place following the disputed election results of October 2024\. During those protests, Mondlane repeatedly and successfully called for peaceful protests by his huge army of loyal supporters; but what the ruling Frelimo party wants to do, with the help of cooperative judges, is to pin the blame on him for the violence and destruction that took place at that time. As a member of the Council of State, he will have to be tried by the Supreme Court. Business owners will no doubt be apprehensive about whether putting Mondlane on trial is going to provoke further violent protests. This seems unlikely. The judges of the Supreme Court conduct their business in a formal manner; show trials are not in their nature. Besides, the government is unlikely to allow TV cameras into the courtroom, for fear that Mondlane, a charismatic and very effective public speaker, would use TV coverage as a propaganda tool. For the same reason, it is quite likely that the judges will order him not to comment on the trial when he leaves the court each day. (It seems that Mondlane will not be kept in prison during the trial, since if that had been the plan, he would already be there now.) *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bde78bee-cbe0-48f2-8478-d94378d692a7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The two most obvious questions arising are: why is Mondlane on trial, and what will the verdict be? In answer to the first, the government and Frelimo would like to make Mondlane responsible for all the country’s problems. Mondlane is the biggest, and indeed the only real threat to Frelimo’s iron grip on power. They would like to neutralise him by damaging his reputation and turning public opinion against him. They have already tried to do so, but have not been successful. It seems that Frelimo thinks that having a trial where prosecutors rather than politicians are making arguments against him will be more convincing. All the same, this is a double-edged sword. President Daniel Chapo has in the past described the protests as criminal and talked about “spilling blood” to stop them if necessary. He was apparently dissuaded from making further such comments, because it was not good for his popularity. Mondlane remains hugely popular, more so than any other single politician. Whenever the government attacks him, it risks wounding itself. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Shoprite shows what’s wrong with the economy URL: https://www.zitamar.com/shoprite-shows-whats-wrong-with-the-economy/ Last updated: 2026-03-05T16:31:50.000Z Good afternoon. News about the profitability problem facing South African-owned supermarket chain Shoprite in Mozambique (see below) provide a moral lesson about unintended consequences. Specifically, the consequences that arises from Mozambique’s lack of an effective industrial policy. Shoprite faces more competition from other retail chains these days than it used to, it is true, and it suffered damage to some of its stores and loss of business during the post-election protests of 2024-5\. However, that is not the main reason its business in Mozambique is in trouble. In recent years, there has been an increase in the small-scale, informal cross-border trade known as *mukhero*, in which goods are bought outside Mozambique and then brought over the border to be sold directly or onto market traders. Informal markets are dominated by people of foreign origin like Pakistanis, Rwandans, Burundians and Somalis, but the *mukheristas* tend to be Mozambicans, who use their relationships with the border authorities to avoid paying customs duties. Although they are mostly small-scale, there are thousands of them. *Mukhero* has grown in size and complexity, and supplies everything from vegetables to car parts to furniture. It is successful because it is cheap, and it is cheap because it is illegal: customs duties and VAT are not paid. But the authorities generally turn a blind eye, because a lot of people depend on *mukhero* for a living. Though it has to be noted that the larger-scale *mukheristas* are hardly poor. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6346e5f0-0253-421f-bab8-750b86b36ac7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But this trade has consequences, and one of them is that businesses that do have to pay duties and taxes get undercut. In the past, market traders would buy Shoprite’s goods and sell them in informal markets for a markup. Today, those same markets can undercut Shoprite. As a result, the chain is considering whether it should close down its business in Mozambique, potentially putting hundreds of people out of work. Smaller shops have responded to the pressure of informal trade by playing the informal traders at their own game: they hand over their goods to street traders to sell on commission, thus avoiding paying VAT. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Riding the tiger’s back URL: https://www.zitamar.com/riding-the-tigers-back/ Last updated: 2026-03-04T15:23:44.000Z Good afternoon. So much for “America First”. The administration of US president Donald Trump seems much more interested in foreign interventions these days. The latest such intervention is the announcement of sanctions on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and four of its senior commanders (see below). There are, of course, several thousand RDF troops operating in Cabo Delgado at the moment, helping to fight the Islamic State-backed insurgency there. And it is ironic that their main purpose is to make the province safe for the big gas projects, one of which is led by the US energy company ExxonMobil, with the enthusiastic support of the US government. The other big project led by TotalEnergies benefits from a $4.7bn US government loan. While these sanctions are less dramatic than kidnapping or assassinating a head of state, they nevertheless demonstrate the extreme volatility of the United States’ foreign relations, and how Trump can inflict sudden damage on states with whom he finds fault, without stopping to think too hard about how defensible the action is or the wider consequences. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c4538738-7742-4ca7-bf90-b25329946c05/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The sanctions themselves may not have an immediate impact in Mozambique. Indeed, they may not have much impact at all there. Neither ExxonMobil nor TotalEnergies is thought to be in a direct contractual relationship with the RDF or the wider Rwanda Security Forces, the armed forces and police, both of whom operate in Cabo Delgado. The European Union provides funding for the Rwandan mission, but this is denominated in euros and is unlikely to be routed through the United States. Funding that supports the RDF from other sources could be affected; US authorities tend to regard any international payment made in US dollars as involving their financial system. However, that does not mean that that funding would have to stop. The Office of Foreign Assets Control, the unit of the US Department of the Treasury that polices sanctions, has discretion in whether to take action against sanctions violations, and it is allowed to exempt them on humanitarian grounds. Besides, the war against the insurgency can be portrayed as a war against Islamic State, something the US can get behind. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Sernic shines, but for how long? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/sernic-shines-but-for-how-long/ Last updated: 2026-03-03T17:14:30.000Z Good afternoon. Have criminal gangs met their match in the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic)? Last weekend saw Sernic raid on black market outlets in the cities of Maputo and Matola selling car parts. It is the latest in a string of cases where Sernic has shown a new energy and capability to go after criminals, including people in important positions in public life who in the past were protected from justice. Recently, Sernic officers have arrested officials at the Ministry of Finance’s treasury department and at the Tax Authority, on suspicion of VAT fraud; it has carried out arrests in a hospital in the city of Vilankulo after a woman died in circumstances where negligence was suspected; and has investigated child abuse in Cabo Delgado. It has also moved quickly on cases like the recent death of a provincial judge in Tete province (Sernic found that he had suffocated in his car) and the death of the Portuguese banker Pedro Ferraz dos Reis last month. While Sernic’s initial finding of suicide in the latter case (issued within 24 hours) was received sceptically by the public, it was upheld by a Portuguese police investigation. Sernic has also prevented any successful kidnappings so far this year (although it remains concerning that some suspected kidnappers were shot dead, something that will fuel the suspicion that they were silenced to protect kidnapping bosses and their friends in politics). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ba7ff4c6-940e-4a09-94cf-06d5f371a49f/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Military escorts resume on N380 highway after deadly ambushSecurity forces reopen Macomia–Awasse stretch of EN380 a week after insurgent attack killed soldiers and civilians![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-318.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-03-03-18.16.23.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/military-escorts-resume-on-n380-highway-after-deadly-ambush/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) A particularly high-profile case for Sernic recently has been the investigation of the embezzlement of food aid for flood victims by officials in Gaza province. At least nine people have been arrested so far, including one working in the provincial governor’s office. Many people have been outraged by the scandal, but Sernic’s work in going after politically connected people has met with approval. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Military escorts resume on N380 highway after deadly ambush URL: https://www.zitamar.com/military-escorts-resume-on-n380-highway-after-deadly-ambush/ Last updated: 2026-03-03T16:47:31.000Z Military escorts for civilian vehicles have resumed on the Macomia–Awasse stretch of the N380 road in Cabo Delgado province, a week after an insurgent attack halted traffic and left soldiers and civilians dead. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### So much dialogue, so little result URL: https://www.zitamar.com/so-much-dialogue-so-little-result/ Last updated: 2026-03-02T16:22:08.000Z Good afternoon. This week marks one year since the terms of reference for government-led reform talks, branded as “inclusive national dialogue” were signed by the government and opposition parties, at an elaborate ceremony in Maputo. Readers will remember that the dialogue process was set up by the government of previous president Filipe Nyusi in response to the furious and violent nationwide protests following the disputed (and highly fraudulent) elections of 2024\. Since then, a technical commission has been appointed and a law governing the process has passed through parliament. The bureaucracy has been extensive and so has the spending, funded by the European Union, the Mozambican government and the United Nations Development Programme. The commission members have been enjoying free air travel around the country, high-quality accommodation and meals, and per diem expense payments. It is a luxury experience for the less privileged commission members. But what is the dialogue achieving? It is worth remembering that the post-election protests revealed just how deep public resentment was with the ruling Frelimo party: not just among the poorest Mozambicans who had little to lose from protesting, but also among more well-off people who joined in the pot-banging sessions to show their support. There was, and is, profound resentment at the way Frelimo steals both elections and the country’s wealth. The protests are over, but the root causes have not yet been addressed, and tensions continue to simmer just below the surface. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/dde0c0ed-05e7-49f0-80e2-0a8d195ab932/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The dialogue process could help here. It is not due to report until October, but the commission chair, Edson Macuácua, could make some public statements about how it is going and give some reassurance that his commission is going to re-wire the state so that, for example, systematic electoral fraud of the sort that happened in 2024 cannot happen again. The leaders of the opposition parties could do the same, and they could update their members to whom they are meant to be accountable. But none of that is happening. The technical commission meets behind closed doors, and while witnesses are appearing before it and papers have been submitted to it, there is little information about what is going on. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The silence around Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-silence-around-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2026-02-27T16:16:29.000Z An ambush on a military-escorted convoy, kidnappings of civilians, and renewed clashes between insurgents and government-aligned forces would normally dominate national headlines. Yet in Mozambique this week, the latest violence in Cabo Delgado has received only limited and fragmented coverage, reflecting a wider pattern in which the conflict continues on the ground even as it steadily recedes from public view. The attack near Quinto Congresso in Macomia district on Sunday illustrates a growing disconnect: while violence linked to the Cabo Delgado insurgency continues, reporting on the conflict appears to be shrinking. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b273e0d9-dd0a-403b-a4d1-49242e13e4c8/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Macomia has become the new centre of the Cabo Delgado conflictThe coastal district of Macomia has become the epicentre of Cabo Delgado’s insurgency this year![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-312.jpg)Zitamar NewsTomás Queface![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-27-17.19.53.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-has-become-the-new-centre-of-the-cabo-delgado-conflict/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Coverage of the incident in domestic media focused narrowly on kidnappings and road disruption. Yet journalists on the ground describe a far larger episode, involving sustained fighting and casualties among Mozambican and allied forces. Some outlets did not report the events at all (in contrast to the Islamic State terror group itself, which provided credible claims, though couched in the language or propaganda). This is not simply a question of editorial judgement or news fatigue. Reporters say access to information from defence authorities remains highly restricted, with official spokespeople often the only permitted sources. In practice, this means incidents frequently go unconfirmed — and therefore unpublished. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Macomia has become the new centre of the Cabo Delgado conflict URL: https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-has-become-the-new-centre-of-the-cabo-delgado-conflict/ Last updated: 2026-02-27T15:49:19.000Z The coastal district of Macomia has become the epicentre of Cabo Delgado’s insurgency this year, having suffered the vast majority of attacks and battles since 1 January, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. After [extending](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-1-14-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com) their operational reach along the Palma-Balama-Montepuez corridor in late 2025 and into Erati and Memba districts in [Nampula province](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-four-in-nampulas-memba-district/), insurgents regrouped in their traditional heartlands of Macomia and neighbouring Mocímboa da Praia at the end of the year. Since January, they have concentrated on attacking supply routes and military positions rather than widening their territorial reach. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Geneva comes to Mozambique URL: https://www.zitamar.com/geneva-comes-to-mozambique/ Last updated: 2026-02-26T16:23:06.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique is to be home to a representative office of the United Nations (UN)’s commissioner for human rights (see below). The announcement yesterday came after lengthy negotiations between the UN agency and the government. The latter will surely use it to try and improve its reputation and argue that it is a defender of human rights. But the fact that the UN is opening an office here in particular must reflect particular concerns that the agency has with Mozambique. Of course, there are flagrant violations of human rights in many African countries, but reports of abuses by security forces fighting insurgents in Cabo Delgado province are particularly eye-catching and have travelled around the world. So, the UN wanted to open an office, and the government (under previous president Filipe Nyusi) asked for one: not something that all African governments would welcome. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4cbd04cb-1648-4ed8-bc93-544186433d1a/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Rwandan soldiers among 14 killed in three-day battle, IS claimsA convoy led by a Mozambican military vehicle came under attack along the Macomia-Awasse section of the N380 road![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-310.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-04-01-17.12.13-2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/rwandan-soldiers-among-14-killed-in-three-day-battle-is-claims/) [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (9-22 February 2026)Over one week into Ramadan, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has continued to focus on sourcing supplies of food and other basic necessities![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-311.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-25-14.20.27.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-february-2026/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Among the many human rights problems in Mozambique, foreign investors are concerned about prison conditions, torture and unlawful killings by security forces in Cabo Delgado, and the treatment of LGBT people. Those issues are thus likely to feature on the agenda of the UN officials based in Mozambique. The Mozambican government will have its own agenda. It will certainly want to get some benefits from this presence, such as in obtaining human rights training for police officers. Despite the police’s traditional and well-deserved reputation for brutality, ministers are not indifferent to this problem. When protests erupted across the country in 2024 following the disputed election results, the government was taken aback by the level of police violence. In order to address the problem, it had to send the armed forces out onto the streets instead, who acted with more restraint. The UN agency could also help with vocational training for prisoners to assist their rehabilitation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### 2026, the year of austerity URL: https://www.zitamar.com/2026-the-year-of-austerity/ Last updated: 2026-02-25T19:18:41.000Z Good afternoon. A bucket of cold water was emptied over thousands of people yesterday, when the Mozambican government announced that it did not have any money to support their business startup projects. A huge wave of applications has been received by the Local Development Fund, which was set up by President Daniel Chapo and which aims to support the development of small businesses, for example in farming or carpentry. But there is little or no money available at the moment to fund them, ministers say (see below). Raising people’s expectations and then disappointing them in this way is bound to cause them political damage. Why the disappointment? Government spokesman Inocêncio Impissa did not go into details beyond saying it was caused by the budget deficit. But there has been a budget deficit for a long time. The fact is that the public finances are worse than the government expected when Chapo became president. Tax collection last year was much lower than forecast, as finance minister Carla Loveira has confirmed. A lot of business activity was paralysed for much of last year due to protests, and in addition, businesses have been reluctant to spend money due to pessimism about where the economy is going. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/cea4ee2b-2a52-4cbd-8e13-65916a8c740e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The government continues to run public finances on a hand-to-mouth basis. It struggles to pay wages and bills to suppliers on time, although it is trying. The arrears are going down, but they have not been cleared yet. In the meantime, some things go unfunded. During the recent floods in southern Mozambique, the state-controlled company Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric paid the cost of hiring helicopters to rescue flood victims, at the request of the government. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Rwandan soldiers among 14 killed in three-day battle, IS claims URL: https://www.zitamar.com/rwandan-soldiers-among-14-killed-in-three-day-battle-is-claims/ Last updated: 2026-02-25T14:19:17.000Z The Islamic State (IS) terror group has claimed that its militants killed 14 members of Mozambican and Rwandan security forces during clashes in Macomia district, Cabo Delgado, in three days of fighting earlier this week. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (9-22 February 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-9-22-february-2026/ Last updated: 2026-02-25T13:39:55.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (9 - 22 February 2026) At least 7 political violence events (2,331 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 6 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,466 since 1 October 2017) 0 reported civilian fatalities (2,719 since 1 October 2017) At least 4 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,162 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Over one week into Ramadan, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has continued to focus on sourcing supplies of food and other basic necessities. Militants based in Catupa forest ambushed a commercial convoy on the N380, leading to sustained clashes with state forces and at least three fatalities, a figure likely to rise. Along the coast and on offshore islands, interactions with communities have been relatively subdued, with supplies either taken or purchased. Only one violent action took place on the coast — the firing of a rocket-propelled grenade at a Mozambican military base on Mocímboa da Praia’s outskirts. ## Situation summary **Clashes intensify in Catupa and on the N380** ISM fighters attacked a commercial convoy near Quinto Congresso on the N380 on the morning of Sunday 22 February, [Zitamar News](https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-attack-military-escorted-convoy-in-macomia/) reports. According to local sources, clashes continued in the area on the subsequent Monday and Tuesday involving ISM, the Local Force, and the Mozambican and Rwandan militaries. The Islamic State (IS) claims 14 fatalities in those clashes among the “Mozambique-Rwanda coalition.” The Sunday ambush came nearly two weeks after failed efforts by the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) to regain control of its former Namabo and Catupa positions in Catupa forest, which lie east of Quinto Congresso. The initial 22 February ambush took place outside Quinto Congresso village at around 10 a.m. as the convoy, with a military escort leading, was traveling north from Macomia town. According to sources, the escort vehicles were allowed to pass before the commercial vehicles were attacked. Pictures in circulation on social media indicate that a number of people were injured in the attack. According to two sources in contact with people in the convoy, the driver of one truck was shot and died at the scene. A military source told [DW](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-tr%C3%AAs-mortos-em-confronto-entre-insurgentes-e-militares-em-macomia/a-76095710?fbclid=IwY2xjawQJol1leHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETJpYTlZSm5kd0s4YU1tdGFBc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHv7Z6T6w9I2lw-JMcAFky-b%5FVMI6FAC2yZMx02jj11CKoxMWb7f4stNAwwDc%5Faem%5Fg1CP9t4BRCZ-UV9QXbXKsQ&ref=zitamar.com) that ISM killed one child in the attack, and that two ISM militants died in a clash that continued until Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) reinforcements arrived later in the day. However, sources in the area state that clashes continued on 23 and 24 February involving FADM, the police Rapid Intervention Unit, the Local Force, and the RDF. The primary purpose of the ambush was to loot goods. One witness, who was part of the convoy, overheard attackers saying “this cement truck is a nuisance, better the rice truck.” According to two sources, sacks of rice from one truck were taken into the bush on the Catupa side of the N380 road, toward the FADM position at Namabo, 4 kilometers east. One source estimated that up to 100 ISM militants, including children, were involved in the attack, some in combat, others busy with unloading cargo from affected vehicles. The 22 February ambush followed clashes in the Catupa forest area between 6 and 9 February when FADM sought to regain control of the area following the [31 January attacks](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-11-february-2026?ref=zitamar.com) on two of their positions there. Based on reports from sources in the area, [Lusa](https://observador.pt/2026/02/19/tres-supostos-terroristas-abatidos-por-militares-mocambicanos-em-macomia/?ref=zitamar.com), and the Islamic State’s (IS) weekly al-Naba newsletter, FADM attempted to regain control of the Namabo and Catupa positions on 6 and 8 February. According to al-Naba, despite FADM deploying infantry with air cover, likely helicopters, ISM killed one FADM soldier at Namabo and another five at Catupa. In the subsequent two days, al-Naba claims that ISM killed two more soldiers, who had been fleeing the fighting, along with one more isolated soldier on 14 February. A source in Pemba also said that a number of wounded soldiers were treated in Pemba Provincial Hospital. According to [Lusa](https://observador.pt/2026/02/19/tres-supostos-terroristas-abatidos-por-militares-mocambicanos-em-macomia/?ref=zitamar.com), military sources say FADM killed three ISM fighters and wounded others in Sunday’s clash. The ambush and subsequent clashes around Quinto Congresso suggest that the casualty numbers will likely rise, and that further operations to tackle ISM in Catupa forest can be expected soon. **ISM resupplies on the coasts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia** ISM was also active along the Palma and Mocímboa da Praia coasts, approaching a number of villages for food and other basic supplies, [Zitamar News](https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-attack-military-escorted-convoy-in-macomia/) reports. Despite a probing attack on FADM in Mocímboa da Praia, the majority of these approaches were far less confrontational and did not result in casualties or outbreaks of fighting. The challenge for authorities is to assess the extent to which these events indicate tolerance of, or even popular support for, the insurgents in coastal communities. On 14 February, militants arrived at Palma’s Quifuqui island, where they took supplies before moving to Maculo on the mainland, north of Mocímboa da Praia, for yet more supplies. The group then moved north by boat toward the Tanzania border, according to local sources. FADM forces arrived at Quifuqui later that day, having been called by islanders, suggesting a good relationship between FADM and the Quifuqui community. ISM was also active on Mocímboa da Praia’s southern outskirts. On 16 February, militants fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the FADM base at Anga, less than 3 km southeast of the town’s airport. There was no follow-up action, suggesting the purpose was to assess reactions. The following week, on 21 February, ISM sent children to buy rice and other goods in the Nambubussi neighborhood on the outskirts of Mocímboa da Praia, according to sources in the area. The insurgents then sailed to Ulo, farther along the coast, where they made more purchases. It is likely that it was this group that kidnapped seven people at Kitope village, also on 21 February. The hostages made it back home the following day. **Businessmen face pressure on the Macomia coast** The Macomia coast remains a zone where ISM and state forces from Mozambique and Rwanda vie for control. For businesses operating in the area, this is a complex environment to navigate, as illustrated by two raids targeting businesses on 12 February. First, in Nacutuco, close to Mucojo village, a trader was arrested by people believed locally to be from the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC). The trader is likely suspected of being part of ISM’s logistics network. Security forces are particularly suspicious of businesses operating in areas where insurgents are present or where communities are thought to be sympathetic to them. On the same day in nearby Nambo village, an unidentified armed group raided the premises of a trader who also operates as a mobile money agent, stealing 80,000 meticais (over 1,200 US dollars) according to a local source. Such a sum is unusually large for a mobile money agent operating in a rural, conflict-affected area. These two events are not isolated. In January, the [detention of a businessman](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-14-january-2026?ref=zitamar.com) in Macomia town, again by an unidentified armed group believed locally to be security forces, sparked demonstrations in the town. **Cholera incident in Mecúfi** In Natuco village in Mecúfi district, police [arrested 13 people](https://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/destaque/detidos-por-destruir-centro-de-tratamento-de-colera-em-mecufi/?ref=zitamar.com) for their involvement in an attack on a cholera treatment center in the village on 18 February. This is the fifth violent attack this month on cholera treatment facilities or health workers addressing the epidemic in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. Those arrested are accused of destroying patient tents at a treatment center. An underlying driving factor in such attacks has been superstitions about the behavior of health workers and deep distrust of the state. According to [Radio Sem Fronteiras](https://www.semfronteirasfm.org/2026/02/prm-detem-13-individuos-por.html?ref=zitamar.com), a Catholic church broadcaster in Pemba, this latest incident was sparked by a dispute about food aid distribution involving a family displaced from Memba district in Nampula. The incident highlights the tense environment among communities in Cabo Delgado. ## Focus: Ramadan priorities This year’s Ramadan message from IS spokesperson Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari makes no demand on affiliates regarding their behavior during the month. He urges them to spend nights both “standing on the front lines, and in the prayer niches.” Al-Ansari’s statement is the first since January 2024 when IS launched its “[Kill them wherever you find them](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-11-december-2023-7-january-2024?ref=zitamar.com)” media campaign. This year’s message is less specific and less bombastic. Most of the statement focuses on the group’s decline in Syria. This is balanced against progress made in Africa, which, according to ACLED data, accounted for approximately 80% of IS violence globally in 2025\. The message concludes with a call for continued “hijra,” or migration to centers of conflict, and for “mujahideen” to be wary of intelligence operations against them. There is also a call for increased use of suicide bombings. Ramadan has obvious importance for ISM, but not enough to consistently shape its behavior. Some years, it has spent the month in the prayer niche, others on the front line. Since at least 2023, there has been no consistent pattern to ISM’s behavior during Ramadan. In 2023 and 2024, there were significant dips in political violence involving the group during the month. In 2025, there was no noticeable change in ISM behavior, while this year, ISM violence seems to be on the rise after a sharp decrease over December and January. For this year, rains, now easing, are likely a more important contingent factor on ISM behavior than the calendar. For ISM, migration of fighters from Tanzania and beyond has been critical in its development. Two of its most senior figures — spiritual leader Ulanga and Suleiman Nguvu — are Tanzanian, so we can expect these links to endure. However, the introduction of suicide attacks is unlikely in Mozambique. Where IS affiliates in Somalia and Nigeria have undertaken vehicle-based suicide attacks against military positions, the Catupa attacks illustrated that ISM is well able to take out state forces’ positions using conventional guerrilla tactics. Suicide attacks against larger positions in urban areas would bring little strategic benefit to ISM, given the number of fighters it would have to commit. ## Roundup *Chapo reshuffles navy leadership, calls for modern armed forces* President Daniel Chapo has [dismissed](https://miramar.co.mz/noticias/policia/presidente-daniel-chapo-renova-comando-da-marinha-de-guerra-20-02-2026-69273?ref=zitamar.com) Mozambique’s navy commander, Eugénio Dias da Silva Muataca, appointing Commodore Bernardo Estevão Nchokomala as his replacement and promoting him to rear admiral. Several FADM officers were also promoted, in what the presidency says is an effort to strengthen strategic leadership and national defense. Speaking a day later at the opening of the 2026 military operational year, Chapo [urged](https://aimnews.org/2026/02/20/mocambique-chapo-exige-exercito-preparado-e-moderno-para-defender-o-pais/?ref=zitamar.com) the armed forces to become more modern and operationally prepared, stressing that combating terrorism remains a central mission. He called for improved training, modern equipment, and stronger coordination to address increasingly complex security threats. *Military registration in Cabo Delgado drops as youth turnout declines* Military authorities in Cabo Delgado have [reported](https://www.zumbofm.com/index.php/noticias/item/7287-cabo-delgado-recenseamento-militar-regista-queda-alarmante-de-18-96-na-afluencia-juvenil?ref=zitamar.com) an 18.96% fall in youth participation during the first six weeks of the 2026 military registration campaign, raising concerns over recruitment targets. By mid-February, 11,378 young people had registered — just over 72% of the 15,789 target — down from 14,372 a year earlier. Officials cite heavy rains, difficult access to remote areas, and delays in the school calendar as reasons for the decline. The campaign, which began on 2 January, runs until 28 February with more than 100 registration agents deployed across the province. ### Local content should be for everyone URL: https://www.zitamar.com/local-content-should-be-for-everyone/ Last updated: 2026-02-24T16:17:16.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican government is preparing to introduce a new law which would regulate the use of “local content” in major projects in sectors like energy and mining. The aim is to increase the amount of contracts given to Mozambican companies by (typically) foreign investors running the projects. But what is the ultimate goal? Is it to boost the Mozambican economy and support local production and skilled jobs in Mozambique? Or is it to line the pockets of a few people with good connections to the ruling Frelimo party? Locally content is an inflammatory political issue. Media commentators are quick to complain that Mozambicans are not getting enough benefits from these big projects, and that too often, the contracts are awarded to foreign companies. (Witness the controversy when it emerged that a Rwandan-controlled security company was in charge of security at TotalEnergies’ gas project in Cabo Delgado province.) *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3b7cc118-5d50-4ab7-9165-573e5626a81e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The Mozambican economy is dominated by elites in or connected to Frelimo. Many companies owe their existence and their success in getting public sector contracts to those connections. But when connections are your only valuable asset, there is no incentive to invest in skills or capacity. It is easier to outsource them and just add your commission fee on top. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Crying over spilt aluminium URL: https://www.zitamar.com/crying-over-spilt-aluminium/ Last updated: 2026-02-23T16:34:52.000Z Good afternoon. It has not been a good few months for Mozambique’s army of political commentators. Late last year, they insisted that the country was being blackmailed by South32, the Australian majority owner of the Mozal aluminium plant. In August, South32 warned that it was starting to reduce operations and maintenance at the plant, since it was pessimistic about reaching a deal on an electricity supply contract to replace the one due to expire in March 2026\. The commentators were incredulous. South32 could not be serious. It was blackmailing, trying to commit daylight robbery. It just wanted to plunder the country’s wealth. At the last minute it would back down and agree a deal. The country did not need Mozal anyway. It could sell the electricity to someone else, for a better price. Of course, no deal was agreed and in December, South32 confirmed that it would indeed shut down operations at Mozal in March, after the power supply contract and the existing supply of raw materials ran out. Suddenly it became apparent that the company was not bluffing. Instead of South32’s alleged blackmail and robbery, the concern became the roughly 20,000 people who would lose work because of the closure: not just Mozal employees and external contractors, but people who sold goods and services to those people. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/729b3373-ee7c-424c-b125-d5b88e71a464/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Suspected insurgents attack military-escorted convoy in MacomiaAt least four civilians were wounded in the ambush![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-307.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-23-15.45.49.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-attack-military-escorted-convoy-in-macomia/) [IMF warns of weak growth prospects for MozambiqueMozambique faces a fragile economic outlook and its government must communicate its policy objectives more clearly![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-308.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/16953090889_2d4010856b-1-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/imf-warns-of-weak-growth-prospects-for-mozambique/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is easy to laugh at opinionated people who fill up space on newspaper pages and social media feeds, and airtime on TV, with their ill-informed opinions. But in fact, many of these loudmouths were not just talking off the tops of their heads. They were being briefed by equally opinionated politicians, mostly in Frelimo but also in opposition parties. The resulting climate of economic nationalism put the government on the defensive, although it probably did not make a difference to the outcome: as this newsletter noted recently, the government had told a commission to look at options for Mozal’s future. It (the government) had come to the conclusion that it did not want to keep the plant open at all costs, and that it might be sold to another investor after being shut down. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Suspected insurgents attack military-escorted convoy in Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/suspected-insurgents-attack-military-escorted-convoy-in-macomia/ Last updated: 2026-02-23T13:51:34.000Z Several vehicles were ambushed on the N380 highway in Cabo Delgado province on Sunday, leaving four passengers injured, in a suspected attack by Islamic State-backed insurgents. The attack took place on the stretch of road near the village of Quinto Congresso, 27 km north of Macomia town. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### IMF warns of weak growth prospects for Mozambique URL: https://www.zitamar.com/imf-warns-of-weak-growth-prospects-for-mozambique/ Last updated: 2026-02-21T10:44:17.000Z Mozambique faces a fragile economic outlook and its government must communicate its policy objectives more clearly, according to the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment published on Thursday. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Gueta Antoinette trips on her capulana URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gueta-antoinette-trips-on-her-capulana/ Last updated: 2026-03-18T11:31:36.000Z Good afternoon. Politics is an unfair business, of course, and people who get involved in it can find themselves remembered for one embarrassing incident that does not reflect who they are or what they have contributed. That may be the fate of Gueta Chapo, first lady of Mozambique and wife of President Daniel Chapo. Chapo has been touring the country, at public expense, in the wake of the floods that struck in January. She has been sleeping in temporary accommodation centres as a gesture of solidarity with flood victims. So far, so good. But then, last Friday, Chapo announced that she was going to distribute 17m capulanas, enough for one for every Mozambican woman, on the occasion of Mozambican Womens’ Day on 7 April. Her promise has gone viral, for the wrong reasons. The capulana, a colourful decorated cloth, is an integral part of Mozambican culture. It serves every possible purpose, from a garment (commonly worn as a skirt) to a bed sheet to a sling for carrying babies. In principle, distributing capulanas as a gesture is not a bad idea. But 17m capulanas would cost a fortune: easily over $50m, and many estimates have gone higher. That kind of money goes a long way in a poor country like Mozambique. People have been sharing infographics showing what could be done with the money instead of buying capulanas. It would pay for quite a few school classrooms, when many children are forced to attend classes sitting on the ground under a tree. The reaction from women has been indignant. They would prefer to be given food or jobs for them and their families than a capulana. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fa040bb0-ea94-4eee-ae59-20814549f9e8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Where Gueta Chapo was planning to get the money from for all those capulanas is unknown; she might have planned to ask for donations. Inevitably however, her promise is likely to inflame suspicion that she is secretly rich through corruption or embezzlement, since everyone in the governing class is liable to be suspected of that. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Going against the grain URL: https://www.zitamar.com/going-against-the-grain/ Last updated: 2026-02-19T16:09:35.000Z Good afternoon. Not for the first time, the Mozambican government is trying to use regulation as a tool of its strategy for growing the economy. Its latest idea is to ban the export of cut wood of all kinds (see below). The export of tree logs is already banned, but this ban would go a step further and mean that any wood cut in Mozambique would have to be made into a finished product, such as a piece of furniture, before being exported. The idea is to encourage the development of manufacturing industries where value is added to raw materials, something that the current and previous governments like to talk about a lot. (Ministers’ plans to introduce an export tax on unfinished products have the same goal). But as yet, there are no signs that it is going to address the challenges that would prevent such industries from taking off. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/223705bd-a99a-4b15-bd28-f6b04942505d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique does make some furniture, but it is a premium product which is too expensive for the poor majority. It is also too expensive for public sector and corporate clients. A major buyer of furniture is the schools sector, but schools as a rule use cheap furniture made from composite materials like plywood and imported from China. The same problem arises with construction wood. It is cheaper to use aluminium windows than wooden ones. Senior figures in the ruling Frelimo party are involved in import businesses, including furniture imports: for example, Claudia Nyusi, the daughter of former president Filipe Nyusi, imports school desks from China. There are therefore powerful vested interests that do not want furniture imports to be threatened. At present, Frelimo elites are involved in the illegal export of unprocessed timber to China, in collaboration with Chinese logging companies (although timber smuggling has decreased in recent years). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The IMF and devaluation: when and how, not if URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-imf-and-devaluation-when-and-how-not-if/ Last updated: 2026-02-18T17:10:35.000Z Good afternoon. “Must try harder” seems to be the message from the school report that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued to the Mozambican government. The fund finally issued a long-delayed statement from its executive board yesterday, three months after its staff visited Mozambique. There seems to have been anticipation in political circles that the IMF was going to agree to a new loan programme with the government. The latter has been asking for one for the past ten months, ever since the IMF’s previous loan deal with Mozambique was terminated. That was essentially because the government was not able to meet the requirements attached to that loan. Yesterday’s statement, however, suggests that the IMF has not really changed its mind in ten months. It still does not think that the government is showing willingness to make economic reforms which it says are necessary. Not that the IMF’s report contained any overtly critical language, but the fact that no loan programme has been agreed, together with the long list of problems that was related, speaks for itself. The problems listed by the IMF are familiar. Public sector debt is growing, and it is harder and harder to repay. Day-to-day public spending is not covered by revenue, and the deficit is too high. External borrowing is hard to come by, and domestic borrowing is getting harder too, since defaults on repaying domestic debt in the last year have made banks reluctant to buy more of it. Economic growth outside the mining sector is weak. The country is vulnerable to climate shocks, as the recent floods have shown. There continues to be a shortage of foreign currency, which makes it hard for businesses to pay for imports, whether of stock or equipment. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/aae5a59f-e56b-4ef0-aad5-554fa30af81f/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The closest the IMF came to criticising the government seems to be the line: “They \[the IMF board\] underscored the urgency of formulating a comprehensive policy reform package to entrench macroeconomic stability and lay the foundation for stronger and more durable growth. A clear communication of reform objectives would be critical to secure stakeholder buy‑in and help build public trust.” That suggests that the government is not communicating reforms clearly enough, in the IMF’s view. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Should Mozambique make aluminium? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/should-mozambique-make-aluminium-2/ Last updated: 2026-02-17T17:02:53.000Z Good afternoon. On or around 15 March, aluminium maker Mozal is expected to halt operations at its aluminium smelter in Beluluane, Maputo province, with the loss of over 1,000 directly employed jobs at the firm and some 5,000 indirect jobs, as well as 22,000 jobs supported by the plant. The plant will be maintained in a usable state, but once it stops producing, it will take about a year to restart again. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking on its future, and the Mozambican government is trying to formulate ideas. As previously reported, several years of negotiations between Mozal’s majority owner South32, the Mozambican government, and power suppliers in Mozambique and South Africa failed to result in an agreement on an electricity price for Mozal’s power supply contract. Partly this stalemate is explained by the government’s position that South32 has been asking to buy power below its cost of production, whereas South32 insists that it cannot afford to buy power at the prices it was offered. It is also explained by a lack of interest on the Mozambican government’s side in Mozal’s future. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://zitamar-news.ghost.io/ghost/?ref=zitamar.com#/members/64355a887a18cd003ddb5ffa)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is not just a matter of indifference or economic nationalism, although there is an element of that. The government appointed a technical commission several years ago to look at Mozal and its future, and it came to the conclusion that the plant did not represent a good model for industrialisation in Mozambique. Mozal was conceived as a project in the 1990s in the aftermath of Mozambique’s civil war, as a reconstruction project to be an anchor for attracting other investors to the country. It relies on alumina imported from Australia, cheap labour and especially cheap electricity, supposedly unaffordably cheap. The commission proposed three options to the government: agree a new power price, close the plant permanently, or sell it to a new investor, probably in India or China. The first option seems to have been abandoned, leaving two. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Prison is for the little people URL: https://www.zitamar.com/prison-is-for-the-little-people/ Last updated: 2026-02-16T16:36:19.000Z Good afternoon. Today gives an example of the double standards in Mozambique’s justice system. Reports have just come in that four people were convicted last week of the murder of a police officer in the city of Nampula in December 2024, during the protests sparked by the disputed results of the elections two months earlier (see below). Police officers and police stations were attacked quite often during this time. The protests died down about 12 months ago, and yet over 1000 people who were arrested for demonstrating are thought to still be in pre-trial detention, according to the NGO Plataforma Decide. They are contributing to the terrible [overcrowding](https://www.zitamar.com/tagging-prisoners-goes-on-trial/) in the prison system, and it is not clear that there is evidence to bring against all of them. And yet they have already spent a year or more in prison, effectively receiving a prison sentence without a trial, let alone a conviction. As we have [noted before](https://www.zitamar.com/protesters-are-still-denied-justice/), imprisoning enemies of the state is a blunt instrument, which is about asserting the authoritarian control of the ruling Frelimo party and not about justice. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b6802cf0-0448-4d17-a33f-726b147d7f72/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Meanwhile, Wilker Dias, the civil rights activist and leader of Plataforma Decide is to visit the Attorney-General’s Office tomorrow to attend a hearing concerning former interior minister Pascoal Ronda and former police chief Bernardino Rafael. The hearing is to investigate whether to charge them over the unlawful killing of protesters during the demonstrations of 2024-5\. Over 300 people were killed in protests during this time, and a subsequent report by the NGO Amnesty International found that the police repeatedly used excessive force, including by firing on protesters without warning and indiscriminately into crowds. In addition, numerous incidents were reported at the time of protesters being shot dead in or near their homes at night, in what were suspected to be targeted killings by the security forces of supposed protest leaders. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Time to build on success against kidnappers URL: https://www.zitamar.com/time-to-build-on-success-against-kidnappers/ Last updated: 2026-02-13T16:35:46.000Z Good afternoon. Have you noticed? Not a single kidnapping has been reported in Mozambique this year, to our knowledge. Only one kidnap victim is thought to be in captivity, the businessman Francisco Cêra, and he was kidnapped in October last year, the last successful kidnapping to date. By comparison, at this time last year, at least three kidnappings had been reported in the media since the start of 2025\. There were ten kidnappings reported last year in all, compared to 32 in 2024. The kidnappers have not given up, as shown by the violent shootout in Matola yesterday that left three people dead (one of whom was a passer-by). But they are now facing much more opposition than before. The suspected kidnappers that were shot yesterday were confronted by officers of the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic). Sernic seems to be handling kidnappings much better since it was removed from the control of the interior ministry and transferred to the Attorney-General’s Office last year. Without the interference of corrupt police officers, the force has a free hand to take much more vigorous action against kidnappers. The car chase yesterday was not the first of its kind. Whereas in the past kidnappings could be carried out near police posts and the perpetrators got away easily, now they are meeting resistance. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/34ece9d5-3de7-4c27-862e-c453404f16dd/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Undoubtedly it is important that President Daniel Chapo has directed the justice system to deal with kidnappings as a priority, and has undertaken a cleanup of the relevant agencies. The replacement of Bernardino Rafael by Joaquim Sive as chief of police, and the replacement of Pascoal Ronda as interior minister by Paulo Chachine both made a difference. It must also be noted again that the kidnapping industry seems to have become more disorganised since the death of Momade Assif “Nini” Satar, suspected to be at the centre of kidnapping gangs, in prison in March last year. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### ENH’s mountain to climb URL: https://www.zitamar.com/enhs-mountain-to-climb/ Last updated: 2026-02-12T17:11:14.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s state-owned oil and gas company, ENH, is pressing ahead with plans to move into operation of oil and gas fields (see below). Under the ten-year strategic plan presented last year, the firm intends to transform itself from one that just takes a minority stake in gas projects and collects revenue from them, to one capable of developing projects itself and operating them. Already, ENH has been training engineers in how to build and run oil and gas infrastructure, including on the Coral South floating gas platform operated by Eni of Italy. Now, it has announced a joint venture with Baker Hughes, the American oil and gas technology and services company, to provide a range of core technical services for oil and gas projects, like well construction and supplying subsea pressure systems. This is an ambitious venture, and one which will draw on the support of one of the world’s biggest oil and gas services companies. Investing in skills and capabilities like this costs money, which ENH does not have, but it should be able to get low-cost loans or grants from the World Bank and other development lenders and donors, who are happy in principle to support capacity building projects. ENH’s ambition is therefore feasible. However, plenty of risks lie ahead. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b1084108-d1c0-429c-b3da-7af25878d124/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) An obvious risk is that elites in the ruling Frelimo party, who are always on the lookout for illicit ways to make money, will try to use their connections to act as intermediaries and win contracts, so that they can earn commission payments or bribes for themselves. That would mean work going to the contractors with the right connections instead of on merit or price. In general, ENH has avoided large-scale corruption until now. However, its recent behaviour gives cause for concern. According to reports, ENH has been complaining about its subsidiary, ENH Logistics, failing to win a contract on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project being developed by ExxonMobil. It is not that the subsidiary was unfairly treated; it is just that one of the winning bidders, Bonatti of Italy, chose to bid without it. It would be unfortunate if ENH were to abuse its position in future to win control of a project, only to find that it didn’t have the capability to deliver it. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Three elections in one URL: https://www.zitamar.com/three-elections-in-one/ Last updated: 2026-02-11T16:47:39.000Z Good afternoon. When people in Mozambique’s ruling Frelimo party start talking about making changes to elections, it is natural to be suspicious. After all, Mozambique has not had a single free and fair election in this century, and there have been quite a few elections. The last two, the municipal elections of 2023 and the national and provincial elections of 2024, were affected by more large-scale and systematic fraud than ever before. So what is to be made of reports that the local elections of 2028 could be postponed for a year (see below)? Although this issue may be under discussion in Frelimo circles, it did not originate there. It was in fact suggested by Cremod, the committee set up by the government to think about ways of decentralising administration in Mozambique. The commission spent two years holding meetings before submitting a report to the government in July 2025, but ministers have not responded to the report or done anything with it. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fb6fb69c-9599-4ddf-acdb-9ca78a8f0713/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Postponing the local elections has an obvious appeal. If they are held on the same day as the provincial and national elections, that could save money, for example if election materials for all three elections are delivered together. For a cash-starved government that cannot afford to make debt repayments on time, that is very important. By 2029, the government should be starting to receive tax revenues from the Coral North gas project, so the public finances ought to be stronger than in the previous year. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Domestic gas needs more than pipe dreams URL: https://www.zitamar.com/domestic-gas-needs-more-than-pipe-dreams/ Last updated: 2026-02-10T17:18:14.000Z Good afternoon. Energy minister Estêvão Pale yesterday admitted what has been obvious for well over a year now: that the Mozambican government will have no option but to sell the domestic share of gas produced by the Coral North floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) platform, when it starts producing gas in 2028\. It is a humbling admission for the economic nationalists in the government and the ruling Frelimo party, who like to argue that Mozambique does not need foreign investors and it can manage its valuable resources by itself. And it raises a fundamental question about in what direction the government wants to take the economy: down the route of more extracting and trading, or into industries that manufacture and add value. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2c264fc3-b18c-439d-af99-0fcc4af1d889/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Manuel Chang pushes for early release from US jailFormer finance minister is continuing to plead for compassionate release![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-301.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/chang-by-anita-jan-2019.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/manuel-chang-pushes-for-early-release-from-us-jail/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Ministers have talked a lot about finding commercial uses for the gas from Coral North, and from the much bigger LNG project led by TotalEnergies of France, scheduled to start production a year later. But the country is not ready. The LNG import and regasification terminal planned for the city of Matola, a project which has been off and on over the years, is now progressing, but is still in development. Nor will a pipeline to take gas from the city of Beira to Zambia be ready by 2028, or a regasification plant in Inhambane province’s Inhassoro district. In the meantime, the only thing to do with the gas is sell it. These projects should be ready in a few years, allowing LNG to be imported and turned back into gas on Mozambican soil. The question then is what to do with it. Making fertiliser is one possibility, but plans to produce fertiliser from natural gas have failed in the past due to economics. President Daniel Chapo has talked about building a “petrochemical city” in Inhassoro, where gas could be transformed into a number of products like plastics. We have yet to see any sign that this wildly ambitious idea is going to become a reality. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Manuel Chang pushes for early release from US jail URL: https://www.zitamar.com/manuel-chang-pushes-for-early-release-from-us-jail/ Last updated: 2026-02-10T07:11:08.000Z Manuel Chang, Mozambique’s former finance minister, is continuing to plead for compassionate release from US prison two months ahead of his scheduled deportation after attorneys rejected his appeal. Chang, 70, is set to be deported on 26 March 2026 but his lawyers filed a motion in December requesting compassionate release, arguing that his age, declining health, and the conditions of his detention constitute “extraordinary and compelling” grounds for his immediate return to Mozambique. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Industry needs a confidence boost URL: https://www.zitamar.com/industry-needs-a-confidence-boost/ Last updated: 2026-02-09T19:42:34.000Z Good afternoon. It has been ten months since the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its loan programme with Mozambique. Daniel Chapo, who had been Mozambican president for only about three months at the time, presented it as a result of the new government needing to agree a new programme aligned with its priorities, but the truth is that the IMF pulled the plug because the government was failing to meet its targets. Chapo and his ministers spent much of last year talking about a new deal and how that was going to be agreed soon, but we are still waiting. The signs are not good: the report from the IMF’s last visit to Mozambique, in November, has still not been published after three months. That suggests that there are some major differences between the IMF and the government that have not yet been ironed out. The IMF is a controversial body, and not everyone likes its favourite diet of public spending cuts and tax rises. But agreeing a deal with the IMF is important for the government, not so much for the cheap loan it would bring as for the confidence it would give to foreign donors, development banks and private investors that they can put their money in Mozambique. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a27cd973-a4a8-4026-a884-22987dd9a654/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The Mozambican economy should be bouncing back after the miserably low 1.1% growth recorded last year, when the country was recovering from violent protests related to the disputed 2024 elections. But at the moment, business confidence is low, as reflected in the purchasing managers’ index compiled by Standard Bank. Last month’s index showed a figure of 50, reflecting no change up or down in business conditions. The damaging floods of last month are a factor, but not the only one. Hiring is not increasing greatly and business activity is flat. It is not hard to see why there is a lack of confidence. From the failure to reach a deal with aluminium maker Mozal, to the sudden decision to impose government control on rice and wheat imports, to the uncertainty over the content of laws on natural resources and local content, the policy and regulatory framework for business looks unstable and unpredictable. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Zitamar Week in Review, 1-7 February 2026 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-week-in-review-1-7-february-2026/ Last updated: 2026-02-08T22:16:44.000Z Last week’s events in Mozambique brought into sharp focus three long-running challenges: the risks faced by journalists investigating powerful interests, an economy constrained by persistent foreign-currency shortages, and a northern insurgency that continues to adapt despite years of counter-insurgency operations. --- ### **A journalist targeted — and renewed concerns for press freedom** Press-freedom concerns sharpened this week following an apparent targeted attack on Carlitos Cadangue, an STV correspondent in Manica province, whose car was shot at in Chimoio. Cadangue has been closely associated with reporting on illegal and informal gold mining in Manica — a sector that has expanded rapidly amid high global gold prices and weak enforcement. Illegal mining in the province has become deeply entwined with environmental damage, unsafe working conditions, and allegations of political protection. Rivers have reportedly been polluted by mining activity, raising concerns about downstream impacts on water supplies and infrastructure linked to the Chicamba dam system. Several sites have also been associated with fatal accidents, including collapses and explosions. One concession in particular — commonly referred to as *“Seis Carros”* — has become emblematic of these tensions, featuring prominently in public debate and reportedly connected to figures close to provincial authorities. Cadangue had previously received threats linked to his reporting, underlining the risks faced by journalists covering extractive industries in politically sensitive settings. For President Daniel Chapo, the attack is more than a criminal case: it is a test of political will. While authorities have previously ordered suspensions of mining activity in response to public pressure, the credibility and durability of those decisions — and of any investigation into the attack — will be closely watched. [The shooting Chapo can’t ignoreShooting at journalists is nothing new in Mozambique, but the latest incident poses a problem for the president![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-297.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/625199660_10162117199890887_1303319613461421367_n.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/the-shooting-chapo-cant-ignore/) --- ### **Will accountability follow?** The case has revived scepticism about whether politically sensitive crimes are investigated to their conclusion. Mozambique’s investigative authorities face a credibility gap after a series of controversial or inconclusive cases, and public confidence remains fragile. Cadangue is reported to have provided specific details about the attackers, including the type of vehicle involved. Whether those leads are pursued rigorously — or quietly set aside — will signal how seriously the state is prepared to confront violence linked to powerful economic interests. **SEE ALSO**: [Can Chapo be a party animal?Frelimo’s Central Committee meeting is a chance for President Chapo to establish his authority. He needs it in order to carry out his policy agenda![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-298.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Chapo-and-Nyusi-at-May-2024-CC.jpeg)](https://www.zitamar.com/can-chapo-be-a-party-animal/) --- ### **A rate cut highlights — but does not resolve — the forex squeeze** On the economic front, the Bank of Mozambique reduced its policy rate from 9.5% to 9.25%, a move welcomed by parts of the business community. But the more pressing concern raised by private-sector groups is the continued scarcity of foreign currency, which is constraining imports, production, and pricing across the economy. The problem is structural rather than technical. Mozambique remains heavily dependent on imports — from fuel to basic foodstuffs — while foreign-currency inflows from investment and exports remain weak after a difficult year. With fewer dollars entering the system than the economy demands, pressure builds throughout supply chains. Business associations have urged the central bank to ease foreign-exchange rules, including by reducing reserve requirements on commercial banks. Reducing reserve requirements would increase the supply of dollars available to banks and importers in the near term. But without stronger inflows from exports, investment or aid, the relief would be limited and temporary. [If not more dollars, then what?Businesses are asking for more help from the central bank. They could do with having their confidence built up![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-299.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-02-16.07.45.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/if-not-more-dollars-then-what/) --- ### **Growth outlook remains subdued** Standard Bank and other analysts continue to paint a cautious picture. Growth this year is expected to remain modest — around 1% — following a prolonged period of stagnation. The economy has yet to regain momentum, and expectations for a strong rebound remain limited. Hopes of recovery continue to rest on large-scale investment projects, particularly in gas. For now, however, their broader economic impact remains prospective rather than immediate. --- ### **Cabo Delgado: violence continues, tactics evolve** In northern Mozambique, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado showed further signs this week of adaptation rather than retreat. Reports indicated that insurgents were killed at sea near Mocímboa da Praia, while nine Mozambican soldiers were confirmed dead in two coordinated attacks in Macomia district. Together, the incidents underline the persistence of the threat despite years of military operations. [Islamic State claim nine killed in two raids on FADM positionsIslamic State-backed insurgents killed nine soldiers in two coordinated attacks on Mozambican Armed Defence Forces![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-300.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-05-07.34.19-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claim-nine-killed-in-two-raids-on-fadm-positions/) Insurgent activity appears to rest on three overlapping strategies: - coercive engagement with communities, often framed as reconciliation or “peace”; - economic extraction, including food demands, extortion of traders, and ransom payments increasingly facilitated via mobile money; and - targeted military attacks, including against Rwandan forces supporting Mozambique’s counter-insurgency effort. Public understanding of the conflict remains constrained, with much of what is known pieced together from limited official disclosure, insurgent messaging, and independent reporting by outlets such as *Zitamar* and the Mozambique Conflict Monitor. --- ### **Floodwaters recede — but risks remain** Finally, while floodwaters in parts of the country have begun to recede, risks remain elevated as the rainy season continues into March. Authorities are monitoring the potential formation of new severe weather systems, including the risk of cyclonic activity in the coming weeks. --- ## **Stay informed: subscribe to the *Zitamar Daily Briefing*** Mozambique is navigating a period of heightened consequence — where decisions on security, accountability, and economic management will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come. The ***Zitamar Daily Briefing*** delivers the most important Mozambique stories **every weekday**, combining independent reporting with clear analysis and local insight. If Mozambique matters to your work — in business, policy, diplomacy, research, or journalism — the Daily Briefing is the most reliable way to stay informed at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. **Subscribe to the *Zitamar Daily Briefing* to understand what’s really happening in Mozambique.** [Subscribe today](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) ### The dangers of fantasy projects URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-dangers-of-fantasy-projects/ Last updated: 2026-02-06T16:24:07.000Z Good afternoon. This week brings yet another idea for an ambitious infrastructure project from a government minister. We have already heard from transport minister João Matlombe recently about a proposal to build a north-south railway for an estimated $7.2bn and road repairs after the floods to cost $3.5bn. Now it is agriculture minister Roberto Albino’s turn. He has said that the government wants to build a dam in Gaza province’s Mapai district to prevent future floods, of the kind which have caused death and damage in Gaza and Maputo provinces in the last month. A ballpark figure of $3bn has been suggested for the cost. Southern Mozambique could do with a new dam. Demand for water in the Greater Maputo area, which includes the city of Matola and the districts surrounding the city of Maputo, is expected to exceed supply in about 2030\. That was why the government planned a new dam at Moamba Major in Maputo province, to create a reservoir to supply the additional water. This project was under construction when it came to a halt in 2016-17, as the Brazilian contractor, Andrade Gutierrez, was hit by the “*lava jato*” corruption scandal and the financing was withdrawn. Despite discussions about restarting the project, nothing has been done, and the clock is ticking. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c0593bf0-4b47-4417-953e-e3d732407b43/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) A dam at Mapai, on the other hand, is in the wrong place to supply Greater Maputo. Moreover, the dam would have to be located in a wide valley, requiring more extensive engineering work to contain the water, and the sandy soil is too absorbent. The idea of building a dam here is highly controversial, and the inevitable backlash risks distracting the government. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The shooting Chapo can’t ignore URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-shooting-chapo-cant-ignore/ Last updated: 2026-02-05T17:01:25.000Z Good afternoon. It is not very unusual for journalists to be murdered in Mozambique, or to have people try to murder them. It is more unusual however for journalists who suffer an attempt on their lives to appear on TV and give evidence against their attackers. This is what has been done by Carlitos Cadangue, the journalist for broadcaster STV who was shot at last night in the city of Chimoio, in Manica province. Cadangue was able to identify the make and model of car his attackers were driving in, part of the registration plate of the car, and the type of uniform worn by his attackers, a uniform commonly used by police special units. In theory it should not be hard to find the vehicle and its owners. Given that the shooting looks politically motivated, may have been carried out by state security forces, and may be traceable back to someone important, it seems unlikely that anyone will try to bring the would-be killers to justice. But the political aspect of this shooting is also what makes it difficult for the government to ignore. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bcf51a01-9742-4ba7-8e73-b6adc431bb57/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Islamic State claim nine killed in two raids on FADM positionsIslamic State-backed insurgents killed nine soldiers in two coordinated attacks on Mozambican Armed Defence Forces![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-296.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-02-05-07.34.19.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claim-nine-killed-in-two-raids-on-fadm-positions/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For months now, Cadangue has been the public face of reporting about mining scandals in Manica province. He has reported regularly on the environmental damage caused by uncontrolled gold mining, including the pollution of rivers and reservoirs. This was instrumental in forcing the government to order the suspension of all mining activity in Manica. Then, he played an important job in exposing the fact that mining was carrying on, illegally, at the “seis carros” gold mine, in which the son and sister of Manica governor Francisca Tomás have an interest. Despite the government ban, mining at that operation has continued without pause. Cadangue also reported on the deaths at that mine caused by landslides and falling debris from explosions. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State claim nine killed in two raids on FADM positions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-claim-nine-killed-in-two-raids-on-fadm-positions/ Last updated: 2026-02-05T05:40:58.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents killed nine soldiers in two coordinated attacks on Mozambican Armed Defence Forces (FADM) bases in the Macomia district of Cabo Delgado province on Saturday, the group has claimed. The insurgents struck FADM positions in the Catupa forest and near the village of Namabo, approximately 25km north of Macomia town, close to the N380 highway. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Can Chapo be a party animal? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/can-chapo-be-a-party-animal/ Last updated: 2026-02-04T16:47:48.000Z Good afternoon. April’s meeting of the ruling Frelimo party’s Central Committee will be a major test of President Daniel Chapo’s control over his party. Chapo is president of Frelimo as well as president of Mozambique, but in the 12 months since he took office, he has hardly given any attention to the former. There were good reasons for that, of course: he has been trying to establish his legitimacy after the disputed elections of October 2024 and deal with the aftermath of the violent protests that followed. But it means that his authority in Frelimo has not been tested much, as he and the party have not had a lot to say to each other. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/665aad2c-a45a-476e-b25f-3f2c02908b20/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For example, Frelimo’s Political Commission is supposed to be a place to discuss and approve policies before they come before the Council of Ministers. It can be used to test out policies and check them for weaknesses. But the commission’s membership dates back to Chapo’s predecessor Filipe Nyusi, and as such, its members do not feel like they have any influence anymore. Former agriculture minister Celso Correia, who was once seen by political observers as Nyusi’s preferred successor and the most powerful commission member, is now sometimes absent from meetings. The statements coming out of the commission meetings recently have been bland and formulaic: congratulating Chapo for his foreign visits and his ribbon-cutting, praising the troops in Cabo Delgado province. There is no sign of real policy discussion. Which is a problem: some more debate could have influenced the shape of two policies that the government rushed out without much consultation, namely the [tax](https://www.zitamar.com/misery-for-the-mobile-wallet-army/) on mobile wallet agents and state control of [rice and wheat imports](https://www.zitamar.com/a-sledgehammer-to-crack-a-grain-of-rice/). Chapo’s opponents in Frelimo will be looking to exploit the controversy over those policies, as well as over his government’s [unimpressive handling](https://www.zitamar.com/authorities-crumble-under-flood-water/) of the floods. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### If not more dollars, then what? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/if-not-more-dollars-then-what/ Last updated: 2026-02-02T16:43:05.000Z Good afternoon. You do not have to spend long talking to a major Mozambican business owner before they start complaining about the lack of foreign currency in the country. So it is not surprising that the CTA business association has raised the issue again in response to the latest interest rate decision from the Bank of Mozambique. The central bank cut its benchmark interest rate, the Mimo rate, from 9.5% to 9.25% on Thursday, a move the CTA naturally welcomed. But the association would also like the bank to reduce the foreign currency reserve requirements on banks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a9a6680d-3d34-407d-bae3-1860738565de/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Unlike interest rates, which the bank has been steadily cutting every month for the past two years now, the reserve requirements have hardly changed recently. This, businesses argue, makes it very hard for them to find the US dollars or South African rand to pay for goods and services abroad, which in turn restricts their chances of growth. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Six cuts, one country brought to a halt URL: https://www.zitamar.com/six-cuts-one-country-brought-to-a-halt/ Last updated: 2026-01-31T09:18:00.000Z Good morning. Traffic on the N1 highway resumed yesterday after a closure of nearly two weeks — an episode that should prompt serious reflection about the fragility of Mozambique’s national infrastructure. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a69159a6-2047-475a-85d1-e93d1c52eac2/)*.* Communications between Maputo and the rest of the country were effectively severed not because of a catastrophic collapse, but because of six relatively minor road cuts along a stretch of roughly ten kilometres. None of the cuts was dramatic in its own right; all were repaired within days once floodwaters receded. Yet together they were enough to halt road traffic and isolate the south from central and northern Mozambique. [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (12-25 January 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-8-december-2025-11-january-2026-2/ Last updated: 2026-01-30T10:33:03.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (12 - 25 January 2026) At least 6 political violence events (2,310 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 3 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,432 since 1 October 2017) At least 2 reported civilian fatalities (2,718 since 1 October 2017) At least 6 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,146 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) conducted a rare mortar attack on Rwandan positions in Macomia amid ongoing clashes with Rwandan forces. The group has also focused on resupplying its forces during the difficult rainy season, particularly on the coast, where it retains some freedom of movement by boat. Elsewhere, an attack on a gold mine in Niassa, along with actions by a criminal group in Metuge pretending to be insurgents, illustrate the increasingly complex environment in which security forces have to operate. ## Situation summary **RDF and ISM clash in Macomia** According to the Islamic State’s (IS) weekly al-Naba newsletter, insurgents attacked Rwandan positions at Mucojo and Pangane in Macomia district with mortars on 18 and 19 January. IS did not claim casualties. However, according to a local source, at least one mortar landed on a civilian compound in Pangane on 18 January, killing one person and injuring another. Another source in the area claimed the attack caused multiple civilian casualties. There were no reports of casualties from the attack on the Mucojo position. The mortar attacks continue an emerging trend of insurgents attacking Rwandan forces. Locally, the attack by the insurgents is thought to be in response to Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) attempts to regain control of Quiterajo. Macomia District Administrator [Tomás Badae admitted](https://opais.co.mz/terrorismo-em-cabo-delgado-quiterajo-continua-fora-do-controlo-do-estado/?ref=zitamar.com) earlier in the month that the Quiterajo area was the only part of the district not under government control. ISM has had mortars since at least late 2022\. In a [training video](https://www.zitamar.com/analysis-is-m-propaganda-highlights-insurgents-own-deficiencies/) released in January 2023 the group displayed drills with mortars, several of which appeared to be incomplete and poorly handled. This may explain how civilians became the unwitting target in Pangane. ISM’s use of IEDs continues. On 9 January, a Rwandan military vehicle escorting a commercial convoy was hit by an IED on the N380 near Chitunda, between Macomia and Awasse. This is at least the fourth time that ISM has successfully deployed an IED in the past three months, two of which have been against the RDF. **Coastal communities at risk as ISM resupplies** Coastal communities have once again been victims of ISM’s attempts to resupply its fighters as the group continues to move freely along the coast. On 12 January, ISM militants came to the Loque settlement, close to Olumbi on the Palma coast. They were returning boats they had used to take supplies they had seized earlier in the month. According to local sources, after leaving Olumbi they encountered fishers from Pangane at sea and took them and their boats. The men — numbering 27, according to one source — were released on 18 January further down the coast, some south of Mocímboa da Praia, and others at Pangane further south again in Macomia district. ISM militants were again active on the Palma coastline. Local sources recounted how the insurgents came to Olumbi on 22 January looking for food before taking again to the sea and seeking supplies on Quifuqui island. Olumbi is approximately 20 kilometers south of the proposed liquefied natural gas plant, while Quifuqui is a further 20 km southward. **ISM enters Mocímboa da Praia once again** While one ISM group was moving at sea on 23 January, another entered Mocímboa da Praia. The group came to the Namaik area in the southeast of the town. According to local sources, they were looking for a specific person. When they could not find their primary target, they kidnapped someone else, one source alleged. This is the first confirmed incursion into the town since 5 November 2025, when ISM militants [took the children](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-12-november-2025?ref=zitamar.com) of ISM leader Farido. As in all recent incursions, ISM fighters entered the town from the southeast. These repeated incursions suggest they have likely maintained a presence southeast of the town toward the coast, despite clashing with Rwandan forces near Nabaje in that area as recently as 21 December. **Unidentified armed group attacks Niassa gold mine** On 15 January, an unidentified armed group attacked a small-scale gold mine in Niassa province’s Marrupa district, killing one man and injuring three others. The victim, [Ckota Almeida](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story%5Ffbid=pfbid04bRQiAqaaviYHQtYSusibMeYjminVifru87vVXwUhVu5TtuqFnA2iTzUYeYMASHCl&id=61566040604285&%5F%5Fcft%5F%5F[0]=AZZsCEu5arn59G77gA-UGnlVXnBLFqs3WNFPtwRN4wjO3RlWMJZpW6k6jQIogjAAH6QU4wlf9HjHGnf8hzL%5FJ8yISmT5z4soWxc3a8UMiy381-YEPpTkbaBfRq9nH5HuXrRXSuAMczfbLwngMgLze5mlQzB1Un5XpwpexpkweGuZ%5FQ&%5F%5Ftn%5F%5F=%2CO%2CP-R), was a well-known musician in Niassa. The mine site, known as Rereco or Lureco, is likely to the west of Marrupa district headquarters. Though the attackers were likely criminals, the incident illustrates the insecurity that sometimes accompanies small-scale and artisanal mining. ## Focus: Gold mine attack highlights generalized insecurity The attack in the Rereco gold mining area, though likely criminal, exposes the extent of the security challenge facing both communities and the security forces. This is becoming more pronounced as “[gold fever](https://www.zitamar.com/gold-fever/),” driven by rising gold prices internationally, has seen small-scale and artisanal mining grow considerably over the past year. This expansion is often marked by violence. In Sofala province in November, miners [clashed with farmers](https://www.rm.co.mz/sofala-mineradores-artesanais-em-gorongosa-invadem-machambas-a-procura-de-ouro/?ref=zitamar.com) after encroaching on their land. More recently, in Nampula’s Mogovolas province, a local civil society organization [claims](https://opais.co.mz/koxukhuro-diz-que-confrontos-entre-policias-e-garimpeiros-resultaram-em-38-mortos-em-mogovolas/?ref=zitamar.com) that police killed up to 38 people in an operation against small-scale miners. ISM has also seen the [potential in the sector](https://acleddata.com/report/ransom-gold-and-spoils-war-islamic-state-mozambiques-new-cash-flow?ref=zitamar.com), targeting small-scale gold and gemstone mining operations as a source of funding. Extortion payments to ISM can safeguard against an insurgent attack, while the group’s presence likely acts as a deterrent to the type of criminal gang that attacked Rereco. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that it has taken so long for criminals disguised as insurgents to emerge. In the week of 19 January, police in Metuge district [arrested](https://www.correiodamanhacanada.com/mocambique-ataques-grupo-simula-ser-terrorista-para-saquear-aldeia-em-cabo-delgado-policia/?ref=zitamar.com) five young men for staging attacks on villages in the guise of Islamist insurgents. According to one report, at the village of Namaruha/Namarrau, the young men entered declaring “Allahu akbar” (“God is great”), prompting villagers to flee, and allowing them access to their homes. Namaruha lies 3 km south of the N1 highway, close to Impire village in Murrebue administrative post. ISM attacks in the area are relatively rare, though militants often cross the N1 close to Impire on sorties south. While police action in arresting the group was effective, [online commenters](https://www.facebook.com/miramartv.mz/posts/pfbid0o1Go3hxz4J2yjkoWdJQyW3uvsDxWLzUhjQA4UThQZNwS6htxGRejv9XQSXjH2AD7l) wondered how they can have such success against fake insurgents, and not the real thing. ## Roundup *PRM and SERNIC in standoff over arrest warrants* On 21 January, the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) moved to execute court-issued arrest warrants against several Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) officers, including special operations officers (GOE), who are linked to an ongoing criminal investigation into the killing of SERNIC agent João Paulo, [killed](https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/55149?ref=zitamar.com) by gunmen on 3 July. Reports [indicated](https://4vesreportermoz.com/ultima-hora-sernic-cerca-comando-provincial-da-matola-para-deter-agente-do-goeo/?ref=zitamar.com) that the PRM provincial command in Matola was attempting to shield the GOE officers, who were said to have sought refuge on the command's premises after being pursued. In response, SERNIC officers reportedly remained outside, maintaining pressure and demanding that the suspects be handed over. However, both the PRM and the SERNIC later [denied](https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/56388?amp=1&ref=zitamar.com) that there had been any siege or confrontation, insisting that the operation had been coordinated and based on cooperation to enforce the law. *Floods affect nearly 700,000 people across southern Mozambique*According to national disaster authorities, severe flooding triggered by heavy rains since early January have [affected](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/cheias-ja-afetaram-700-mil-mocambicanos-com-105-mil-em-centros-de-abrigo%5Fn1713016?ref=zitamar.com) nearly 700,000 people (around 151,900 families) across southern Mozambique. Over 103,000 people have been displaced and are currently staying in more than 100 shelters. Since the start of the rainy season in October, including the most recent flooding, at least 124 people have been killed and 148 injured nationwide. The floods have caused extensive damage to housing, schools, health facilities, roads, and agricultural land. From 7 January alone, the authorities have reported damage to 229 health units, 366 schools, four bridges, and over 1,300 km of roads. *National Human Rights Commission reports no evidence of rights violations linked to Mozambique LNG* Mozambique’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) [says](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/direitos-humanos-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-sem-evid%C3%AAncias-de-viola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-em-megaprojeto-de-g%C3%A1s/a-75655783?ref=zitamar.com) it has so far found no evidence of human rights violations connected to the Mozambique LNG project in Cabo Delgado led by TotalEnergies, according to statements by CNDH chair Albachir Macassar to Lusa. He said investigators had gathered testimonies but had been unable to identify or locate individuals allegedly involved in, or affected by, the reported abuses — including claims that 26 people escaped torture. The commission stressed that the investigation that started in June last year remains ongoing. ### A lot of hot air about gas production URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-lot-of-hot-air-about-gas-production/ Last updated: 2026-01-29T16:34:42.000Z Good afternoon. In some ways, it is a rather odd time for French energy firm TotalEnergies to be announcing the restart of work on its liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo Delgado province, something that happened at a ceremony at the project site today attended by President Daniel Chapo. The company had been expected to announce a restart on the project, known as Mozambique LNG, at some point in the second half of last year. Chief executive Patrick Pouyanné said in July that they would make a decision by September, but no decision came. By then, *Zitamar News* had already reported what was causing the delay: [failure](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-bills-government-for-billions-in-exchange-for-restarting-gas-project/) between TotalEnergies and the Mozambican government to agree on adding $4.5bn to the project’s tax-deductible expenses in order to reflect costs incurred by the project being delayed for over four years due to the insurgent threat. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/50a8915f-d48e-4853-b787-6b0fe3889939/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Now the project is officially “restarting”, although the reality is that it restarted many months ago. *Zitamar* reported a source close to the project back in August as saying: “We are currently beyond the preparatory work for restarting”. By then, the waters around the Mozambique LNG site on the Afungi peninsula were being dredged, and contractor Daewoo was doing preparatory work to build the LNG trains that will liquefy the gas. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Misery for the mobile wallet army URL: https://www.zitamar.com/misery-for-the-mobile-wallet-army/ Last updated: 2026-01-28T15:53:38.000Z Good afternoon. Agents working for electronic money platforms are not happy. The government has from this month imposed a 10% tax on the commissions charged by these agents when people make transfers to and from their e-money wallets accessed on their mobile phones. These platforms, with names like M-Pesa and e-Mola, have become very popular for sending money in a country where many of the poor majority do not have access to a bank account. But the agents, who number around 400,000, say that they were not consulted about it and that the tax will prevent them from making a living. They have been protesting today outside the offices of mobile network operator Vodacom, and a nationwide protest is planned for Monday. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/d7929f07-b797-4d74-8a62-03e6c8d73026/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Up to now, the agents were not being taxed on their income, and one could argue that they ought to pay tax just as employed people do. On the other hand, the commission agents get on transfers is very small. Moreover, the lack of job creation in Mozambique means that many young people become agents on leaving school. With so many agents in the bigger cities, there is high competition for customers and not a lot of business to go round. Thus earning a living is already difficult. That is why they are so upset. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Getting away with murder URL: https://www.zitamar.com/getting-away-with-murder/ Last updated: 2026-01-27T16:49:40.000Z Good afternoon. In September 2020, four members of the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique (FADM) recorded a video of themselves beating and killing a naked woman just outside the town of Awasse, in Cabo Delgado province’s Mocímboa da Praia district. They were seen beating the woman and then shooting her a total of 36 times with automatic rifles and a machine gun. The soldiers, who were heard claiming on the video that the woman was an insurgent, all wore FADM uniforms. The NGO Amnesty International geo-located the video to a precise location outside Awasse on the R698 highway. Yet despite this compelling evidence, the Mozambican government did not investigate the matter and did not admit that its soldiers had murdered a civilian. This is what it does every time the security forces are accused of killing or mistreating people in Cabo Delgado, which over the years has happened a lot. Even when the evidence is overwhelming, the government refuses to admit that its forces commit human rights atrocities. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9f40f032-bd1e-4066-913c-3740d1445dad/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Insurgents step up attacks on Rwandan and Mozambican forces in MacomiaInsurgents have launched several attacks in recent days![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-294.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-01-27-18.19.08.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-step-up-attacks-on-rwandan-and-mozambican-forces-in-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) And so it is with the infamous “[container massacre](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-troops-based-at-totalenergies-project-site-massacred-civilians-says-report/)” when, according to reliable sources, Mozambican armed forces killed around 200 men who were imprisoned in containers just outside the entrance to the workers’ camp for the liquefied natural gas project led by TotalEnergies on Cabo Delgado’s Afungi peninsula. The killings took place over three months in 2021, after TotalEnergies had evacuated the site following an insurgent attack on the nearby town of Palma. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents step up attacks on Rwandan and Mozambican forces in Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-step-up-attacks-on-rwandan-and-mozambican-forces-in-macomia/ Last updated: 2026-01-27T16:27:17.000Z Insurgents have launched several attacks in recent days against the Rwandan and Mozambican forces in the Macomia district of Cabo Delgado province, according to local sources and Islamic State-linked media. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Licence to rob URL: https://www.zitamar.com/licence-to-rob/ Last updated: 2026-01-26T16:46:23.000Z Good afternoon. A group of people is accused of robbing a village in Cabo Delgado province’s Metuge district last week, posing as members of the Islamic State-backed in insurgency when in fact they were just particularly violent robbers (allegedly cutting off a woman’s finger). While *Zitamar News* has not yet confirmed this story from its own sources, it is consistent with the situation in the war-torn parts of northern Mozambique, where robbery and extortion is carried on in places which, due to insurgent movements, are perceived to be free from government control. In Niassa province last week, another group also posing as insurgents attacked an unlicensed mining camp, reportedly killing a man and wounding others. Similarly, during the Mozambican civil war of the 1970s and 80s, some people posing as guerrillas from the paramilitary group Renamo would stop traffic on the roads to demand money from passing drivers. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6abce65a-44ae-4a61-bf9f-c39b9260cb47/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Essentially, where the state is thought to be absent, there are always people ready to take advantage by robbing their fellow citizens. On a more petty scale, when floods deposit mud and sand on the roads, youngsters will clear the roads and then demand payment from passing traffic for their work, throwing stones if they do not get paid. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A light at the end of the tunnel URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/ Last updated: 2026-01-23T19:19:34.000Z Good afternoon. For months, negotiations over power supply to Mozal have looked like a slow-motion collision between principle and pragmatism. Mozambique’s public line has been firm: the state will not subsidise an aluminium smelter owned by multinational shareholders, and if Mozal cannot secure power on commercial terms, closure is its own decision. That position remains formally unchanged. But behind the scenes, something important appears to be shifting. Recent signals suggest Eskom — and by extension South Africa — is stepping into a more central role in the talks. That matters. Not just because Eskom is the counterparty that would ultimately deliver power, but because its deeper involvement changes the politics of the dispute. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e7648cf5-aac0-430c-b429-3130593d4372/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Until now, the standoff has largely been framed as a bilateral issue between Mozambique and South32, Mozal’s majority owner. In that framing, any concession by Maputo risks being portrayed as a subsidy to foreign capital. Eskom’s emergence offers a third axis — one where the negotiation is no longer just about Mozambique giving ground, but about regional energy coordination and shared industrial interest. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The police won’t be policed URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-police-wont-be-policed/ Last updated: 2026-01-22T16:23:35.000Z Good afternoon. Law enforcement in Mozambique is in crisis after yesterday’s dramatic standoff between officers of the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, at the latter’s provincial headquarters in Matola. Sernic officers spent over 10 hours surrounding the building after the police refused to hand over two officers whom Sernic wanted to arrest in connection with the killing of Sernic officer João Paulo earlier this month. This was despite the fact that Sernic had obtained arrest warrants for them. In the end, according to reports, the wanted officers got away in police cars, and Sernic was left empty-handed. Reports today, however, are now saying that the officers were in fact arrested. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bb269b58-2c09-4e62-90a1-ee03c920444e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) One of the remarkable things about this shocking incident is that no higher authority was able to successfully intervene, at least not for at least 10 hours. We do not know if the Sernic officers tried to speak to their bosses at the Attorney-General’s Office, or if the police tried to speak to the Ministry of the Interior, in order to resolve the standoff. If they did, then it did not work. Some media commentators have suggested that Sernic does not have the authority to arrest people itself. Whether or not that is true, the fact remains that it did have warrants for the arrest of those police officers, but the police decided to act as if they were above the law, and nobody was able to convince them to behave otherwise. A more responsible police force would have executed the warrants. It is yet more ammunition for critics of the force, which already has a terrible reputation for lawlessness. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Rumours come alive over banker’s death URL: https://www.zitamar.com/rumours-come-alive-over-bankers-death/ Last updated: 2026-01-21T16:37:56.000Z Good afternoon. Suicide is the provisional verdict issued by the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic) on the death of Pedro Ferraz Reis, chief financial officer and board member at Portuguese-owned bank BCI in Mozambique, who was found dead at the Polana Hotel in Maputo on Monday evening. Sernic says that he left work, bought knives and rat poison, and then went to the hotel where he wounded himself and ingested the poison. Images that appear to show Reis buying the knives and poison have been shared on social media, probably leaked by Sernic in order to back up their verdict. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/81ce250d-3489-467c-903b-ce3ad242697c/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But social networks, which have diverted their attention from commenting on the floods and the government’s response to them, are having none of it. Reis worked at one of Mozambique’s major banks and sat on its credit committee, which would have considered applications for loans from many people connected to the ruling Frelimo party. Where there is wealth in Mozambique, there is usually Frelimo. These people are able to use their influence to get bank loans that businesspeople without Frelimo connections would not be able to secure. When they have trouble repaying, they are usually able to persuade the bank to delay starting formal recovery proceedings, something that would be humiliating as it involves having their name published by court order. As such, rumours have spread that Reis was killed by powerful people over a debt problem. There is no evidence at present to support such an idea. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A bull in a rice shop URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-bull-in-a-rice-shop/ Last updated: 2026-01-20T16:30:50.000Z Good afternoon. The Competition Regulatory Authority (ARC) has joined the ranks of those who are criticising the government’s plans to intervene in rice and wheat imports. A report from the authority, issued two weeks ago but which has just come to light, raises a wide range of problems with the plans. It questions whether they are a reasonable response to the problem identified by the government, namely tax evasion, loss of foreign currency and consequent risk of money laundering, through under- and over-invoicing. It notes that there are other possible solutions to those problems, like stricter enforcement by customs authorities. It points out that the measure could (read: will) raise costs and reduce efficiency, and notes the potential for the state to abuse its dominant position in the market. And most importantly of all, it warns that food security could be harmed as a result. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/69d02de8-ffcf-4244-9d06-6195af45574d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Some of the ARC’s report has been overtaken by events. Following the universally bad initial reactions to the announcement of the plan, the Cereals Institute of Mozambique (ICM), which is to be in charge of rice and wheat imports, has changed course and declared that it will not, after all, be the sole importer of rice and wheat. Traders will be able to choose their own suppliers to import rice and wheat, but those suppliers will have to be approved by the ICM. This is an improvement on the previously announced plans, but it does not deal with all the problems. Importers will be dependent on the ICM to approve them to start importing. Every company that currently imports will face uncertainty about whether it will be allowed to continue trading. There is nothing to stop the ICM from choosing a favoured group of suppliers in exchange for bribes, whether those are bribes to the ICM itself or to ruling party Frelimo. That is essentially what was happening with [pigeon pea](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/pigeon-peas) exports, where the ICM previously sought to control who could export and in what amounts. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Authorities crumble under flood water URL: https://www.zitamar.com/authorities-crumble-under-flood-water/ Last updated: 2026-01-19T16:16:47.000Z Good afternoon. Where is the food? Where are the tents? Where is the bedding, medication and other supplies needed to look after over 100,000 people who have fled their homes to escape floods? Those are the questions being asked as flood victims continue to stream into reception centres in southern Mozambique. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5d44ad4a-339f-4b76-bfcd-aa0581e9713e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) On Friday, this newsletter gave a fairly positive [assessment](https://www.zitamar.com/learning-to-stay-away-from-floods/) of the Mozambican authorities’ response to the floods. But since then, things have moved fast. More people have been needing support, and the National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction (INGD) and its president, Luísa Meque, has not been able to keep up. While it is true that these floods look like the worst since 2000, they are highly seasonal and the INGD did have several days’ notice of their arrival. But it does not seem to have taken care in that time to make sure that the necessary supplies were distributed around the country to regions where they would be needed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Learning to stay away from floods URL: https://www.zitamar.com/learning-to-stay-away-from-floods/ Last updated: 2026-01-16T18:19:42.000Z Good afternoon. The enduring image of Mozambique’s worst-ever flood in the year 2000 was that of Rosita Mabuiango, the “miracle baby” born in a tree surrounded by floodwater and then winched to safety by a South African helicopter. 26 years later (and just after Mabuiango’s untimely death from anaemia), Mozambique is ending the week amidst the worst flooding the country has seen since 2000\. Not only has heavy rain increased the water levels in the reservoirs created by dams in the Limpopo, Umbeluzi and Incomati river basins, but those reservoirs lie downstream of dams in South Africa and Eswatini, whose floodgates have been opened to deal with the high water levels. In response, the authorities have been forced in turn to open floodgates in the Pequenos Libombos, Corumana and Massingir dams. The water level in the Pequenos Libombos reservoir was at 97% of capacity yesterday. The dam has been discharging at a rate of 2,500 cubic metres a second into the Umbeluzi river basin in Maputo province, now threatening the towns of Boane and Umbeluzi, parts of Namaacha district, and the city of Matola, Mozambique’s largest city. At the Massingir dam, water is being discharged at over 8,600 cubic metres a second at the time of writing, but despite this, the water level is only four metres short of the top of the dam; the reservoir is at 107% of capacity. The emergency floodgates have been automatically opened for the first time since 1977. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1c499e00-17e1-403d-a1bb-1a98e8379ece/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The flooding is worst in Gaza province, where the Limpopo river flows to the sea near the town of Xai-Xai. People have been evacuated from the cities of Chókwè and Chibuto to get out of the way of rising waters, and evacuations from Xai-Xai are likely to follow. In the Limpopo valley, some 100,000 people have fled their homes and need food and shelter. Neighbourhoods in Maputo are also being flooded, although this is not related to the dams overflowing so much as due to uncontrolled housebuilding in floodplains. Today the government declared a “red alert” across the country, which will give it the power to forcibly remove people in high risk areas and to use available resources to help victims. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The bitter pill of an IMF deal URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-bitter-pill-of-an-imf-deal/ Last updated: 2026-01-15T16:23:59.000Z Good afternoon. The government keeps talking about reaching a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new loan programme. The latest example is in an interview President Daniel Chapo gave to Bloomberg Television, where he talked about renegotiating the state’s foreign debt ($9.8bn at the end of 2024) once a deal has been reached and “trust” with foreign creditors has thus been established (see below). The last such programme ended in early 2025, when it became clear that the government would not be able to meet the IMF’s targets. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4d2fcc83-0c62-43a4-b8c0-1a05fb17ff6c/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 - 11 January 2026)Political violence in northern Mozambique declined significantly at the end of 2025![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-292.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-01-15-10.39.54.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-8-december-2025-11-january-2026/) [The resurgence of the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique in 2025Insurgents have gained ground with more mobile tactics against an increasingly complacent military![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-293.jpg)Zitamar NewsTomás Queface![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-01-15-11.35.57.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/the-resurgence-of-the-islamist-insurgency-in-mozambique-in-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) While a loan programme would give the constantly cash-starved government access to some much-needed cheap borrowing, Chapo and his ministers mainly want a deal with the IMF because of the confidence it will give to the bond markets, foreign creditors and donors. The government hopes that it will lead to a reduction in the cost of public sector borrowing, as Chapo noted, and greater help from development finance agencies. In his Bloomberg interview, Chapo said that any deal with the IMF needed to focus on “the lives of the people”. What he seems to mean is that he does not want the IMF to make demands that will cause unrest among the poor majority. Unfortunately for Chapo, the IMF is guaranteed to make demands that “the people” will not like. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (8 December 2025 - 11 January 2026) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-8-december-2025-11-january-2026/ Last updated: 2026-01-15T12:04:02.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (8 December 2025 - 11 January 2026 ) At least 17 political violence events (2,298 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 13 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,418 since 1 October 2017) At least 3 reported civilian fatalities (2,709 since 1 October 2017) At least 11 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,133 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Political violence in northern Mozambique declined significantly at the end of 2025, with December being the height of the rainy season, which constrains both Islamic State Mozambique (ISM)’s and state forces' mobility and thereby their capacity to undertake operations. Despite this seasonal decline, state forces, both Mozambican and Rwandan, clashed with ISM along the coast and inland, indicating a new seriousness in confronting the group. Violence in Nampula, related to state operations against miners, and in Cabo Delgado’s Metuge district, related to the cholera outbreak, serve as reminders that, away from the conflict, northern Mozambique’s social fabric remains fragile. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/01/data-src-image-a86b9c57-4bcd-4f6f-8726-1184d6614c23.png) ## Situation summary **Clashes on the coast** ISM remained active on the coast of Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Palma districts over December and January. It is clear that ISM is still able to move along the coast, despite heightened marine patrols by both the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM). The Islamic State (IS) claimed that militants clashed with an RDF naval patrol at Nabaje, 17 kilometers south of Mocímboa da Praia town. According to a source, they had been in the area buying supplies from locals. It is unclear if the ISM fighters were at sea during the clash. There were skirmishes on the Macomia coast in the days that followed. According to IS, militants clashed with a FADM naval patrol on 23 December near Quiterajo. As in Nabaje, it is not clear if the militants were at sea for the clash. The following day, ISM killed five RDF soldiers in a clash at Cogolo, 20 km further south. IS released images of the soldiers and the weaponry that had been seized. The following day, a large detachment of FADM soldiers arrived by sea at Pangane. According to sources in the area, some of the detachment were unsure of where they were, or what their mission was. Some of the detachment moved to Macomia town, while others reportedly went to Quiterajo. Fighting broke out again on 29 December, when Mucojo residents heard explosions coming from the north toward Cogolo. On 3 January ISM militants arrived at a place known as Loque, close to Olumbe, on the Palma coast, where they stayed the night, having purchased supplies such as soap, rice, and flour at a nearby market. According to a local source, they did not pay the full price and left the following morning. **ISM return to the N380** On 9 January, ISM struck a military vehicle, [said to be RDF](https://www.tiktok.com/@daniel.nambanedan/video/7593600873222262027?%5Fr=1&%5Ft=ZM-92xPIKxG3UB&ref=zitamar.com) by a source at the scene, with an IED on the N380 highway between Chai and Quinto Congresso in Macomia district. It is unclear how badly the vehicle was damaged, or if there were casualties. On the same stretch of road that day, a convoy of commercial vehicles was ambushed. Vehicles were damaged, but there were no reported casualties in the civilian vehicles. In a video clip taken at the scene, gunfire could be heard in the distance. According to a source, fighting, likely with RDF, lasted from 9 a.m. until late afternoon. The military vehicle that was hit was likely acting as an escort to a commercial convoy. Despite the firefight, ISM appeared to have remained in the area. In a 12 January statement, IS claimed to have captured and killed a “militia member,” likely Local Force, on 10 January near Chai. No claim has yet been issued for the IED or attack on the convoy. **Demonstrations erupt in Macomia town after businessman’s arrest** Two days of demonstrations in Macomia town were sparked by the arrest of businessman Ali Maridade on the evening of 9 January. According to one source, he was arrested by officers from the police’s Rapid Intervention Unit and the National Criminal Investigation Service. Maridade is a trader in the town who travels extensively for his business across the province and to Tanzania, according to local sources. On 10 January, demonstrators blocked roads in the town, prompting gunfire from the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) in an attempt to disperse crowds. One police post was set alight in that day’s disturbances. The following day, FDS restored order, again opening fire according to a source. Sources indicate that no civilians were killed in the gunfire on either day. It is not yet known why Maridade was arrested. However, small businessmen active in the province are often suspected by the authorities of being connected to the insurgency in some way. The incident highlights the continued poor relationship between communities and the FDS in Cabo Delgado. A fortnight before the demonstrations in Macomia, a video clip in circulation showed a man in Mocímboa da Praia complaining of having been beaten by FADM soldiers and claiming that the soldiers stole over 9,000 meticais from him. He also complained about their inability to respond effectively to the insurgency. The incident was confirmed by a source in the town. **Militants move through Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, and Mueda districts** Small groups of ISM fighters were active in districts north of the Messalo river. IS claimed to have killed one civilian near Diaca in Mocímboa da Praia district on 22 December, and another in Magaia village to the south in Muidumbe district the same day. In Nangade district, local sources say that on 10 December, ISM attacked Nambedo village, 8 km east of Nangade town. One civilian was injured in the attack. IS itself claimed both the attack and the killing of a civilian near the village two days later. Local sources think that ISM’s recent presence in Nangade has been driven by the need to escort fellow militants from Tanzania into northern Mozambique. Almost two weeks after the Nambedo attack, around 23 December, militants moved westward toward Namatil in Mueda district, said locally to be close to crossing points from Tanzania. Three days later, ISM militants, likely the same group, set up a roadblock between Mueda and the Negomano border crossing. A number of vehicles were stopped to demand money and other valuables from passengers, including a bus from the King Masai company. By coincidence, in the first week of January, a King Masai bus running from Nampula to Dar es Salaam was [stopped in the Tanzanian capital](https://www.instagram.com/reels/DTP-AeEDMxz/?ref=zitamar.com) and found to be carrying bales of marijuana. Local sources have linked recent activity in Nangade district to efforts to bring senior fighters in from Tanzania. ISM’s links with Tanzania are long-standing. Tanzania has made significant efforts for many years to undermine ISM support networks within its borders and maintains a military presence in Mozambique. However, political divisions in the armed forces that emerged after the October elections — [which the ruling party’s former Prime Minister Joseph Warioba confirmed in an interview in late December](https://youtu.be/jqdj51g%5FSSQ?si=xKdWGm8f8lSoDjn4&t=168&ref=zitamar.com), are likely undermining Tanzania’s ability to support Mozambique’s counter-insurgency efforts. **Beyond the insurgency, cholera and mining spark violence** Incidents in Metuge district in Cabo Delgado and in Nampula province indicate the fragility in communities in northern Mozambique. In Nanlia village in Metuge district on 12 December, people set fire to local officials’ houses, accusing them of spreading the ongoing cholera epidemic that has affected the village. The following week, on 17 December, in Nampula’s Eráti district, citizens also targeted officials’ homes in Megoro village south of Alua, again over suspicions that they were spreading the disease. Such attacks are not unusual and have been recorded in northern Mozambique in [1999, 2001, 2009, 2019](https://www5.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%5F469-27Feb2020%5FCabo-Delgado-origins-notes.pdf?ref=zitamar.com), [2020](https://www5.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%5F509-3Dec20%5FCabo-Delgado%5Fviolence%5Fland%5Fmil-aid.pdf?ref=zitamar.com), and [more recently](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-27-november-10-december-2023?ref=zitamar.com) in 2023\. Further south in Nampula’s Mogovolas district, police [claimed](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mogovolas-massacre-de-garimpeiros-ou-leg%C3%ADtima-defesa/a-75415068?ref=zitamar.com) that they had killed seven in a clash with a Naparama militia and Anamola party members around 29 December. This assertion was challenged by local civil society organization Kóxukhuro, which claims that police killed 38 miners in an operation targeting small-scale and artisanal mining in the district. According to the Center for Development and Human Rights, local radio [reported](https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Fatal-shootings-of-artisanal-miners-in-Mogovolas-demand-an-independent-and-transparent-investigation-.pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawPRpHJleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFQTVdOS09xaTRtQ21EQkpMc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHvCMAbVuqz0wkl9Z4rgYFIt8zhrquEHcSSIwYmdQRPS3gKNrk2Vu83jzeMIU%5Faem%5F%5FiNVCQrLnOEKMqeYslIEhQ&ref=zitamar.com) that police killed up to 13 miners. It is highly unlikely that members of Anamola, a party led by a Christian pastor, would in some way collaborate with Naparama, which has traditional spiritualist roots. ## Focus: ISM-RDF clashes intensify In spite of ISM’s reduced activity overall, normal in December due to the rains, the turn of the year saw several significant clashes between ISM and the RDF. Both the RDF and FADM struggle to control the Macomia coast, while ISM remains active further inland, particularly in Macomia and Muidumbe districts. RDF activity in 2025 remained lower than in 2024\. However, a concentration of activity in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts in the second half of 2025 and into 2026 indicates a new resolve to disable ISM, possibly related to the lifting of force majeure on the TotalEnergies-led liquefied natural gas project in Palma district in October. ISM has not stepped back, though. Despite RDF efforts on the Macomia coast, including the killing of at least 35 ISM militants around 30 November near Cogolo village and the establishment of an RDF combat outpost at Pangane, ISM fighters remained active in the area. On 24 December, the group killed five RDF soldiers at Cogolo. The IED attack on a Rwandan vehicle on the N380 on 9 January came just one month after clashes with ISM further north on the same road on 5 and 6 December, as Rwandan forces responded to an ISM ambush on a commercial convoy. In the past, the RDF has been noticeably reluctant to take on ISM on that road. Both FADM and the RDF still struggle to control the Macomia coast, as seen in FADM’s ill-fated efforts to send reinforcements to the area. Past conflict trends in Cabo Delgado suggest that the insurgency will slowly increase again as the rains ease. Events in December and January suggest that while the RDF is increasingly willing to take on ISM, the insurgents themselves are not backing down. Low-level conflict, particularly in Macomia, Muidumbe, and Mocímboa da Praia districts, will continue to shape people’s lives in Cabo Delgado in 2026\. ## Roundup *Capetine warns that an underfunded defense budget makes Mozambique vulnerable* Retired Lieutenant General Bertolino Capetine [warned](https://youtu.be/z4Bk4hSmZMA?si=yosTIlRxUSCAHtWF&ref=zitamar.com) that Mozambique remains vulnerable to insurgency and other security threats due to structural weaknesses in its defense capabilities and insufficient investment in national security. Speaking at the National Inclusive Dialogue on Defense and Security last month, Capetine criticized the low budget allocation for defense. He argued that projected defense spending of around 1% of the national budget by 2029 will leave the state ill-equipped to protect its territory and citizens. Capetine also said that this underinvestment has resulted in inadequate military equipment and a limited ability to respond to internal and external threats, particularly in Cabo Delgado, where insurgent violence persists. He also highlighted shortcomings in strategic planning, intelligence, maritime defense, and cybersecurity, describing the lack of a coherent, long-term strategy as undermining both national security and investor confidence. *Natural gas revenues lift Mozambique’s sovereign fund value to $116 million* Mozambique's Sovereign Fund has seen its market value rise by nearly 6% since it began operations, reaching $116.41 million US dollars following a $6.1 million capital injection on 6 January 2026, the Bank of Mozambique [reported](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/economia/fundo-soberano-de-mocambique-cresce-6-apos-nova-entrada-de-capital-em-janeiro%5Fn1708575?ref=zitamar.com). The fund was initially capitalized in December 2025 with $109.9 million from natural gas revenues, largely from LNG projects in Cabo Delgado. The central bank manages the fund under a legally defined investment framework. The fund aims to save resource revenues for future generations and stabilize the national budget against commodity price volatility. Safeguards include internal controls and independent external audits. ### The resurgence of the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique in 2025 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-resurgence-of-the-islamist-insurgency-in-mozambique-in-2025/ Last updated: 2026-01-15T09:45:12.000Z After several years of relative calm brought about by foreign military support, northern Mozambique faced a renewed Islamist insurgency in 2025\. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reveals not only a sharp rise in insurgent attacks but also a significant shift in strategy. In 2025, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) expanded its reach into more districts, striking remote and vulnerable communities with swift, mobile units. Meanwhile, clashes involving the Mozambican Defense and Armed Forces (FADM) and their Rwandan allies (RDF) remained at the same low level as the previous year, leaving gaps for insurgents to exploit (*see chart below*). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2026/01/data-src-image-a9cf6394-e246-4f6a-b9d6-b5e9f798652a.png) _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Hidden debts thieves on a PR offensive URL: https://www.zitamar.com/hidden-debts-thieves-on-a-pr-offensive/ Last updated: 2026-01-14T17:01:13.000Z Good afternoon. Today's issue of newspaper *Canal de Moçambique* is shouting about a “big interview” with António Carlos do Rosário, the former head of economic intelligence at the intelligence service SISE, who played a major role in the so-called “[hidden debts](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/hidden-debts)” or “tuna bond” corruption scandal and who was sentenced to 12 years in prison by a Mozambican court for his crimes. Do Rosário and his fellow criminals have been released by a court pending their appeal against their convictions. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2689df8f-543a-482f-91d4-e7a3e69ba794/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Police station burned in protest in MacomiaThe unrest was sparked by the alleged detention of a market trader by security forces![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-291.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2026-01-14-14.00.18.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/police-station-burned-in-protest-in-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In the extremely long and rather one-sided interview, do Rosário denies being guilty of anything and tries to pin the blame on former president Filipe Nyusi instead. Nyusi, as Mozambicans will recall, was defence minister when the contracts for a maritime security system financed by the hidden debts was signed, and as president he allowed the trial over the hidden debts to go ahead, but he himself escaped giving evidence, let alone being investigated for his role. Now that do Rosário and the other convicts are at liberty, it seems they want to hit back at Nyusi. The interview is not the only sign of this. Social networks in Mozambique have recently seen messages shared defending people involved in the hidden debts-financed security and fishing projects, like do Rosário, Bruno Langa and Teófilo Nhangumele. The messages have sought to argue that, contrary to the court’s findings, they are not corrupt or criminals; they were just doing legitimate business. Any bribes they took were commissions and perfectly acceptable. There have also been stories spread that former finance minister Manuel Chang, who was convicted in the United States of crimes relating to the debts, was about to be released from prison. This has in fact not happened; all that has happened is that his lawyers have asked for him to be released on compassionate grounds. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Police station burned in protest in Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/police-station-burned-in-protest-in-macomia/ Last updated: 2026-01-14T12:35:10.000Z A police station was set on fire and a soldier was seriously injured in protests that erupted following the arrest of a local businessman in Macomia, Cabo Delgado province, local sources told *Zitamar News*. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A sledgehammer to crack a grain of rice URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-sledgehammer-to-crack-a-grain-of-rice/ Last updated: 2026-01-13T16:16:42.000Z Good afternoon. Every so often the Mozambican government comes up with an unwise and controversial policy proposal, which eventually is abandoned once it accepts that it is a bad idea or when it fails to produce the desired results. Plans for the state to take over imports of wheat and rice look like they belong in this category (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/15e8a0d5-54c0-4214-b62a-811b94f79446/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The stated reason for the policy is fairly straightforward. The government is putting the blame on agricultural importers for the continuing shortage of foreign currency in Mozambique, especially US dollars. Importers, who pay for imports in dollars, are accused of over-invoicing for the imports when they get transfers from banks. They move the leftover dollars abroad to their foreign bank accounts and repay the full amount in meticais, as is normal. This way, they get to move money abroad, which they might think safer, and get around the shortage of foreign currency. Under the policy put forward by the Ministry of the Economy, the Cereal Institute of Mozambique (ICM) will have sole control of wheat and rice imports. That does not inspire any confidence. It was the ICM which was formally responsible for imposing the illogical and industry-strangling quotas on pigeon pea exports, as part of a corrupt scheme to control the export trade for the benefit of the ruling party Frelimo and its friends in business. That scheme was no doubt directed by forces within Frelimo, but the ICM demonstrated that it can easily be made into a tool for corruption and market abuses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique must breathe without the N1 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-must-breathe-without-the-n1/ Last updated: 2026-01-12T16:54:18.000Z Good afternoon. At the weekend, the N1 highway in Inhambane province was blocked by heavy rainfall for the first time during the current rainy season. More such incidents can be expected over the next eight days, during which more heavy rain is expected. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/72330eaf-3565-4d2f-97f8-172ff1308c19/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The N1 is Mozambique's windpipe: the country cannot survive for long when it is blocked. All ten of Mozambique’s provinces rely heavily on food imports, especially vegetables, coming in through the port of Maputo and overland from South Africa. Even the northernmost provinces get their food imports from down south rather than importing it from neighbouring countries. Other imports, too, come in through the port of Maputo. A combination of lower volumes and bureaucracy discourages shipping lines from using ports further north, although the port of Nacala in Nampula province is recently renovated and can handle containers as well as bulk cargo. The government keeps talking about the promise of transporting goods internally by boat along the coast, but maritime transport has still not really taken off, due to high costs. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A gravestone for a shellfish URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-gravestone-for-a-shellfish/ Last updated: 2026-01-09T16:32:27.000Z Good afternoon. News that the Spanish fishing business Nueva Pescanova is planning to withdraw from Mozambique (as a website reports, and sources speaking to *Zitamar News* confirm) is another nail in the coffin of the country’s prawn fishing industry. In fact, it is probably the last. Nueva Pescanova is withdrawing partly for internal reasons: the company is restructuring, and the Mozambican market is not a priority. But conditions in Mozambique do not help. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/868ec177-edfd-4624-b55a-1a6239be13ad/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The fishing of prawns, known as shrimp in the United States, was once a big export business for Mozambique, earning over $100m a year in revenues. But the industry has declined in the last few decades, mainly because stocks of prawn have gone down. The government has failed to control overfishing, and prawn breeding areas have been damaged by pollution caused by sediment released from heavy mineral sands mining in Nampula and Zambézia, as well as by the destruction of mangrove forests on the coast. Prawns are only meant to be fished six months a year, to protect the prawns during their juvenile stage, but many coastal residents who fish for a living ignore this. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The tax man goes digital URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-tax-man-goes-digital/ Last updated: 2026-01-08T16:11:54.000Z Good afternoon. The government is belatedly starting to try to integrate the huge number of payments made on electronic money platforms into the tax system (see below). Platforms like e-Mola, M-Kesh and M-Pesa have more accounts than there are adults in Mozambique. Many self-employed people, from market sellers to plumbers and electricians, accept payments via electronic money platforms, and up to now, have avoided paying tax on their earnings. Despite the explosion of e-money transfers in recent years, the tax system has not kept up. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/52a72bfb-520e-4205-b742-6e63a6e326bb/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The law that was passed last month will mainly affect around 400,000 agents of the e-money platforms, who register accounts for customers and process cash withdrawals for them. Those agents will now pay a 10% tax on the commission that they charge on transactions, which itself is a small percentage. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gold or blood URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gold-or-blood/ Last updated: 2026-01-07T16:31:16.000Z Good afternoon. Unlicensed mining, and the disorder and death associated with it, is continuing to grow, as this week’s headlines demonstrate. Informal mining is now rife in several parts of central and northern Mozambique. The increase in mining activity over the last year is due mainly to a rise in the gold price making mining more viable and profitable. But miners have also felt emboldened because of the climate of impunity that arose after the election-related protests of 2024-25\. It is not a coincidence that there is significant unlicensed gold mining going on in Nampula province, where there is little respect for the ruling party Frelimo. There has also been an increase in unauthorised mining recently at the Montepuez Ruby Mining concession in Cabo Delgado province. This is apparently driven by envious people in the ruling Frelimo party trying to challenge their comrade, the Frelimo war veteran Raimundo Pachinuapa, who owns a minority stake in the business. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6588e067-94b6-46e0-9c16-e57ed4b7cf79/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Up to now, the government has been hesitant to control the miners. It is still reluctant to use force against civil disorder in the wake of the election-related protests. As such, local authorities have been discouraged from using force. Even if they wanted to, a lot of the mining happens in remote areas which are hard to police. There was actually a police crackdown on miners in Nampula’s Mogovolas district from the end of December, which left either seven or 38 people dead, depending on whom you believe. But a nationwide crackdown has not been ordered. That remains a possibility if informal mining continues to increase. Although the government does not have the resources to shut down all unlicensed mining everywhere, it could target the hotspots. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Emre Çınar and the long road home URL: https://www.zitamar.com/emre-cinar-and-the-long-road-home/ Last updated: 2026-01-09T14:37:39.000Z Good afternoon. Two months ago, a delegation of 13 Turkish arms companies visited Mozambique, with Turkish government officials attending. There was speculation, and no doubt hope in the Mozambican armed forces, that an order would be placed for hi-tech weapons like drones that could help fight the insurgency in the north. But nothing happened. The Mozambican government would need a line of credit from Turkey to pay for weapons, but none was offered. Now, the Turkish government has requested the extradition of Emre Çınar, the director of the Willow international schools in Mozambique, whom they perceive to be an opponent and follower of the dead dissident Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen. Are the two things linked? Could Çınar’s extradition be the price the Turks expect in exchange for an arms deal? There are certainly grounds for suspicion. They have asked before for Çınar to be extradited, but only informally. This is the first time a formal extradition process against him has been launched. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/084f47fc-d11e-43c0-91e6-457feb5b7b9b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Turkish president Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government is ruthless in its pursuit of opponents, as its zealous but failed attempts to capture Gülen showed. But how likely is Çınar to be extradited? Mozambican courts are heavily influenced by political pressure when it comes to politically sensitive cases. However, they appear to generally follow procedure in extradition cases. Çınar’s case is to be heard by the Supreme Court, which is relatively independent in its decisions. The fact that the judge has granted bail to Çınar is a positive sign for him that his case will be properly handled. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Is Mozambique next for a US intervention? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/is-mozambique-next-for-a-us-intervention/ Last updated: 2026-01-05T21:06:25.000Z Good afternoon. In Nigeria and Venezuela, the new year has been chimed in by the sound of US bombs, showing an interventionist turn in President Donald Trump’s foreign policy. In Mozambique, there is increasing speculation among observers of the political scene that US intervention could soon come to their country. Unlike in Nigeria and Venezuela, however, this would only be good news for the government and for ruling party Frelimo. On 25 December, the US bombed sites in north-western Nigeria thought to be occupied by members of Lakurawa, a militant group linked to Islamic State (IS). Although the Nigerian government (which may or may not have been forced into accepting the strikes) denied that they were aimed at any religious group, Trump said that the IS-backed group was the target. Trump has also previously claimed that Christians are being persecuted in Nigeria, picking up a grievance made by the Christian right wing in America which forms part of his political base. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique of course has its own IS-backed militant group, and evangelical movements in the US have been complaining that Christians are under siege there as well. Hence senior people in Frelimo along with other political commentators believe that a US strike against the insurgents in northern Mozambique could be on the table, although there is no hard evidence that an intervention is on the way. In theory, the US armed forces could use their extensive powers of surveillance, including intercepting communications, to track down the locations of insurgents hiding in the forest, enabling a precision bombardment. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The state of Chapo’s nation URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-state-of-chapos-nation/ Last updated: 2025-12-19T17:18:43.000Z Good afternoon, and welcome to the final issue of this newsletter for 2025\. We’ll return on 5 January 2026. In the event of major breaking news, we may publish on our website or on our Telegram channel, which you can find here: [https://t.me/zitamarlive](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com) Thank you to all our readers for staying with us over the ten years of our existence. That’s right — Zitamar is 10! We soft-launched at the end of November 2015, before a harder launch in January 2016\. Just in time for one of the most momentous years in Mozambique’s recent history… Zitamar is now transitioning into a new era, with editor in chief Tom Bowker following his co-founder Leigh Elston in stepping back from an editorial role, almost five years since their departure from Mozambique. Zitamar’s editorial team is now led by Fernando Lima, with analyst Tomas Queface, reporters Alexandre Nhampossa and Amade Abubacar, and editors Rene Lavanchy and Tavares Cebola. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/4ff0096b-b0ab-408c-868e-0572136e367a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) We appreciate your continued support and wish you an excellent festive season and a great year ahead. And please consider [subscribing](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) if you haven’t already. In the current climate of shrinking development budgets, more than ever it is our subscribers that keep Zitamar on the road. Now, on to today’s Leader! President Chapo’s first State of the Nation address will be remembered less for what it promised than for what it chose to display. In an unusual move for such a solemn occasion, the president projected images of last year’s post-election protests to the assembled deputies — a deliberate staging of national trauma. The message was unmistakable: Mozambique was a victim of sabotage, assaulted by “violent, illegal and criminal” unrest, and the government’s task has been one of emergency management rather than governance. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Austerity should be for everyone URL: https://www.zitamar.com/austerity-should-be-for-everyone/ Last updated: 2025-12-18T16:28:15.000Z Good afternoon. The state budget for 2026 which was passed last week was an exercise in sensible, if unexciting pragmatism. It did not seek to plug the budget deficit, although it did propose to reduce it by a small amount, from nearly MZN127m ($1.98bn) in this year’s budget to MZN113.6bn in next year’s. Public spending is going up modestly by about MZN8bn ($125m), and revenue collection is meant to increase slightly more, by MZN21bn. Allowing for inflation, public spending and state revenue will barely increase (spending is still down compared to the 2024 budget, when it was set at MZN568m). Essentially, the government’s approach of funding the budget deficit with expensive domestic borrowing will continue, in the absence of a real alternative. State-owned companies with spare cash are being encouraged to spend it buying treasury bonds, so that at least the government has the funds to pay salaries and the interest on those bonds is repaid to the state instead of commercial banks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/93bc5897-0f20-436c-a6e4-7437165b45af/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But that does not mean that the government is not trying to save money. Several initiatives and projects have seen their funding frozen or reduced, and this week has seen announcements that state audit bodies and business inspectorates will be merged, an apparent result of President Daniel Chapo’s [demand](https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-asks-for-plans-to-close-and-merge-government-agencies/) earlier this year for proposals to close or merge state bodies. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Donald Trump’s Christmas present URL: https://www.zitamar.com/donald-trumps-christmas-present/ Last updated: 2025-12-17T17:55:53.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday saw the United States government promise $360m a year for five years to fund healthcare in Mozambique (see below). It is a far cry from the dark headlines of January and February, when the suspension of US aid was followed by the closure of the United States Agency for International Development. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6797f5dd-a2b9-47d8-8086-fa0669d5ba79/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The funding announced yesterday will not restore every US-funded project that was lost earlier this year, but it is an important sign of US confidence in Mozambique. The so-called “America First global health strategy” of US president Donald Trump’s government aims to promote American interests by reducing the risk of disease spreading to US shores or affecting US interests abroad. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Tagging prisoners goes on trial URL: https://www.zitamar.com/tagging-prisoners-goes-on-trial/ Last updated: 2025-12-16T16:15:02.000Z Good afternoon. An early Christmas present is here for 3,000 prison inmates, who are to be released with electronic tags in a pilot project to relieve overcrowding in the prison system, which launched yesterday (see below). It is shameful that it has taken such a long time to implement this project, which has been pushed by justice ministers in the past and also by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which is supporting the initiative. Mozambique’s prisons are appallingly overcrowded, with over 20,000 prisoners currently and capacity for less than 9,000 of them. As well as lack of funding, a major obstacle to implementing tagging has been cultural attitudes. Many Mozambicans are strongly opposed to the idea that criminals should be allowed to roam freely instead of being behind bars, despite the fact that the state cannot afford to feed or house so many prisoners. Angry crowds have been known to burn down police stations and beat up police officers for releasing people arrested for petty theft. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2cfcd9a5-03bb-4bcb-bfd6-2ed90c8f931c/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogThe Mozal aluminium plant in Maputo province is to be shut down around 15 March next year, according to a statement from South32, the majority owner of Mozal. South32 said that the plant would be placed in “care and maintenance” mode. The decision to shut down the plant follows the failure of South32 to reach an agreement with the Mozambican government and with power suppliers in Mozambique and South Africa to agree a “sufficient and affordable electricity supply” for Mozal beyond March 2026, according to the statement. The shutdown is expected to generate initial costs of approximately $60m for worker layoffs and contract terminations, with estimated annual maintenance expenses of $5m, it says. Zitamar News discussed the Mozal shutdown in yesterday’s Daily Briefing leader, here.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-92.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/vaimJdQaPtutKK2DQ7YM_fQFoheo7_0fSihiNFUjCqV-POR6nB4Ky6f6RY6Ydr9ezUMmIg6O5FK-FEXMx04uGvOH9WG7AExj3o2YxtkaqNBuhg27Wz0Z-Mov9kbcNX3i1ZAu47UyEDKmS6L2RKIiez5EKISgNz3_zRDHcF5zAu7ixmuFf1J4hQNRDoNtAWOH9rJRshJSllvh6R4dHu5gUK-pg8pn9tY4Mx8Jkk4Y0QwDCeGAfqFc-t9W6ceQAIjb7YOWjNTn3VuND6buF1bS5sVYo3w4h7-AbA0SZShwPthZqqQ95pLO2cnOq_43AS22GwnQX5fSo3npF-c8HNnVNg.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4586?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For that reason alone, the tagging project will be under a lot of scrutiny. We understand that not all 3,000 prisoners will be released at once, but in phases. All the same, the stakes are high. If the National Penitentiary Service, which is in charge of monitoring the tagged prisoners, fails to control them, there may be pressure to drop the scheme. Already there is suspicion that corrupt officials may allow privileged convicts to avoid having their movements monitored, in exchange for bribes. Another risk factor is how the families of prisoners will react to having an unemployed criminal living in the family home and needing to be maintained. When hundreds of prisoners escaped in the disorder following last October’s disputed elections, some of their families refused to keep them and sent them back to prison. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Time running out for a Mozal deal URL: https://www.zitamar.com/time-running-out-for-a-mozal-deal/ Last updated: 2025-12-15T17:06:32.000Z Good afternoon. 0.3 US cents may not sound like a lot of money, but it could well be what causes the Mozal aluminium plant to close. That is the difference between the maximum tariff per kilowatt-hour which Mozal’s majority owner, South32 of Australia, is understood to be willing to pay (6.4 cents), and the minimum the Mozambican government says must be charged (6.7 cents) in order to cover the costs of generating the 950MW or so of electricity Mozal uses. Over the course of a year it amounts to almost $25m dollars, assuming that the plant (which runs 24 hours a day) consumes power steadily all year round. South32 has threatened to shut down the plant if it does not reach a satisfactory agreement on renewing the current power supply contract, which expires in March. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8dff39c3-3005-4fac-8242-0b99e8f96475/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Technically Mozal buys its power not from the Mozambican government or its electric utility EDM but from a company jointly owned by EDM and South African power utility Eskom. However, because the power from Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa dam which is sent straight to South Africa is critical to supplying Mozal, the negotiations have been left largely to Mozambicans. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Dirty rivers and dirty money URL: https://www.zitamar.com/dirty-rivers-and-dirty-money/ Last updated: 2025-12-12T16:20:24.000Z Good afternoon. It is welcome news that the Dutch government has come to the rescue of the polluted waterways of Manica province, which have been ruined by the effects of unlicensed and uncontrolled gold mining there (see below). For months now, swarms of people have been descending on the province, prompted by recent gold finds and a rise in gold prices. There has been frenzied panning for gold in rivers and digging up of farmland. Farmers, who rely on the rivers to irrigate their fields, have watched their crops being destroyed. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ecb390d6-aae0-4ea3-9bca-3948b78cdf38/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) All the same, cleaning up the rivers is not going to address the malpractice that enables the problem. Aside from the fact that a lot of poor people have been looking for gold because they are desperate to earn a living, there is the fact that they have enjoyed the cooperation of corrupt local officials. The humble *garimpeiro* who wades into a muddy river with a plastic bowl sells their gold to smuggling networks who work in collaboration with those officials. And the more organised (but still destructive and often illegal) mining done by mining companies, mostly Chinese, requires the political connections provided by elites in the ruling Frelimo party. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### No higher law than safety URL: https://www.zitamar.com/no-higher-law-than-safety/ Last updated: 2025-12-11T17:18:22.000Z Good afternoon. The latest political controversy being hotly discussed on social media in Mozambique is the transport minister João Matlombe’s decision to suspend the operations of bus company City Link, following the accident in Maputo province last week that left seven people dead. A lot of people have argued (and the consensus among lawyers seems to be) that Matlombe does not have the power to suspend the company from running buses just because of an accident, even one as horrific as this. Is there, then, any justification for the government to act outside the law, something that happens pretty often in Mozambique anyway, and usually for the wrong motives? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c241b24d-ad64-4340-b1bd-504219390758/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The reason why Mozambique’s roads are so dangerous (over 600 people have died in road accidents so far this year, more than from malaria, HIV/AIDS or the war in Cabo Delgado province) is not that Mozambicans are particularly irresponsible by nature or particularly bad at driving. It is that there is no safety culture, and that is partly the responsibility of bus and minibus operators, who do nothing to encourage their drivers to drive safely. Instead, what they do is make them work to exhaustion and set daily targets that force them to exceed the speed limit and overtake dangerously, which is what happened in last week’s accident. Nor do they check if their drivers have a valid licence for driving buses or if they are properly insured. And that is before we discuss the condition of their buses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Black gold starts flowing again URL: https://www.zitamar.com/black-gold-starts-flowing-again/ Last updated: 2025-12-10T20:03:56.000Z Good afternoon. Among the positive signs of economic recovery in Mozambique is the gradual resurgence of the graphite industry. Government figures released last week say that graphite production is expected to rise by 10% next year, to just over 14,800 tonnes. Last year, it was not clear if and when graphite production in Mozambique was going to restart. Australian graphite miner Syrah Resources, the main graphite mining business with an operational mine, was not able to produce graphite for much of the year, thanks to a combination of competition from cheaper Chinese synthetic graphite and disruptive protests. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/84aceab5-e17f-45fd-b49c-caae67df27eb/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (24 November - 7 December 2025)The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) went on the offensive against Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-289.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-12-10-17.26.57.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-24-november-7-december-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Since then, the protests have subsided and demand for graphite has continued to grow. The International Energy Agency forecast this year that global graphite demand would double between now and 2040\. In addition, the Chinese government has placed restrictions on graphite exports, and this year the US government imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese graphite. Manufacturers of graphite anodes for electric vehicle batteries are increasingly looking to, or considering, sources outside China, and graphite miners in Africa are enjoying a revival as a result. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (24 November - 7 December 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-24-november-7-december-2025/ Last updated: 2025-12-10T15:59:38.000Z ## By the numbers At least 14 political violence events (2,285 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 46 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,398 since 1 October 2017) At least 11 reported civilian fatalities (2,706 since 1 October 2017) At least 13 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,125 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) went on the offensive against Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts. In Muidumbe, they responded to ISM attacks on the N380 that closed the road for some days. The most significant clash was in Macomia district, where RDF killed at least 35 ISM fighters. Beyond the province, decisions by the United Kingdom and Netherlands governments to withdraw finance from the LNG project once again put the spotlight on Mozambican forces' persistent targeting of civilians in the conflict. ## Situation summary **ISM clashes with Rwandan and Mozambican troops in three districts** In Muidumbe district, the N380 between Chitunda and Xitaxi villages was closed for at least four days, beginning on 5 December, in the wake of increased ISM activity on that stretch of road and a significant military response. Early in the morning on 28 November, ISM attacked a vehicle that was travelling without a military escort, injuring one passenger. On 5 December, ISM detonated an IED, damaging the lead vehicle in a commercial convoy. Zitamar [reports](https://www.zitamar.com/ambush-on-military-convoy-halts-traffic-on-key-cabo-delgado-road/) that ISM then ambushed a Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) unit sent to support the convoy, injuring at least eight soldiers. Islamic State (IS) claimed on its social media channels that in the attack, insurgents injured some soldiers, damaged one vehicle, and captured another. A video clip from the scene supports their claim to have seized one vehicle. According to a local source, during the initial attack on the convoy on 5 December, some people in the convoy were kidnapped and later released once a ransom was paid. IS issued a further claim for an attack on a joint FADM and RDF patrol on 6 December. This was likely a clash with FADM and RDF reinforcements sent in response to the previous day’s events. By 7 December, likely RDF helicopters undertook airstrikes in the area, according to a source. No casualties were reported. Airstrikes were also a feature of clashes in Mocímboa da Praia. State forces helicopters, likely RDF, struck Nhonge island, also known as Mionge, on 27 November. This followed armed clashes between the FADM navy and ISM forces on the island earlier that day. According to local sources, ISM forces in the area moved to Nhonge island from the mainland around Ulo village to avoid FADM navy patrols. An IS statement described their visit to Nhonge as a “preaching tour,” though local sources reported theft of property, abduction of civilians, and widespread fear among residents of the island and villages on the nearby coast caused by ISM’s presence. Further south on the Macomia coast, RDF and ISM forces clashed in the Simbolongo area in the week of 1 December. According to local sources, at least 35 people were killed. Sources indicated that this included ISM militants and civilians, including women and children. Prior to the clashes, on 27 November, RDF captured three ISM fighters close to Pangane. These events follow the [establishment](https://moztimes.com/en/rwandan-forces-open-new-position-in-pangane-village-to-cut-off-the-insurgents-logistics/?ref=zitamar.com) of an RDF outpost at Pangane in November. According to a local source, the RDF has also set up outposts at Ilala and Cogolo in the area. **Militants attack a Nangade village as they move toward the Tanzania border** Further north, ISM fighters moved out of Mocímboa da Praia district, northward into Nangade district around 25 November. By 2 December, they had reached the northwest of Nangade district, around the border with Mueda district, and close to the border with Tanzania. A local source assumes that the purpose of such trips to border areas is to pick up recruits and supplies from Tanzania, though this cannot be confirmed. ISM only undertook one attack as they moved through the district, on 26 November, at Ngalonga village, southwest of Nangade district headquarters. There, they burned a store with 300 sacks of cashew nuts and three houses. There were no casualties. **ISM fighters leave Chiure** In the south of the province, a group of ISM fighters killed three civilians close to Ntutupue on the EN1 road on 28 November, according to an IS claim. According to a local source, this was one of two groups of ISM fighters that were seen on 30 November crossing the EN1 near the towns of Impire and Ntutupue, respectively. Further east, on 29 November, another group making its way north killed seven farmers in eastern Ancuabe district, and abducted some others. They are thought to be the last of the group that attacked communities in Nampula’s Eráti and Memba provinces in November. According to separate sources, by 30 November the two groups had made their way to Cagembe in Quissanga district — a village frequently used as [a stopping-off point](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-12-november-2025?ref=zitamar.com) by ISM when moving north or south. ISM was not the only group active on the EN1\. On 1 December, a group armed with “[blunt objects](https://aimnews.org/2025/12/04/unspecified-number-of-men-kidnapped-by-terrorists-in-metuge/?ref=zitamar.com),” and from the towns of Silva Macua and Ntutupue was stopping traffic and demanding money. According to state news agency Agência de Informação de Moçambique, a FADM detachment dispersed the likely criminal group. Further west on the EN1 in Metoro town, and one week prior to that incident, on 26 November, a mob killed a Local Forces commander outside a police station in the town. The mob suspected him of killing three motorcycle taxi drivers two months beforehand, and stealing their motorcycles. **Workers demonstrate at LNG plant** Demonstrations took place at the main entrance, known as Quatro Caminhos, to the liquefied natural gas plant (LNG) at Afungi in Palma district on 27 and 28 November. It is unclear what drove the demonstrations. One local source said it involved local staff who had been laid off by security companies and claimed to have been replaced by outsiders. According to another [source,](https://mozanorte.blogspot.com/2025/11/palma-antigos-trabalhadores-de-uma.html?m=1&ref=zitamar.com) staff from various companies were claiming they had not been paid fully and on time. ## Focus: LNG investment decisions raise questions over FADM civilian targeting On 1 December, the UK [announced](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-12-01/hcws1111?ref=zitamar.com) the withdrawal of financial support for Mozambique LNG, the TotalEnergies-led project at Afungi. The UK withdrew both loan and export insurance support, saying that an evaluation of existing risks had shown that the overall project risk increased, though the statement contained no details on specific risks. On the same day, the Netherlands government announced that TotalEnergies had withdrawn a request for financial support through the government’s Atradius agency. However, Atradius' export credit support for TotalEnergies was under review due to allegations of human rights violations, triggered by [Politico reporting](https://www.politico.eu/article/totalenergies-mozambique-patrick-pouyanne-atrocites-afungi-palma-cabo-delgado-al-shabab-isis/?ref=zitamar.com) of the killing of civilians by a Mozambican Joint Task Force (JTF) funded by TotalEnergies at the Quatro Caminhos entrance to the LNG site. On 1 December, Clingendael, the organization commissioned to undertake the review, published a summary of its[ investigative report](https://www.clingendael.org/publication/human-rights-violations-mozambican-security-forces-context-mozambique-lng-project?ref=zitamar.com). The report highlighted actions by Mozambican forces that targeted civilians, and confirmed the broad outline of events laid out in Politico. TotalEnergies [continues to deny](https://totalenergies.com/news/press-releases/mozambique-lng-clarification-totalenergies?ref=zitamar.com) any complicity in human rights abuses. ACLED data on civilian targeting by FADM in the years since 2021 present a complicated picture. At the heart of the Politico allegations against TotalEnergies was the mechanism through which it supported members of the JTF through direct payments. This mechanism was overhauled in October 2023, with TotalEnergies providing support [directly to the central government](https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-new-security-deal-between-mozambique-and-gas-project-investors/), rather than to members of the JTF, and the JTF withdrew from the project site. In just over two years since the recalibration of the relationship with TotalEnergies, civilian targeting by FADM in Palma, Nangade, and Mocímboa da Praia districts is no longer an issue (*see maps below*). However, it clearly remains an issue for FADM elsewhere. In Cabo Delgado province in 2025, civilian targeting accounts for 13% of violent events involving FADM, for the most part concentrated in the nearshore waters of Macomia district. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2025/12/2025-12-10-17.43.38.jpg) While this is a lower proportion than in 2024, it is still higher than 2021, when civilian targeting accounted for 11% of FADM’s actions. There is also a worrying trend in civilian fatalities in these incidents, which have been rising throughout 2025, despite the number of events remaining at lower levels (*see graph below*). ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2025/12/2025-12-10-17.43.41.jpg) This pattern raises a different set of questions from the ones that Clingendael was asked to investigate. Firstly, those interested in security sector reform will want to consider what steps are necessary to address this continuing problem. Interested parties range from the European Union, which provides technical assistance to FADM, to President Daniel Chapo. Though Chapo denies that such human rights abuses occur, he has made [security sector reform](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-7-20-april-2025?ref=zitamar.com) a key part of his administrative platform. There is also an issue for TotalEnergies to consider. Clingendael points to the influence of the more professional Rwandan forces in establishing security in the north of the province and resetting relations with communities. The question for Total Energies, therefore, is whether it could withstand the withdrawal of Rwandan forces. While they are likely to remain for the LNG plant construction period, their presence will not be indefinite. Reform in the operations of FADM will therefore be critical for TotalEnergies also. ## Roundup *Security sector reform meets resistance within the police* A series of end-of-year public service meetings is revealing tensions within government over President Chapo’s security sector measures targeting the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM). Speaking at the 27 November meeting of the Ministry of the Interior’s Coordinating Council, President Chapo [highlighted](https://aimnews.org/2025/11/27/chapo-exige-do-ministerio-do-interior-uma-reflexao-profunda-sobre-prevencao-e-combate-ao-crime/?ref=zitamar.com) corruption in the PRM, particularly in the traffic and migration sectors. He made no direct response to Minister of the Interior Paulo Chachine’s remarks two days prior, which challenged the May decision to place the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) under the direction of the Attorney General. Speaking at a meeting of the PRM Council, Chachine [claimed](https://opais.co.mz/chachine-diz-que-prm-sem-sernic-esta-desfalcada/?ref=zitamar.com) SERNIC still relied extensively on the police for its work and that the police required an intelligence service to operate effectively. Attorney General Américo Letela indirectly pushed back at this on 8 December at a meeting of SERNIC’s Coordinating Council. He [emphasized](https://aimnews.org/2025/12/08/pgr-exorta-ao-sernic-para-elevar-rigor-no-combate-a-criminalidade/?ref=zitamar.com) the need to strengthen SERNIC, with a priority on removing corrupt elements from the service. In doing so, he hinted at the principal reason President Chapo wants to separate SERNIC from the police — the fear that it protects corrupt elements within PRM. *Budget cuts deepen as recession hits Mozambique’s health sector* Mozambique’s revised budget for 2026 [forced](https://aimnews.org/2025/11/25/governo-altera-contas-no-pesoe-para-2026/?ref=zitamar.com) the government to cut state revenue projections by 24 billion meticais (380 million US dollars) for this year and 15 billion meticais (US$238 million) for next year. Although officials suggest that essential services will be protected by limiting cuts to non-priority investments, the health sector is already under [severe strain](https://www.zitamar.com/free-to-suffer/). Hospitals lack the funds to cover basic expenses, from medical supplies to water, electricity, and routine maintenance, while chronically low wages continue to push doctors and nurses to demand informal payments from patients. With USAID's withdrawal reducing financial support further and no alternative funding model in sight, ordinary Mozambicans are finding it increasingly difficult to exercise their constitutional right to free health care in practice. *Sweden to cut development aid to Mozambique and four other countries* Sweden is gradually ending its bilateral development cooperation with Mozambique and four other countries, shifting toward fewer aid partnerships. According to a [statement](https://www.swedenabroad.se/en/embassies/mozambique-maputo/current/news/sweden-is-reshaping-its-cooperation-with-mozambique-gradually-phasing-out-bilateral-development-cooperation/?ref=zitamar.com) from the Swedish Embassy in Maputo, the decision, which will take effect by 31 August 2026, is not linked to events in Mozambique but rather aims to evolve relations into areas such as trade, investment, and collaborative efforts on climate, health, and peace. Support for Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Liberia, and Bolivia will be phased out in the coming years in order to [redirect](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/sweden-cut-development-aid-five-countries-divert-money-ukraine-2025-12-05/?ref=zitamar.com) funds toward Ukraine. Support to Ukraine will increase to at least $1.06 billion in 2026 for rebuilding energy infrastructure. ### Portuguese promise URL: https://www.zitamar.com/portuguese-promise/ Last updated: 2025-12-09T17:36:13.000Z Good afternoon. Fountain pen ink was due to flow liberally in the Portuguese city of Porto today, since the Mozambican government expects to sign 21 cooperation agreements with Portugal (see below). Like most such agreements, these are signed in ink, not blood, so they do not represent hard commitments to deliver projects. But President Daniel Chapo and his government have been lobbying the Portuguese hard to put their money where their mouth is. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c4463c8d-73a0-4527-a1c0-b410cdc30867/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As this newsletter noted yesterday, Mozambique’s foreign aid is drying up, and the reputation of Chapo’s government among foreign governments is still tarnished by the fraudulent elections held last October and the brutal police crackdown on protests that followed. But Portugal remains loyal to Mozambique, its former colony, where it is for example in charge of the European Union’s military advice mission supporting the Mozambican armed forces in fighting the northern insurgency. Chapo’s government is hopeful that it can secure financial support in the region of billions of dollars to help Portuguese businesses and institutions go to work in Mozambique. Their idea is to get loans and guarantees that will provide backing for commercial rather than development projects, thus sidestepping the problem of aid fatigue and reduced aid budgets. Even so, however, it would be a lot of money for the Portuguese government to find, and the Mozambican idea is for the Portuguese to access and manage European Union cooperation funds. Benefiting from a shared language, Portuguese businesses and investors are quite keen to start up businesses in Mozambique in various sectors, from tourism and hospitality to electrical supplies, and they have a good track record in employing Mozambicans, raising service standards and knowledge transfer. If they receive financial backing, the argument goes, then they can compete with Chinese businesses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Stockholm syndrome URL: https://www.zitamar.com/stockholm-syndrome/ Last updated: 2025-12-08T16:03:58.000Z Good afternoon. The Swedish government’s decision to end direct development aid to Mozambique (see below) has left Mozambican NGOs in shock, but nobody should have been very surprised by it. For one thing, donor countries everywhere are cutting their aid to the developing world, and Mozambique has already seen reductions from the United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Sweden is not the only Nordic country to lose interest in Mozambique: Denmark has closed its embassy in Maputo and it stopped providing aid in 2015\. And the centre-right Swedish government elected three years ago could be counted on to be less interested in foreign aid than its predecessors. But also, the Mozambican government has not done itself any favours. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/89a4ed5b-2126-4e2b-ba5a-e24e29f65dee/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique’s new gas facility targets domestic marketA new $760 million gas processing facility is the first such project ever built aimed at supplying Mozambique’s own energy needs![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-287.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-12-08-17.02.22.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-new-gas-facility-targets-domestic-market/) [Ambush on military convoy halts traffic on key Cabo Delgado roadSeveral members of the military injured, with unconfirmed reports of deaths![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-288.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-12-08-16.02.39.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/ambush-on-military-convoy-halts-traffic-on-key-cabo-delgado-road/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Sweden has been one of Mozambique’s longest-standing donors, having supported the country since independence in 1975\. But the Mozambican government has not rewarded that loyalty. In contrast to how carefully it has accounted for finance from the US or the International Monetary Fund, Mozambican state institutions have been careless in managing aid money from Sweden and in accounting for it. At times funds have been diverted or their use has not been properly explained. Apparently the government did not think there would be consequences. Nor has the government been very careful in how it explains its human rights record or the recurring problem of election fraud. Ministers have taken the attitude that foreign countries will quickly forget about abuses and then go back to business as usual, but over the years, donors have hit back by reducing funding. The widespread evidence of massive fraud in the latest Mozambican elections held in October would only have encouraged this trend. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s new gas facility targets domestic market URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-new-gas-facility-targets-domestic-market/ Last updated: 2025-12-08T15:06:01.000Z Last week's inauguration of the new Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) in Temane came just as the facility sent its second truckload of 20 tonnes of cooking gas (LPG) on the 730-km journey south to distribution centres in Matola's industrial area. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Ambush on military convoy halts traffic on key Cabo Delgado road URL: https://www.zitamar.com/ambush-on-military-convoy-halts-traffic-on-key-cabo-delgado-road/ Last updated: 2025-12-08T14:16:17.000Z An ambush on a Mozambican military unit responding to an insurgent attack on Friday, 5 December, left at least eight soldiers injured and possibly some dead, according to local sources — the latest incident to paralyse traffic on the N380, the main road linking the southern and northern districts of Cabo Delgado. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Zandamela cuts up the credit cards URL: https://www.zitamar.com/zandamela-cuts-up-the-credit-cards/ Last updated: 2025-12-05T17:10:05.000Z Good afternoon. The Bank of Mozambique this week announced its latest measure to try to deal with the shortage of foreign currency, especially US dollars, which makes it hard for businesses to import goods and to take their revenues out of the country. A recent symptom of this was when the airline Emirates announced in October that it would no longer sell plane tickets through travel agencies in Mozambique. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/51a7d96b-8b9c-45b4-938b-fb4c4c0e1e95/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The central bank announced on Wednesday that it was imposing a spending cap of $93,900 per person for foreign currency payments and cash withdrawals made with Mozambican debit and credit cards. Why? Because businesses trying to get around the foreign currency shortage have been resorting to using their credit cards to pay for imports, and making withdrawals from cash machines abroad. That has resulted in Mozambican banks having to find increasing amounts of US dollars to settle their accounts with card services companies like Visa, and those banks have complained to the central bank, hence the restriction. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Domestic gas: now more than hot air URL: https://www.zitamar.com/domestic-gas-now-more-than-hot-air/ Last updated: 2025-12-04T17:44:43.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday saw the inauguration of a gas processing plant that should, if things go according to plan, replace three-quarters of Mozambique’s imports of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), also known as cooking gas. In bottled form, the gas is mainly used for cooking and domestic heating, as well as some industrial processes. The plant in the town of Temane in Inhambane province, has been built by South African petrochemicals firm Sasol, but the gas will be sold by Mozambican state-owned oil and gas company ENH, which will use part of the proceeds to repay Sasol’s investment. As well as LPG, the plant will also supply “methane-rich gas” to the nearby Temane gas-fired power plant, and produce light oil for export which can be turned into fuels. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/24cf15f6-195d-4d2d-99bd-c11a36cbe19f/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For the first time in its history, Mozambique is able to produce gas in significant amounts for domestic consumption. Up to now, domestic gas use has been limited to a very small amount in the piped gas network in the city and province of Maputo. The government will be pleased at this, since this is a step forward in its strategy to exploit Mozambique’s gas for domestic use and create jobs along the way, instead of just exporting it. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### No worries for TotalEnergies URL: https://www.zitamar.com/no-worries-for-totalenergies/ Last updated: 2025-12-03T16:24:30.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique is in the headlines across the world, and as usual, not for reasons the government would like. After months of uncertainty, the British and Dutch governments yesterday confirmed that their export finance bodies would no longer support the financing of the $20bn-plus liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by TotalEnergies in Cabo Delgado province. About $2.2bn of support has been withdrawn, although only $300m of that is a loan (from UK Export Finance); the rest is loan guarantees from the UK and from the Netherlands. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2659f9e6-65b9-4980-b70f-ee62b52fd2ca/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Privately, TotalEnergies has been pessimistic about British and Dutch support for many months, and the firm’s chief executive Patrick Pouyanné has previously said that TotalEnergies could replace the loans they would have guaranteed by investing its own equity. There is no sign that any other export financiers will withdraw. Were the United States to withdraw its $4.5bn export finance loan, that would be disastrous for the project, but President Donald Trump’s government has already signalled its support for the project and directed the Export-Import Bank of the United States to grant the loan. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Free to suffer URL: https://www.zitamar.com/free-to-suffer/ Last updated: 2025-12-02T16:34:35.000Z Good afternoon. Should hospitals and clinics charge for healthcare? It is an emotive issue in Mozambique and elsewhere in the world, and access to free healthcare is required by the Mozambican constitution. As this newsletter noted yesterday, Beira’s general hospital has been ordered to stop demanding user charges from patients, after an NGO complained. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0e2afe81-cde1-478f-a609-6408fe2dfa7a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But behind the ideal of free healthcare lie some grim realities. For one thing, getting treated often requires paying money anyway, just not to the hospital authorities. Doctors and nurses commonly demand bribes in order to treat patients. Pregnant mothers who cannot or will not pay risk being left to give birth without help. Apart from the fact that bribes are ingrained in the culture of state institutions, they do not earn a decent wage. For another, the healthcare sector is severely underfunded. It is normal that hospitals and clinics cannot afford to pay for adequate medical supplies, or electricity and water bills, or for other services like security. We recently noted that many facilities have no flushing toilets or running water, as they are unable to maintain their water and sewage pipes. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas, blood and hot air URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-blood-and-hot-air/ Last updated: 2025-12-01T16:27:34.000Z Good afternoon. The gas projects are starting up again in Cabo Delgado province - but their return is overshadowed by the claim that the corporations developing those projects are linked to alleged killings and torture of civilians by the Mozambican armed forces. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fc1b12ca-67bf-4062-83ff-026ffb81cc39/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) President Daniel Chapo denied claims of human rights abuses when he spoke to journalists at the weekend, as he was opening a local office of the National Human Rights Commission in Pemba, the provincial capital. It is the first time the president has addressed the issue since he took office. There are a number of reasons why he may be commenting now. For one thing, he was in Cabo Delgado and speaking to journalists on the subject of human rights, so the topic may have been unavoidable. For another, an NGO has just launched legal action against French energy firm TotalEnergies in France, accusing it of being complicit in war crimes on the grounds that it financially supported troops who are said to have [tortured and killed](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-troops-based-at-totalenergies-project-site-massacred-civilians-says-report/) civilians. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Searching for reinforcements URL: https://www.zitamar.com/searching-for-reinforcements/ Last updated: 2025-12-01T09:38:52.000Z Good morning and welcome to Friday’s newsletter. Defence minister Cristóvão Chume told parliament yesterday that the armed forces face “great difficulties” in acquiring lethal equipment because the defence investment budget has no room for new weapons or ammunition. It is true that the sector has taken cuts, and that replacing old kit is costly. But focusing on the lack of money risks missing the real issues holding back Mozambique’s military. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The biggest problems are not financial. They are structural — and, in some cases, criminal. For years, frontline soldiers in Cabo Delgado have complained that they do not receive the basic supplies they need: rations, fuel, uniforms, communications gear, and medical support. These shortcomings persist even though the state allocates money for them. The problem is not simply that the government cannot afford these items; it is that they do not consistently reach the troops. This is largely a logistics failure. The armed forces lack the qualified personnel and systems needed to ensure that equipment moves efficiently from procurement to storage to the battlefield. Without competent logistics and administration, even a well-funded army will struggle to maintain readiness. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News and Zitamar Pro tiers only._ ### What’s right for Memba is right for Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/whats-right-for-memba-is-right-for-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-12-01T15:29:46.000Z Good afternoon. Only the waters of the Lúrio river separate the district of Chiúre in Cabo Delgado province and the district of Memba in Nampula province. However, they might as well be in different countries when you consider how different the military and civilian response has been to insurgents attacks in the two districts. When insurgents attacked Memba recently, burning homes and churches and killing a handful of civilians, they may have been surprised to find armed forces chasing them as they made their way back to Cabo Delgado. Such a rapid response from the security forces is uncommon. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2b03cc1a-10e5-4605-9942-c40fe15f5670/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (10 - 23 November 2025)Operations by Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Macomia district in recent weeks have placed pressure on Islamic State Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-286.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-26-17.09.07.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-27-october-9-november-2025-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) What happened next was even less common. The provincial governor, Eduardo Abdula, came to visit the Alua administrative post in Eráti district, where about 80,000 people from Memba have taken refuge from the insurgent attacks. Abdula stayed the night there and arranged for 60 tonnes of food to be delivered. He has also been coordinating the wider humanitarian response to the attack. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (10 - 23 November 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-27-october-9-november-2025-2/ Last updated: 2025-11-27T10:37:21.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (10 - 23 November 2025) At least 14 political violence events (2,270 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 12 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,341 since 1 October 2017) At least 12 reported civilian fatalities (2,690 since 1 October 2017) At least 14 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,107 since 1 October 2017) ## Situation summary **Counter-insurgency operations continue in Macomia district** Clashes between state forces and ISM have resumed in Macomia district in what appears to be a significant ongoing counter-insurgent operation. The Islamic State (IS) claimed in its weekly newsletter al-Naba that on 10 November, ISM fought off attempts by the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) to recover an outpost at Quiterajo. On 15 November, IS claimed to have injured two Rwandan soldiers in a clash 20 kilometers south, at Cogolo village. Six days later, local sources say another clash occurred at Cogolo, when ISM ambushed Rwandan forces who had uncovered an IED planted by the group. No fatalities were recorded, and according to one source, ISM suffered injuries in the clash. The clashes at Cogolo came after Rwandan forces [reportedly](https://moztimes.com/en/rwandan-forces-open-new-position-in-pangane-village-to-cut-off-the-insurgents-logistics/?ref=zitamar.com) established a new outpost at nearby Pangane village on 10 November, adding to their current position at Mucojo. ISM and Rwandan forces also clashed on 16 November at Limala, just 20 km from Quiterajo in southern Mocímboa da Praia district, according to an IS claim. The clashes at Quiterajo, Cogolo, and Limala may be indicative of wider counter-insurgent operations. Satellite imagery of the area from NASA FIRMS shows extensive fires west of Quiterajo in Catupa forest, for three weeks beginning 4 November. Though not conclusive, evidence of sustained fire events in a known ISM stronghold, confirmed clashes recorded on the coastal periphery, and a strengthened Rwandan presence on the coast strongly suggest an ongoing operation. An operation in Catupa forest may also explain the westward movement of fighters from eastern Muidumbe district toward the northern end of Montepuez district. Between 11 and 17 November, a small group of fighters thought to have moved from the Lake Nguri area killed at least four civilians as they moved through Muambala, Nampanha, and Mapate villages in southern Muidumbe district, toward the northern end of Montepuez district. In a further attack on Primeiro de Maio village on 20 November, ISM killed four civilians, according to IS. **ISM moves freely in Eráti and Memba districts of Nampula** Zitamar News [reports](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-four-in-nampulas-memba-district/) insurgents dressed in military uniforms were first seen on 10 November moving between Cutua in Eráti and Cucune in Memba district. By 21 November, they had undertaken 13 attacks on civilian communities across the two districts and killed at least 21 civilians. According to a source, ISM was moving in at least three groups. Militants first hit Pavala and Sirissa villages on 10 November, before moving south to attack Nhage and Nahavara villages on 13 November, almost 60 km south of the Lúrio river dividing Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces. Over the next eight days, attacks across the two districts prompted over [66,000 people](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-emergency-tracking-tool-report-movement-alert148-22-nov-2025?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) to flee Memba for shelter in Eráti district, primarily in Alua town. According to the [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/mozambique/mozambique-escalation-violence-memba-and-erati-districts-nampula-province-situation-report-1-20-november-2025?ref=zitamar.com) (OCHA), the numbers of people displaced within Memba district have yet to be properly assessed, but thousands have fled to Memba district headquarters, as well as to Lúrio, Chipene, Mazua, Cava, Tropene, and Miaja towns. OCHA also reports up to four trucks of people arriving in the port town of Nacala, further south. The governor of Nampula province, Mariamo Abdula, [reportedly told media](https://www.facebook.com/61551545422074/posts/122217290390051514/?rdid=QGFrcvx5GCbByFVt#) on 24 November that military operations were ongoing and successful. The only evidence of any state forces engagement is a report in al-Naba of a clash with a FADM foot patrol on 12 November. The report, which included photographic evidence of seized equipment, did not specify if the attack was in Eráti or Memba district. ## Focus: What draws ISM to Nampula? ISM activity in Nampula province reached its highest point on record in November with 16 events in the first three weeks of the month, and the highest monthly fatality rate since the insurgency began. November is the third consecutive month in which ISM has been active in northern Nampula, marking it the most sustained activity in the province since the insurgency began. The insurgents' activity in November has been characterized by the rapid movement of at least three groups of fighters, civilian targeting, and property destruction, prompting large-scale displacement. The campaign has also been notable for the number of incident claims, 10, released by IS. ISM’s repeated incursions suggest that the group may be looking to strengthen its existing connections in the area, possibly with a view to bolstering supply routes for recruits and goods. ACLED first records insurgent activity in Memba in June 2022, and in Eráti in August 2022\. However, there is evidence that the group has significant ties to the province. Researchers Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira present evidence of the existence of [recruitment networks](https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/e-JPHv20n2.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) in the province since at least 2016\. They also describe long-standing connections between fishing communities in Nampula with counterparts in Quissanga, Ibo, and Macomia, further north in Cabo Delgado. Such established relationships can provide entry points for developing supply lines and targeting new recruits. The violence of their current sojourn may, counterintuitively, be an indicator that ISM wishes to strengthen its position in an area where it has strong connections. Mass displacement and disruption of civic administration, particularly in the absence of an effective military response, create an environment in which the group can operate with some freedom. ## Roundup *ExxonMobil lifts force majeure on Rovuma LNG* ExxonMobil has [lifted](https://worldoil.com/news/2025/11/20/exxon-lifts-force-majeure-on-rovuma-lng-clearing-path-for-major-mozambique-gas-development/?ref=zitamar.com) force majeure on its Rovuma liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, imposed after ISM attacked Palma town in 2021\. The decision paves the way for a final investment decision, expected in 2026\. The move follows TotalEnergies’ recent restart of work on the adjacent Mozambique LNG project. First production for both the Exxon-led Rovuma LNG development and TotalEnergies’ project is expected in the early 2030s. *TotalEnergies accused of complicity in “container massacre” in Mozambique* The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) filed a [criminal complaint](https://www.ecchr.eu/pressemitteilung/totalenergies-faces-criminal-complaint-for-complicity-in-war-crimes-torture-and-enforced-disappearance-in-mozambique/%20-%20not%20a%20criminal%20complain?ref=zitamar.com) in France on 17 November accusing TotalEnergies of complicity in war crimes, torture, and enforced disappearances in Mozambique. The complaint, submitted to France’s National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, centers on a 2021 incident known as the “[container massacre](https://www.politico.eu/article/totalenergies-mozambique-patrick-pouyanne-atrocites-afungi-palma-cabo-delgado-al-shabab-isis/?ref=zitamar.com),” in which Mozambican armed forces allegedly detained, tortured, and killed civilians at TotalEnergies’ gas site. ECCHR argues that TotalEnergies knowingly supported a military unit with a documented history of human rights abuses by providing housing, food, equipment, and bonuses to soldiers. According to ECCHR, internal documents obtained through freedom-of-information requests show the company was aware of violent abuses by the forces it relied on for security. ECCHR says that TotalEnergies and its executives should be held accountable for enabling these crimes. *Mozambique grants extension to TotalEnergies' LNG project* The Mozambican government has [granted](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/mocambique-aceita-repor-quatro-anos-e-meio-da-paragem-do-megaprojeto-de-gas%5Fn1699109?ref=zitamar.com) TotalEnergies an additional 4 1/2-year extension to the Cabo Delgado LNG project concession, corresponding to the period during which it was suspended under a force majeure declaration due to insurgent attacks between April 2021 and October 2025\. TotalEnergies had requested a 10-year extension, citing losses of 4.5 billion US dollars. However, the government opted to restore only the actual period of suspension and commissioned an independent audit to verify all related expenses. ### Whose side is Paulo Chachine on? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/whose-side-is-paulo-chachine-on/ Last updated: 2025-11-26T16:59:16.000Z Good afternoon. It is unusual for a government minister in Mozambique to flatly reject government policy, but that is what interior minister Paulo Chachine has done in criticising the decision to move the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic) out of his ministry and to the Attorney-General’s Office (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e5e4f0cf-05eb-4ee0-bfe5-ddcb4d599904/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique LNG back on track after letter leak derailmentThe government of Mozambique and the Mozambique LNG project in Area 1 of the Rovuma Basin appear to have moved past several weeks of turbulence![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-285.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-26-17.03.34-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-lng-back-on-track-after-letter-leak-derailment/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chachine did not say a word to complain when the move was announced six months ago. His comments seem rather confused: on the one hand, he says that the change only exists “on paper” and not in reality, but on the other, he claims that the police are suffering due to no longer having an intelligence service at their command. Extraordinarily, he expresses the hope that Sernic can be moved back to the interior ministry. Has he told President Daniel Chapo that he was wrong to approve the move? There is no need for Sernic to be moved back in order for the police to do their job. Given proper procedures for doing so, the police can perfectly well cooperate with Sernic and ask them for information without controlling them as they did before. In this way the FBI in the United States cooperates with police forces without answering to them or giving them full access to investigations. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique LNG back on track after letter leak derailment URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-lng-back-on-track-after-letter-leak-derailment/ Last updated: 2025-11-26T15:38:17.000Z The government of Mozambique and the Mozambique LNG project in Area 1 of the Rovuma Basin appear to have moved past several weeks of turbulence triggered by TotalEnergies’ unilateral declaration, at the end of October, that it was lifting force majeure. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Will Brazil come back? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-brazil-come-back/ Last updated: 2025-11-25T16:18:23.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambicans have been in a ferment over this week’s visit by Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. It is very unusual for a politician of Lula’s importance to visit the country, even if the visit is explained by the historic ties of trade and cooperation between Mozambique and Brazil, and by Lula’s interest in Africa (and, cynics might say, his support for undemocratic regimes). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6c170263-40da-49ce-99e9-9e6dc1710937/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Lula spoke with apparent warmth and conviction about collaboration between Mozambique and how, after a period when it had stopped, it should now restart. He mentioned various sectors of the economy and highlighted healthcare and education. That will be music to the ears of the Mozambican government, whose healthcare and education sectors rely very heavily on foreign aid. Healthcare provision in particular has suffered considerably since the withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo versus Frelimo: round one to Chapo URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-versus-frelimo-round-one-to-chapo/ Last updated: 2025-11-24T16:42:09.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican government claims to have found a way forward with French energy firm TotalEnergies over the costs of its gas project and the tax it has to pay on it — although as we explain, its official statement is not true (see below). But it took three weeks for this to happen, during which it had to deal with commentators aligned with the ruling Frelimo party attacking TotalEnergies and calling them bandits and blackmailers. This threatened to limit Chapo’s freedom to negotiate with the company, and to force him into a hardline position just for the sake of political convenience. And that problem arose in the first place because someone leaked a letter from TotalEnergies to President Daniel Chapo asking for its extra costs to be taken into account and for a longer concession period for the project. None of this is to say that Chapo should just give in to the demands of TotalEnergies. But complex negotiations are not conducted by shouting slogans like “bandits” through a megaphone. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/49d93b43-ec04-495d-9cc6-d29b5d866aee/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The lesson of all this is that Chapo still does not have very widespread support within his party. There are still plenty of party figures with loud voices and power who are willing and able to make trouble for him by promoting views that disagree with, or threaten to derail, government decisions. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Fox Nyusi guards the electoral chickens URL: https://www.zitamar.com/fox-nyusi-guards-the-electoral-chickens/ Last updated: 2025-11-21T16:26:38.000Z Good afternoon. There is something grimly appropriate about former Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi being appointed to lead the African Union’s election observation mission in Guinea-Bissau, as one of his predecessors, Joaquim Chissano, announced yesterday. The election process in Guinea-Bissau makes Mozambique look democratic by comparison. The main opposition coalition has been excluded from taking part in the elections on the grounds that candidates submitted their applications late. The same supreme court that ruled this also said that the incumbent president, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, could remain in power until September, even though his five-year term ended in February. In any case, he has stayed on since September. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0bef986b-68b9-4b52-a945-cadc75bc3024/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Nyusi ought to be an expert in election misconduct by now. The last two elections he presided over, the local elections of 2023 and the national and provincial elections of 2024, saw the most systematic and organised fraud of any Mozambican elections. The large-scale manipulation of the voter roll by electoral authorities meant that the elections had been manipulated before a single vote had been cast, and made it impossible to tell what a fair result would have been. To argue over whether Nyusi personally ordered all this is irrelevant. When electoral officials, prosecutors, police and officials in the ruling party are all working hand in hand to rig an election result, the responsibility can only lie with the head of state and leader of that ruling party. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### All the president’s men? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/all-the-presidents-men-2/ Last updated: 2025-11-20T16:45:38.000Z Good afternoon. Who was the man standing next to the Chinese ambassador at the launch of the “Young City” urban development project in Maputo in April this year? His name is Alcides Chihono, but he likes to use the nickname Cantona, which adorns the registration plate of his Mercedes luxury four-wheel-drive. And along with Ingilo Dalsuco, he is one of two people who are perceived by Mozambican and foreign businesses to be power-brokers who can fix deals with President Daniel Chapo and his office. Both those men are profiled in the latest edition of newspaper *Canal de Moçambique*, in a way that may, or should, be embarrassing for Chapo. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3d952dd5-ea93-40b3-9cdc-e07a3eb87dfc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chihono is thought to have acted as a middleman for Phoenix International Group, a Hong Kong-based property developer that does not seem to have done business in Mozambique before the Young City project was announced. He claims to be close to Chapo, and he certainly is in a literal sense: his office is located a few steps away from the presidency building. Chihono also asserts that he has ties to the security services, something which would make him part of an elite circle of trusted people in Mozambican politics. At any rate, he seems to have been successful in lobbying for the Nigerian oil company Aiteo Group. Sources within Mozambican state-owned oil and gas firm ENH speak of a Nigerian lobby there. Dalsuco is the son-in-law of former finance minister Manuel Chang, who has since been jailed in the United States for his leading role in the so-called “hidden debts” or “tuna bond” corruption scandal. *Canal* says that he continued to run business interests for his father-in-law when Chang was behind bars. It also notes that, unlike other people connected to Chang, he has not been questioned over whether he was involved in the hidden debts scheme. But he is known to have sold several buildings to the public sector in Inhambane province, during Daniel Chapo’s term as provincial governor. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Generals hunger for Turkish delight URL: https://www.zitamar.com/generals-hunger-for-turkish-delight/ Last updated: 2025-11-19T17:31:33.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambican generals will be hoping that yesterday’s meeting between President Daniel Chapo and representatives of the Turkish defence industry will yield tangible results in the form of weapons orders. No doubt the 13 Turkish arms companies in the delegation will be hoping the same. Ever since the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province began eight years ago, the Mozambican government has been trying to acquire more sophisticated weapons. It has repeatedly sought them from the European Union, which so far will only provide non-lethal equipment. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/208057c2-4ab0-483d-9bf5-dfe289f25b81/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Straightforward commercial arms deals are not an option for the government, as it lacks the money to pay upfront. What it needs is credit, and that means doing a deal with another government. This will surely be what the generals are looking for. Mozambican defence ministers have visited Turkey in the past in search of weapons, but the payment terms have been an obstacle. No such credit has been announced yet, but the Turkish officials would have surely known that that would be a prerequisite to selling any decent amount of weapons. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gold fever URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gold-fever/ Last updated: 2025-11-18T16:54:25.000Z Good afternoon. The gold rush in central Mozambique continues to intensify, and as it does so, it claims more and more human and environmental victims (see below). Farmers are seeing their farmland destroyed, unlicensed miners are inflicting savage wounds on each other and waterways are being polluted. The farmland affected, for example in Sofala province’s Gorongosa district, is among the most fertile in the country. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2992dc80-2675-4fc9-b3c7-30e068f0fd84/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Insurgents kill two people in attacks on two villages in MuidumbeAt least two people were killed in insurgent attacks on the villages of Nampanha and Mapate in Muidumbe district![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-283.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-18-15.09.41.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-two-people-in-attacks-on-two-villages-in-muidumbe/) [Cabo Delgado insurgents kill four in Nampula’s Memba districtThe insurgents have been moving southwards, seemingly to access recruitment zones and supply corridors in Memba![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-284.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-18-15.40.09-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-four-in-nampulas-memba-district/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mozambique has always had informal mining, but this current fever in the central provinces has been brought on by recent gold discoveries and a rise in the gold price on international markets. A less visible but still damaging effect is that children are being diverted away from school to dig for gold. In fact, the government has made an effort in recent years to legalise unlicensed, informal miners, known as *garimpeiros*, so that they can carry on their trade without harm to other people or the environment. But such measures, which are gradual and employed on small groups of miners, are totally inadequate to deal with the waves of people suddenly flooding into Manica and Sofala provinces. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Delgado insurgents kill four in Nampula’s Memba district URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-four-in-nampulas-memba-district/ Last updated: 2025-11-18T15:32:08.000Z At least four civilians were killed on 13 November in the village of Nhagé, in the Mazua administrative post of Memba district, as insurgent forces continued their southward advance from Cabo Delgado into northern Nampula province. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents kill two people in attacks on two villages in Muidumbe URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-two-people-in-attacks-on-two-villages-in-muidumbe/ Last updated: 2025-11-18T13:30:17.000Z At least two people were killed in insurgent attacks on the villages of Nampanha and Mapate in Muidumbe district, northern Cabo Delgado, between 15 and 16 November. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Chapo hears the church’s prayers URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-hears-the-churchs-prayers/ Last updated: 2025-11-17T16:50:29.000Z Good afternoon. Meetings between a head of state and a religious leader are often nothing more than a courtesy. But the recent meeting between President Daniel Chapo (who professes to be a devout Catholic) and Archbishop Inácio Saure, the archbishop of the city of Nampula, was a little more substantial than that. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e0f0a019-5d84-4724-bdeb-c854243f248a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Saure is not a man to restrict his comments to politicians to light conversation. He is one of Mozambique’s most outspoken religious leaders, having previously complained publicly about some comments made by the first secretary of the ruling Frelimo party in Nampula, who said that Frelimo would stay in power until Jesus Christ returned to earth. Another issue raised by Saure has been the government’s shutdown of the Catholic-run radio station Rádio Encontro in February. As this newsletter [noted](https://www.zitamar.com/signal-interference/) at the time, the suspension (since reversed under pressure from the governor) seemed to have more to do with the popularity of the radio station than with its signal interfering with aircraft communication. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The axe begins to fall on public sector wages URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-axe-begins-to-fall-on-public-sector-wages/ Last updated: 2025-11-14T16:39:05.000Z Good afternoon. Two news items today give an update on the government’s long-running attempts to reduce waste and overspending on public sector jobs. Yesterday, transport minister João Matlombe announced that at least 80 jobs would be cut at the state-owned airline LAM, and prime minister Maria Benvinda Levi announced that promotion and career progression was being reintroduced into the civil service, having been frozen previously to deal with an emergency level of overspend on public sector wages. That, in turn, was caused by the deeply flawed implementation of the so-called “single salary table” (TSU) pay scale, which was intended to simplify public sector pay but instead ended up increasing the cost of the wage bill. Opportunistic civil servants took advantage of the new and unfamiliar system to argue for more money. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Both LAM and the TSU are a work in progress. LAM has been a victim of the culture in which people with good connections in the ruling Frelimo party are able to secure public sector jobs for their relatives and friends, regardless of whether there are actual jobs that need doing. Although Matlombe has only confirmed the cutting of 80 jobs at the airline, the government has identified 500 surplus employees in total, many of whom, including pilots, are being paid to stay at home and not work. In fact, thanks to corruption and patronage, LAM’s workforce (a rather misleading term) has ballooned from around 800 to around 900 in the last two years. It is highly likely therefore that further job cuts will be announced later. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Interpol versus the gangs URL: https://www.zitamar.com/interpol-versus-the-gangs/ Last updated: 2025-11-14T07:10:34.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday's newsletter. It is not usual to see officers from Interpol, the international police cooperation agency, on Mozambican streets checking vehicles alongside Mozambican police (see below). And to do so on the streets of the cities of Nampula and Nacala is a bold move. Nampula province has a well-deserved reputation as Mozambique’s crime hotspot. This operation, which is being supported by the provincial authorities as well as the central government, is probably meant to send a message that the government is ready to confront organised crime gangs in their heartland. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/295072e7-aa73-4a4d-b20e-a12355f6f5cb/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Two killed, more taken in insurgent raid on Muidumbe villageKillings and abductions in Muambula village, Muidumbe, follow suspected incidents of insurgents taking their own offspring from homes in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-280.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-13-05.43.26.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/two-killed-more-taken-in-insurgent-raid-on-muidumbe-village/) [Insurgents take a child in deadly raid on Macomia townOne person was killed in an insurgent attack on the town of Macomia![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-281.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-12-09.45.23-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-take-a-child-in-deadly-raid-on-macomia-town/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Interior minister Paulo Chachine declined to go into details when asked about the operation, but *Zitamar News* understands that the aim is to find illegal weapons and stolen cars. A great many cars stolen in South Africa end up in Nampula, where the gangs enjoy protection from law enforcement. This is an industrial-scale criminal enterprise, and while the harm is mostly felt in South Africa, it contributes to an image of Mozambique as a place where criminals can act with impunity, which is bad for business and for foreign cooperation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Two killed, more taken in insurgent raid on Muidumbe village URL: https://www.zitamar.com/two-killed-more-taken-in-insurgent-raid-on-muidumbe-village/ Last updated: 2025-11-13T07:34:22.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents attacked Muambula village in Cabo Delgado’s Muidumbe district on Tuesday, killing two people and abducting more. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Economic nationalists spoil economic recovery URL: https://www.zitamar.com/economic-nationalists-spoil-economic-recovery/ Last updated: 2025-11-12T16:32:18.000Z Good afternoon. Economic recovery is around the corner, or so the Mozambican government is claiming. For the past three quarters, the economy has shrunk owing to the debilitating effects of the protests sparked by last year’s disputed elections. Now ministers are saying that things could turn around when third quarter figures, for the period July-September, are published. Average GDP growth in the first half of the year was -2.4%, according to government figures. If the budget projection for this year is accurate and the economy grows by 2.9% overall (and that is a big “if), then it will need to grow by 5.3% in the second half. But since it is rebounding from a depressed state, that may be possible. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/dac61eee-ba4b-4a51-93d2-517af8bc0aee/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (27 October - 9 November 2025)Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) was active in seven districts of Cabo Delgado province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-279.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-11-12-15.38.31.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-27-october-9-november-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) If the comments of finance minister Carla Loveira are to be trusted, activity is picking up in sectors like agriculture, energy and infrastructure. The unfreezing of TotalEnergies’ massive gas project in Cabo Delgado should also help: locals in the province report seeing more job adverts posted in connection with the project. But the government cannot just sit back and wait for the recovery to happen. Investors, particularly foreign investors, are still wary about the investment climate in the wake of the post-election protests. Concerns about political stability, however, seem to have been overtaken by concerns about government policy and regulation, and how predictable and supportive that is for businesses. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (27 October - 9 November 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-27-october-9-november-2025/ Last updated: 2025-11-12T15:53:28.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (27 October - 9 November 2025) At least 11 political violence events (2,251 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 10 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,316 since 1 October 2017) At least 10 reported civilian fatalities (2,670 since 1 October 2017) At least 10 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,077 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) was active in seven districts of Cabo Delgado province. ISM militants once again entered Mocímboa da Praia town, this time to take two of the children of Farido Selemane, the group’s military commander. They met no resistance from residents or state forces in the town. Some fighters finally returned to Muidumbe and Macomia districts, from Balama and Montepuez districts in the southwest, where they had been since the end of August. There was notable activity in districts south of Macomia, particularly in Quissanga, where Cagembe village has clearly become a hub for the group. ## Situation summary **ISM returns to Mocímboa da Praia unimpeded** On the night of 5 November, a group of ISM fighters took two children from the Milamba neighborhood of Mocímboa da Praia. Multiple sources agree that they are the children of Farido Selemane, military commander of ISM, and were taken on his order. In addition to the group that entered Milamba, another group went to the Aeroporto neighborhood, also on the southeastern side of town. Neither group met any resistance, nor did they threaten residents. Farido came to prominence in 2022, when he was [promoted](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-weekly-25-31-july-2022?ref=zitamar.com) to a senior leadership position. He has been the military commander since the death of [Bonomade Machude Omar](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-monthly-august-2023?ref=zitamar.com) in August 2023\. Though the military commander of the insurgency, he has significant religious education and was a mosque leader in Mocímboa da Praia before the insurgency. Originally from the Milamba neighborhood, he is understood to be in his late 30s, according to local sources. Although not as high-profile as ISM’s [appearance at a mosque](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-preach-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/) on 7 October, the incident illustrates similar issues. The groups were able to freely move through parts of the town, to an extent that, according to one source, neither the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) nor the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) felt free to intervene, fearing either injury to, or even a confrontation with, residents. **Clashes in Muidumbe and Macomia district** Clashes were reported in both Muidumbe and Macomia districts, likely involving ISM militants who have returned from Balama and Montepuez districts. On 27 October, FADM continued shelling ISM positions around Nguri lake, east of Miangelewa in Muidumbe district. The shelling [had begun](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-29-october-2025?ref=zitamar.com) on 26 October. Also on 27 October, ISM clashed with a joint FADM and RDF patrol near Miangelewa. No casualties were reported. Closer to the coast, in Macomia district on 3 November, ISM clashed with FADM near Unidade village, south of Quiterajo town. According to a report in the Islamic State weekly al-Naba, ISM thwarted a FADM attack on one of its positions. ISM seized a grenade launcher, ​​two automatic rifles, three machine guns, and some ammunition, according to al-Naba. Although successful, the ISM group at Unidade seems to have moved south following the clash, according to sources in the Mucojo area. Between 3 and 5 November, a group of insurgents, among them women and children, was reported to have moved southward through Cogolo village, approximately 17 kilometers south of Unidade. Counterintuitively, this brought the group closer to an RDF position at Mucojo town. The group may have been trying to make its way to Quissanga district, where ISM militants regularly congregate, according to local sources. ISM fighters remain active in wooded areas around Macomia town on the N380, which are popular with hunters. IS issued a claim for the 29 October killing of two civilians near Machova, southeast of Macomia town. Twenty-five km north of Macomia town, ISM entered Quinto Congresso village on the night of 8 November, killing one man, after asking for him by name. **ISM reaches out to communities in Quissanga** ISM was active in Quissanga district, for the most part interacting non-violently with residents. Between 31 October and 2 November, its members were present in Cagembe village. This is at least the 11th appearance the group has made there since January 2024\. None of these appearances have included violence. According to a source, the group continued its way southeast of Cagembe, on the coast, where ISM fighters entered Arimba village. There, they preached in the mosque for some time. According to al-Naba magazine, the lecture focused on the “purpose of God’s creation.” According to other sources, they also took some food from the village. **ISM’s continued presence in the south** Further south of Quissanga, the group was active in Metuge, and Mecufi districts, and is thought to be continuing further south of those districts. According to one source, the objective of the push south is to reach Nampula to bring in new recruits, and secure financing through targeting gold mines. On 29 October, ISM militants stormed an informal gold mine near Impire on the N1 road from Pemba. On 8 November, ISM kidnapped up to eight civilians near Mieze village, according to various sources. Mieze also lies on the N1, 10 km west of Pemba town. The group demanded ransoms of up to 30,000 meticais. According to one source, a ransom of 15,000 was paid for the release of one woman. RDF and FADM were deployed to the area that day, but they withdrew by nightfall, according to a source. The following day, another group was seen near Impire in Mecufi district, moving south. Further south again, on 1 November police fired on civilians waiting for food aid in Napala village in the south of Chiúre district, killing two. The incident illustrates the tense relations between aid agencies and recipients. ISM was active in Napala as recently as 10 October, when it clashed with FADM forces. If militants are moving south toward Nampula, these tensions likely remain. ## Focus: ISM sustaining a presence south of Macomia ISM is increasingly active in districts south of Macomia, with its approach to communities becoming more aggressive the further south it operates. In the predominantly Muslim Quissanga district, ISM’s actions have for the most part been non-violent in 2025, in contrast to its sustained violence against civilians in the more Christian districts of Ancuabe and Chiúre. However, this posture in Quissanga is relatively new, suggesting that behavior toward communities is driven by tactical concerns, rather than communities’ religious identities. The evolution of ISM activity around Cagembe illustrates this change. ACLED first records insurgent activity in the town in January 2020, when the group killed two civilians in the village. A further four were killed in an attack the following month. In September that year, insurgents [destroyed much of the town](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-weekly-21-27-september-2020?ref=zitamar.com), accusing residents of passing information to the security forces. This violent approach reflects ISM activity in Quissanga more widely in 2020, when insurgents were involved in over 62 political violence events, accounting for most of their activity in the district that year. In approximately two-thirds of those events, ISM targeted civilians. In Cagembe all ISM action from 2024 to 2025 has been non-violent. ISM benefits from this. The group has developed a sustained presence in the area, where they had a base up to 2021, when the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique put pressure on insurgency positions in the area. In the province’s other southern districts, which are home to a greater Christian population, ISM’s actions remain predominantly violent. Observers [often](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2024-02/jihadist-attacks-in-mozambique-force-missionaries-to-flee.html?ref=zitamar.com) [characterize](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-003338%5FEN.html?ref=zitamar.com) ISM as specifically targeting Christian people and institutions. Such targeting happens, though only in a relatively small proportion of ISM actions. In those other southern districts in 2024, 17% of political violence involving ISM concerned church buildings, though the proportion has declined to 7% this year. The evidence suggests a change of posture toward communities in the south is not to be expected, but for reasons that are broader than religious identity. In areas such as Muidumbe and the western side of Macomia district, ISM maintains an aggressive posture toward the civilian population. This reflects community characteristics apart from religion. For example, Frelimo has community structures in those areas, out of which [the Local Force](https://acleddata.com/actor-profile/local-forces-communal-militias-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com) arose. ISM has a number of interests across southern Cabo Delgado, including potential income from mining and transit of recruits from Nampula, as well as undermining governance through attacks on communities and their subsequent displacement. ## Roundup *ExxonMobil aims to lift force majeure on Palma gas project* ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods said the company was considering lifting force majeure on its liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique soon. The US company is considering the move after TotalEnergies declared force majeure on its sister project on the Afungi peninsula, in Palma district, in April 2021\. "Total just lifted their force majeure, and we're looking at, and are in the process of, trying to do the same," Woods [told investors](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exxon-looks-lift-force-majeure-lng-project-mozambique-2025-10-31/?ref=zitamar.com) during an earnings call on Friday 31 October. While a press briefing scheduled on Wednesday with Mozambique President Daniel Chapo at Exxon's headquarters in Spring, Texas, [was canceled](https://www.ft.com/content/383c5e31-3365-4cfa-bbdc-f9a9836b04b8?ref=zitamar.com), Woods said the two of them had had a productive meeting. *Pemba mayor concerned by the surge in requests for firearm permits* Satar Abdulgani, the mayor of Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado, has [expressed alarm](https://www.zumbofm.com/index.php/noticias/item/7192-cabo-delgado-edil-de-pemba-preocupado-com-aumento-de-pedidos-de-porte-de-arma-de-fogo-na-cidade?ref=zitamar.com) over a significant rise in applications for firearm carry permits. Speaking at the launch of the Week of Legality at the attorney general's office on 30 October 2025, Abdulgani noted that the municipal council is being inundated with requests from locals, business owners, and government officials, some of whom are from outside the city. He described the situation as “worrying” amid the growing perception of insecurity in Pemba and the ongoing conflict in the province. *Zambézia mining losses indicate the prize ISM seeks* Zambézia province has [lost up to 200 million meticais](https://aimnews.org/2025/11/10/estado-perde-mais-de-200-milhoes-de-meticais-devido-a-mineracao-ilegal/?ref=zitamar.com) so far this year, according to the provincial administration. Provincial infrastructure director João Sembane pointed to licensing revenue, local shares of company profits, employment, and taxes as areas of loss. The Zambézia figures give some indication of the revenues being lost to the state in Cabo Delgado due to poor governance of the sector. A fraction may make its way to ISM, explaining the group’s newfound interest in mining. Recent research from the [Rural Environment Observatory](https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/DR-314-ENG-1.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) in Maputo illustrates the complications in addressing this issue, as local corruption and political rent-seeking dominate the sector. The research also illustrates the potential entry points for ISM to take advantage. ### Insurgents take a child in deadly raid on Macomia town URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-take-a-child-in-deadly-raid-on-macomia-town/ Last updated: 2025-11-12T08:04:31.000Z One person was killed in an insurgent attack on the town of Macomia, Cabo Delgado, on Monday night, that saw insurgents also abduct a child believed to be one of their sons. The Islamic State-backed insurgents attacked the Nanga A and Nanga B neighbourhoods around 11 p.m. on Monday. The neighbourhoods are either side of the main N380 road, just north of the town centre. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Donors won’t fix the government’s neglect URL: https://www.zitamar.com/donors-wont-fix-the-governments-neglect/ Last updated: 2025-11-12T15:19:20.000Z Good afternoon. Last week, President Daniel Chapo asked for over $37bn to fund Mozambique’s climate resilience plan. His request is one of the government’s more ambitious pitches, but asking (or, in some cases, begging) for money is what comes most naturally to the Mozambican government. At the other end of the scale, a consultant working for the government last week said that it needed $700m to implement its civil aviation strategy. The part which was unsaid, but implied, was that the government wants donor countries and development banks to provide the money. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e297fd94-d09a-4ff7-8a21-5dbac595a547/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Begging has become an institution, and quite a lucrative one for consultancy firms, who get to write reports for the government explaining why it needs this or that sum of money for this or that sector. But it has become a substitute for taking action and taking responsibility. An example of this is the roads sector, where the government previously obtained grant funding for the repair of the N1 highway. The money was spent and the road was repaired, but government funds intended for maintenance got diverted. Without maintenance, the condition of the road inevitably got worse, and now large stretches of the N1 are in a terrible state and it needs major interventions (which are taking a long time to go through the procurement phase). Had the government taken better care of the road, it would not have needed to embark on such an expensive and cumbersome project to rehabilitate it now. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A bull in an airport shop URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-bull-in-an-airport-shop/ Last updated: 2025-11-10T16:04:30.000Z Good afternoon. “An unprecedented diagnosis” is how the newssheet *Mediafax* today describes transport minister João Matlombe’s speech last week, where he decried the state of Mozambique’s aviation sector. Matlombe found faults in all areas, from poor security to underinvestment in infrastructure to a lack of a guiding mind for the whole sector, which would allow the different organisations involved to work in harmony. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ad8d32c7-cdd3-42d7-be31-a8e6f97f0df7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Among the minister’s eye-catching comments was that 40% of state-owned airline LAM’s air routes are probably running at a loss. Matlombe suggested that not many people wanted to fly to the cities of Quelimane in Zambézia province or Lichinga in Niassa province, for example. His comments go further than the government has been willing to go in the past in talking about waste at LAM. Raising the possibility of closing air routes is a politically sensitive subject in a country like Mozambique, which due to its size and the lack of alternative means of transport (bad roads, no north-south railway line) depends on domestic flights to allow people to get around. Some of those loss-making routes will be saved from closure, either due to political pressure or because they provide a useful social purpose. But it is still significant that Matlombe has put the issue on the table. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Making cooking go greener URL: https://www.zitamar.com/making-cooking-go-greener/ Last updated: 2025-11-07T16:39:14.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambicans are about to get their first deliveries of locally produced bottled cooking gas. The first batch of liquefied petroleum gas has emerged from the production plant run by South African petrochemical firm Sasol in Inhambane province (see below). According to state-owned oil and gas company ENH, the new gas should be cheaper to buy than existing supplies of imported cooking gas. ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents abduct children from Mocímboa da PraiaMembers of the Islamic State-affiliated insurgency are believed to have removed their own children from the port city, raising fears of a coming attack![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-278.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Screenshot-2025-10-08-at-15.27.35-2.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-children-from-mocimboa-da-praia/) *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b05aae74-9105-4001-948d-cfa72eb798ce/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In theory, the 30,000-tonne-a-year LPG plant could transform domestic energy use in the country. It has the potential to provide 60% of the country’s cooking gas demand. Already, cooking gas is favoured by households able to buy gas cookers, since it is cheaper than the alternative of charcoal. An 11kg bottle of cooking gas costs MZN942 ($14.70) in Maputo and can last for around a month. A bag of charcoal costs about MZN700 but lasts for more like two weeks. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents abduct children from Mocímboa da Praia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-abduct-children-from-mocimboa-da-praia/ Last updated: 2025-11-07T13:44:13.000Z Armed insurgents abducted children believed to be their own offspring in a raid on the town of Mocímboa da Praia on Tuesday, in the same neighbourhood where they held a public meeting last month. SEE ALSO: [Insurgents preach in Mocímboa da Praia townThe audacious public event in the symbolically and strategically vital town could mark a significant shift in the insurgent group’s strategy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-277.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Screenshot-2025-10-08-at-15.27.35-1.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-preach-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/) _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Chapo seeks to polish his image, and Mozambique’s URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-seeks-to-polish-his-image-and-mozambiques/ Last updated: 2025-11-07T10:17:20.000Z Good afternoon and welcome to yesterday’s newsletter. President Daniel Chapo is in Brazil this week for the United Nations’ COP 30 climate change conference. The president has a wide range of interests, judging by his foreign travel these days. Last month he was in Switzerland for a meeting of the World Meteorological Conference. Before then he attended a meeting of the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville. He also tried to visit the United Kingdom earlier this year, but failed due to organisational problems. For next year, the government has announced a long list of countries Chapo plans to visit: Russia, China, Canada, Vietnam, Angola and Botswana. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/510f0e5a-2226-4da8-808a-5352f39f3582/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Particularly eye-catching was Chapo’s visit to the United States last week. The official pretext for the visit was to attend a conference on miombo, the savannah and scrubland territory in southern Africa which occupies much of Mozambique. Did the president need to attend? Not really. But as well as creating an excuse to visit the headquarters of oil and gas firm ExxonMobil in Houston and encourage them to move ahead with their gas project in Mozambique, it also gave Chapo the chance to be photographed with JD Vance, the US vice-president. At COP 30, Chapo has been shaking hands with other world leaders for the cameras. While some of these visits may look pointless, they are necessary if Chapo is to improve his public image by being seen with foreign dignitaries. The fact is that those dignitaries are mostly unwilling to visit Mozambique: witness the near-complete absence of heads of state and government at Chapo’s presidential inauguration in January, and the lack of Western leaders at the 50th anniversary celebrations of Mozambique’s independence. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The right to be rude URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-right-to-be-rude/ Last updated: 2025-11-05T16:20:11.000Z Good afternoon. The acquittal of the economist Carlos Castel-Branco and the journalist Fernando Mbanze by the Supreme Court last month, in a judgment that emerged today, is a victory for media freedom. It is also a sign of the increasingly limited influence of former president Armando Guebuza and his circle. In 2013, public prosecutors indicted Castel-Branco and Mbanze over an article written by the former in the newssheet *Mediafax*, in which he heavily criticised Guebuza, the then president, for being authoritarian and compared him to dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar and Mobutu. They were prosecuted for defaming the president, a criminal offence. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c7125b45-2623-4e69-bc71-b758359c143d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mbanze was prosecuted for publishing the article as editor of *Mediafax.* The Maputo city court acquitted the two, but the public prosecutor's office appealed, arguing that the right to freedom of speech needed to be balanced with protecting the honour of the president. The appeal court also acquitted them, but prosecutors went to the Supreme Court, which has now rejected the case once and for all. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Corruption fighters find their voice URL: https://www.zitamar.com/corruption-fighters-find-their-voice/ Last updated: 2025-11-04T16:56:40.000Z Good afternoon. The Administrative Court is on the warpath. A report from the court is accusing the fuel importer Mitra Energy of illegally receiving MZN561.7m ($8.8m) in payments from the government, as compensation for it selling imported fuel at a discounted cost (see below). Although there is no suggestion that Mitra was not entitled to claim money for fuel imports, the court said that Mitra did not provide the necessary documents to claim the money. Mitra also seems to have been the only fuel importer that was compensated in cash instead of through a credit note. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ee1683a0-cdf0-470a-bfd2-6445dc1b6d62/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The Administrative Court has meanwhile questioned the way in which the government has been repaying debts to contractors (see below). There is a substantial backlog of payments and many contractors have not been paid for several years. The court has accused some contractors of paying bribes in order to get repaid sooner. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Tourism industry needs a welcome mat URL: https://www.zitamar.com/tourism-industry-needs-a-welcome-mat/ Last updated: 2025-11-03T17:50:30.000Z Good afternoon. The launch of a two-day tourism conference in the city of Vilankulo today invites the reflection that tourism in Mozambique is a mixed bag. On the one hand, parts of the sector, notably wildlife tourism, are growing fast. Safari tourism is booming in Maputo province, in Gorongosa National Park in the central province of Sofala, and in Niassa province (although recent insurgent attacks in Niassa have wiped out tourism there for this year’s tourism season). Visitors to Niassa and Gorongosa are efficiently flown to their resorts from international airports. The airport at the seaside resort town of Vilankulo processes tourists efficiently, as they form the vast majority of its passenger traffic. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/329fd0b8-cb55-4369-b80c-6fd48569f3bc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But other aspects of the tourism offer could be improved. Tourists arriving at airports with more mixed passenger traffic, such as Maputo, the busiest airport, face a potential adventure in trying to get a tourism visa. Migration authorities can be inconsistent and uncooperative. Tourists travelling by road, mostly South African tourists who have driven into the country down the N4 highway, face further drama. Highways are infested with police who will stop traffic on any excuse in their hunt for bribes. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The Frelimo fat cats costing a fortune URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-frelimo-fat-cats-costing-a-fortune/ Last updated: 2025-10-31T17:35:38.000Z Good afternoon. The former Frelimo politician Gilberto Mendes is understood to be unhappy at the fact that his name appears in today’s edition of newspaper *Savana*, in the headline of an article talking about people in debt to the state over the privatisation of state-owned businesses. Mendes’ business is one of 130 which, according to a state agency, has still not paid the full price that was agreed to acquire assets, in this case a former cinema which now functions as a theatre. Mendes himself claims that he invested some money in the theatre which needs to be accounted for in the sale price. The total sale value of the businesses where money is owed is nearly MZN896m ($14m), according to *Savana*, most of which seems to be unpaid, and which has also accumulated interest over the past 35 years or so. Another example is the printing company Cegraf, bought by Hermenegildo Gamito and Lucas Chachine, who went on to become president of the Constitutional Council (the highest court dealing with constitutional matters) and the chairman of mobile network operator Vodacom, respectively. There is still nearly MZN2.7m ($42,000) owed on that sale, according to *Savana.* *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ac26fcd1-7dc6-4efd-9ba8-c05edff0b13b/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogThe government will analyse the proposal presented by French energy company TotalEnergies in the letter sent to the President Daniel Chapo on Friday last week, Chapo said yesterday. In the letter, TotalEnergies proposes extending the concession period for its forthcoming gas project for another 10 years, as well as increasing the costs of its project it can recover from taxes and fees by $4.5bn. The project has been suspended for the past 4.5 years due to insecurity in Cabo Delgado, until TotalEnergies announced it was being formally unfrozen on Friday. Chapo said that the process was not yet closed and that the government might make “counter-arguments” to TotalEnergies’ proposal. A video of Chapo’s comments (in Portuguese) is attached.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-91.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/vlpKei5eCtysWya6MgryAW1TuApNvp6lkv62h4BJdsqXuobxxRZ7HswFcWt8SFMgJRuHJUCo_xLPTAPXR7lkOS18h-9VG9RNyAc7YnO6jdkK8phgEVDQzHIdaNYPYFAO4HI2TtL9_gy0qf9mJhndObcFi-WONBTF_WDcy9MgE-bFeJZ0nwvUgMmozl5dNSIV0x8AefBi6QrEGZN9j09Z5iesV7tgGDPp6GEJDcgF3fP6ACAYMEs4lLn4EMd1CInO3Mj6_oEoRByc38liyX6xUro7O0vhY2Y0XkizeMYPi3OGFDZIiQguz-jslNub-cR_Jt4LEpvbrWkDa9n-VNw0rw)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4543?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is scandalous that, in a country where children sit on the ground and study under trees because there is no money for desks or classrooms, this money remains uncollected by the state year after year and decade after decade. Needless to say, the people who owe the money tend to be elites of ruling party Frelimo with friends in high places. They were already offered heavily discounted prices for the assets when they were privatised, and in many cases they only paid a small fraction of that price. Today, they parade around in sharp suits and expensive cars, but their apparent wealth is built on debt. Efforts to collect the debts are variable, and may depend on who owes money and how many friends they have in government at any moment. Publicity is also a factor. Some debtors, like the husband of former prime minister Luisa Diogo or like former president Armando Guebuza, are thought to have paid up in order to avoid having their name mentioned in media coverage of the debts (although in Guebuza’s case, his debt was actually paid by a friend). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas plans smell of desperation URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-plans-smell-of-desperation/ Last updated: 2025-10-30T16:32:28.000Z Good afternoon. What is the Mozambican government going to do with all its future gas? According to President Daniel Chapo, by law the state is entitled to 25% of the gas produced from forthcoming liquefied natural gas (LNG) production projects as domestic gas, the property of the state to use or sell. He was speaking during a meeting with executives from oil and gas firm ExxonMobil in Houston, Texas, to talk about the company’s plans for its $30bn project in Cabo Delgado province, known as Rovuma LNG. Now that TotalEnergies has announced the formal unfreezing of its own LNG project, ExxonMobil is expected to push forward with its own plans. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/dc7dfe08-04e2-438e-a5a4-06a737a27831/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (13 - 26 October 2025)Cabo Delgado witnessed a surge in insurgent activity![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-276.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-10-30-08.13.30.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-29-september-12-october-2025-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Whether the state actually gets 25% of the gas produced from those two projects (a sizeable amount, nearly 8m tonnes a year, more than production from Eni’s Coral South and Coral North offshore gas projects combined) remains to be seen, but even if it does, the government has yet to show how the gas would provide widespread benefits for Mozambicans. We have been here before. In the past the government has tried to advance projects to use Mozambican gas locally, including from the offshore Rovuma basin, the gas fields to be exploited by TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil. Those projects, such as a fertiliser plant to be built by Norwegian fertiliser producer Yara, or a gas-to-liquids plant to be built by Shell, largely [came to nothing](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-gas-study-ignores-reality-of-abandoned-industrial-projects), apparently proving to be commercially unviable for one reason or another. A joint venture between state-owned oil and gas firm ENH and Kogas of South Korea to build a gas distribution network in and around the city of Maputo has been disappointing; only about 500 households have been added to the network in Maputo in the past six years, and that project may well be stalled now that Kogas has withdrawn from it. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (13 - 26 October 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-29-september-12-october-2025-2/ Last updated: 2025-10-30T14:15:10.000Z **By the Numbers** Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (13 - 26 October 2025) At least 12 political violence events (2,236 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 22 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,296 since 1 October 2017) At least 18 reported civilian fatalities (2,659 since 1 October 2017) At least 11 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,061 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Cabo Delgado witnessed a surge in insurgent activity. Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) targeted security forces in Montepuez and Muidumbe, inflicting casualties. Insurgents also continued civilian killings in Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Metuge districts. ISM operations were compounded by other patterns of unrest, particularly around mining sites in Montepuez. While Local Forces claimed an ambush on insurgents along the N380, killings of civilians off the coast of Macomia by Mozambican marines underscore continued risk to fishing communities. The diffusion of ISM activity across Cabo Delgado suggests operating in dispersed units has enabled insurgents to spread their operations beyond traditional strongholds. ## Situation Summary **ISM ambushes police convoy in Muidumbe** Insurgent activity continued in the Muidumbe district, with militants attacking security forces, targeting civilians, and disrupting traffic in the area. On 17 October, insurgents looted farms and temporarily halted traffic on the N380 highway near Miangelewa. On 21 October, militants ambushed a police convoy near the village of Xitaxi on the N380 highway, killing the driver of the lead police vehicle, which they hit with a rocket-propelled grenade. The convoy was traveling between Auasse and Macomia. The ambush disrupted traffic for several hours. The ambush sparked panic in surrounding villages and in the district capital of Namacande, prompting some residents to flee, according to a local source. The Islamic State (IS) later published images of the attack, showing the burned Mahindra pickup and the body of the dead officer. In a rare move, Interior Minister Paulo Chachine confirmed the killing of the police officer. On 22 October, five fishermen were captured and beheaded near Nguri Lagoon, according to a source. Their bodies were discovered the next morning. On 26 October, the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) launched a bombardment over Nguri, reportedly targeting insurgent positions along the lagoon. Nguri Lagoon is less than 10 kilometers from the site of the Xitaxi ambush on 21 October, which suggests the insurgent group has been able to sustain a presence in the area. **ISM targets civilians in Mocímboa da Praia and Metuge** ISM carried out at least three attacks in Mocímboa da Praia district between 14 and 20 October, according to claims issued by IS. On 14 October, militants beheaded a security guard employed by Rwandan security company ISCO to guard the gas project on the Afungi peninsula. He was killed during a raid on his home village of Maputo, near the border with Palma district. IS later claimed responsibility for two more incidents: the burning of two houses in Mbau on 19 October and the killing of a civilian in Quelimane village on 20 October. These latter claims remain unverified. Further south, insurgents were seen crossing National Highway 1 (N1) between Impiri and Nanlia in Metuge district on 16 October, possibly returning from Nampula. By 21 October, residents were [fleeing](https://observador.pt/2025/10/21/camponeses-em-fuga-devido-a-circulacao-de-alegados-terroristas-em-metuge/?ref=zitamar.com) Impiri in Metuge district and Intutupue in Ancuabe amid sightings of militants. Two civilians producing alcoholic beverages from sugarcane near Nicavaco, Metuge district, were found beheaded on the same day, according to a local source. IS claimed responsibility for the killings. On 22 October, two ISM fighters appeared in Natugo village, in the Mahate administrative post in Quissanga district, and met with two children, whom they asked to warn residents of their presence, according to a local source. Three days later, on 25 October, a group of around 20 insurgents raided Tacanama village, near Nacoba, 3 km from Natugo village, stealing motorcycles and looting food before retreating into nearby forests. No casualties or property destruction were reported. **Unrest at Montepuez mining sites** The Montepuez district experienced two major incidents around mining operations. On 14 October, ISM militants took over a Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) camp guarding a gold mining concession in the Nairoto administrative post without meeting resistance from the troops stationed there. The site, operated by the Mwiriti mining company, owned by senior Frelimo member Raimundo Pachinuapa, was raided at dawn. UIR officers fled their posts during the assault, as they were outnumbered by the attackers, and [remain missing](https://cartamz.com/sociedade/47073/ataques-terroristas-agentes-da-uir-desaparecidos-apos-ataque-a-uma-mineradora-em-montepuez/?ref=zitamar.com). Militants set fire to mining machinery, vehicles, and motorcycles. No casualties were reported. The following day, on 15 October, violent clashes broke out between informal miners and police in the Montepuez district after security forces reportedly killed an informal miner in the village of Ntseue. Enraged miners [marched](https://moz24h.co.mz/three-dead-at-gemfields-mrm-mining-concession/?ref=zitamar.com) with the victim’s body to the nearby Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM) compound, where they confronted officers guarding the gate. Two police officers were killed, and their weapons were seized by the crowd. Gemfields, MRM’s parent company, [confirmed](https://www.gemfieldsgroup.com/two-mozambique-police-officers-killed-by-illegal-miners-at-mrm/?ref=zitamar.com) the incident in a statement suggesting the informal miner was killed during a raid by immigration authorities. **Mozambican navy accused of killing civilians off the coast of Macomia** On 16 October, three fishermen were allegedly shot dead by Mozambican marines off the coast of Mucojo, Macomia district. Witnesses stated that a naval vessel opened fire while the men were fishing. This event led representatives of the communities in Mucojo to meet with Rwandan forces to [discuss](https://mozanorte.blogspot.com/2025/10/representantes-das-aldeias-de-mucojo.html?ref=zitamar.com) the continued attacks on fishermen, in which Rwandan forces stated that they had already raised the issue with Mozambican authorities and were awaiting a response. Meanwhile, on 24 October, Local Force militias ambushed a group of insurgents near Litandacua, also in Macomia, killing three. Local sources said the militants were traveling from Balama and Montepuez toward Macomia to reinforce bases dispersed by recent military operations. **Focus: ISM’s expanding reach across Cabo Delgado** While ISM activity in October persisted in key northern districts such as Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, incidents also extended into Balama and Montepuez along the Lúrio river, where insurgents have maintained a presence since the end of August. The spread of activity in October is well beyond the traditional Muidumbe-Macomia heartland (*see map below*). The focus on the north is potentially linked to the increasing importance of Palma ahead of the restart of the LNG project, although a small group is unlikely to be able to threaten the site. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2025/10/2025-10-30-16.11.02.jpg) The pattern followed in 2025 differs from 2024, with a wider operational reach, beyond long-established strongholds (*see map below*). This geographic pattern underscores ISM’s continued resilience, seemingly operating in smaller groups that enhance their mobility, are harder to track, and can potentially stretch security forces more easily. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2025/10/2025-10-30-16.11.10.jpg) ISM becoming active across a wider spread of territory has not come at the expense of operational capacity. Following a decline in 2023, ISM activity in Cabo Delgado increased sharply in 2024, and it has been able to sustain that intensity since. In 2025, some months have reached a level of activity similar to 2022 (*see graph below*). This suggests a renewed capacity for sustained insurgent activity and an increased operational reach in Cabo Delgado. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/2025/10/2025-10-30-16.11.14.jpg) ## Roundup *TotalEnergies lifts force majeure after Rwanda protection guarantee* TotalEnergies, the French company leading the Mozambique LNG project in Palma district, announced its long-awaited decision to lift the force majeure declaration on the project, in place since the insurgent attack on Palma town in 2021\. In a letter to Mozambican President Daniel Chapo, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné said the decision followed comments made by Chapo earlier this month confirming that Rwandan forces would remain in Cabo Delgado at least until the project, and a neighboring project led by ExxonMobil, were built. The decision means work on the project can restart in earnest, though preparatory work has been ongoing, with 4,000 workers already on site, Minister of Defence Cristóvão Chume [said last week](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/mocambique-ministro-da-defesa-diz-que-e-preciso-mudar-narrativa-porque-cabo-delgado-e-viavel%5Fn1692902?ref=zitamar.com). Pouyanné’s letter added that the company still requires Mozambique’s government to recognize that the project has incurred 4.5 billion US dollars in additional costs due to the 4 1/2-year stoppage, and to extend its production license by 10 years. *Cabo Delgado is “stable and viable” despite media narrative, government claims* Minister of Defence Cristóvão Chume [criticized](https://evidencias.co.mz/2025/10/22/para-atrair-investimentos-chume-defende-mudanca-de-narrativa-sobre-terrorismo-em-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com#google%5Fvignette) people who talk about terrorism in Cabo Delgado province “every day,” giving the impression that the province was a place where “you can't go.” Speaking after the opening of a session of parliament on 22 October, Chume said that this narrative was discouraging investment in Mozambique. “We should continue to invest in a positive narrative that makes people think that Mozambique is still a place where we can invest, not scare people away,” he said, adding that Cabo Delgado was “stable and viable.” *Mozambique removed from money laundering and terrorism financing “grey list”* The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has removed Mozambique from the “grey list,” officially known as “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring” which includes countries identified by the FATF as having strategic deficiencies in their measures to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. A plenary session of the FATF, held in Paris on 24 October, informed the Mozambican authorities that the country has been removed from the list, where it featured since 2022\. Countries on this list are subject to increased monitoring and scrutiny by the FATF. The list is intended to serve as a warning to the countries concerned to improve their performance and comply with international standards. ### Trying to rekindle the IMF romance URL: https://www.zitamar.com/trying-to-rekindle-the-imf-romance/ Last updated: 2025-10-29T16:29:29.000Z Good afternoon. How to win back an estranged lover? The Mozambican government is not opting for perfume or chocolates, but instead the unromantic hiring of a financial advisory firm. The “lover” in question is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which broke up with the government in April by suspending its interest-free loan programme. And they are visiting Mozambique in November to see about starting a new one. As much as the government may want to portray that as a new administration asserting itself and wanting to change the conditions attached to the loan, the fact is that the IMF left the government, not the other way round (even if the IMF allowed the government to formally suspend the programme to save face). The government desperately needs that loan, partly because it struggles to pay its debts (debt service and public sector wages account for almost 90% of the state budget, and the proportion is increasing), and partly because of the credibility it will gain from investors and other funders as a result. The main reason the loan was suspended was because the government was drifting further and further away from the conditions attached to the loan, such as on reducing the size of the wage bill. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/79e99a36-ded9-42c1-bb84-78c77dc74bc4/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For all that President Daniel Chapo and his ministers may want to present themselves as imposing a new agenda, the fact is that they will have to agree to deliver quite similar outcomes to the previous IMF loan deal if they are to get a new loan. That means cutting the wage bill as a proportion of GDP, and increasing tax collection, including, probably, by removing exemptions on VAT. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### There’s a war on pollution still to fight URL: https://www.zitamar.com/theres-a-war-on-pollution-still-to-fight/ Last updated: 2025-10-28T17:21:43.000Z Good afternoon. The announcement by waste management firm Moz Environmental that it is to move its waste treatment plant out of a neighbourhood of the city of Pemba (see below) is a rare victory for local residents in the fight against pollution. For several years now, local people have complained about the noxious effects of the plant, which they say gives them breathing problems, generates an unpleasant smell, corrodes the metal roofs of their homes and prevents plants from growing. But they got little sympathy from the authorities or the media, at least not until Satar Abdulgani took over as mayor in 2023. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2de1dda7-4874-4cea-9dbb-8f7f5dbb9bbe/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [‘Force majeure’ lifted on Mozambique LNG after government agrees terms with TotalEnergiesLandmark decision comes after TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné reached a deal with president Chapo on how much additional cost from the lengthy stoppage the project could claim against future taxes![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-275.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Bowker![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo-1710756771820-2fd0a15d38ef)](https://www.zitamar.com/force-majeure-lifted-on-mozambique-lng-after-government-agrees-terms-with-totalenergies/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) When Abdulgani ordered South African-owned Moz Environmental to shut down its operations, a court overturned his order. But it is not clear that the court was really taking a view on whether the plant was generating harmful emissions or not. There does not seem to have been a proper investigation mounted at any point, including by public prosecutors. In fact the true level of environmental damage being done by the plant remains unclear. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas and the grey list: work in progress URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-and-the-grey-list-work-in-progress/ Last updated: 2025-10-27T16:14:07.000Z Good afternoon. Champagne corks are no doubt popping in the corridors of government after two important achievements over the last few days. On Friday, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-money laundering body, decided to remove Mozambique from the so-called “grey list” of countries deemed to have inadequate protections against money laundering and terrorism financing. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b4eac577-2ddb-439e-8590-8afeb88b0928/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) On the same day, TotalEnergies, the energy company in charge of developing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) production project in Cabo Delgado, told President Daniel Chapo that it was lifting “force majeure”, the legal status which has governed the suspension of the project's contracts for the last four and a half years. The action means that TotalEnergies and its partners have decided that the security situation has improved enough to resume work since the insurgent attack on the town of Palma, next to the project's construction site, in March 2021. These are very welcome developments for the government which will give it a much-needed public relations boost at a time when the government and the ruling Frelimo party remain unpopular, public finances are in a terrible state, unemployment is worryingly high and economic growth is weak. They should also provide some benefits for the economy by encouraging foreign investment and job creation. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### ‘Force majeure’ lifted on Mozambique LNG after government agrees terms with TotalEnergies URL: https://www.zitamar.com/force-majeure-lifted-on-mozambique-lng-after-government-agrees-terms-with-totalenergies/ Last updated: 2025-10-25T10:48:40.000Z The TotalEnergies-led Mozambique LNG consortium has finally lifted the ‘force majeure’ declaration on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in northern Mozambique, four and a half years after a terrorist attack [forced an abrupt halt and evacuation](https://zitamar.com/total-withdraws-completely-from-afungi-leaving-lng-site-in-government-hands/?ref=zitamar.com). The French energy giant informed the Mozambican government of its decision yesterday, after TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné reached a deal with Mozambican president Daniel Chapo on how much additional cost, caused by the lengthy stoppage, the project could claim against future taxes. The original reason for the force majeure declaration — insecurity caused by terrorist activity — had long ceased to be an obstacle to restarting, though the situation remains far from resolved. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Why one stop won't start URL: https://www.zitamar.com/why-one-stop-wont-start/ Last updated: 2025-10-24T16:18:07.000Z Good afternoon. Everyone agrees that one stop border posts would be a good thing for Mozambique. You only need to look at the painfully long queues, several kilometres long, of lorries waiting at the border crossings of Ressano Garcia on the South African border (2,000 lorries a day can appear at the border on their way to the port of Maputo) and Machipanda on the Zimbabwean border to see how slow it is to convey goods across the country’s frontiers. In cross-border trade, time is money. The quicker the border can be crossed, the lower the cost of doing so and the lower the cost of imported goods and Mozambican exports. A one-stop border post would greatly reduce the amount of time spent at separate checkpoints operated by the authorities on both sides of the border. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3a9d56fe-62da-49f6-9bbc-8fba469cc3f0/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Implementing one-stop border posts, however, is taking a long time. Plans to roll out the border posts have existed on paper for several years; in fact, an agreement with South Africa on setting one up at Ressano Garcia was signed as far back as 1998\. But so far, only one single-stop border crossing has been set up, at Calomué on the Malawian border. This is not even the busiest border crossing with Malawi, let alone among the busiest of all the crossings. But the effect of streamlining border procedures would be greatest at the busiest crossings. As well as handling trade with Zimbabwe, the Machipanda border crossing also deals with transit traffic on its way to and from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Funding for setting up single-stop border posts at Ressano Garcia and Machipanda is on offer from the African Development Bank and the World Bank respectively. Plans published last year indicated that the Ressano Garcia border post was meant to be being set up by now, in time to open next year, but those plans have not been carried out. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Shooting the messenger URL: https://www.zitamar.com/shooting-the-messenger/ Last updated: 2025-10-23T16:47:36.000Z Good afternoon. It would be a chilly day in hell if the Mozambican government decided to stop complaining about how the media reports on the war in Cabo Delgado province. Defence minister Cristóvão Chume has returned to this traditional subject, grumbling that there is too much discussion of insurgent activities (see below). Chume claims that pessimistic media coverage is affecting investment in the province. That is unlikely to be true. Major investors like TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, the lead developers of the big gas projects, have security consultants to advise them about the security situation; they do not proceed on the basis of the latest headlines. Nor do people flee their villages because of media reports. What media coverage does affect is how Mozambique is generally perceived abroad by people and organisations who lack expert knowledge of the situation. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/01d76530-2025-45cd-9512-7ae35d7d133d/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgent ambush in Muidumbe kills one Mozambican police officerInterior minister Paulo Chachine confirmed the ambush and the death of the police officer yesterday![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-274.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-10-23-11.31.13.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-ambush-in-muidumbe-kills-one-mozambican-police-officer/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chume points to what he claims are 4,000 people working on TotalEnergies’ gas project as evidence for how Cabo Delgado cannot be unsafe. (That number must include people indirectly involved with the project, working in support services such as quarrying stone or logistics, as well as people directly employed by the project). In fact, *Zitamar News* and others have reported on the increasing preparations to resume work on that project. It is just that we have also not avoided reporting on insurgent activities, which seem to be timed to coincide with those preparations. But the government, as usual, would rather the media did not say anything about Cabo Delgado. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgent ambush in Muidumbe kills one Mozambican police officer URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-ambush-in-muidumbe-kills-one-mozambican-police-officer/ Last updated: 2025-10-23T13:48:28.000Z At least one member of the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) of the Mozambican police was killed on Tuesday in an ambush by Islamic State-backed insurgents on the N380 road in Muidumbe district, Cabo Delgado province. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Team Chapo fights for patronage URL: https://www.zitamar.com/team-chapo-fights-for-patronage/ Last updated: 2025-10-22T15:36:07.000Z Good afternoon. The complaints raised against a Chinese cement company, which has been fined for illegally trying to build a factory in Sofala province (see below), look quite routine on the face of it. It is not unusual for Chinese investors in Mozambique to attract complaints about violating environmental regulations. But such complaints are on the increase, and there is more to them than meets the eye. There have also been complaints recently about Chinese firms mining gold in Manica province and heavy mineral sands in Chibuto district, Gaza province. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5786b088-6720-4b3f-8920-525beae829a5/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But Chinese firms are not acting alone. No foreign investor could hope to march into Mozambique and start mining or building a factory without local help and support. As usual, political elites within the ruling Frelimo party provide access to land and licences in exchange for a share of the profits. In Manica, for example, the company Flomining, controlled by former president Filipe Nyusi’s son Florindo, holds three mining concessions, operated by Chinese contractors. But now that Daniel Chapo is president, new groups are rising up to challenge the dominance of the families of Nyusi and of his predecessor as president, Armando Guebuza. Hence the increase in complaints about Chinese firms: not all those complaints are motivated by concern about the environment, but about dislodging one local fat cat in favour of another. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The state can’t keep the lights on URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-state-cant-keep-the-lights-on/ Last updated: 2025-10-21T16:12:27.000Z Good afternoon. In Mozambican hospitals, it is not unusual for babies to be delivered with the help of phone torches. Schools and healthcare facilities are liable to have their electricity and water supply cut off due to not paying their utility bills. It is not just the permanently cash-starved public sector that faces this problem, either. Most of the debts to the Southern Regional Water Company are from residential and commercial clients (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Water companies and the state-owned electric utility EDM are dealing with the legacy of the post-election protests last year, when the call went out for people not to pay their utility bills as a protest against the state. For a time, the companies tolerated the non-payment without interrupting their supply, but since April and May they have begun cutting off customers. Another effect of the protests has been a loss of jobs, which has further impacted bill payment. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The protest that never was URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-protest-that-never-was/ Last updated: 2025-10-20T16:28:48.000Z Good afternoon. Today has been, so far, a fairly ordinary day on the streets of Mozambique. But if you were to believe commentators on the state-owned broadcaster TVM, the police, and the messages coming from the ruling Frelimo party on social media, you would have expected there to be mass protests today called by opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane. In fact, no protests have taken place. So what was going on? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/686ca437-03c3-4378-ad0a-be0b295ebf4b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Despite the claims being made on TVM and on social media, Mondlane did not, in fact, announce any protests for today. Today is the first weekday following the first anniversary of the killings of Mondlane’s lawyer Elvino Dias and the political activist Paulo Guambe on 19 October last year, in the wake of the disputed general elections. Nobody has been arrested, let alone charged, over the killings, which are widely suspected to have been the work of the security forces, and which took place in daylight and in view of security cameras. Yesterday also saw the inauguration of a new district office for Mondlane’s Anamola party in a Maputo neighbourhood. So today seems like a plausible time for Mondlane to hold a demonstration. But did he want one? _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Four more years? No thanks, Ossufo URL: https://www.zitamar.com/four-more-years-no-thanks-ossufo/ Last updated: 2025-10-18T08:29:02.000Z Good afternoon. If Ossufo Momade, the leader of opposition party Renamo, were to compare himself to an animal, he might choose an old warhorse, if he wanted to be dignified. A less generous observer, however, might compare him to a leech instead. Since the elections a year ago, in which Momade came a bad third as presidential candidate and his party lost half its seats in parliament, he has contributed nothing useful to public life in Mozambique, and all he wants to do now is secure financial benefits for himself and maintain his aides in their party jobs. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/30129dee-7ce5-4577-bad8-cfcbfbf856b2/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Islamist insurgents behead off-duty LNG security guard in Cabo DelgadoIslamic State-linked insurgents may have targeted the man while he was on leave in his home village![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-273.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Screenshot-2025-10-17-at-11.29.10.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamist-insurgents-behead-off-duty-lng-security-guard-in-cabo-delgado/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For the past year, former guerrillas of Renamo have been protesting against Momade and demanding that he step down after leading the party to disaster in last year's elections. Momade has said and done almost nothing to defend himself; indeed he has been more or less invisible (admittedly this may have been partly on health grounds; he had to go abroad for medical treatment before the elections). Only now has he finally acted. Momade reluctantly allowed Renamo to hold a national council meeting, but in the city of Nampula, his power base. From here Momade promised he would not run for president in the next presidential election in 2029, while pointing out defensively that he was elected president at the last party congress. The implication is that he should be left alone as party leader until then. But that would mean that Renamo will not choose the person to lead it into the next national elections until a few months before those elections. This is unacceptable; a leader needs time to introduce themselves. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamist insurgents behead off-duty LNG security guard in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamist-insurgents-behead-off-duty-lng-security-guard-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-11-03T14:54:04.000Z An off-duty security guard employed by the Rwandan security company guarding the Mozambique LNG project was killed by insurgents while on leave in his village on the border between Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts, Cabo Delgado province, on Tuesday night. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The jobless are getting more reckless URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-jobless-are-getting-more-reckless/ Last updated: 2025-10-16T15:22:17.000Z Good afternoon. Just how high is unemployment in Mozambique? Economists say that there are no reliable statistics available, but three recent incidents suggest that it might be increasing. The mayor of the town of Marracuene, 30km from Maputo, reports that he recently advertised 60 job vacancies for a new municipal police force, and received over 7,000 applications. While getting over 100 applications for each job may be unexceptional in a big city, Marracuene is just a small town. In cities, there is far more demand: when the Tax Authority in Maputo advertises a job vacancy, for example, it can expect 20,000 applications. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/44747c4d-576a-479e-bce9-f758ee59858b/)*.* # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (29 September - 12 October 2025)Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) undertook operations in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-272.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Map_MCM_Overview_29Sep-12Oct-EN.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-29-september-12-october-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In central Mozambique meanwhile, the police have given up trying to control the gold rush in Manica province’s Gondola district. A temporary ban on mining has failed to stop people from trying their luck at digging for gold in the province. The ban may even have made things worse by sitting down other informal mining activities in the province. Would-be miners have come over from neighbouring Sofala province to try to find some gold. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (29 September - 12 October 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-29-september-12-october-2025/ Last updated: 2025-10-16T13:01:52.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (29 September - 12 October 2025) At least 8 political violence events (2,222 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 6 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,272 since 1 October 2017) At least 5 reported civilian fatalities (2,641 since 1 October 2017) At least 9 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,050 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) undertook operations in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. In Nampula, its actions displaced thousands, while it remained active in Chiúre district in southern Cabo Delgado. In the north, on 9 October, it undertook its first operation in Palma town since 2021, killing one civilian and kidnapping another, and carried out an attack in Nangade town. The group remains active in Balama and Montepuez district, maintaining a presence close to gold mining sites. Most notably, ISM representatives entered Mocímboa da Praia on 7 October to address residents. They met no resistance from either the community or armed forces. ## Situation summary **Thousands homeless in Memba and Chiúre districts following ISM attacks** Between 29 September and 6 October, ISM killed one soldier and destroyed hundreds of homes and two churches in villages in Nampula’s Memba district, according to claims issued by the Islamic State (IS). The claims related to attacks on five villages across Memba. According to the[ International Organization for Migration (IOM)](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-144-cabo-delgado-and-nampula-attacks-8-october-2025?close=true&ref=zitamar.com), between 2 and 6 October alone, almost 2,200 people were displaced due to the group’s activity in Memba. On 9 October, a group of ISM militants crossed the Lúrio river from Memba back into Cabo Delgado’s Chiúre district. At the village of Napala, they clashed with the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM). IS claimed that FADM fled, and that ISM then destroyed “hundreds” of houses and a church. Militants crossing from Nampula likely met with counterparts who were already in Chiúre district. According to IOM, over 1,100 fled the Mazeze area of the district between 3 and 6 October in response to the group’s presence. **Killings in Palma and Nangade towns** ISM attacked Palma and Nangade towns on the night of 9 October. Both operations involved ISM working in small groups to conduct brief attacks on civilians. In Palma attackers approached the town from the north and reached as far as the airport area. The attack may have been targeted. According to a local source, the militants called on a particular house and told a woman they needed to speak to her husband, who went to seek the assistance of the military. Before help could arrive, the gunmen killed the man’s nephew and kidnapped the woman, according to the source. On the same night, ISM militants entered Nangade, killed at least one civilian, abducted a boy, burned a church, and looted goods, according to sources in the town. IS claimed both attacks on its social media channels. The next night, 10 October, ISM killed a Local Force member near Pundanhar, which lies in the west of Palma district on the Nangade road. IS also claimed this attack. Also near Pundanhar, a motorcycle taxi driver was kidnapped, likely by ISM militants, and a ransom of 50,000 meticais was demanded. It is not known if the driver was released. Residents of both Nangade and Palma towns remain fearful. In Nangade, militants were seen moving toward Nangade town on 6 October. On 10 October, one day after the attack, they were still within one kilometer of the town. Palma, too, is uneasy. On 12 October, people panicked after hearing a rumor of a further attack and looked to leave the town. According to a source in the town, the rumor was spread by bus operator interests. ## ISM remains in Balama and Montepuez districts ISM remains active in Balama and Montepuez districts, over six weeks since a group of almost 100 arrived in Montepuez after trekking from Muidumbe and Macomia districts. At the start of the month, on 2 October, militants attacked Mpaka village, where they killed one civilian and destroyed some property. The same day, they attacked the nearby Tatango village, where they burned a church and other property and spent the night. According to the [MozaNorte news site](https://mozanorte.blogspot.com/2025/10/terroristas-continuam-gozar-de-livre.html?ref=zitamar.com), military forces arrived in Mpaka on 2 October but did not move to Tatango, despite being told of the insurgents’ presence there. The two villages lie approximately 20 km north of Balama town. According to a source with strong contacts in the area, the original group of up to 100 is now organized in four groups. The largest is thought to be based in the north of Balama district, near the Messalo river, while three small groups operate further south. Though isolated, the area is rich in minerals, which has likely prompted their sustained presence across the two districts. On 7 October, a group of ISM militants appeared at the Ntola gold mining site, where they called a meeting of miners. According to a source in the mining sector, they stated that they had come to stay but required daily contributions, presumably cash, and threatened to burn property if their demands were not met. They also said they wanted access to gold, according to the source. ## Focus: The insurgency comes full circle in a Mocímboa da Praia mosque On 7 October, after nightfall, a group of up to eight ISM armed militants entered the southern side of Mocímboa da Praia town and made their way to a mosque in the Nabubussi neighborhood in the Milamba area. After making an address, they made their way out of the town again, meeting no resistance. They had just made their most high-profile and public statement since the insurgency began eight years ago. The address in the Nabubussi mosque was conceived as a media event. Three ISM fighters, dressed in FADM military gear, stood before a crowd of women, men, and children that they had gathered into the mosque. It was after 7:30 p.m., and evening prayers were over. The speaker held a wireless microphone as one of his colleagues recorded him on a mobile phone for a clip to be released four days later on IS media channels. Many in the crowd had their phones raised, openly recording. Others were outside, crowded around the windows, watching. Clips of the address were in circulation locally that evening. The northern Mozambique insurgency was [seeded in mosques and religious schools](https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/files/213966687/JEAS%5FJihadi%5FInsurection%5FEric%5FMorier%5FGenoud%5F2020.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) in Mocímboa da Praia. In choosing a mosque in the town for their most public statement yet, ISM raised significant questions about state authority in northern Mozambique, and indicated that its organizing ideological framework remains consistent. By entering the town in this way, the group also demonstrated that it is the only IS affiliate in East Africa with real political power in its sights, however distant. ISM’s ability to enter the town, call residents for a public meeting, and leave peacefully indicates the weakness of state authority in the town. It is not clear if the Mozambican authorities and Rwandan forces were wholly unaware of the incursion or reluctant to engage in a residential area. It is clear that those residents of all ages gathered for the meeting showed no fear of the armed men speaking to them. Concerns about the level of local support for the insurgency expressed in recent weeks by [Rwandan](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-1-14-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com) and [Mozambican](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-15-28-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com) security officials are clearly not unfounded. From clips in circulation, the speaker’s address was simple. He first presented ISM as a legitimate authority in opposition to Frelimo. In this, he echoed one of the [group’s earliest messages](https://x.com/emorier/status/1243082181100163072?ref=zitamar.com) from 2020, from Quissanga. He then said his Muslim audience had a duty to support the group in jihad. He went on to warn them not to collaborate with the authorities, and to attend none of their meetings. Finally, in stating that only the “army of Islam” can bring peace, he rhetorically asked if the Rwandan army was there. The event took place on the same day that a government team arrived in Pemba for a series of consultations for the Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI), a presidential initiative to encourage dialogue across political divides. Though Mocímboa da Praia was not on the group’s itinerary, ISM’s actions kick-started difficult conversations at a public meeting held on 10 October. Attended by hundreds and overseen by Cabo Delgado Governor Valige Tauabo, [one speaker wondered](https://vm.tiktok.com/ZNdWaGE8G/?ref=zitamar.com) if the insurgency was actually a Makonde plot against coastal peoples. At the meeting, Governor Tauabo [invited insurgents](https://observador.pt/2025/10/10/governador-de-cabo-delgado-diz-que-terroristas-devem-usar-dialogo-nacional-para-expor-insatisfacoes/?ref=zitamar.com) to take part in the DNI. Given their relative freedom of movement in Mocímboa da Praia, this is not an outlandish idea, particularly following President Daniel Chapo’s [recent suggestion](https://www.aljazeera.com/video/centre-stage/2025/9/25/mozambique-at-50-a-conversation-with-president-chapo?ref=zitamar.com) of dialogue. Just the possibility of dialogue with the state means that ISM has made more political progress than more famous IS affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia. Both are resilient, but isolated, groups, and both physically and politically distant from real power. ISM, on the other hand, has returned to the town of its birth, been accepted by some, and been invited to talk. ## Roundup *Inclusive National Dialogue team arrives in Cabo Delgado* The DNI team that arrived in Cabo Delgado on 7 October is scheduled to remain until 17 October. The team planned to meet with community representatives in Pemba, Mecufi, Metuge, Chiúre, Ancuabe, Montepuez and Balama districts. DNI is an initiative President Chapo [launched](https://presidencia.gov.mz/?p=1548&ref=zitamar.com) in April to build “lasting consensus as the basis for stability.” Envisaged as taking place “from Rovuma to Maputo,” the consultation team won’t make it any further north than Metuge. Any dialogue with insurgents, as suggested by Governor Tauabo, will be much more discreet than that envisaged in the formal process. *Chapo confirms Rwandan forces to stay until 2029, guarding gas project construction* President Chapo [announced](https://presidencia.gov.mz/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Discurso-de-S.-Excia-PR-no-Anu%CC%81ncio-da-Aprovac%CC%A7a%CC%83o-da-DFI-do-PCN-FNLG-021025.pdf?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com) on 2 October that Rwandan forces will remain in Mozambique until two onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in Palma district are built, currently expected in 2029\. He was speaking at an event to mark Italian company ENI’s final investment decision for a second floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility off the coast of Cabo Delgado. At the ceremony in Maputo, Chapo said the status of forces agreement, [inked with Rwanda in August](https://aimnews.org/2025/08/28/mozambique-and-rwanda-sign-status-of-forces-agreement/?ref=zitamar.com), “confirms the extended presence of Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado, at least during the construction period of the Mozambique and Rovuma LNG projects,” led by TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, respectively. The agreement with Rwanda means that “the conditions have now been met for the lifting of force majeure on the Mozambique LNG project,” Chapo said. The Mozambique LNG project in Palma district has been suspended since TotalEnergies withdrew workers and declared force majeure in the wake of the insurgent attack on Palma in 2021\. In practice, [work has continued](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-continuing-to-work-on-gas-project-despite-suspension-data-shows/), with 2,000 workers now on site. But the firm is understood to be waiting for the government to agree on an updated plan of development for the project that takes into account 4.5 billion USD in expenses it says it has incurred due to the 4 1/2-year stoppage, before lifting force majeure. ### Charming China URL: https://www.zitamar.com/charming-china/ Last updated: 2025-10-15T21:47:44.000Z Good afternoon. Prime minister Benvida Levi’s visit to China this week (see below) underlines the importance of Mozambique-China relations in the eyes of the Mozambican government. Levi came away with a modest win in the form of China forgiving most of the interest on its loans to the Mozambican state, and making a donation of 100m yuan ($14m). That is welcome, given that China is Mozambique’s biggest creditor nation (holding 13.7% of the state’s foreign debt, according to the latest figures) and the government spends most of its revenues on repaying its debts. But the Mozambican government is hoping for more. A bigger victory would be if it persuaded the Chinese government to extend new loans to Mozambique. But China seems to remain unwilling to do this, given Mozambique’s difficulties in paying back its existing debts. The days when the Chinese government handed over loans to finance big projects like the Maputo-Katembe bridge have not yet returned. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7627fb64-39c4-4762-bca5-64c1cc818f79/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) So Levi’s visit was about more than just formalising the forgiveness of the loan interest. The Mozambican government is eager to show China that it is a friend, including by members of the government regularly showing their face in China (foreign minister Maria Manuela Lucas was there a few months ago). And indeed the Chinese government maintains a friendly attitude, as Chinese president Xi Jinping showed yesterday when he talked about the two countries deepening their partnership together. Even if that friendliness does not quite extend to giving the Mozambican government everything it wants. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Time to end the muddle of provincial government URL: https://www.zitamar.com/time-to-end-the-muddle-of-provincial-government/ Last updated: 2025-10-14T16:22:14.000Z Good afternoon. Who runs Mozambique’s provinces, governors or secretaries of state? Since elected provincial governors were introduced in 2019, both of them have in theory had supreme executive power over provincial government, an unnecessary duplication that wastes resources and risks causing confusion and disputes between the two. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/87397bd2-d387-4f84-ac0c-ff62a01d0842/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents kill boy in the town of PalmaThe child of a local worker has been killed and his wife abducted, in the first insurgent attack on the town since 2021![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-271.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-10-14-17.52.33.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-boy-in-the-town-of-palma/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) President Daniel Chapo’s government has indicated that it intends to reduce the responsibilities of secretaries of state, who are appointed by central government, to essentially an oversight role. This would mean they needed fewer officials working for them and a smaller budget. But, nine months into the new government, there is still no sign of any such proposals. It is true that formally changing the respective responsibilities of governors and secretaries of state would mean altering the Mozambican constitution, which would take some time. But there is nothing to stop Chapo publishing guidelines in the meantime. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents kill boy in the town of Palma URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-boy-in-the-town-of-palma/ Last updated: 2025-10-15T07:45:39.000Z A 16-year-old boy was killed in an attack on the town of Palma in Cabo Delgado attributed to Islamic State–backed insurgents on 10 October, which would be the first incursion into Palma since the town was retaken by Mozambican security forces in March 2021\. The Islamic State later claimed responsibility for the killing, saying the victim was a Christian. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Lies love a vacuum in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/lies-love-a-vacuum-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-10-13T15:51:56.000Z Good afternoon. Panic gripped people in coastal neighbourhoods of the Cabo Delgado town of Palma yesterday, after rumours spread that insurgents were entering the town. The commotion was such, according to a source in touch with *Zitamar News*, that security forces began to investigate. This only made matters worse, says the source, as the locals were not sure if the people in uniform were security forces or insurgents (the latter like to wear uniform, as this newsletter noted recently). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/809dd09e-216d-4f40-a47d-984ef0fe4089/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The locals can hardly be blamed for being jumpy. As we report today, insurgents dressed in military uniforms got into the town on Friday and killed a 16-year-old boy, the first time they have been able to penetrate into the town since the March 2021 attack that left [over 1,400 people](https://www.zitamar.com/over-1-190-killed-in-2021-palma-massacre-new-survey-finds/) dead or missing. Confidence in the security forces, even the once celebrated Rwandans, to protect the towns of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia seems to be declining among residents. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo seeks church blessings URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-seeks-church-blessings/ Last updated: 2025-10-10T16:35:00.000Z Good afternoon. What are the most common non-residential buildings being built in Mozambique? Quite possibly churches and mosques. Religion is booming, in particular evangelical Christianity. Many evangelical churches in Mozambique are like community centres, where the faithful can spend most of their Sundays in prayer and social activities. Deep religious convictions are common, and despite Mozambique's official status as a secular state, there is considerable prejudice against the godless. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bd21fce2-2d29-4bf8-adbf-51a93c9deddc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In this context, it is natural that politicians want to make friends, and ideally alliances, with churches and religious leaders. This helps to explain President Daniel Chapo’s meeting this week with the colourful Kenyan preacher “Prophet” David Owuor, founder of the Repentance and Holiness Ministry, who has endorsed Chapo and said that God has chosen him to be president. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### We need to talk about Mocímboa URL: https://www.zitamar.com/we-need-to-talk-about-mocimboa/ Last updated: 2025-10-09T16:17:38.000Z Good afternoon. The insurgents who got into the Cabo Delgado town of Mocímboa da Praia on Tuesday evening and spent some time addressing people in a local mosque (see below) caught the authorities with their trousers down. There are conflicting reports about how much time the insurgents spent in Mocímboa (although the mosque itself was on the outskirts of the town, so they do not appear to have got into the town centre), but it looks likely that they were around for over an hour, and they left the mosque unmolested by the security forces, who only showed up later. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e62082b8-7919-4797-96e7-b1a14ec6483b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Certainly this is an embarrassment for the security forces, whose strategy for Cabo Delgado includes giving particularly strong protection to the towns of Palma and Mocímboa, which are located close to the forthcoming massive gas projects led by TotalEnergies of France and ExxonMobil of the United States. These towns, both of which insurgents have been able to get into several times recently, do not deserve the term of “fortresses” given to them in the media. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique’s border bets URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-border-bets/ Last updated: 2025-10-10T05:39:42.000Z Good morning. Mozambique has a plan to concession two of its land border crossings to private operators, under public-private partnerships (PPPs) that it hopes will speed up trade flows, increase revenue, improve security, reduce dependence on neighbouring countries’ infrastructure, and improve Mozambique’s image. There is certainly room for improvement on all these points. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b7a0e096-e7e1-4321-ac6f-d7f9fa074625/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents preach in Mocímboa da Praia townThe audacious public event in the symbolically and strategically vital town could mark a significant shift in the insurgent group’s strategy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-270.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Screenshot-2025-10-08-at-15.27.35.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-preach-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Across southern Africa, border PPPs have become fashionable. Zimbabwe’s Beitbridge crossing — redeveloped by a consortium known as Zimborders under a long-term concession — has delivered modern facilities and faster processing, according to government data. But traders and transporters complain of rising user fees, and civil society has questioned the transparency of the deal. In Zambia, private operators at Kasumbalesa and Chirundu have financed new truck parks and digital systems, yet persistent bottlenecks show that private capital alone cannot fix poor coordination between customs and immigration agencies. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents preach in Mocímboa da Praia town URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-preach-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/ Last updated: 2025-10-09T10:25:01.000Z A group of insurgents gathered residents of Mocímboa da Praia on Tuesday evening, urging them to join their “religious cause,” in a rare public appearance inside the town. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Economical ambitions URL: https://www.zitamar.com/economical-ambitions/ Last updated: 2025-10-07T21:21:45.000Z Mozambique’s Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, PRECE, sets out a clear ambition: to move the country from technical recession to sustained growth — excluding gas production — of 6.3% by 2029\. The challenge is to make it real. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ab50b556-649c-4f6a-b0fe-c85dde3a8159/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogUnknown armed men at 6:20 a.m. today kidnapped businessman Francisco Cera outside his business premises on Zedequias Manganhela Avenue in downtown Maputo after blocking his car and firing shots into the air, according to the website Integrity. The victim, aged in his late 50s, owns automotive parts companies NBC and Battery Center, and is a shareholder of the MIDAS franchise. Zitamar News has learned that he holds Portuguese citizenship. Attached is a CCTV recording of the kidnapping. Sign up for Zitamar’s daily briefing email here ...to keep abreast of all the latest developments in #Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-87.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/NYqkjd3RD6blwl0FtkdoYssPU-fwr6KRk33qmBlEh_VVTam0oSDKgffebFSUWa-4keQcnxFumr85m_iiv_rtX1gpLATTtH7DwSJu8HdLDHG2ZzSepFaLXdYZBZF9vWGTIMdqFgnfQK7xEUziqe8puUX4EUZLOY9PqEkrltsxTgNBJ4dExJ32hYqM4V_xQ-0WJ2YFAJSHeftysqRPQAqN6I_-KLOCX77y475kKKfin7sg2FAd237g8Q8-Ex62FvnjIAF7qyGkF8sSOjNXCwTnGWYVsoxGPJqZVWyXuf0iRO5OZwpB7k6UIKoLb46UvjWVg-aYJU_yoTexbWH13NQH7A)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4516?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The plan’s pillars are sound. Digitalising the tax system should help close loopholes and improve transparency. Cheaper credit and new financing tools — including a Development Bank and Mutual Guarantee Fund — could finally channel investment into productive sectors such as agriculture. Temporary VAT exemptions and lower fuel taxes aim to ease pressure on families. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique and Malawi: A new era of pragmatic partnership URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-and-malawi-a-new-era-of-pragmatic-partnership/ Last updated: 2025-10-06T21:31:59.000Z Good evening. President Daniel Chapo’s weekend trip to Blantyre for the inauguration of Malawi’s new leader, Peter Mutharika, was more than a gesture of regional solidarity. It was an investment — political and economic — in a relationship that has too often been defined by mistrust and missed opportunity. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c8d908ca-d32d-4fcb-87dc-c113e81124e5/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For decades, colonial legacies and security tensions coloured ties between the two neighbours. Malawi’s founding president, Hastings Banda, maintained close relations with Portugal’s Salazar and Caetano regimes, and his successors offered sanctuary to Renamo during Mozambique’s civil war. Geography, too, has long bound the two countries in uneasy interdependence: landlocked Malawi depends on Mozambican ports and transport corridors for access to global markets, while Mozambique competes with Tanzania and South Africa to offer the most efficient and secure routes. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### More gas goes ahead, but the biggest projects remain on hold URL: https://www.zitamar.com/more-gas-goes-ahead-but-the-biggest-projects-remain-on-hold/ Last updated: 2025-10-06T07:50:27.000Z Hello, and welcome to a weekend edition of the Zitamar Daily Briefing. It’s been a landmark week for gas production in Mozambique, but not in the way some expected. At a ceremony in Maputo on Thursday, president Daniel Chapo shared the stage with the CEO of Italian oil and gas company Eni, to confirm that a second floating LNG platform on the Coral gas field, off northern Cabo Delgado, will go ahead. But no such announcement was made about the much bigger TotalEnergies-led onshore project. Media speculation that TotalEnergies (TE) would formally lift the force majeure status on the project, under which it halted work in 2021, last week led the environmental NGO Friends of the Earth to [seek a preliminary injunction](https://foe.org/news/lawsuit-to-stop-trumps-illegal-lng-giveaway?ref=zitamar.com) to stop the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) disbursing nearly $5bn to the project. But in a filing seen by Zitamar News, TE told the court in Washington DC on Wednesday that force majeure would not in fact be lifted this (last) week. Though force majeure was invoked due to insecurity around the project, that is not the reason it is not now being lifted. Though the security picture in that part of Cabo Delgado has hardly improved, TE and its partners are now satisfied that they and the government, with the support of Rwanda, can secure the project itself. Chapo said yesterday that he had agreed with Rwanda that their forces would remain in Mozambique at least until the project, and a neighbouring one led by ExxonMobil, are built — thus probably until the end of this decade at least. But another agreement is needed before TE lifts force majeure — despite it now having some 2,000 people working on the project site. The company wants extra costs that the shutdown incurred to be included in an addendum to the Plan of Development it previously agreed with the government, which would ultimately reduce its tax bill. The government is resisting — and is insisting that force majeure must be lifted before an agreement on the addendum is reached. ### SEE: [TotalEnergies bills government for billions in exchange for restarting gas projectThe company is seeking an agreement on costs before it formally resumes activity on the $20bn project - although on the ground, major work has already begun![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-266.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2024-07-25-17.27.02-3.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-bills-government-for-billions-in-exchange-for-restarting-gas-project) There were tough negotiations, too, along the road to Thursday’s FID by Eni. President Chapo proudly told the audience in Maputo — and the country at large — that his government had insisted on, and won, a domestic allocation of 25% of the gas produced by the Coral North platform, and 100% of the condensate, to be used as fuel for power generation. ### SEE: [Mozambican state enjoys better terms as Coral North gas project goes aheadThe state has earned $210m in revenues from the Coral South project so far, mostly from its share of revenues from gas produced![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-267.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-15-17.42.34-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-state-enjoys-better-terms-as-coral-north-gas-project-goes-ahead) In pointed comments he thanked Eni for its respect for Mozambican law, and for concessions made on both sides in order to reach a rapid agreement — which also involves the company building a 75 megawatt (MW) gas-fired power plant at Temane, in Inhambane province, where Globeleq and Sasol are currently building a 450MW plant. Whether gas or condensate actually reaches Mozambican industry and consumers is a moot point. Mozambique currently does not have the infrastructure to regasify LNG, and plans to build such infrastructure at Inhassoro and Beira sound unrealistic to industry experts, though plans are advanced for a regasification facility in Matola. But Mozambique can sell its part of the production for cash, in any case. With FID for Coral North achieved, Chapo said on Thursday that the conditions are now in place for force majeure to be lifted on the TE-led Mozambique LNG project. TE apparently does not agree. At issue is $4.5 billion that TE says the shutdown has cost the project (see our detailed report linked above). How much longer will the company, and its consortium partners, be willing to continue a stalemate which is now being painted as a lack of respect for Mozambique and its rules? --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents escalate attacks in Cabo Delgado’s Balama districtIslamic State-backed insurgents launched a fresh wave of attacks in the Balama district of the southern Cabo Delgado province this week![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-265.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-10-03-19.12.35.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-escalate-attacks-in-cabo-delgados-balama-district/) --- ### From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogItalian oil and gas company Eni yesterday announced a final investment decision for a floating gas liquefaction platform in Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin, representing an investment of $7.2bn according to Mozambican president Daniel Chapo. The Coral North platform will be the second floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform built by the Eni-led consortium\* on the Coral gas field, after the Coral South platform which entered operation in 2022\. Together they will bring Mozambique’s annual LNG production to more than 7 million tonnes. \* Eni (50%), CNPC (20%), Kogas (10%), ADNOC subsidiary XRG (10%), ENH (10%). Eni’s press release is here https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2025/10/pr-eni-announces-final-investment-decision-mozambique-coral-north-project.html Chapo’s statement is attached. Sign up for Zitamar’s daily briefing email here Follow Zitamar on our Telegram Channel, on BlueSky, Twitter / X, Facebook, and Linkedin ...to keep abreast of all the latest developments in #Mozambique![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-86.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/voIwQ90EmS3WToXBT2y-lGjTo_wZiTJNsSa0LYTL4aFsJon_bHKt7WUly12DTi6K_DeI-LbmtawAQwSFE4nBOYBnqXjUfG870u51pLdMP4FOLl-GGtUT3aMGbe9XkDtdqJvIUDr_qomuCo5KtiOH40rdKcmJHWvfA8YDl9uXbGpFjuRXAN7Ss9bjPOtkqHntfH63LQz4rNL1YkqO070oii71Ov5HaaOisF7q2eArqL0Mufj-ZajYYniLWj7Me7ShFxc9_2d9CVZkTOUZx93ReIf4-cpOp6vOim70wyL0WDoiZbgRzCIX3bV3gu40djRHg-EE_snQ1z4MdacP4BM4Sg.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4512?ref=zitamar.com) --- # Also in the news: - **Government awaits TotalEnergies statement on force majeure - Chapo (**[**Lusa**](https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/mundo/2863651/pr-de-mocambique-diz-que-totalenergies-deve-deixar-forca-maior?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Eni to build 75MW thermal power plant in Temane (**[**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2025/10/03/eni-vai-construir-central-termica-de-75-megawatts-em-temane/?ref=zitamar.com)**,** [**Lusa**](https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/mundo/2863675/eni-vai-construir-central-termica-por-110-milhoes-no-sul-de-mocambique?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Coral North to start FLNG production in 2028 (**[**Lusa**](https://observador.pt/2025/10/03/coral-norte-garante-gas-em-tres-anos-e-mocambique-como-terceiro-maior-produtor-africano/?ref=zitamar.com)**,** [**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2025/10/02/coral-norte-podera-gerar-mais-de-tres-mil-milhoes-de-usd-em-contratos-com-empresas-mocambicanas/?ref=zitamar.com)**,** [**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2025/10/02/eni-e-parceiros-assinam-dfi-para-desenvolvimento-do-projecto-de-gas-natural-coral-norte/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** - **Government notifies mining companies about suspension of activities (**[**AIM**](https://aimnews.org/2025/10/02/manica-governo-notifica-empresas-mineiras-sobre-suspensao-de-actividades/?ref=zitamar.com)**)** _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents escalate attacks in Cabo Delgado’s Balama district URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-escalate-attacks-in-cabo-delgados-balama-district/ Last updated: 2025-10-03T17:24:39.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents launched a fresh wave of attacks in the Balama district of the southern Cabo Delgado province this week, burning homes and causing a number of villages to evacuate to the district's main town. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Police in the firing line URL: https://www.zitamar.com/police-in-the-firing-line/ Last updated: 2025-10-02T17:50:00.000Z Good afternoon. Is it safe to be a police officer in Mozambique? Two incidents this week at opposite ends of the country suggest not. Yesterday, an officer of the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic) was shot and wounded in his car in the city of Matola, while in the north, a police officer was killed at a pumping station operated by mining company Kenmare in Nampula province the day before (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/292b4845-51dc-4a00-b925-00e2748b6dad/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies continuing to work on gas project despite suspension, data showsA channel is being dredged for a pipeline to carry the gas from the offshore gas field to liquefaction plants![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-263.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2024-07-25-17.27.02-2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-continuing-to-work-on-gas-project-despite-suspension-data-shows/) [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (15 - 28 September 2025)Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) attacked three district towns in northern Cabo Delgado, while maintaining a presence in the province’s southern and western districts![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-264.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Cabo-Ligado-30-Sep.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-15-28-september-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The contexts are of course rather different. The officer shot in Matola yesterday was the fourth to be attacked in that city since mid-June. All of them have been targeted while driving or riding in cars, and this is the first time that the officer has survived. It is hard to escape the impression that there is an assassination campaign going on, especially given the history of such killings within law enforcement. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### TotalEnergies continuing to work on gas project despite suspension, data shows URL: https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-continuing-to-work-on-gas-project-despite-suspension-data-shows/ Last updated: 2025-10-02T15:48:32.000Z Significant preparatory work for the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by French energy firm TotalEnergies has been continuing recently at the project’s construction site in Cabo Delgado province, new data shows. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (15 - 28 September 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-15-28-september-2025/ Last updated: 2025-10-02T06:49:06.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (15 - 28 September 2025) At least 19 political violence events (2,209 in total since 1 October 2017) At least 21 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,257 since 1 October 2017) At least 19 reported civilian fatalities (2,631 since 1 October 2017) At least 19 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,035 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) attacked three district towns in northern Cabo Delgado, while maintaining a presence in the province's southern and western districts. The most significant was ISM’s second attack in September on Mocímboa da Praia town, in which they killed five, contributing to tensions in the town. In the south, at least one group crossed into Nampula province at the end of September. Joint Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) and Rwandan operations in Macomia may have contributed to ISM’s increasingly dispersed attacks. ## Situation summary **ISM attacks three district headquarters** Between 22 and 28 September, ISM attacked the Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, and Macomia district headquarters, killing at least nine civilians. In each incident, a small group of fighters targeted communities on the outskirts of the three towns under the cover of darkness. The attackers met resistance from state forces in Mocímboa da Praia only. On 22 September, ISM entered the Filipe Nyusi neighborhood, moved from house to house, and killed five people — beheading four men and shooting one woman dead. According to a local source, the group retreated once Rwandan forces fired two grenades at them. The attack followed an incident the previous day in Mitope village, about 10 kilometers west of Mocímboa da Praia, where, according to an Islamic State (IS) claim, insurgents killed one civilian. On 23 September, ISM entered Nangade district headquarters around 11 pm, where they looted a shop for food supplies. Three people were kidnapped to carry the goods, while one woman collapsed dead while fleeing. According to a local source, the group that attacked is trying to establish itself in an area called Mboi, where Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, and Palma districts meet. On the night of 28 September, ISM entered the Nanga neighborhood of Macomia district headquarters. According to local sources, they targeted the home of a Makonde businessman, where they killed at least four people, including a businessman known locally as Chibaba. The attackers kidnapped two adolescents before retreating. **FADM and RDF launch operation in Catupa forest** Following a deployment of troops from Macomia to the coast on 11 September, FADM and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) undertook significant operations against ISM in the Catupa forest area of Quiterajo. On 15 September, people in the Muidumbe lowlands first heard explosions coming from the southeast, according to a source in the area. These continued into the following day, when helicopters, likely RDF, were seen flying from Macomia town to the Quiterajo area. The operation resulted in residents fleeing, and it continued for at least two days with troops pursuing insurgents and conducting reconnaissance operations, according to a military source[ ](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/militares-mocambicanos-intensificam-combate-a-terroristas-em-macomia%5Fn1684354?ref=zitamar.com)who spoke with the Lusa news agency. With the Macomia airstrip restricted to military traffic, FADM also strengthened its navy presence on the coast, while the Local Force was also deployed in the rear, according to a source. On 19 September, two sources reported that an ambulance had left the coast and was heading to Macomia town. It was assumed to be carrying injured state forces, indicating that fighting had continued beyond 16 September. On 20 September, an ISM group was seen crossing Runho village, about 1.5 km from an RDF position, heading toward Quissanga. Some insurgents may have remained. On 20 September, a group of fighters clashed with a joint FADM and RDF patrol. IS issued a claim for the incident the following day, placing it at Namaneco, south of Quiterajo town. Three days later, on 23 September, ISM claimed to have killed two soldiers in a clash in the Catupa forest. **ISM still active in Balama and Montepuez districts** ISM remained active in both Balama and Montepuez districts, with IS claiming attacks on five villages in which two people were killed. Almost 100 ISM fighters have been in the area since the end of August. With much of Montepuez sparsely populated, it has concentrated its activities in informal gold mining areas west of Nairoto, with forays to Balama district. In Balama, the group claimed three attacks, though only the one on Monapo village on 19 September could be geolocated. The group then moved north into Montepuez where it attacked Lusaka village on 24 September. Around this time, some of the group commandeered two logging trucks and drove to the Nambatano mining area near Ntola, according to a source. However, some remained, attacking Mahepe village west of Lusaka where, according to IS, they burned a church and 23 houses. The attacks in Balama caused [over 2,100 people to flee](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-142-balama-mocimboa-da-praia-attacks-23-september-2025?close=true&ref=zitamar.com), according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). **Militants cross from Chiúre into Nampula province** In southern Cabo Delgado, another group of ISM militants was active in Meluco, Ancuabe, and Chiúre districts, and crossed the Lúrio river to Nampula province. The group of militants first attacked Mitope village on 15 September, according to an IS claim. Three days later, militants attacked Nonia village in Ancuabe district, where it burned some houses. Continuing south into Chiúre district, they moved through Ntique village, where a grenade they dropped was found by two children, according to local sources. The grenade exploded, the sources said, seriously injuring the pair. ISM’s [foray into Chiúre in July](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-14-july-3-august-2025?ref=zitamar.com) displaced around 50,000 people. Given the lack of reports of displaced people arriving in the district headquarters of Ancuabe and Chiúre, few if any have returned. ISM has likely been moving through mostly depopulated villages. By 26 September, one group had reached Nacoja village on the Lúrio river, where IS claimed they killed one civilian and burned a church. Another group crossed the river into Nampula province, possibly at Namapa, over 40 km west, according to a Zitamar source. Reports emerging from Nampula are as yet unclear, but suggest that there have been some attacks on civilian communities in Erati and Memba districts, and that security forces have been deployed to the area. According to the [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/mozambique/mozambique-conflict-and-violence-cabo-delgado-affecting-civilians-flash-update-1-29-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com), Mozambican forces encountered a group of fighters in Nampula’s Erati district as early as 25 September, arresting one. In response, ISM killed one civilian, OCHA said, though it did not give the location of the two events. A local official also confirmed fighting in that area. The following day OCHA reported multiple abductions and burning of homes in Memba district. A local source confirms that insurgents appeared in the Chipene village in Memba. On 28 September, according to OCHA, the group attacked Pavala village in Memba, burning a school and a health center. According to a local government source, security forces arrived in Chipene administrative post, also in Memba district, the same day. ## Focus: Mocímboa da Praia attack highlights tensions in the town Though the two recent attacks on Mocímboa da Praia have been short-lived and restricted to the outskirts, their impact has been significant. After the 7 September attack, aid agencies restricted their activities in the district. Four days after the 22 September killings, Doctors Without Borders, the primary health services provider in the district, announced the [suspension of its activities](https://www.msf.org/mozambique-msf-suspends-activities-mocimboa-da-praia-violence-surges?ref=zitamar.com) in Mocímboa da Praia. The agency’s misgivings are shared by the population. According to IOM, almost 1,500 people [fled the town](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-142-balama-mocimboa-da-praia-attacks-23-september-2025?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) in the wake of the 7 and 22 September attacks and due to rumors of an upcoming attack on 5 October, which marks the anniversary of the first day of the insurgency in 2017\. Most headed to Mueda. This is despite authorities attempting to stop people from leaving the town following the second attack, according to local sources. Alongside fear of ISM, there is a significant element of distrust growing between authorities and communities in the town. In a 24 September meeting between district authorities and the business community, business leaders said they were moving their families out of town and feared losing both their businesses and their property. The account of the meeting came through Frelimo messaging channels in Mocímboa da Praia. Assuring them that they were safe, police District Commander Alberto Napova reportedly said that “there is evidence that the enemy is among us, but we report little. If we continue like this, the war may take its time to end.” Napova’s message echoed [similar comments](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-1-14-september-2025?ref=zitamar.com) made by a Rwandan commander in the wake of the 7 September attack. Pictures [accompanying the report](https://www.facebook.com/franciscoalbertompango.mpango/posts/pfbid0vt99PRVTLoBbFheGpndupojczLNSVrZJ3gGxpJbRH4ymG8eWDyALBR2kAWr8p4GUl) also reflected the tensions between security forces and the community. As business leaders met inside with Helena Bandeira, the Nampula-based mayor of Mocímboa da Praia, and district administrator Sérgio Cipriano, dozens of young men squatted outside, guarded closely by RDF troops with automatic rifles and tear gas launchers. An underlying tension may be that between the Mwani and Makonde communities. According to the[ Mozambique Times](https://moztimes.com/en/insurgents-attack-mocimboa-da-praia-neighbourhood-for-the-second-time-in-two-weeks/?ref=zitamar.com), the victims in the 22 September attack were Makonde, as were the victims in the recent attack in Macomia town. The neighborhoods in Mocímboa da Praia attacked recently have long had a [predominantly Makonde](https://university.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique%5F498-13Aug2020-corr%5FMocimboa-da-Praia%5FHistory-of-violence.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) population. The mainly Christian Makonde originally come from the Frelimo heartland of the Mueda plateau, where the liberation war against Portugal began, and have dominated Frelimo leadership, while coastal Muslim communities are primarily Mwani. It was likely such tensions that led District Commander Napova to stress in his remark that the insurgents come from a range of ethnic backgrounds. ## Roundup *President Chapo opens the possibility for dialogue with insurgents* In a recent [interview](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=agS2WSticqY&ref=zitamar.com) with Al Jazeera, Mozambican President Daniel Chapo described two strategies for addressing the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The first is a military solution supported by Rwandan and Tanzanian forces. Chapo also suggested the possibility of opening a dialogue with the insurgents to resolve the conflict, pointing to historical examples such as Mozambique’s struggle for independence and its 16-year civil war, both of which ended through negotiations. He added that the government could explore ways to identify the insurgent leadership and their motivations to facilitate peace talks. *Authorities detect $7 million of suspicious financing linked to “terrorism”* The Mozambican Financial Intelligence Office has [identified](https://cartamz.com/politica/46431/apurados-7-milhoes-de-usd-suspeitos-de-financiar-terrorismo-em-cabo-delgado-nos-ultimos-sete-anos/?ref=zitamar.com) more than 458.6 million meticais (around 7 million US dollars) in “terrorist” financing in Cabo Delgado between 2017 and 2024\. According to the office, this financing involves the deposit, withdrawal, and transfer of small sums. The aim is to conceal activities within the banking and mobile financial services systems. Those suspected of involvement include traders, civil servants, members of NGOs, and private companies — mainly from Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula — as well as individuals from countries in southern, central, and eastern Africa that are affected by “terrorism,” according to the report” *“Everything ready” for Mozambique LNG project restart* TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné told investors in New York on Monday that “everything is ready” for a full restart of the Mozambique LNG project, which has been formally suspended under a force majeure declaration since an attack on the town of Palma in March 2021\. His words lend weight to a[ report](https://www.upstreamonline.com/exclusive/its-happening-mozambique-lng-force-majeure-set-to-be-lifted-within-days/2-1-1877484?ref=zitamar.com) in respected industry publication Upstream that said the decision on lifting force majeure would be announced on Thursday, 2 October. Pouyanné confirmed reports that the project consortium and the Mozambique government still needed to approve an updated development plan and budget to account for the impact of the force majeure, Bloomberg[ reported](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-29/totalenergies-ceo-says-mozambique-lng-project-ready-to-restart?ref=zitamar.com). The chief executive of ExxonMobil, operator of another LNG project to be built next to TotalEnergies’, met with President Chapo in New York last week and sought assurances over security in the area, the Financial Times[ reported](https://www.ft.com/content/e75c579b-7d3c-4128-b584-2adb4e4c22eb?ref=zitamar.com). ## ### Mining comes under military control URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mining-comes-under-military-control/ Last updated: 2025-10-01T15:20:03.000Z Good afternoon. Why is Mozambique’s defence sector being given responsibility for cleaning up the polluting mining sector in Manica province? The alarm over the levels of pollution has been raised by media reports, and since amplified by the Manica provincial government. But now the central government has decided to act, based on a report into the situation on the ground produced by the armed forces, under the direction of defence minister Cristóvão Chume. A suspension of all mining activities in the province will be enforced by the presence of Mozambique’s Security and Defence Forces — suggesting that the military will be there as well as, or instead of, the police. An interministerial commission has been set up to review the licensing regime, reinforce oversight, define authorised areas where mining can be authorised, and create effective enforcement mechanisms. This interministerial commission will be led by none other than defence minister Chume. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) One might think that Chume has enough on his plate, fighting the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. And there are other arguments for not putting him in charge of regulating mining — beyond the obvious, that there is already a ministry for that area, and a regulatory institute. But Chume has also made headlines for being one of those Frelimo elites with interests in the mining sector — raising questions of a conflict of interest. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Ghost officials will haunt again URL: https://www.zitamar.com/ghost-officials-will-haunt-again/ Last updated: 2025-09-30T15:55:05.000Z Good afternoon. Is the news that 18,000 so-called “ghost” employees have been removed from public sector payrolls (see below) evidence that President Daniel Chapo’s government is cracking down on corruption, as Chapo promised to do? Not necessarily. Under Chapo’s predecessor Filipe Nyusi, the government also removed fake public servants whose pay was being embezzled by corrupt managers. In 2018, the existence of 30,000 ghost employees was announced, who the government said had been drawing pay for three years at a cost of $250m. In 2023, 7,000 ghost personnel were said to have been removed from the armed forces payroll. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b9830f1e-08dd-44c1-a6ae-1114967b33e2/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican and Rwandan forces launch operation to destroy insurgent bases in Macomia and Mocímboa districtsHelicopters have flown to the area, a stronghold for the insurgents, and bombings have been carried out![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-262.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-30-17.27.05.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-and-rwandan-forces-launch-operation-to-destroy-insurgent-bases-in-macomia-and-mocimboa-districts/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Hiring ghost employees is evidently very lucrative for those corrupt bosses who pocket the money. At an absolute minimum, assuming that all 18,000 of these latest ghosts were only earning the roughly MZN105,000 ($1,640) a year minimum wage for civil servants, that would cost around $2.5m a month, or $30m a year. The real figure is most likely to be higher. It hardly needs saying that the cash-starved Mozambican government desperately needs this money for legitimate expenses, like paying the wages of real employees, something it struggles to do on time. The government continues to run a budget deficit and to rely on expensive domestic borrowing (some of which it has restructured because it was unable to repay on time) to pay its bills. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican and Rwandan forces launch operation to destroy insurgent bases in Macomia and Mocímboa districts URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-and-rwandan-forces-launch-operation-to-destroy-insurgent-bases-in-macomia-and-mocimboa-districts/ Last updated: 2025-09-30T15:30:59.000Z Mozambican and Rwandan security forces have launched a new military operation in Cabo Delgado province aimed at dismantling key insurgent hideouts and strategic bases linked to Islamic State, according to local resident sources. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Does Mozambique need to negotiate with terrorists? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/does-mozambique-need-to-negotiate-with-terrorists/ Last updated: 2025-09-30T10:06:20.000Z Good afternoon. Is President Chapo turning towards a new strategy to try and end the conflict in Cabo Delgado? In remarkable comments made to broadcaster Al Jazeera this weekend, he said plainly that the end of the conflict would come through negotiation, meaning that the government needs to sit down with the insurgents and talk. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/46eeb6bf-eb8a-4fe7-b10b-f6c07a87866e/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Four dead as insurgents attack Macomia townIslamic State claimed the attack on Macomia, which is the third major town to be targeted in the last month![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-261.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-29-15.58.58.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/four-dead-as-insurgents-attack-macomia-town/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Last week, as we noted in our last newsletter, Chapo admitted that the conflict is not going well, from the government perspective. That is putting things lightly. Even since then, insurgents have attacked the town of Macomia, and are active in different cells across Cabo Delgado province. A military offensive in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts may have yielded some results — the military is slower to publicise its successes than the insurgents are — but it also appears to have made space for, or provoked, more insurgent activity. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Four dead as insurgents attack Macomia town URL: https://www.zitamar.com/four-dead-as-insurgents-attack-macomia-town/ Last updated: 2025-09-29T14:43:41.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents attacked the town of Macomia in Cabo Delgado at around 11pm on Sunday night, in what was the third insurgent attack on a district capital this month, after attacks on the towns of Mocímboa da Praia and Nangade. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Getting real about Islamic State in Mozambique URL: https://www.zitamar.com/getting-real-about-islamic-state-in-mozambique/ Last updated: 2025-09-28T05:46:04.000Z Good morning – with apologies for the late arrival of Friday's Daily Briefing. On Mozambique’s Armed Forces Day it is customary to generously praise the men and women who defend the country in uniform, even though we're aware of major operational shortcomings, particularly in Cabo Delgado where a guerrilla group claiming to defend Islamic values has inflicted enormous suffering on the population, and the military deployed there, since October 2017. However, speaking at his first Armed Forces Day as president on Thursday, Daniel Chapo acknowledged the armed forces’ effort, but said it is insufficient and that more investment is needed. [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is a dilemma in a country with a gaping deficit in its state budget, where the urgent needs of social sectors are already being diverted to the war effort. The international tap can hardly be turned on, when even for civilian sectors there is a clear shortage of donations to a country that was until a decade ago one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in Africa. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Insider, Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Gas burns bright but will soon evaporate URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-burns-bright-but-will-soon-evaporate/ Last updated: 2025-09-25T08:41:03.000Z Good afternoon. There is good news in today’s newsletter for the gas industry in Mozambique, with a final investment decision all but confirmed for the Coral North floating LNG project, and confirmation that the LPG production facility in Inhambane will begin operations before the end of the year. Of course you can’t win them all, and oil and gas exploration is hit and miss. That’s why another Eni-led consortium has handed back an offshore block in the Angoche Basin, as *Zitamar News* reveals today. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* --- # The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Eni-led consortium quits Mozambique offshore exploration blockThe consortium won the block in 2015, signed the exploration concession in 2018, drilled a well in 2023, and quit in 2024![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-259.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/photo_2023-06-20_13-09-40.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/eni-led-consortium-quits-mozambique-offshore-exploration-block/) [Nangade town target of latest insurgent attack in Cabo DelgadoOne man survived being shot in the neck, but one woman died fleeing the attack on the headquarters of Nangade district, northern Cabo Delgado![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-260.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-24-13.28.10.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/nangade-town-target-of-latest-insurgent-attack-in-cabo-delgado/) --- [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But more concerning for the sector in Mozambique is the glacial pace at which the Mozambican state is moving to encourage more exploration. The A5-A block, which Eni has now given up on, was awarded in 2015, but the exploration concession was not signed until 2018 — by which time one of the stakeholders, Norway’s Statoil, had given up. Another block that Eni won in 2022 is still waiting for the go-ahead from the Administrative Court. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Eni-led consortium quits Mozambique offshore exploration block URL: https://www.zitamar.com/eni-led-consortium-quits-mozambique-offshore-exploration-block/ Last updated: 2025-10-01T08:21:15.000Z A consortium led by Italian oil and gas major Eni, which won the right to explore an offshore area in Mozambique’s Angoche Basin in 2015, has handed the block back to the Mozambican government, *Zitamar News* has learned. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Nangade town target of latest insurgent attack in Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/nangade-town-target-of-latest-insurgent-attack-in-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-09-24T11:28:32.000Z At least one woman died and three people were abducted during a lightning raid on the district headquarters of Nangade in Cabo Delgado province on the night of Tuesday 23 September. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Anamola needs to be bigger than Venancio URL: https://www.zitamar.com/anamola-needs-to-be-bigger-than-venancio/ Last updated: 2025-09-23T16:42:16.000Z Good afternoon. Venâncio Mondlane, the leading opposition figure in Mozambique, yesterday revealed his latest move to stay one step ahead of the government and other opposition parties. His new party, Anamola, is launching its own public consultation on how politics in Mozambique should be reformed — in parallel to the public consultation launched under the so-called inclusive dialogue process, from which Mondlane and Anamola have, ironically, been excluded. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/a582f841-d502-4d81-8b1d-c7bf0b44530b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) No politician in Mozambique is better at speaking to the Mozambican public than Venâncio Mondlane, and it seems likely that his public consultation has a better chance of being genuinely inclusive, though both processes still need to prove themselves. The continued exclusion of Mondlane and Anamola represents a denial of reality by Mozambique’s leaders: that Mondlane and his party are now the most significant political force in the country after Frelimo, and look set to remain so for years to come. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Frelimo can change if it wants to URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-can-change-if-it-wants-to/ Last updated: 2025-09-23T08:15:04.000Z Good morning and welcome to yesterday’s newsletter. The Constitutional Council (CC) has delivered its verdict on whether it is unconstitutional for the same person to be president of Mozambique and president of a party. While formally the CC declined to rule on the question, in rejecting the case it made clear it saw no reason to view holding both posts simultaneously as unconstitutional. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/08c14c8c-952d-44e9-a380-a6851165d967/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Five dead and several kidnapped in new attack in Mocímboa da Praia townSuspected Islamic State-linked insurgents again attacked the town of Mocimboa da Praia yesterday![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-258.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/image_2025-09-23_093642370.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/five-dead-and-several-kidnapped-in-new-attack-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That need not be the end of the matter, however. Mozambique’s political parties, and in particular Frelimo, as the only one ever to hold the presidency of the country, could decide on their own to divide the two roles, and cease having the party leader also be the party’s candidate for president of the country. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Five dead and several kidnapped in new attack in Mocímboa da Praia town URL: https://www.zitamar.com/five-dead-and-several-kidnapped-in-new-attack-in-mocimboa-da-praia-town/ Last updated: 2025-09-23T10:46:25.000Z Suspected Islamic State-linked insurgents again attacked the town of Mocimboa da Praia in the early hours of Monday 22 September, killing at least five civilians and kidnapping others. Sources told *Zitamar News* that the attack took place around 02:00 in the Filipe Nyusi neighbourhood, the same neighbourhood [hit by insurgents on 7 September](https://www.zitamar.com/at-least-four-killed-in-overnight-attack-on-mocimboa-da-praia/). Of the five victims, at least four were beheaded after the insurgents went from house to house, and the fifth victim, a woman, was shot. Witnesses said that members of the Rwanda Defence Forces responded to the insurgent incursion by launching two grenades, which forced the attackers to retreat. One grenade reportedly landed on a residential balcony but caused no injuries. Sources also confirmed that several civilians were abducted during the attack, with reports indicating that families have received ransom demands. The exact number of those kidnapped remains unconfirmed, though initial claims suggested three people were taken. One of those taken was an employee of a Mozambican non-governmental organisation, according to two separate sources; one source said they had been freed after a ransom was paid. During the attack, several residents fled their homes during the night to the bush, where they stayed until dawn. Others continue to flee the town of Mocimboa da Praia, fearing further attacks. The attack on the same neighbourhood on September 7, killing four civilians including a primary school teacher, was the first in Mocímboa da Praia since 2021, and prompted many families to flee to safer areas. Following that attack, civil and military authorities in the town sought to reassure residents and state employees about their safety. According to the latest update from the Mozambique Conflict Monitor on 11 September, the authorities held a public meeting to discuss the situation, which turned into a peaceful protest as people refused to talk to representatives of the Mozambican security forces present. Insurgents have remained active in the Mocimboa da Praia district. On September 14, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for killing one person in the village of Mbau on September 12\. On September 5, a group of fighters clashed with a Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) patrol near Diaca, over 40 km west of Mocimboa da Praia town. According to ACLED, the conflict monitoring organisation and Zitamar’s partner on the Mozambique Conflict Monitor, the first two weeks of September saw nine incidents of political violence in Cabo Delgado, resulting in 21 fatalities, most of them civilians. *This article was produced by Zitamar News under the* [*Mozambique Conflict Monitor*](https://acleddata.com/monitor/mozambique-conflict-monitor-cabo-ligado?ref=zitamar.com) *project, in collaboration with ACLED. The contents of the article are the sole responsibility of Zitamar News.* ### Chapo's first corruption scandal URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapos-first-corruption-scandal/ Last updated: 2025-09-19T19:46:36.000Z Good afternoon. Having written earlier this week about the dangers of politicians’ children trafficking in influence, it seems the first major corruption scandal of the Chapo presidency is precisely that — albeit not involving Chapo’s own offspring. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6c82dce9-ca6a-4ec7-8f2f-51df7afe64d8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The Administrative Court this week ruled that the contract awarded by the national cotton and edible oils institute (Instituto do Algodão e Oleaginosas de Moçambique, IAOM) could not proceed, since the winning bid, from a new company called Future Technologies of Mozambique (FTM), did not meet certain legal criteria and was also not the most advantageous for Mozambique. The court did not, however, mention the political controversy around the issue. The IAOM falls under the Ministry of Agriculture, and FTM is related to the agriculture minister, Roberto Albino, through a business partner of his, Paulo Auade Junior. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Protesters are still denied justice URL: https://www.zitamar.com/protesters-are-still-denied-justice/ Last updated: 2025-09-18T15:58:43.000Z Good afternoon. It has been at least six months since the violent protests sparked by last year’s Mozambican general election died down. But although the police may have stopped shooting protesters, the Mozambican state is continuing to victimise its opponents. As Venâncio Mondlane, opposition politician and figurehead of the protests, points out, there are thousands of people still imprisoned who were arrested during the demonstrations, who have yet to be charged, let alone tried. He was speaking after the acquittal on Monday of several leading supporters of his, who had spent several months in prison. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/40d618b5-c820-4342-851a-542896f809c8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In principle, it can be legal to keep people in prison for extended periods of time in Mozambique. The law makes special provision for crimes against state security, of the kind of which Glória Nobre, a financial aide to Mondlane and one of those acquitted on Monday, was accused. However, to extend a captive’s time behind bars, prosecutors need to go to a judge and give reasons why they should stay in detention. Has this been done for everyone still in prison? Unlikely. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Dynasties dig deep URL: https://www.zitamar.com/dynasties-dig-deep/ Last updated: 2025-09-17T17:41:15.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s recent mining disputes in Manica — the Revuboè concession, and the bitter clash between the Guebuza and Nyusi families reported today in *Evidências* (see below) are not isolated local quarrels. They are a symptom of a deeper, entrenched pattern: the conversion of political power into private wealth by the relatives and close associates of those who have held power, and in particular the presidency. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ba0aa77a-2c44-48b3-8691-f37f67393162/)*.* [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (1 - 14 September 2025)On 7 September, a small group of ISM fighters killed at least four civilians in Mocímboa da Praia’s 30 de Junho neighborhood![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-256.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Overview---MZM---1---14-SEP-2025---EN.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-august-2025-2/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As *Evidências* reports, the struggle between the Guebuza and Nyusi families saw Florindo Nyusi, son of former President Filipe Nyusi, allegedly leveraging his family's influence to try and block the development of a mining concession by a Guebuza family company, Focus 21 Explorator. The article details allegations of threats, intimidation, and abuse of state power, with Florindo Nyusi reportedly even demanding lists of government officials who approved Focus 21's permits. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (1 - 14 September 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-august-2025-2/ Last updated: 2025-09-17T17:11:12.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (1 - 14 September 2025) - At least 9 political violence events (2,185 in total since 1 October 2017) - At least 21 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,215 since 1 October 2017) - At least 20 reported civilian fatalities (2,594 since 1 October 2017) - At least 9 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (2,011 since 1 October 2017) ## Situation summary **ISM enters Mocímboa da Praia** On 7 September, a small group of ISM fighters killed at least four civilians in Mocímboa da Praia’s 30 de Junho neighborhood, fewer than 2 kilometers from the town’s airport. According to one report, fighters went door to door to identify victims. It is unclear if they were doing so on the basis of religion or ethnicity, though District Administrator [Sérgio Cipriano said](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBSG3priz98&ref=zitamar.com) that the attackers asked for people by name. Neither Mozambican nor Rwandan security forces responded directly to the attack, though the Rwandan forces’ Mozambique headquarters are less than two kilometers from the 30 de Junho neighborhood. ISM was active elsewhere in Mocímboa da Praia district. On 5 September, a group of fighters clashed with a FADM patrol near Diaca, over 40 km west of Mocímboa da Praia town. IS issued a claim for the incident the following day. On 12 September, IS issued a claim for the killing of one civilian in Mbau, further south in Mocímboa da Praia district. As a result of the attacks, [over 1,700 people fled](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-140-muidumbe-mocimboa-da-praia-montepuez-attacks-12?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) Mocímboa da Praia for Mueda, Palma, and Montepuez, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). **FADM navy shootings continue** Macomia district and its coastal waters remain unstable. On 8 September, a FADM navy patrol [killed at least 16 people](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-massacre-of-civilians-on-cabo-delgado-island/), believed to be civilians, at Rolas island, off Macomia but part of Ibo district. Local sources say that a group of people had moved to Rolas from Matemo to set up a fishing camp, and that a navy patrol from Ibo approached the island and opened fire on all there. This is the third consecutive month in which the FADM navy has opened fire on civilians off the Cabo Delgado coast. Around 22 August,[ FADM killed five fishermen](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-18-31-august-2025?ref=zitamar.com) near Pangane. The previous month, at least [three civilians died](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-30-june-13-july-2025?ref=zitamar.com) in a similar incident near Pangane village. According to FADM spokesperson Colonel Benjamin Chabualo, the reports from Rolas island were “false.” Cabo Delgado Governor Valige Tauabo said on 13 September that he [“did not yet have all the data,](https://moztimes.com/en/cabo-delgado-governor-fails-to-visit-matemo-island-to-learn-about-fishermen-massacre/?ref=zitamar.com)“ almost a week after the incident. Though he had planned to visit that day, his trip was postponed. Nevertheless, authorities seem to be concerned. Mozambique Conflict Monitor understands that since the shooting, naval patrols in the area have greatly reduced. The killings prompted some seasonal fishermen from Nampula to leave the area. Among them were 16 young men who took a truck in Macomia town but were arrested by police in Metoro, in Ancuabe district, on 12 September on suspicion of being insurgents. According to a local source on the coast, they took a bus from Pangane to Macomia before getting a lift in the truck in which they were found. They remain in detention in Pemba. Two days after the Rolas killings, on 11 September, at least 10 Rwandan trucks were seen moving toward the coast, though there have been no reports of clashes in the area since their arrival. One day before the Rwandan forces moved east, on 10 September, shots were heard in Macomia town, prompting some to move to the bush, according to sources in the town. For at least four days before that, there had been an ISM presence to the south of Macomia, contributing to tensions in the town. **ISM clashes with FADM in Montepuez** As predicted in the [most recent Mozambique Conflict Monitor,](https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-18-31-august-2025?ref=zitamar.com) the group of up to 90 insurgents who had been heading west along the Messalo river finally reached the Nairoto Administrative Post area around 31 August. Arriving first in Nacololo village, they continued south toward Ntola, a village close to several artisanal gold mining sites. They stayed in that area until 10 or 11 September, according to local sources. FADM forces were dispatched to the area. ISM ambushed an initial force near Ntola on 7 September. According to a statement issued by IS, there were no fatalities in the attack. ISM attacked at least one village in Montepuez on 10 September. The village, Nquewene, lies approximately 15 km west of Ntola. IS also issued a claim for an attack at Mavala village on 12 September, where, according to the claim, they captured and killed one person, likely male. Though ISM’s claim said the attack occurred in Montepuez, Mavala lies in Balama district, approximately 30 km north of Balama town, and 50 km west of Montepuez district headquarters. FADM has clearly been stretched by ISM’s push into Montepuez and now Balama. Mozambique Conflict Monitor records just one engagement between the two forces while ISM has been there. **People flee ISM in Muidumbe and Meluco lowlands** ISM continues to maintain a presence in the lowlands of southern Muidumbe and into Meluco districts since its attack on Mapate village on 25 August, during which insurgents killed five civilians. On 3 September, the group carried out an attack and killed four civilians in Xaxaxa village in Meluco, just across the Messalo river that separates Muidumbe and Meluco. On 7 September, they entered Miangalewa village on the N380 and killed a young man. Originally from the village, he had been visiting from Nampula to buy fish. Around 11 September, the group was seen moving across territory closer to Mapate village again, south of the main road running into the Muidumbe lowlands. Residents of the district headquarters, Namacande, as well as people in neighboring villages spent nights sleeping outside, according to various sources. According to IOM, over 2,000 people [fled their homes](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-140-muidumbe-mocimboa-da-praia-montepuez-attacks-12?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) in Muidumbe district due to attacks, or fear of attack, between 25 August and 11 September. ## Focus: Residents question response to Mocímboa da Praia attack If ISM’s attack in Mocímboa da Praia’s 30 de Junho neighborhood on 7 September was planned to create uncertainty and division in the minds of residents and authorities, it was a success. Given the rate of ISM activity in Mocímboa da Praia district, it should not have come as a surprise and indicates a considerably heightened risk of further attacks. The 7 September attack was only the second by ISM in Mocímboa da Praia town since September 2021\. On 31 August last year, a group of up to 10 ISM fighters [clashed with a Rwanda patrol](https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-update-19-august-1-september-2024?ref=zitamar.com) in the town. ISM violence in Mocímboa da Praia district in 2024 was more than double that of the previous year. The rate of activity in the district this year is not quite as high, but it had almost met 2023 levels by mid-September. The population’s response to this year’s attack has been quite different from last year. Demand to leave the town has been enough to drive up the price of a Mueda bus ticket by two-thirds. The unease is also seen in relations between residents and authorities, and in particular with the Rwandan forces. On 10 September, the district administration called a meeting with public officials and community leaders, which was also attended by a Rwanda Defence Force commander. According to a statement circulated by local Frelimo officials, the commander told those gathered that despite the advantages state forces have, “eliminating a small group of bandits within a short radius” remains a challenge. He went on to suggest that the insurgents were receiving support within the community. The following day, 11 September, authorities called another public meeting to discuss the situation, which turned into a peaceful protest as people refused to speak with representatives of the Mozambican security forces present. On a video clip of the protest in circulation on social media, a person is heard saying that they will only speak with Rwandan forces. In another lengthy voice note recorded after the protest, also in circulation on messaging apps, a woman argues that attendees wanted to speak with the Rwandans not because they favored them, but because Rwandan forces had failed to respond to the community’s reports, and attendees wanted to voice their complaints directly. Neither Rwandan forces nor FADM responded promptly to the 7 September attack, allowing ISM to escape. ACLED has [documented](https://acleddata.com/report/rwanda-mozambique-limits-civilian-protection?ref=zitamar.com) a similar reluctance by Rwandan forces to respond to ISM actions in Macomia district. Such a lack of response in urban areas may quickly diminish the reputation for effectiveness that Rwandan forces have developed and weaken communities’ trust in them. As the demonstration on 11 September showed, it also has very real political implications for Mozambican authorities and may create openings for further attacks. ## Roundup *OCHA laments declining humanitarian assistance* The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [says](https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-2025-humanitarian-response-conflict-31-july-2025?ref=zitamar.com) that humanitarian responders have reached just over 70% of the people in Cabo Delgado they had hoped to assist in the first seven months of this year. OCHA says the response has received just 66 million US dollars of its $352 million requirement. It has now prioritized the districts of Macomia, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Quissanga. Funding challenges aside, the conflict makes these the most difficult areas to reach. *New commander for Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado* Rwanda is preparing to [rotate](https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rdf-army-chief-of-staff-briefs-rwanda-security-force-ahead-of-deployment-to-cabo-delgado?ref=zitamar.com) out its security forces in Cabo Delgado, with a new contingent coming in under the command of Major General Vincent Gatama. At a briefing ahead of their deployment, the incoming troops received a message from Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in which he emphasized the importance of maintaining the discipline and momentum demonstrated by the Rwandan security forces in Cabo Delgado over the past four years. *Marshall Samora Machel Academy holds inaugural congress on Cabo Delgado* On 11 September 2025, the Marshall Samora Machel Academy, a military academy in Nampula, [held](https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19cHXdAm4Z/) its first one-day academic congress, with a focus on the Cabo Delgado conflict. One study, which analyzed insurgent activities in Cabo Delgado from 2017 to 2024, emphasized the Mozambican state's institutional weaknesses in remote areas, resulting in limited access to essential services and employment opportunities. This absence hampers intelligence-gathering efforts, according to the study. Another study highlighted budgetary asymmetries that may undermine the reputation of Mozambican armed forces. Despite successes, such as reclaiming areas like Mocímboa da Praia and reducing insecurity, the study suggests that the disparity between Mozambique’s limited defense budget and Rwanda’s externally funded support poses a challenge to the legitimacy of Mozambican forces. ### Who cares about dead fishermen? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-cares-about-dead-fishermen/ Last updated: 2025-09-16T15:07:00.000Z Good afternoon. It has been over a week since at least 18 civilians were killed on the island of Rolas in Cabo Delgado province’s Ibo district, in what is alleged to have been an unprovoked attack by Mozambican naval forces. This is the third attack on civilians blamed on naval forces in as many months, and also the bloodiest. And yet, shamefully, there has once again been absolute silence from the central government on the matter. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f7ead29d-b62b-41e1-ac27-fd36f818e41a/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Yet again the government has demonstrated that the security forces are not fully accountable to them. The men in uniform (the senior commanders generally are men) will not take orders from, or explain themselves to, mere civilians, and the politicians would rather not try to stand up to them when there is a war on the insurgency to be fought. Only the governor of Cabo Delgado, Valige Tauabo, has acknowledged the reports and promised to look into them (something he did not do with the attacks in August and July, however). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### The meaning of Mocímboa da Praia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-meaning-of-mocimboa-da-praia/ Last updated: 2025-09-15T20:08:34.000Z Good evening. Mocímboa da Praia is not just another front in Cabo Delgado: it is the theatre in which narratives of control, protection and legitimacy are fought. Last week’s insurgent attacksand the level of attention they drew from both civilian and military authorities exposed the fact that the battle for hearts and minds in the town, and in Cabo Delgado more widely, is not going well. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/50757970-9880-4fb6-be86-e273a8e8dffe/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Locals have returned to the town since 2021 because they were given security guarantees, which have now been exposed as fragile if not worthless. Residents feel betrayed; they do not understand how Rwandan contingents, long seen as the guarantors of stability, did not prevent or swiftly repel the incursion as they once did. Rwandan forces themselves are frustrated that locals did not tip them off, fueling suspicions and reciprocal blame between locals and the Rwandan security forces. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Pigeon peas and the war on judicial extortion URL: https://www.zitamar.com/pigeon-peas-and-the-war-on-judicial-extortion/ Last updated: 2025-09-12T15:27:02.000Z Good afternoon. Last month might possibly have brought an end to the long series of courtroom battles related to the [pigeon pea](https://www.zitamar.com/tag/pigeon-peas) export scandal. Regular readers will know that the multinational agricultural commodity trader ETG has been locked in a three-year fight with the Mozambican conglomerate Royal Group to try to export pigeon peas and other crops from the port of Nacala. In short, Royal Group and people in the ruling Frelimo party have conspired to operate a cartel to monopolise pigeon pea exports, with help from corrupt police, judges and customs officials. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1908e65a-a1ce-4fe6-a99e-b572112692fd/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Newspaper *Savana* now reports that a provincial court in Nampula province has finally struck down the decision by a corrupt judge in Nacala to authorise the [seizure](https://www.zitamar.com/pigeon-peas-mozambique/) of $70m-worth of ETG’s goods back in December 2023, and the detention of ETG employees who were unable to pay exorbitant bail amounts. That decision has been a long time coming. It has come after the original judge in that case, Noé Zimpinga, was found to have taken bribes and dismissed from his post. It also comes after the launch of legal action brought by ETG against the Mozambican government in an international arbitration court. ETG is suing the government for $120m for not having protected its rights under an investment treaty between Mozambique and Mauritius, where the company is registered. That legal action is ongoing, although a settlement ought now to be possible. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Between a strong metical and a hard place URL: https://www.zitamar.com/between-a-strong-metical-and-a-hard-place/ Last updated: 2025-09-11T15:18:24.000Z Good afternoon. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently added its voice to the chorus of complaints about the shortage of foreign currency in Mozambique. Following the visit of an IMF team to the country at the end of last month, the team issued a statement calling for “greater exchange rate flexibility… to relieve FX \[foreign currency\] pressures and facilitate the reduction of external imbalances”. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5a634c90-06d7-458f-beed-6fd37329f249/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The reference to “imbalances” probably refers to the gap between the official and unofficial or “parallel” exchange rates, which the IMF says has increased. The NGO the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) reported last month that the US dollar was worth about 74.25 meticals, compared to the official exchange rate of 63.91 meticals. The South African rand was worth just over four meticals on the unofficial market, compared to 3.54 at banks. CIP found that foreign currency was easy to obtain in large amounts on the black market, suggesting that the main problem is not shortage of funds, but the official exchange rate which keeps the value of the metical artificially high. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Will insurgents try to turn off the gas? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-insurgents-try-to-turn-off-the-gas/ Last updated: 2025-09-11T07:06:56.000Z Good afternoon. Why, after a period of relative calm, are insurgents being seen in many different parts of Cabo Delgado province all of a sudden? Last month saw a series of insurgent attacks in Palma district, as we report today, and on Sunday they carried out a raid in the town of Mocímboa da Praia. Palma is home to the big gas project led by French energy firm TotalEnergies, and Mocímboa da Praia district is next door. For that reason, both are heavily guarded by Rwandan and Mozambican security forces. But this protection did not stop the insurgents from getting through, again and again. In Mocímboa, according to the district administrator Sergio Cipriano, the insurgents had enough time to methodically go from house to house searching for specific targets by name. Four townspeople were dead before they left. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/cdc630be-c936-4bc4-a2d1-0f2507df9169/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican navy accused of “massacre” of civilians on Cabo Delgado islandThe attack, which has been denied by a spokesman, is the second time in less than a month that the navy has been accused of killing civilians![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-252.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Screenshot-2025-09-10-at-17.56.45.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-massacre-of-civilians-on-cabo-delgado-island/) [Insurgents escalate attacks in the Palma district in AugustAfter eight months of relative calm, insurgents launched several attacks in the district that is home to TotalEnergies’ gas project last month![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-255.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-09-10-17.20.18-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-escalate-attacks-in-the-palma-district-in-august/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Beyond those northern districts, sources have reported seeing insurgents in increased numbers in parts of the districts of Quissanga and Montepuez in recent days. Those numbers still need to be confirmed, but what is clear is that the insurgents are not afraid of being seen. This can only strengthen the suspicion that their activities are timed to coincide with the anticipated resumption of the gas project, which was suspended over four years ago due to the insurgent threat. Both the government and much of Mozambique’s business sector have been calling for and keenly awaiting that to happen. The insurgents know this, and they might well want to sabotage it. A show of force in districts further away from the project could potentially be intended to draw security forces away from protecting it, or to just increase the general sense of insecurity. More information is needed before making any firm conclusions about what the insurgents are up to. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican navy accused of “massacre” of civilians on Cabo Delgado island URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-massacre-of-civilians-on-cabo-delgado-island/ Last updated: 2025-09-10T16:15:19.000Z At least 16 people were killed when boats believed to belong to the Mozambican navy opened fire on civilians on Rolas island, in Cabo Delgado province’s Ibo district, late on Monday 8 September. Most of the victims were local fishermen from Matemo island, who had traveled to the area to fish. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents escalate attacks in the Palma district in August URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-escalate-attacks-in-the-palma-district-in-august/ Last updated: 2025-09-11T06:47:15.000Z Sunday night’s attack on neighbourhoods in the port town of Mocímboa da Praia is the latest of a series of incidents likely to concern to French energy giant TotalEnergies, which hopes to be able to soon end the suspension that halted progress on its massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) project there in 2021. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Alcohol policy needs sober reflection URL: https://www.zitamar.com/alcohol-policy-needs-sober-reflection/ Last updated: 2025-09-09T15:31:47.000Z Good afternoon. It is doubtful how much of a difference the government’s new restrictions on alcohol sales (see below) will make to the widespread problem of alcohol abuse. For a start, while larger shops and supermarkets face restrictions on when they can sell drinks, smaller shops and street stalls are exempted. The latter are more expensive, and a lot of problem drinking is done by the poor and unemployed. If they have to pay more, that is likely to curb their intake. On the other hand, there are no restrictions on selling drinks during the daytime, except on Sundays. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/134347f5-5938-4fb0-8abf-7cb1a9703cbc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Secondly, the restrictions on making the so-called “xivotxongo”, a cheap, strong drink, may not be effective. By banning the use of pure ethanol (that is, alcohol) in the production of alcoholic drinks, the government probably hopes to stamp out xivotxongo production altogether. But even if its production disappears in Mozambique, a healthy illegal trade in smuggled drinks will continue across the South African border. Drinks manufacturers in Mozambique are used to dealing with production restrictions, anyway: they change the branding and colouring of their drinks and then carry on as before. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### At least four killed in overnight attack on Mocímboa da Praia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/at-least-four-killed-in-overnight-attack-on-mocimboa-da-praia/ Last updated: 2025-09-10T14:53:49.000Z Suspected Islamic State-linked insurgents attacked the key town of Mocímboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province last night, according to multiple local sources who say at least four people were killed. The attack, which began around 11pm and continued into the early hours, caused widespread fear and chaos among residents, many of whom fled the town. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### The yellow peril URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-yellow-peril/ Last updated: 2025-09-05T15:42:29.000Z Good afternoon. A recent outburst of news stories about unlicensed gold mining in northern Mozambique (see below) does not mean that the region is experiencing a gold rush. People have long prospected for gold in the provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, but there is a scarcity of information about it. Both provinces are poor and not well served by local journalism, and information is hard to come by. Only occasionally does some incident bring the mining activities to light. Thus in the administrative post of Lupilichi in Niassa, near the Tanzanian border, recently some Chinese people were arrested on charges of not only illegal mining but also unauthorised possession of firearms, and now some foreign miners are said to have been expelled. Meanwhile, in Cabo Delgado, police in the Nairoto administrative post in Montepuez district are accused of taking bribes from unlicensed miners. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f834a257-02d5-497f-9107-b2a330491356/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Cabo Delgado is dotted with gold deposits in at least six of its 16 districts. As well as Montepuez, there is unlicensed gold mining near the village of Ravia in Meluco district, as well as in the districts of Metuge, Namuno, Ancuabe and Chiúre. Last month, police fired shots to disperse people who were trying to mine for gold in the town of Montepuez, threatening to undermine nearby buildings. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Businesses pray for a blue flame URL: https://www.zitamar.com/businesses-pray-for-a-blue-flame/ Last updated: 2025-09-04T17:02:00.000Z Good afternoon. News that South African supermarket chain Shoprite is considering closing its stores in Mozambique will add to the generally lukewarm sentiment among businesses. In some ways, it is not very surprising. Two Shoprite stores, one in the town of Macia in Gaza province and one in the Magoanine neighbourhood of the city of Maputo, were damaged during the nationwide protests last year, and have not been reopened. The political climate remains tense and the risk of violent disorder hangs in the air. And Shoprite has been facing increased competition in recent years from the Dutch retail franchise Spar and from increasing numbers of small neighbourhood convenience stores run by immigrants from other African countries. With the economy in a fragile state and more people living precariously, it is likely that more people are shopping more frequently and on a smaller scale, instead of doing big grocery shops. This favours neighbourhood shopping over making long trips to a large supermarket. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/89571d46-4916-4195-8400-1d979ccfaa8c/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor (18 - 31 August 2025)Soldiers on a FADM naval vessel opened fire on two civilian vessels near Pequeue in Macomia, killing at least five people![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-251.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Overview---MZM---19---31-Aug-2025---EN.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-august-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) However, none of this was raised as a concern by the company’s chief executive Pieter Engelbrecht in his interview with the Reuters news agency on Tuesday. Instead, he talked about how the big liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by TotalEnergies in Cabo Delgado province had still not restarted, and about insurgents returning to the district of Palma, where the project, known as Mozambique LNG, is located. His point about insurgents is presumably that they might pose a threat to the project restarting. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor (18 - 31 August 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-18-31-august-2025/ Last updated: 2025-09-04T08:54:39.000Z ## By the Numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (18 - 31 August 2025) - At least 8 political violence events (2,173 in total since 1 October 2017) - At least 20 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,188 since 1 October 2017) - At least 12 reported civilian fatalities (2,568 since 1 October 2017) - At least 7 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,999 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy patrols remain active off Macomia, killing at least five civilians around 22 August. Despite these patrols, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) remains present in coastal areas of the district. In Palma district, ISM killed at least three civilians south of Palma town, where it has been active for at least three weeks. Stretching security cover, ISM fighters are also making their way westward along the Messalo river to Montepuez. Amid this activity, Rwanda and Mozambique signed a military agreement cementing Rwanda’s operation in northern Mozambique that is now over four years old. ## Situation summary ***FADM kills at least five civilians off Macomia*** Soldiers on a FADM naval vessel opened fire on two civilian vessels near Pequeue in Macomia, killing at least five people around 22 August, according to multiple local sources. One vessel, named Real Madrid, was traveling north from Mefunvo island in Quissanga district to Pangane in Macomia district. FADM navy patrols are active in the area, operating out of Ibo island. This is at least the third such confirmed incident since the first week of July. A source in the area reports that another fishing boat from Pangane, named Mbaraca, was also shot at with an unknown number of fatalities. However, according to a spokesperson, FADM “[categorically ](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-again-accused-of-killing-civilians-off-cabo-delgado-coast/)denies” any involvement in these incidents. The attack comes amid ongoing ISM activity on the Macomia coast. On 19 August, ISM fighters were seen at Pangane, before moving onwards toward Quiterajo in a boat they hired at Mussemuco in the south of the district. On 24 August, ISM and FADM clashed at Quihanhune island, off the coast of Quiterajo. One source reported a clash, while another reported the seizure of explosives allegedly brought in from Tanzania. Multiple sources have reported arrests and civilian targeting by the FADM navy between 21 and 27 August, although the individual events could not be confirmed. Given continued ISM activity, FADM may have determined that anybody at sea is ISM. Such an assumption would be misplaced. Coastal communities need to fish and bring in supplies by boat. Two sources indicated that the boat targeted on 22 August was carrying salt. ISM activity onshore also belies the assumption that the coastal community wholly supports ISM. On 22 August, ISM abducted a woman at Pangane who brews and sells alcohol, taking her away by boat. Four days later, ISM abducted a local official in Nagulue village, close to Mucojo, reportedly for collaborating with the security forces. ***ISM remains active in Palma district*** In Palma district, ISM remained active south of Palma town. On 23 August, about a dozen ISM fighters in FADM uniforms stopped a minibus that was travelling between Zambia and Olumbe villages, stealing from passengers. The Islamic State's weekly newsletter, al-Naba, published a picture of 11 passengers, with an ISM fighter addressing them. According to al-Naba, he spoke of “the purpose and goals of jihad… and the media’s lies about them.” The group then headed south, according to a source. Also on 23 August, ISM killed three civilians near the village of Hovlili, less than 10 kilometers south. The two actions are indicative of ISM’s current strategy of moving and operating in small cells, which conventional forces find difficult to counter. ***Kidnap for ransom continues as ISM looks to raise money*** South of Mocímboa da Praia town, a group of ISM fighters passed through Chimbanga village around 27 August, where they abducted two girls and looted goods. This is the fourth incident involving ISM fighters in the district in August. Further south, in Quissanga district, ISM fighters returning from Ancuabe and Chiúre districts kidnapped at least 16 men at the fishing community on the shore of Bilibiza lake on 19 August. The militants demanded ransoms of between 10,000 and 15,000 meticais (150 to 230 US dollars). ***ISM move toward Montepuez may stretch security forces*** Reliable sources report that insurgents are moving toward Nairoto in Montepuez district. They started moving westward in small groups along the Messalo river before attacking Mapate village in Muidumbe district. There, on 25 August, they killed four civilians and burned almost 30 buildings, according to a claim that IS issued four days later. According to one source, the attack caused people in nearby Mandela and Mandava villages to flee. Two days later, the insurgents were seen near Homba in southern Mueda district. If the group continues its westward journey, it may threaten the R698 road that connects Montepuez town to Mueda. There is also a possibility that the group may continue further westward toward Niassa. In either case, if the security forces respond, their resources will be stretched. ## Focus: Status of forces agreement signed with Rwanda After more than four years in Mozambique, Rwanda finally signed a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the host country on 27 August. Defense ministers Juvenal Marizamunda of Rwanda and Cristóvão Chume of Mozambique [signed the document](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DN3MGkxZEgt/?ref=zitamar.com) during President Daniel Chapo’s two-day visit to Rwanda. A SOFA provides an agreed legal framework for military operations between states. It governs all aspects of deployment, such as the importation, control and removal of arms and equipment, civil and criminal liability of foreign forces, management of bases, and operational relations with the host country. There is no evidence that a SOFA was in place prior to 27 August. The timing of the SOFA was likely influenced by TotalEnergies’ efforts to restart the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Palma, suspended since 2021\. The agreement may help reassure investors and regulatory bodies that the project is secure and has guardrails in place to ensure that the security response is respectful of human rights. Through official and proxy channels, Rwanda has focused on the level of security it can bring to Cabo Delgado. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) [released a video](https://youtu.be/l1V%5FeAFgZX0?si=iSiT%5FkvfZz2y6Ma-&ref=zitamar.com) on 29 August showcasing Rwandan forces’ actions at sea, on land, and in the air. One social media account regarded as a proxy for the Rwandan government floated the idea of Rwanda establishing a “[permanent base](https://x.com/FactsOnRwanda/status/1960693634698809738?ref=zitamar.com)” in Mozambique. The RDF’s video may not reflect its actions. ACLED records RDF involvement in just 10 violent incidents thus far in 2025\. ACLED research has [demonstrated](https://acleddata.com/report/rwanda-mozambique-limits-civilian-protection?ref=zitamar.com) that Rwandan forces now adopt a conservative posture, even in areas where they have established combat outposts such as Macomia district. An unwillingness to aggressively engage with ISM can place civilians at greater risk of attack. Though Rwanda has troops positioned at Mucojo on the coast, at Chai on the N380, and near Ancuabe town in the south, this posture is unlikely to change under the SOFA. This is seen most clearly in coastal Macomia, where FADM, rather than Rwandan forces, has taken the lead in combat on land and at sea. ## Roundup *CPJ and MISA Mozambique call for investigation into disappearance of two journalists* In preparation for the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances on 30 August, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and MISA Mozambique [urged](https://cpj.org/2025/08/missingnotforgotten-cpj-misa-mozambique-call-for-investigation-into-2-journalist-disappearances/?ref=zitamar.com) the Mozambican authorities to clarify the fate of two missing journalists, Ibraimo Abú Mbaruco and Arlindo Chissale. The two reporters disappeared in similar circumstances in Cabo Delgado. Mbaruco, a reporter for Palma Community Radio, disappeared on 7 April 2020 after texting a colleague to say that he was “surrounded by soldiers.” Chissale, editor of Pinnacle News, was abducted on 7 January 2025 by men, some of whom were wearing military uniforms, from a minibus in Silva Macua. Chissale had previously been arrested in 2022 and warned that he was on a “target list” after criticizing the ruling Frelimo party’s alleged electoral fraud in 2024\. His family understands that he is no longer alive. The CPJ and MISA Mozambique have condemned the government’s inaction, highlighting the unsafe environment for journalists and raising concerns about military involvement in these unresolved disappearances. *Cabo Delgado authorities halt community radio revival* On July 22 2025, the provincial government in Cabo Delgado [revoked](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/r%C3%A1dio-em-cabo-delgado-forcom-acusa-governo-de-ilegalidade/a-73627762?ref=zitamar.com) the authorization granted to the National Forum of Community Radios (FORCOM) on 17 February to install equipment for Mocímboa da Praia Community Radio. This was despite the national government information office, known as GABINFO, issuing an operating license in November 2024\. According to the provincial authorities, this decision was made because FORCOM lacks formal ties to any centrally managed reconstruction plan. FORCOM installed the equipment at the radio's original site in May 2025\. FORCOM contests the revocation, asserting that it had complied with all legal requirements and had not been informed of any changes regarding the building's use. FORCOM views the decision as a violation of press freedom and suspects that it is an attempt to transfer the radio’s frequency and ownership to the state-run Institute of Social Communication (ICS). That the case was not reported until mid-August illustrates the need for a stronger media presence in Cabo Delgado. ### Insurgents rob with impunity URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-rob-with-impunity/ Last updated: 2025-09-03T15:56:08.000Z Good afternoon. News that the Attorney-General’s Office is investigating the kidnapping and extortion practised by insurgents in Cabo Delgado province (see below) raises an obvious question. Why was this not done before? It is hard to believe that prosecutors were looking into the crimes long before this announcement was made. After all, no results have been communicated. And it should not be hard to trace where the money went, at least initially. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2a46c11f-cae1-4bb5-9d38-ffe0c16b05a8/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) For at least five months now, insurgents have been stopping traffic on roads in Cabo Delgado, taking people prisoner and demanding ransom payments to let them go. They have been using the digital money services M-Pesa and Emola to receive payments. Such transactions can be easily traced. But there is no sign that they have been. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Shut out of Fortress Afungi URL: https://www.zitamar.com/shut-out-of-fortress-afungi/ Last updated: 2025-09-02T14:06:34.000Z Good afternoon. Business owners in Cabo Delgado province’s Palma district who are upset with French energy firm TotalEnergies will find little comfort in a statement from the firm’s head in Mozambique (see below). For months now, there have been complaints that TotalEnergies was cutting off the site of its $20bn-plus gas project on the Afungi peninsula from the rest of the district, forcing workers on the project to stay within the fenced construction site and restricting access to the site by land. This mostly or completely wipes out any chance local businesses had to informally sell goods and services to the project’s contractors or to people working for it. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1991c5ce-e616-41e4-a68e-001b589d333d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Initially it seemed that TotalEnergies was only forcing workers to remain on the project site and banning the long-distance transport of supplies for the project by land — with good reason, since the roads connecting Afungi with districts to the south, like the R775 to the town of Mocímboa da Praia and the N380 linking Mocímboa to the rest of Cabo Delgado, are vulnerable to insurgent attacks, and insurgents have repeatedly stopped traffic on the latter recently. But in recent weeks it has started to look like TotalEnergies will not allow mixing of local traders and workers who are based at the project site either. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Another spark could set Mozambique alight URL: https://www.zitamar.com/another-spark-could-set-mozambique-alight/ Last updated: 2025-09-01T15:35:23.000Z Good afternoon. The brutal killing of a police officer on the N1 highway in the neighbourhood of Bobole in Maputo province this morning (see below) should concern everyone interested in Mozambique’s political and economic stability. According to unconfirmed reports on social media, the police officer was believed to have shot at a minibus that failed to stop at a police roadblock, and to have caused the death of a child. If true, that would be the second time in just over a month that police have been known to shoot at a vehicle for failing to stop when required; in July they shot at one that avoided going through a toll gate in Inhambane province. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/f932a9fa-9425-482f-88db-1f5baccf81c6/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The public response was no less violent than the alleged police provocation. The police officer thought to be responsible was caught, beaten and then (dead or alive) set on fire. Protesters also blocked the N1, Mozambique’s only north-south arterial road, which remained blocked several hours later. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Rwanda isn’t going anywhere URL: https://www.zitamar.com/rwanda-isnt-going-anywhere/ Last updated: 2025-08-29T15:23:14.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo’s visit to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, this week was important for at least two reasons. For one thing, it brought Rwandan president Paul Kagame out in public, dispelling rumours that he was ill. But for another, the agreement signed by the two governments on the Rwandan military presence in Cabo Delgado province (as Chapo and Kagame met for the first time since Chapo took power in January) effectively answered suspicions and hopes that Chapo was not keen on it. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/725b8fea-2c0b-4946-a794-4a0e945a0b4c/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgent attack in Muidumbe kills at least twoThe killings come as some insurgents have been seen once again moving south and threatening the districts of Meluco and Montepuez![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-250.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-29-17.00.45.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-attack-in-muidumbe-kills-at-least-two/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Ever since Chapo’s predecessor as president, Filipe Nyusi, and Kagame agreed a deal for Rwanda to provide troops to fight the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, there has been a body of opinion in the ruling Frelimo party and wider society that was hostile to the move. Many senior figures in Frelimo have used their political connections to win contracts to supply the Mozambican armed forces. The Rwandan troops, who have their own supply arrangements, were a threat to their business opportunities. More generally, the fact that Mozambique was forced to call for outside military help hurt the pride of some, and undermined claims about the effectiveness of the country’s armed forces. There were also those who believed, without good evidence, that Rwanda had turned Cabo Delgado into a sort of colony and was making money out of business opportunities in the province as part of a secret deal with Nyusi. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgent attack in Muidumbe kills at least two URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-attack-in-muidumbe-kills-at-least-two/ Last updated: 2025-08-29T15:10:11.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents killed at least two people and beheaded them in the village of Mapate, in Cabo Delgado province’s northern Muidumbe district, on Monday 25 August. The attack took place at around 10am, and the victims were ambushed while working in their fields a short distance from the village. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Borders shouldn’t cut lives in half URL: https://www.zitamar.com/borders-shouldnt-cut-lives-in-half/ Last updated: 2025-08-29T14:26:43.000Z Good afternoon. Where do you draw the border between Mozambique and Malawi? That is a question of more than philosophical interest for the farmers and traders who regularly cross the border for life and work. Long before colonial officials drew a series of straight lines to mark the border between the two countries in the nineteenth century, the peoples around what is now called in English Lake Malawi shared common ethnic identities and languages. Those identities and languages were sliced down the middle when the frontier was drawn, but they continue to cross the border. Both the old colonial name for Malawi, Nyasaland, and the current name of Mozambique’s neighbouring Niassa province come from the word “Nyasa”, which means “lake people” in one of the Bantu languages spoken in the area. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/592208a9-91c1-4936-8469-bb86d8a5ad00/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Even today, there are many Malawians and Mozambicans who have extensive family ties on both sides of the border. There are also strong economic incentives for crossing it. Malawi’s population density is several times higher than Mozambique’s, and there is a shortage of farmland. Niassa, by contrast, is sparsely populated. The result is that many Malawians farm land in Niassa, and some, it seems, have chosen to live there. Trade also takes people across the border: for example, petrol is much cheaper in Malawi than in Mozambique, despite fuel prices being regulated in the latter. Mozambicans, whose rural hospitals are generally [in disrepair](https://www.zitamar.com/hospitals-struggle-to-turn-on-the-funding-taps/), also cross the border to use hospitals in Malawi. Malawian money is used in Niassa. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Hot air won’t make aluminium URL: https://www.zitamar.com/hot-air-wont-make-aluminium/ Last updated: 2025-08-27T15:38:53.000Z Good afternoon. The threatened shutdown of the Mozal aluminium smelter is threatening 37,000 direct and indirect jobs, according to the CTA business association (see below). In a statement this week, the CTA said that Mozal contributed 3% of Mozambique’s GDP and 30% of its exports. But its future is menaced by a [dispute](https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-governments-negotiations-over-mozal-and-kenmare/) between the business’ majority owner and operator, South32, and the government over how much it should pay for power. In these circumstances, the CTA should be standing up for Mozambican businesses. But it is failing to do so. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ec7fcc70-6307-48f6-8649-6edfd4b00dec/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican navy again accused of killing civilians off Cabo Delgado coastThis is the second accusation of killing carried out by the Mozambican navy in the space of two months![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-249.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2024-08-12-17.56.40-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-again-accused-of-killing-civilians-off-cabo-delgado-coast/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Yesterday the CTA called a press conference where its president Álvaro Massingue raised the alarm about 20 contracts with suppliers which he said Mozal had terminated. That is indeed something the association should be responding to. Unfortunately, the CTA’s prescriptions fall short. Massingue called for the cancelled contracts to be reinstated, for more local suppliers to be hired by Mozal (according to newssheet *Mediafax*, he accused Mozal of favouring South African over Mozambican businesses) and for 40% of Mozal’s aluminium production to be reserved for the domestic market. These are fanciful demands which have no basis in reality. For a start, it is a traditional complaint of Mozambican business owners that they are overlooked in favour of foreign (especially South African) businesses. This is an essentially nationalist or protectionist argument to the effect that Mozambican firms should be given priority for winning contracts. The same kind of argument surfaced when it emerged that a [security firm](https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-security-firm-protecting-totalenergies-gas-project/) with majority Rwandan ownership was helping to protect the TotalEnergies-led gas project in Cabo Delgado province. It was outrageous to some that a Rwandan firm had one this contract, and was evidence of a Rwandan takeover. But there was no evidence to support such an analysis. The company in question, whose security guards are hired in Mozambique, was selected from several bidders through a tender process. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican navy again accused of killing civilians off Cabo Delgado coast URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-again-accused-of-killing-civilians-off-cabo-delgado-coast/ Last updated: 2025-08-27T08:20:07.000Z The Mozambican navy has been accused of killing five civilians aboard a boat that was travelling to the coastal village of Pangane from one of the islands of the Quirimbas archipelago, where the navy is on patrol. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### SMEs fight for their lives URL: https://www.zitamar.com/smes-fight-for-their-lives/ Last updated: 2025-08-26T15:29:59.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday’s launch of a fund to provide loan guarantees for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs; see below) is a welcome development, although whether it actually benefits the sector is another matter. Such businesses struggle to get financing on affordable terms from banks, and are sometimes forced into dealing with more informal, ruthless loan sharks. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9b9ae9c0-853d-47b7-ab03-9cd9315085ac/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But access to finance is only one of the problems that SMEs face, and to some extent, the fact that they are often trying to borrow money reflects their wider problems. SMEs in Mozambique are fighting for life even before they are born. Starting a business is a slow and bureaucratic process, and, typically for Mozambique, requires paying bribes to public servants to get them to process paperwork. Once a business is set up, there is the challenge of running it. There is a shortage of qualified managers and accountants in Mozambique, and SMEs lack the funds to pay adequate wages to attract people with the qualifications to operate a business. There is also a lack of assistance from the government, which does not really provide much advice or support to help businesses grow and navigate their challenges. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### It's a crime that it's so hard to export URL: https://www.zitamar.com/its-a-crime-that-its-so-hard-to-export/ Last updated: 2025-08-25T15:15:04.000Z Good afternoon. Is Mozambique really losing about half of its annual GDP due to smuggling, as secretary of state for trade António Grispos claims (see below)? Unlikely. But there is a huge problem in legalising imports and exports. And much of that problem can be laid at the door of Grispos’ colleagues in the ruling Frelimo party. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/5708383d-fe94-4f67-b8e1-e25ef9a7fae7/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Stalled Mozambique-Malawi power line construction now due for completion in OctoberThe long-delayed project has faced numerous problems, such as landmine clearance, higher than expected winds and recently vandalism and looting![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-248.jpg)Zitamar NewsFungai Caetano![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-25-16.54.12.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/stalled-mozambique-malawi-power-line-construction-now-due-for-completion-in-october/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is Frelimo that benefits greatly from the bribes paid to customs and other officials which enable smuggling to take place. Much of this bribery, as is well known, happens at the port of Nacala, which amongst other abuses has seen corrupt officials manipulate the pigeon pea export trade for the benefit of exporter Royal Group in alliance with Frelimo bigwigs. As a result, legitimate exports have been prevented from leaving the country. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Stalled Mozambique-Malawi power line construction now due for completion in October URL: https://www.zitamar.com/stalled-mozambique-malawi-power-line-construction-now-due-for-completion-in-october/ Last updated: 2025-08-25T14:59:51.000Z Work to build an electricity transmission line linking Mozambique and Malawi has stalled and is not now expected to be completed until October, the project’s manager has told *Zitamar News.* _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Trade potential waits at the border URL: https://www.zitamar.com/trade-potential-waits-at-the-border/ Last updated: 2025-08-26T14:27:12.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo has been banging the drum for more investment in Mozambique, specifically in the so-called Nacala corridor, the railway and coal terminal that allows coal from Tete province to be shipped to the port of Nacala in Nampula province (see below). He was addressing his comments to Mitsui, the Japanese conglomerate which is a shareholder in the TotalEnergies-led liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo Delgado province. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e93af78a-e276-4e72-a746-39231ed2b128/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor 20 August (4 - 17 August 2025)ISM launched attacks across Palma district, including around the Afungi LNG plant, in early August![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-247.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Map---MCM---Overview---4-17-Aug-25---EN.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-20-august-4-17-august-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The president invited ridicule when he talked about how “Mitsui is already investing in the Nacala Logistics Corridor”. Mitsui sold its share in Nacala Logistics, the company that manages the railway and terminal, in 2021, and the venture is now wholly owned by Vulcan Resources, operator of the Moatize coal mine in Tete. But he had a meeting with Mitsui, more likely to discuss the LNG project, and Mozambican leaders feel obliged to go through the ritual of calling for more investment from supposedly eager foreign investors. In fact, Mitsui has decided to step away from investing more in Mozambique for strategic reasons of its own; it is essentially the importance of the LNG project in providing gas for power generation in Japan that keeps it involved there. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Hospitals struggle to turn on the funding taps URL: https://www.zitamar.com/hospitals-struggle-to-turn-on-the-funding-taps/ Last updated: 2025-08-21T15:21:56.000Z Good afternoon. A bucket of water greets you when you visit many a hospital toilet up and down the country. It is not that hospitals and health clinics do not have wash basins and flushing toilets; it is that quite often, they do not work, because the running water and sewage system has not been maintained properly. Some hospitals date back over 50 years to the Portuguese colonial period, and are in need of replacement or renovation. Others are newer, having been built with donor funds, but once they were completed, the donors went home and the government did not find the money to look after them. In some hospitals, nurses have to make long journeys to a borehole to refill their buckets, taking them away from their patients. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e8e587fb-f2b1-4adb-9a48-04d579cf2781/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) None of this will be news to anyone familiar with Mozambican hospitals and how they operate, but the problem has been highlighted by the NGO WaterAid in a new survey, which finds that only 56% of healthcare facilities in Maputo, Gaza and Niassa provinces have “basic access” to water supply, according to reports (see below). If access to toilets and other hygiene facilities is included, the number of facilities with basic provision falls to just 16%. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Ring-fencing LAM URL: https://www.zitamar.com/ring-fencing-lam/ Last updated: 2025-08-21T14:06:07.000Z Good afternoon and apologies for the delay in sending yesterday’s Daily. João de Abreu, until this week head of the aviation regulator IACM, has been forced into retirement after he refused to deny a licence to South African-owned airline Fastjet to run commercial flights in the country, in competition with state-owned national airline LAM. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/cb67b34d-e938-4726-9c2e-06b06a81d4ce/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It’s a sad end to a long and distinguished career in Mozambican aviation. But although he's a victim of a political decision, he is also a victim of Mozambique's internal contradictions over whether or not it has a free market economy. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor 20 August (4 - 17 August 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-20-august-4-17-august-2025/ Last updated: 2025-08-21T13:04:03.000Z ## By the numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (4 - 17 August 2025) - At least 17 political violence events (2,162 in total since 1 October 2017) - At least 9 total reported fatalities from political violence (6,165 since 1 October 2017) - At least 6 reported civilian fatalities (2,554 since 1 October 2017) - At least 16 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,988 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Following their recent incursion into the south of Cabo Delgado, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters were active across eight districts in the past fortnight. This wide reach was enabled by ISM operating small, mobile groups that stretched security forces. This allowed fighters in Palma district to mount three attacks, including in villages on the southern side of the liquefied natural gas plant in Afungi. As the insurgents return to Palma, the Islamic State (IS) has maintained frequent coverage of ISM in its media outlets, including the first feature video focusing on Mozambique that was released on 11 August. ## Situation Summary ***ISM attacks in Palma*** ISM was active for at least one week in areas south and east of the Afungi LNG plant (*see map below*). On 5 August, two sources reported shelling by Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) and Tanzanian forces in the Nangade district that prompted ISM fighters to disperse to Palma. The following day, ISM attacked Maputo village — just 38 kilometers south of the LNG project in Palma district on the road to Mocímboa da Praia — burning some business premises and one house. In a claim posted on social media, IS said that it targeted the house of a Local Force commander. ![](https://lh7-rt.googleusercontent.com/docsz/AD_4nXcTGQ7xjTJSN59TGqKoliXCjYSOws8Hbsl8ZwWUVCHfOKMoxJd9CEN46SQoAIIXLfkhaK5yVGoOlHyyWz9LhzMxXL0L_N2jwmpg6THdAO4326wCCoFxYBN_RX5EoODFU9F6Pby7KA?key=Ci5PA0usgystozMeIdWmgw) Following the attack on Maputo, ISM seems to have remained in the area. Following unconfirmed sightings around Maputo over some days, Defense and Security Forces, thought to be Marine Police, landed in Maganja on 11 August, south of the LNG plant, and moved inland. The operation did not deter ISM. On 14 August, the group attacked Zambia village, north of Maputo. No details of the attack have emerged yet. ISM is also active in the west of Palma town. ISM fighters were first sighted in the area on 10 August, and are likely still there. On 16 August, two off-duty FADM soldiers and their motorcycle taxi driver were killed on the Palma-Pundanhar road. IS released photos of the deceased and one of the victim’s identity card. According to a local source, they were abducted by a small group of ISM fighters along with at least two other civilians, and killed them when the militants discovered they were soldiers. The remaining civilians were held for ransom. ISM’s heightened activity in Palma takes advantage of the strain the group has put on FADM by moving south, and of a seeming reluctance of Rwandan forces to respond, despite having a large camp next to the LNG plant, and another in Pundanhar. ***ISM fighters move north following their southern incursion*** ISM moved back to Macomia district over the past fortnight after their operations in Chiúre and Ancuabe districts. Their fighters moved back the way they had come, via Meluco and Quissanga districts. At least 10 fighters arrived by sea near Pangane, having sailed from Mussemeco in Quissanga district on 18 August. Nevertheless, at least one small group has remained in the south, according to local sources. State forces attempted to confront returning fighters on three occasions during their move north. On 7 August, FADM troops were [sent to Nangumi village](https://www.zitamar.com/three-killed-in-latest-insurgent-attack-along-n380/), which is five kilometers north of Silva Macua, to respond to an ISM attack on the town. When they arrived, FADM clashed with ISM. Two civilians were killed in crossfire, while one Local Force member was taken by ISM and later killed. Some ISM fighters made their way slowly north through Mecufi and Metuge districts. In Mecufi, on 10 August, ISM killed a civilian near Nancaramo village on the N1, according to a claim made by IS, which mistakenly placed the village in Ancuabe district. The following day, ISM, likely the same group of militants, attacked Nacuta village in Metuge, just 15 km north of Nancaramo. According to a source, some premises were set on fire, with those of prominent individuals being targeted. Some villagers, including children, were abducted to carry looted goods and for ransom. Four days later, the group killed one civilian near Nampipi village, also in Metuge, suggesting they were not under significant pressure to move north. ***N380 roadblocks continue*** By the time of the Mecufi and Metuge attacks, other ISM fighters were already in Meluco district. On 6 and 7 August, ISM established roadblocks on the N380, between 19 de Outobro and Nangoro villages, approximately 30 km south of Macomia town. Over the two days, numerous vehicles were stopped. Christian drivers and passengers were taken and forced to pay ransoms ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 meticais (about 150 to 460 US dollars). On the second day, FADM arrived and clashed with the group, according to a source in touch with an affected driver. There were further, but as yet unconfirmed, sightings of ISM fighters in subsequent days in villages in the area. According to one source, the group involved in the roadblocks later moved through Cagembe in Quissanga district, seemingly returning to Macomia district. North of Macomia town, near Chai, ISM mounted another roadblock on 14 August, despite the [reintroduction of military escorts](https://aimnews.org/2025/07/24/military-escorts-re-introduced-in-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com) north of Macomia in July. The Chai detachment of the Local Force ambushed the ISM group as they left the roadblock. According to a local source, one Local Force member was injured in the clash, and ISM suffered undetermined casualties. Further north again, and close to the N380, ISM fighters, likely those active around Chai, killed a fisherman at a lagoon near Primeiro de Maio on 15 August. The roadblocks prompted military escorts for traffic on the N380 between Pemba and Macomia, mirroring the other escorts along the same road between Macomia and Awasse. However, even the escorted convoys are seemingly under attack. Footage on social media claims to show an escorted convoy [under attack](https://www.facebook.com/reel/1195325965649049) on 17 August in Macomia district, though the exact location was not given. ***Disorder in Montepuez and Namuno*** Demonstrations in Montepuez town and Namuno district indicated the delicate state of local politics in the south of Cabo Delgado. In Montepuez on 13 August, police fired warning shots over informal miners who were demonstrating against their removal from the site of a new gold find near the town. In Machoca town in Namuno, trouble broke out on 15 August. According to one account, the house of the director of the medical center was attacked. Another account connected the trouble to the detention of a supporter of Venâncio Mondlane and that a subsequent protest occurred at the residence of the area police commander. The incidents raise serious questions about governance in Cabo Delgado. The Montepuez incident indicates that there are no systems in place for managing informal mining practices, such as those that exist in neighboring Tanzania. Though details of the Machoca event are as yet unclear, it demonstrates a significant lack of faith in local government. ## Focus: Mozambique video highlights IS propaganda campaign The ISM video feature released on 11 August called “[Light of Jihad](https://jihadology.net/2025/08/11/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-light-of-jihad-wilayat-muzambiq/?ref=zitamar.com)” was the culmination of a month-long propaganda campaign. ISM’s operations had featured significantly in IS social media channels and its weekly newsletter, al-Naba, since mid-July. The 18-minute film places the insurgency in the context of the oppressive rule of the colonial period, and what they describe as the continued marginalization of Muslims since independence. However, the piece presents no specific contemporary political analysis and makes no political demands. The management of natural resources, such as gemstones or natural gas, for example, is not mentioned. As is standard in IS communications, the conflict is framed as a struggle for the rights of Muslims in Mozambique, and presented within IS’s narrow theological view, while the film’s depiction of the group’s battlefield activity serves to demonstrate their strength. The film shows previously unreleased footage from attacks this year on FADM positions at Primeiro de Maio and Quiterajo, as well as statements seemingly filmed in Quiterajo and threatening further attacks. Though the themes are framed as universal, the presentation is localized through the use of Kiswahili for the most part, and a closing statement in the Emakhwa language. However, the film is just one highlight of IS’s sophisticated social media presence. The group’s ability to distribute material through existing channels that serve Mozambican audiences demonstrates a nuanced understanding of social media that allows it to get past platform controls. For some time, IS supporters have forwarded incident claims and photo reports published by IS on its closed channels to Mozambican discussion groups and social media channels. This is an approach that has long been used by IS. In the past, IS propaganda was regularly seeded in large East African Facebook groups, connecting people to IS Telegram accounts, and directly distributing graphic material. This practice is now mostly restricted to niche platforms such as Telegram, now that Facebook and other platforms have implemented controls. However, even Telegram is more vigilant now about its use by IS and similar groups, as individual accounts and private channels that distribute such content are regularly shut down. Counterintuitively, IS now uses public groups and channels on the platform, as well as private ones. In April this year, IS took over a mainstream Muslim Telegram public channel that had been operating since 2021 and has since been using it to issue incident claims. Messages from this channel, which has over 13,000 followers, are now being forwarded to Mozambican public channels. Another public Telegram channel established in July this year posts material that is not explicitly branded as IS, but presents granular information about IS ambitions in Mozambique, East Africa, and elsewhere. IS, or IS supporters, forward posts in Arabic from this group into Mozambican channels. In these ways, IS successfully maintains a presence on social media and reaches small though influential audiences in Mozambique. ## Roundup *TotalEnergies postpones meeting with the Palma business community* A planned meeting between TotalEnergies in-country managers and representatives of the business community in the town of Palma, located next to the gas projects on the Afungi peninsula, was postponed from 12 August to 21 August. The meeting, to be held at the Palma Residences hotel, will address the question of access to the projects for local businesses in light of a recent decision from the French energy giant to lock down the site and not bring in supplies by road. A local source told MCM the reasons for the cancellation were unknown, though the cancellation came amid military operations close to the plant. *EU military mission has been a “game changer,” mission head says* The head of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Mozambique (EUMAM Moz), Portuguese Brigadier-General Luís Barroso, said in an [interview](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-war-will-take-years-to-end-warns-head-of-european-unions-military-mission) with *Zitamar News* that the EU’s military assistance had been a “game-changer” in Cabo Delgado. However, he also admitted that it would take “years” for the conflict to end. The mission provides ongoing support to 11 marine and commando units of FADM previously trained by EU trainers. Later this month, a mission from the EU’s External Action Service will conduct an on-site assessment of the needs of the Mozambican armed forces and the possibility of further assistance. A further team from the service will then assess whether the mission should have its mandate changed or extended, or whether it should be ended. *Insurgents accused of using child shields in Cabo Delgado* The governor of Cabo Delgado, Valige Tauabo, [claimed](https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20250817-autoridades-de-cabo-delgado-apelam-%C3%A0-vigil%C3%A2ncia-face-a-raptos-de-menores?ref=zitamar.com) that insurgent groups are using abducted children as human shields during attacks on villages in the province. Speaking at the Mbau administrative post in the Mocímboa da Praia district, Tauabo asserted that the insurgents use this tactic to prevent the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and their Rwandan allies from effectively countering their attacks. He emphasised that the insurgents abduct children, mainly aged 12 to 13, during raids and deploy them at the forefront of their operations. However, there is no evidence to indicate this is happening. Children are [kidnapped and trained to fight](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2025/8/6/abducted-children-return-traumatised-in-mozambique?ref=zitamar.com), and have been seen in some images posted by IS. However, battlefield videos do not indicate the use of “human shields” in attacks on state forces in what are usually chaotic and fast-moving events. *The Justice Ministry approves Venâncio Mondlane's ANAMOLA party* The Mozambican Ministry of Justice, Constitutional and Religious Affairs has officially recognized the formation of the National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique (ANAMOLA) party, which is led by the former presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane. Mondlane initially proposed the acronym ANAMALALA, but this was rejected because it is an Emakhwa term, meaning “enough,” or “it’s over.” As that term is specific to an ethnic group, this is considered contrary to the Mozambican Constitution and the Political Parties Act. It also did not correspond to the full name of the party. Following this adjustment, the party was approved on 7 August. ### Bloody roads URL: https://www.zitamar.com/bloody-roads/ Last updated: 2025-08-19T21:55:38.000Z Good evening. Monday was another tragic day on Mozambique’s roads: in less than 100km between Maputo and Gaza, 35 people lost their lives in the space of an hour on Monday morning. It is no exaggeration to say the slaughter on the roads is worse than the violence in Cabo Delgado, where almost every day Mozambicans are also killed by the regional branch of the Islamic State. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ec1ba5b8-6fec-4471-962a-9230e8dfbed3/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As always, the authorities trotted out the usual excuses: speeding, violations of traffic laws, breaches of the ban on passenger vehicles circulating at night. And because it is winter, heavy fog was blamed too, further complicating driving conditions. Convenient explanations — but far from the whole story. Take the minibus (or ‘chapa’) that crashed near the village of 3 de Fevereiro. On a wide, well-paved stretch of road, it skidded off a bridge into a river, killing 24 people. The vehicle had a legal capacity of 15 passengers, but was carrying 27\. Minutes earlier it had passed through the Incoloane police checkpoint, where every ‘chapa’ and truck is supposedly inspected. Nothing irregular was detected — not the night-time journey, not the excess passengers, not the fact that the driver lacked the proper licence. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### An inclusive talking shop URL: https://www.zitamar.com/an-inclusive-talking-shop/ Last updated: 2025-08-18T20:07:07.000Z Good afternoon. The so-called “inclusive dialogue” process, launched after last year’s disputed elections, is moving into its next phase, namely a public consultation. And what could be more inclusive than asking all Mozambicans, whoever and wherever they may be, what direction they want the country to go in? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/725adf8b-990e-47bf-8c67-238ad904a83c/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Of course, asking is one thing. They were asked to vote at last October’s elections. Actually giving them a say in the country’s destiny is quite another, and something that Frelimo, the ruling party for all of independent Mozambique’s 50-year history, is not very good at. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Party time for Mondlane URL: https://www.zitamar.com/party-time-for-mondlane/ Last updated: 2025-08-15T15:56:35.000Z Good afternoon. Venâncio Mondlane, Mozambique’s de facto opposition leader, will no doubt be pleased that his Anamola party (renamed from Anamalala) has finally been officially approved by the government, a mere four months after the party’s application for registration was first submitted (see below). But as this newsletter has noted before, that does not mean that the ruling Frelimo party has decided to embrace multiparty democracy after 50 years of resisting it. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/8c57378b-59bb-458f-95a1-12cea32efd09/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Inside the government’s negotiations over Mozal and KenmareMinisters have obtained improved terms with miner Kenmare Resources, but not without compromise, while an agreement over Mozal’s power price remains elusive![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-245.jpg)Zitamar NewsRene Lavanchy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Mozal-Aluminium-Operations-South-32-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-governments-negotiations-over-mozal-and-kenmare/) [Cabo Delgado war will take “years” to end, warns head of European Union’s military missionBrigadier-General Luís Barroso hailed the forces trained by the European Union as a “game changer”, but said military action alone would not solve the Cabo Delgado insurgency![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-246.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-15-15.54.20.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-war-will-take-years-to-end-warns-head-of-european-unions-military-mission/) ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogDane Kondic, chief executive of Mozambican state-owned airline LAM, today denied a report from newssheet Canalmoz that claimed that he quit the company at a board meeting today. Speaking on a video call from the board meeting this afternoon, he told Zitamar News that he was working as normal and that he expected to sign a new contract tomorrow after an initial three-month contract ended this week. Kondic was hired as interim chief executive three months ago to lead a restructuring of the company, a process which LAM’s directors said they expected to take 12 months. Since then he has been appointed as non-executive chairman of Botswana’s national airline, but the LAM board has since asked him to resign from that job.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-85.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.telesco.pe/file/iCGVcqW4pS8mf1-54Tv6LjbA2Z-yZ41vcjUQ-yo2loHSz_WU2aomp74ICKxGRzRRoVbvceo5G8BtIWcxqtzOdLq9otLL9Ka3ft0ZFoZfVFmrNlKNj9HgMjhp9egKplBjKwe34HI2ibjvp0IwA8HBBPy2FC6Z3w0qR8kSnf2vCUXwpEVVQ9CZ01p5kugXt_QKTij-AhnmsClyDPq-vesG5-CSwKahtsDFI6oS5FFGHYrngZ_D-WYfnpJzpnUA4Y98nR4EYNtt880390ofUvCzf31_Dbe2cw53W6gCHn3fw65Uk1Q_KQ8y-3nvt_6gONeW8ytM6RMH1V6m15wljRNi2w.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4447?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mondlane and his adviser Dinis Tivane continue to be pursued by the justice system over his role in the protests sparked by last year’s disputed elections, which the former presidential candidate insists he and his supporters won. And President Daniel Chapo has not shown much sign recently of wanting to engage with Mondlane or involve him in the so-called “inclusive national dialogue”, the talks on political and constitutional reform between Chapo and opposition party leaders. The provincial leader of the Frelimo veterans’ association who recently caused controversy by saying that Frelimo “will only leave power after Jesus Christ returns” speaks for a lot of people within the party. There are still many ways in which Mondlane’s ambition to govern Mozambique could be blocked. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Inside the government’s negotiations over Mozal and Kenmare URL: https://www.zitamar.com/inside-the-governments-negotiations-over-mozal-and-kenmare/ Last updated: 2025-08-15T15:34:15.000Z The Mozal aluminium smelter is a drain on revenues that the Mozambican state could be earning from power sales. That, at any rate, is the opinion of a source close to the negotiations between Mozal’s majority owner, Australian metal producer South32, and the government-appointed commission negotiating with it over a new power supply contract. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Cabo Delgado war will take “years” to end, warns head of European Union’s military mission URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-war-will-take-years-to-end-warns-head-of-european-unions-military-mission/ Last updated: 2025-08-15T14:45:35.000Z The insurgency in Cabo Delgado province will take “years” to end, the head of the European Union (EU)’s military mission in Mozambique has warned, although he said there were “signs of improvement” in the fight against the insurgency. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The Mozal standoff URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-mozal-standoff/ Last updated: 2025-08-14T15:38:54.000Z Good afternoon. The long-running dispute between South32, the Australian majority owner of the Mozal aluminium smelter, and the Mozambican government will be a test of how far the current trend of economic nationalism, which is evident both in government policy and in popular sentiment, can go. South32 has been negotiating with a commission set up by the Mozambican government to agree a new power purchase contract for the smelter, whose current contract expires next year. The Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric (HCB) company, which is majority owned by the government, is the official power supplier, although the power is transmitted through the transmission network of South African electric utility Eskom. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/dd60d394-e451-4e63-8dd9-058366540120/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) That the power price needs to go up is not in dispute. Mozal currently pays $0.03 a kilowatt-hour for power, a bargain basement price which is half what Eskom pays HCB for power for South Africa. The question is by how much. The government’s position is that the current tariff amounts to a subsidy of the business, which also enjoys a special ultra-low tax regime. South32’s response today is that the price demanded by the government, which has not been publicly disclosed, would make the business “cash flow negative every single month, every single day”. As things stand, it says, it is more likely than not that the plant will be shut down in March 2026. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Does Mozambique need more police? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/does-mozambique-need-more-police/ Last updated: 2025-08-13T16:08:55.000Z Good afternoon. How many police officers does Mozambique have? The Ministry of the Interior is not going to tell you. The overall number of police officers and the number in each formation is deemed to be a state secret. As is well known, this opacity has been exploited by senior police commanders to embezzle money through the creation of so-called ghost employees, whose pay they pocket. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/d31e544e-b2cc-437b-9401-ad5822c685b7/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It also means that there is uncertainty over how many police need to be recruited, an issue that has resurfaced now that the interior ministry has announced a new recruitment campaign for the Mozambican police, aiming to recruit 4,000 officers in four months (see below). Whether this is too many or not is hard to say, but anecdotal evidence suggests that there are parts of Mozambique which have too many police and parts which have too few. While in Maputo and some southern towns, police can be seen swarming around and patrolling in groups of three, in rural districts in the north and the cities of Pemba and Nampula, police can feel absent. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Shacks under attack URL: https://www.zitamar.com/shacks-under-attack/ Last updated: 2025-08-12T15:35:43.000Z Good afternoon. The long-running fight against informal retail shacks and street sellers has claimed Manuel de Araújo, the mayor of the city of Quelimane, as its latest victim (see below). De Araújo, a member of opposition party Renamo, claims that the criminal case against him was “politicised”, but in fact, he admitted that he permitted people to continue informal selling along the coastal road in the city after prosecutors ordered him to remove their stalls. The only political aspect to the case is that such actions are not brought against Frelimo mayors who also tolerate illegal street selling. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/7dda4740-766f-4aba-9069-e861ab8da910/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The government would argue that street selling is unsafe and an unauthorised obstruction of public space. Street sellers in many cities and towns fill up the pavements and roadsides along roads where there is the greatest opportunity to capture passing trade. Once those spaces are full, they spill over into the roadway, restricting space for vehicles to travel. The N6 highway going out of the city of Beira towards Zimbabwe is congested in this way, and lorries heading in opposite directions are forced to share the same lane. Street sellers and pedestrians thus have to walk in the road, causing accidents and deaths. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Planting the flag in a gasfield URL: https://www.zitamar.com/planting-the-flag-in-a-gasfield/ Last updated: 2025-08-11T15:36:27.000Z Good afternoon. Fifty kilometres off the Mozambican coast, on board the Coral South floating gas platform operated by Eni of Italy, are engineers employed not by Eni or its contractors or subcontractors, but Mozambique’s state-owned oil and gas company ENH. They are trainees, learning how to build and operate a gas platform. ENH is training technical staff all over the world, not just in Mozambique but in oil and gas-producing countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and the United States. Gradually, ENH is acquiring the ability to operate oil and gas production facilities itself, as its chair, Ludovina Bernardo, has said it wants to do (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/72c32fe2-cf47-49ea-877e-521eabe5d920/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Three killed in latest insurgent attack along N380This is the latest in a series of attacks by the N380 and N1, the two main highways in Cabo Delgado province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-244.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-11-17.07.05.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/three-killed-in-latest-insurgent-attack-along-n380/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Sources at the company, however, have clarified to *Zitamar News* that operating a project is a long-term goal and not something it intends to do imminently. That is just as well, because while ENH may have qualified engineers, its leadership team is dominated by people appointed by politicians on political grounds, with little experience of the oil and gas sector. Bernardo is one such person, having been appointed ENH chair last year after several years as deputy minister for industry and commerce, with no background in the hydrocarbons sector. Being a project operator means making high-level executive decisions about it, and it is not clear that ENH is ready to do this. But, say sources, it is working on strengthening its corporate governance and negotiating skills. Those will need to improve if ENH is to convince private oil and gas companies to invest in a project it is in charge of developing. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Three killed in latest insurgent attack along N380 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/three-killed-in-latest-insurgent-attack-along-n380/ Last updated: 2025-08-11T15:13:02.000Z At least three people were killed in an insurgent attack on the village of Nangumi in Cabo Delgado province’s Ancuabe district on Thursday 7 August. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Chapo is playing with fire URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-is-playing-with-fire/ Last updated: 2025-08-08T15:23:50.000Z Good afternoon. Another month has passed without the government approving the registration of de facto opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s new political party. When Mondlane filed a legal complaint against the justice ministry, saying that it had exceeded the permitted time to respond to his party’s application, the Constitutional Council ruled that he was wrong, and that the 60-day deadline to issue a response had restarted in early June. That time is now finished, and there is still no answer. This despite the fact that, as we now learn, the party name has been changed from “Anamalala” to “Anamola”, after the ministry raised problems with the previous name (see below). But is that enough? *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/50110a43-4fc0-4d2b-8eff-63f85db0d4fd/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Pigeon pea exports re-liberalised after cereals authority changes mindThe reversal of an earlier decision comes amid a battle between corrupt forces in state institutions and promoters of free trade![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-242.jpg)Zitamar NewsRene Lavanchy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/pigeon_peas_mozambique.jpeg)](https://www.zitamar.com/pigeon-pea-exports-re-liberalised-after-cereals-authority-changes-mind/) [Insurgents move their roadblocks on N380 south after military escorts resume further northThe insurgent activity on the highway yesterday prevented humanitarian food aid from being handed out in the town of Macomia![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-243.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-08-15.23.53.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-move-their-roadblocks-on-n380-south-after-military-escorts-resume-further-north/) [Subscribe from just £9 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) We do not know what answer the council will give to Mondlane’s request (he is seeking that it approve the party’s registration, taking the matter out of the justice ministry’s hands). Certainly the council, most of whose members are chosen by ruling party Frelimo, will not defy the government’s wishes. But there is more than one way of carrying out those wishes. And whether or not Anamola is approved, it is looking increasingly likely that the government and Frelimo will make sure that Mondlane’s political ambitions are blocked. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Pigeon pea exports re-liberalised after cereals authority changes mind URL: https://www.zitamar.com/pigeon-pea-exports-re-liberalised-after-cereals-authority-changes-mind/ Last updated: 2025-08-08T15:10:58.000Z Agricultural commodity traders can go back to exporting pigeon peas and similar products from this week, the Mozambican customs and cereal authorities have announced, in a bizarre reversal of an earlier decision that would have blocked all such exports until the end of September. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents move their roadblocks on N380 south after military escorts resume further north URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-move-their-roadblocks-on-n380-south-after-military-escorts-resume-further-north/ Last updated: 2025-08-08T13:35:30.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents set up roadblocks on the N380 highway in the Meluco district of Cabo Delgado province yesterday, disrupting traffic on the main road connecting the north and south of the province for several hours. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Mozambique’s mobile monetisation URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambiques-mobile-monetisation/ Last updated: 2025-08-07T15:15:28.000Z Good afternoon. Does every adult in Mozambique now have an electronic money account? Probably not quite, but there are enough e-money accounts to go round all of them with some left over (see below). E-payments are one of Mozambique’s few unqualified success stories from the past decade. In contrast to the proportion of the population that holds a bank account, which has remained almost static, the use of e-money platforms has exploded since 2015. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b3defe03-a5e6-4ba7-b128-c5f943af52ad/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 6 August 2025 (14 July - 3 August 2025)Starting around 15 July, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters moved south out of Macomia, through Quissanga and Ancuabe districts and into Chiúre district![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-240.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-06-22.11.17.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-6-august-2025-14-july-3-august-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The authorities cannot take any credit for this growth: on the contrary, the government and the Bank of Mozambique have viewed e-money platforms like M-Pesa and Emola with suspicion. The central bank has sought to regulate the mobile phone network operators that run the e-money platforms as though they are banks, although they do not provide a full range of banking services. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 6 August 2025 (14 July - 3 August 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-6-august-2025-14-july-3-august-2025/ Last updated: 2025-08-07T12:24:48.000Z ## By the numbers Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (14 July - 3 August 2025) - At least 14 political violence events (2,142 in total since 1 October 2017) - At least 28 reported fatalities from political violence (6,151 since 1 October 2017) - At least 11 reported civilian fatalities (2,542 since 1 October 2017) - At least 13 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,969 since 1 October 2017) ## Overview Starting around 15 July, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters moved south out of Macomia, through Quissanga and Ancuabe districts and into Chiúre district. They met resistance only from Naparama militiamen, at least 14 of whom they killed. The operation displaced almost 50,000 people in seven days in Chiúre district. Continued movements and attacks by ISM in the north of the province indicate that the move to Chiúre was tactical rather than in flight. As well as stretching the Mozambican military, a sustained propaganda campaign linked to the operation kept ISM in the public eye as a force in northern Mozambique. **ISM moves south** On 15 July, a group of approximately 60 fighters was seen moving across the road that links Macomia town to the coast. Judging from reports from local sources as well as the Islamic State (IS) weekly al-Naba, the fighters made their way south to Quissanga before dividing in two and moving into Ancuabe district. Al-Naba highlighted preaching sessions ISM conducted in villages during this time, reflecting its generally non-aggressive, though intimidating, posture toward communities in Macomia and Quissanga districts. ISM’s first attack during this operation was on Nanduli village in Ancuabe district on 20 July, where local sources reported they burned houses and looted property. IS claimed the attack two days later. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), [almost 2,000 people](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-136ancuabe-chiure-and-muidumbe-attacks-20-28-july?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) fled this attack. The next attack was on 22 July near Nathocua village, also in Ancuabe district, and almost 20 kilometers south of Nanduli. According to local sources, at least six civilians were killed in fields near the village. The group’s subsequent movements are unclear, until their arrival at Chiúre-Velho on 24 July, where they attacked a police station and freed one insurgent who was in detention there. A clip IS released under the [Amaq News Agency](https://x.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1951170478829080965?ref=zitamar.com) brand indicates that fighters faced no resistance, suggesting that police fled before they arrived. ISM remained in Chiúre for at least the following seven days, displacing tens of thousands. According to IOM, [almost 52,000 people fled](https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-ett-movement-alert-report-137-ancuabe-chiure-and-muidumbe-attacks-20-july-03?close=true&ref=zitamar.com) ISM attacks in the district, mainly in villages on either side of the N1 between Chiúre and the crossing to Nampula at the Lurío river. To the east of the road, ISM undertook at least five attacks, during which they reportedly killed at least four civilians and abducted three, as well as destroying property. Villages affected included Ntonhane, Cinco, Kimila, Mareira and Maririni. A more complicated scenario developed to the west of the N1\. Around 27 July, youth from the Ocua, Namogelia, and Catapua areas mobilized as a Naparama militia. By the following night, ISM had killed at least 14 of them in Melija village, according to a photo report released by IS. The next day, 29 July, Naparama youth killed two undercover police officers at Nivenevene village who they suspected to be ISM. There have been no reports of attacks in Chiúre since 31 July. Local sources say insurgents tried to cross the Lúrio river to Nampula province but were unsuccessful. On 3 August, Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) reinforcements arrived in Chiúre district headquarters, by which time ISM appeared to have left the area. Two sources indicated that they moved westward toward Namuno and Montepuez. **Attacks continue in the north** While some forces have moved south, ISM maintained a presence on the Macomia coast in recent weeks. The group appeared in Pangane village on 17 July, when they took fuel for a boat engine, and again on 29 July, according to sources in the area. On 25 July, the group successfully deployed an IED just north of Mucojo town, damaging a FADM vehicle. According to a source, ISM warned the local community beforehand not to use that stretch of road. Four days later, the group entered Manica village, just three km west of Mucojo on the Macomia road. According to a source, they were interested in learning of the movements of soldiers stationed near Manica. On the same day, 29 July, Rwandan forces captured two ISM members at an abandoned hotel by the beach near Mucojo. Further up the coast, north of Mocímboa da Praia town, local sources reported that insurgents arrived at Nkomangano village on 1 August, taking two boats and their crews for ransom. Inland, a young armed male insurgent and a young woman in advanced pregnancy handed themselves in to the authorities on 22 July. ISM also remains active farther west. On 23 July, the group attacked Magaia village in northern Muidumbe district, killing at least three members of the Local Force. The group remains in the area. IS issued a claim for the killing of a man in the area on 3 August. **Business pressure keeps the N380 open** After the Mueda branch of the Confederation of Economic Associations (CTA) wrote to local government to complain about ISM activity on the N380, saying it impeded trade, military escorts have been reintroduced on the N380\. This follows a meeting between business leaders and Cabo Delgado Governor Valige Tauabo on 22 July. Though one source indicated that road blocks were planned the week before the meeting, there have been none since 12 July. ## Focus: Southern thrust meets little resistance ISM’s push into Ancuabe and Chiúre districts in late July is its fourth foray to the south of Cabo Delgado province since the start of 2024\. July’s advance, like previous ones, met no resistance from state forces, and only token resistance from militias, a failure [recognized](https://www.rfi.fr/pt/%C3%A1frica-lus%C3%B3fona/20250731-falha-no-per%C3%ADmetro-de-seguran%C3%A7a-permitiu-%C3%BAltimos-ataques-em-cabo-delgado?ref=zitamar.com) by Minister for National Defense Cristóvão Chume. As with ISM’s previous campaigns, attacks on civilians and a strong propaganda campaign featuring attacks on Christian targets characterized the operation. ISM’s push toward Chiúre, and its ability to remain there for at least seven days, is surprising given that FADM’s Macarara camp, and the nearby Rwandan military camp, are just 50 km from Chiúre district headquarters by road in Ancuabe district. FADM reinforcements did not arrive until 3 August. For FADM, this may illustrate just how stretched their forces and logistical support are in northern Mozambique. Given that this is the fourth incursion in 18 months, Chiúre residents’ faith in the state’s ability to protect them must be sorely tested. As well as the obvious strain on the security forces, the displacement that ISM deliberately causes also puts huge pressure on local administration. UN OCHA notes that 60 schools have been closed across the district, while schools in Chiúre town are [overwhelmed](https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/iom-cccm-new-arrivals-flash-update-cabo-delgado-chiure-district-30-july-2025?ref=zitamar.com) by displaced people seeking shelter. [Doctors Without Borders has pointed](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/cabo-delgado-situa%C3%A7%C3%A3o-alarmante-nos-campos-de-deslocados/a-73503213?ref=zitamar.com) to the inevitable increase in infectious diseases under the precarious conditions in the camps. ISM’s push south was accompanied by an intense online propaganda campaign. Through its Telegram channels, IS published 13 claims for attacks in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts between 22 July and 3 August, as well as a video package of the attack on the Chiúre-Velho police station. The operation also featured prominently in al-Naba for two consecutive weeks. IS propaganda stressed ISM’s differing posture in predominantly Muslim and predominantly Christian communities. In Quissanga and Macomia, images released on Telegram and in al-Naba showed ISM figures lecturing people in their villages. In contrast, images from Ancuabe and Chíure showed destruction of villages and brutal killings. Whether this has an impact on inter-communal relations remains to be seen. As with previous moves south, this came in the wake of heightened state forces operations in northern districts. However, given that ISM maintained a presence in the north while dispatching a group south indicates it was likely a tactical move to stretch state forces, rather than flight from operations against the insurgents. ## Roundup *Suleimani Nguvu tagged as ISM communications chief* Intelligence available to the United Nations Security Council’s sanctions monitoring team, published in its [24 July report on IS and al-Qaeda](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482?ref=zitamar.com), says that ISM’s strategic communications are now run by Suleimani Nguvu, a Tanzanian who has been in the leadership since January 2025\. As the likely interlocutor with IS media operations, he is now a key figure in the group. The Security Council report notes that the leadership otherwise remains the same, as outlined in its [February report](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/71/Rev.1?ref=zitamar.com): Ulanga, also Tanzanian, and Faridi Suleiman Harune. The report notes continued links with the Democratic Republic of Congo, from where it says the group has received a recent influx of recruits. *President Chapo reshuffles military leadership* Mozambican President Daniel Chapo [promoted ](https://aimnews.org/2025/07/28/chapo-movimenta-generais-das-fds/?ref=zitamar.com)several FADM officers on 28 July, including Major-General Messias André Niposso, a former Renamo officer. Niposso was promoted to lieutenant-general and deputy chief of staff, [replacing](https://cartamz.com/politica/44862/novo-vice-chefe-do-estado-maior-general-das-fadm-toma-posse/?ref=zitamar.com) Bertolino Capitine. Capitine was dismissed by former President Filipe Nyusi in September 2024 for [criticizing](https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/mocambique-comandante-da-policia-diz-que-nao-se-declara-guerra-ao-terrorismo%5Fn1605121?ref=zitamar.com) the government’s approach to counter-insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Niposso’s appointment upholds the tradition, established in the post-1992 peace agreement, of balancing the FADM leadership between former government and Renamo officers. Chapo also promoted Major General André Mahunguane to army commander, replacing Tiago Nampele, who was appointed commander of the Mozambican Civic Service. These changes conclude a military reshuffle that began in April with the appointment of Júlio Jane as FADM’s chief of staff, replacing Joaquim Mangrasse. *Venâncio Mondlane faces five charges over post-election protests* Former presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane [announced](https://aimnews.org/2025/07/22/venancio-mondlane-acusado-de-cinco-crimes-pela-procuradoria/?ref=zitamar.com) on 22 July that Mozambique’s Public Prosecutor’s Office had formally charged him with five crimes related to protests following the 2024 general elections. Mondlane made this announcement after a hearing at the Office of the Attorney General in Maputo. The charges include public advocacy of crime, incitement to collective disobedience, public instigation of a crime, instigation of terrorism, and incitement to terrorism. These charges conclude the preparatory investigation phase, and proceedings will now move forward to trial. Mondlane claims that the judicial process is linked to his allegations of significant electoral fraud, which he says were confirmed by international observers. *Strengthened cooperation with Russia* Foreign Minister Maria Lucas met her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow on 22 July. In a statement, Lavrov said Russia would welcome requests to strengthen “[defence and counter-terrorism capabilities](https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign%5Fpolicy/news/2037503/?ref=zitamar.com).” Since the departure of the Wagner Group in 2020, such cooperation has been limited. However, [Zitamar News reports](https://www.zitamar.com/exit-usaid-enter-russia/?ref=zitamar-daily-briefing-newsletter) that President Chapo is keen to strengthen relations with Russia and is thought to be planning a visit to Moscow. ### Mozambican timber: stunted growth URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-timber-stunted-growth/ Last updated: 2025-08-06T16:06:47.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambique’s timber industry is in trouble, but not for the reasons that the government or the trade association suggest (see below). The number of forestry businesses operating in the country has fallen by almost half since last year. The government talks about a shortage of timber and market problems, while the Mozambican Federation of Timber Operators complains about the policy framework and blames the government for buying Chinese timber. But neither of these things explain the sharp fall in the number of businesses in the last year. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/81a2d7cf-df10-48b9-8591-62784bf77e28/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies bills government for billions in exchange for restarting gas projectThe company is seeking an agreement on costs before it formally resumes activity on the $20bn project - although on the ground, major work has already begun![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-238.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2024-07-25-17.27.02-1.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-bills-government-for-billions-in-exchange-for-restarting-gas-project/) [Insurgent offensive slows with the arrival of troops in ChiúreChiúre district saw several attacks spread out over eight days on 24-31 July, but Mozambican troops only arrived on the eighth day![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-239.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-08-06-14.59.04.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-offensive-slows-with-the-arrival-of-troops-in-chiure/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) What has changed is that the government has stepped up enforcement activity against illegal timber exports. Mozambican law prohibits the export of unprocessed timber logs, as well as the export of endangered species of wood in any form. Although the illegal trade in timber has not been suppressed, more cargoes of timber have been stopped, and this has forced some timber firms out of business. In other words, the timber industry has been dependent on illegal exports. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### TotalEnergies bills government for billions in exchange for restarting gas project URL: https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-bills-government-for-billions-in-exchange-for-restarting-gas-project/ Last updated: 2025-08-06T15:46:56.000Z As August moves on, “restart” seems like the magic word on the Afungi peninsula of Cabo Delgado province, like “Open Sesame” in the fairy tale *Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves* from the Thousand and One Nights. But instead of a cave, the word will open the door to restarting construction work on the $20bn-plus liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by French energy firm TotalEnergies on the peninsula. And instead of magic, it is money that is needed to roll the stone out of the way. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgent offensive slows with the arrival of troops in Chiúre URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgent-offensive-slows-with-the-arrival-of-troops-in-chiure/ Last updated: 2025-08-06T15:02:34.000Z Islamic State Mozambique have recently mounted a string of attacks in the district of Chiúre, on the southern border of Cabo Delgado province. The attacks only ended as Mozambican troops arrived in the district at the end of last month and as insurgents clashed with the Naparama militia. By then, the insurgents had caused a humanitarian crisis, forcing over 40,000 people in the district to flee their homes in the space of nine days. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Minimal expectations for minimum wages URL: https://www.zitamar.com/minimal-expectations-for-minimum-wages/ Last updated: 2025-08-05T16:14:02.000Z Good afternoon. Negotiations on setting the minimum wages for this year began yesterday, after having been pushed back by five months (see below), but workers and trade unions should not get excited about the prospects for a pay rise. The mood among corporate managers speaking to *Zitamar News* is gloomy. There is little belief that the government knows how to revive the economy, after the decline in activity suffered late last year and early this year due to the violent protests sparked by the disputed election results. That, after all, was the reason why the wage talks did not take place in March as scheduled: many businesses were in ruins, some quite literally. As such, bosses seem unwilling to grant a more than symbolic pay rise this year. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e6c2dde6-b133-441a-86a6-5d7f7036d6cc/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) On the other side, things also look gloomy. While minimum wages in some sectors of the economy, like extractives and banking, have been increasing above inflation recently, others have not kept pace with inflation: other factors also go into minimum wage calculations, like the economic performance of a sector. Even the official inflation measure, which includes things like cultural and leisure activities, underestimates the cost of living for people on low incomes, whose basket of essential goods and services is rather different. The result is that, in some sectors, a gap has opened up between the minimum wage and what a living wage would be, and that gap has been getting wider and wider. While it is true that most Mozambicans do not have formal jobs, minimum wages are still relevant to people on lower incomes, as they provide a benchmark (even if many employers in the informal sector actually pay less than the relevant minimum wage; in part that reflects the fact that informal workers do not pay tax or social security contributions). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A fairer deal for provinces URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-fairer-deal-for-provinces/ Last updated: 2025-08-04T15:20:39.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican government is starting to consider how to implement President Daniel Chapo’s promised plan to remove the unnecessary duplication in provincial government, by removing the responsibilities of provincial secretaries of state that overlap with those of provincial governors (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9819102b-d896-457a-aad9-d86a22472e34/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As part of the legislative reforms that will deliver these changes, the government is also looking at the possibility of giving more financial autonomy to governors, for example by giving them the ability to raise and spend taxes. Currently, some taxes are collected at the provincial level, but they are sent to the Ministry of Finance which then decides how to distribute funding for provincial governments. The provincial administrations rely entirely on central government for their funding. This is in contrast to municipalities (cities with their own elected councils), which can levy taxes. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The cities that smell of corruption URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-cities-that-smell-of-corruption/ Last updated: 2025-08-01T15:37:06.000Z Good afternoon. An interview with Luís Giquira, president of the municipal council (or more simply “mayor”) of the city of Nampula in today’s edition of newspaper *Savana* throws an interesting spotlight on the management of self-governing cities in Mozambique, but not a surprising one. Giquira took over as mayor in February 2024 from Paulo Vahanle of opposition party Renamo. The city that he took over was, he says, “technically bankrupt”. It had been blacklisted by the bank FNB over an unpaid debt of MZN26m ($407,000), it was employing over 1,000 workers on irregular arrangements, and social security contributions deducted from pay had been diverted, according to Giquira. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9d11e92d-0ba4-4cb7-8175-4fe2f4eaa790/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The problems he describes can be found in many cities across the country. Mozambique is not alone in that its local government is plagued by corruption and weak financial management, although there are some factors specific to this country that make things worse. The lack of proper jobs combined with the patronage culture in the political parties means that mayors are always under pressure from their parties to hand out jobs to party members. This may help to explain all the people in Nampula who Giquira says had been unofficially placed on the payroll, and who have now been dismissed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Will Chapo keep greedy hands off his projects? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-chapo-keep-greedy-hands-off-his-projects/ Last updated: 2025-07-31T15:48:11.000Z Good afternoon. The government has unveiled two new initiatives this week: the long-awaited Local Economic Development Fund and a new tracking system for medicines. All governments like to announce shiny new projects that they claim will improve people’s lives; however, in the case of the Mozambican government, it does not have a good track record of making those projects work. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/will-chapo-keep-greedy-hands-off-his-projects-2/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) President Daniel Chapo admitted as much when he made a comment about unspecified “past mistakes” in announcing the launch of the fund. This was presumably a reference to the disastrous so-called “seven million” development fund launched under previous president Armando Guebuza. Instead of being used to finance worthwhile development projects, most of the money in that fund was lent out to members of ruling party Frelimo, who were not forced to repay the loans, so that the vast majority of the money was stolen. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Will Chapo keep greedy hands off his projects? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-chapo-keep-greedy-hands-off-his-projects-2/ Last updated: 2025-08-05T13:29:17.000Z *This truncated version of the Zitamar Daily Briefing is for subscribers on the* Zitamar News *tier. Pro subscribers can read the full version* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/will-chapo-keep-greedy-hands-off-his-projects/)*.* _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News tier only._ ### Another year, another exodus in southern Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/another-year-another-exodus-in-southern-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-07-30T15:46:51.000Z Good afternoon. Islamic State-backed insurgents seem to be close to finishing another tour of southern Cabo Delgado province. Once again, the insurgents have responded to attacks by security forces further north by going on the march south and heading towards Nampula province, possibly to pick up recruits. This last happened around the beginning of the year. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2e068179-9768-43a4-b1ca-23430235e03b/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Once again, the security forces have been unwilling or unable to stop them. The insurgents attacked the administrative post of Chiúre-Velho, on Thursday. They have now been roaming around Chiúre district for at least a week, but have not been confronted by either Mozambican or Rwandan government forces. This was not for want of intelligence: even civilians have been able to observe the insurgent movements, and they could easily have been intercepted. Troops of the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces have moved in to Chiúre-Velho, but after the insurgents had moved on. Only the Naparama and the Local Force militia groups have confronted the insurgents in the district. This despite the fact that the fighting capability of the Mozambican armed forces in Cabo Delgado has improved significantly in the last few years, as shown by the fierce fighting in Macomia district recently. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Teachers in the firing line URL: https://www.zitamar.com/teachers-in-the-firing-line/ Last updated: 2025-07-29T16:08:22.000Z Good afternoon. Reports of the forced transfer of a group of teachers in Inhambane province to jobs in remote parts of the province, as punishment for having previously supported opposition party Renamo, are nothing new (see below). Teachers are not infrequently victimised by the authorities, for at least two reasons. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fc70537b-4ca9-418e-bc74-fd2a4d56d3ff/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Firstly, teachers are essential to the running of elections: their classrooms are used as polling stations and they are typically recruited as staff. As part of this, they are expected by the ruling Frelimo party to take part in vote-rigging, for example in registering voters and counting votes. They are also expected to take part in campaigning on behalf of Frelimo. Teachers who refuse to cooperate can expect to get into trouble. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Will courts turn off the gas taps? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/will-courts-turn-off-the-gas-taps/ Last updated: 2025-07-28T15:52:17.000Z Good afternoon. Last week’s advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the liability of states over climate change will be unwelcome news for fossil fuel investors in Mozambique, and by extension for the Mozambican government. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/bcc4e169-98c7-49ef-aba7-013ae2f8516f/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): ## [Islamic State Mozambique claims a series of attacks in Chiúre districtThe attacks provide further evidence that insurgents have been moving towards the south of the province, as witnessed earlier this month![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-237.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-28-17.29.03.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-mozambique-claims-a-series-of-attacks-in-chiure-district/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Perhaps the government should have been more careful in what it wished for. Over two years ago, Mozambique was one of many countries whose government put its name to a United Nations resolution calling on the ICJ to give an opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change. That resolution spoke in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, the global production of which is dominated by a handful of major polluters. Since Africa as a whole accounts for a tiny proportion of those emissions (3.7%, according to the International Energy Agency’s latest figure, for 2022), African countries might have thought they had nothing to worry about from the court. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Islamic State Mozambique claims a series of attacks in Chiúre district URL: https://www.zitamar.com/islamic-state-mozambique-claims-a-series-of-attacks-in-chiure-district/ Last updated: 2025-07-28T15:35:19.000Z Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Cabo Delgado province’s southern Chiúre district, targeting the villages of Chiúre-Velho and Ntonhane. They also claimed to have attacked the village of Napala elsewhere in the district as part of their [advance south](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-intensify-roadblocks-in-cabo-delgado-and-begin-advancing-south/) into Cabo Delgado province. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### New government, same wish-list for business reforms URL: https://www.zitamar.com/new-government-same-wish-list-for-business-reforms/ Last updated: 2025-07-26T17:39:08.000Z Good evening — and apologies again for the late delivery of what is now yesterday’s Daily. The Mozambican private sector yesterday had its first face-to-face with the new government. After a troubled succession process, Álvaro Massingue, whom the previous leadership tried in court to ban from running for the position, surprisingly but easily won the election for president of the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique, the CTA. The other side had taken its seats with even more drama, of course. Benvinda Levy, the prime minister, and a handful of ministers in her cabinet, attended the first meeting to assess the country's business environment, after months of street confrontations that left many economic infrastructures in ruins. The most fragile, targeted by devastating looting, will likely never reopen, worsening unemployment, especially in the Maputo metropolitan area. But while the new get together brought new faces into the limelight, the problems, for the most part, are well known. At the top of the list, the CTA maintained its demands for the government to fulfil its promise to pay the $50m in unpaid bills owed to the private sector, as well as VAT refunds. In a positive move, the Ministry of Finance secretary of state said the government had allocated $23.7 million this year to pay arrears for the period 2017-2023, and promised additional payments in 2026. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/33d8f9d7-b2e6-42d1-97fe-f0d04ba053c0)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro and Institutional Mozambique tiers only._ ### Insurgents return to attack Magaia village in Muidumbe, northern Cabo Delgado URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-return-to-attack-magaia-village-in-muidumbe-northern-cabo-delgado/ Last updated: 2025-07-25T13:43:14.000Z At least three Local Force members were injured in an insurgent attack on the village of Filipe Samuel Magaia in the north of Muidumbe district, Cabo Delgado province, close to the border with the district of Mocímboa da Praia. The attack took place on 23 July and involved several heavily armed insurgents who entered the village at around 4 p.m., firing indiscriminately and looting supplies from the local population. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. [View Larger Map](https://www.openstreetmap.org/?mlat=-11.6462&mlon=39.9593&ref=zitamar.com#map=12/-11.6462/39.9593) _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Double standards URL: https://www.zitamar.com/double-standards/ Last updated: 2025-07-25T09:22:41.000Z Good morning, and our apologies for the delay in sending yesterday’s newsletter. On Tuesday, opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane was finally told which crimes he is accused of, after about three months of hearings at the Attorney General's Office (PGR) regarding post-election demonstrations. According to the indictment, Mondlane is charged with five crimes, including incitement to terrorism, incitement to collective disobedience, and public incitement to commit a crime. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/eab2a06d-f302-4881-bdeb-c11313c8a17d/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live Blog💥 The village of Chiúre-Velho, in the southern Cabo Delgado district of Chiúre, came under attack from insurgents this morning, multiple sources have told Zitamar News. The attack is consistent with a move southward by the insurgents, that we reported on yesterday.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-83.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.cdn-telegram.org/file/gOk7THQXireZSYgf2pdkBUmdvjtRGsRzJ3IFmIiHL2eXqTU0hw8JrvoR_PjNezVaHWSraXzskbbBIugp9mWj1Lxe1h0Nc5nWAxbaPLxXqVjkfiJCPMGeGQ084ArlDLCxcpUfF_-EL9h94Kvxc5feoWlw49jwP56HiRXcZNwU2KbuaPqgSH1AgoAZIaxEqBH1AYvaS2RIyix37b9c9lnp1wq_ejLCh5vvUhhlf-1C6vA_WsiZd3NH9AFEPKv4pQTsaumxbHyYEzykYGsDysn7uRVaDpdBDjPe8PXANgSe63q2eVJqi5kbxnVMfvQIg8ROPqzE555PtRR1q0UbCM4xGA.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4406?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The charges are based on Mondlane's repeated calls on social media for his supporters to protest against the election results. But those demonstrations were fundamentally motivated by fraud in favour of the ruling party Frelimo in the October 2024 general elections. The fraud was documented by the press, some civil society organisations, as well as international observers, including the European Union. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Exit USAID; enter Russia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/exit-usaid-enter-russia/ Last updated: 2025-07-23T16:13:13.000Z Good afternoon. The visit of Mozambican foreign minister Maria Lucas to Moscow this week is the latest evidence of a deepening relationship with Russia, the groundwork for which was set by former president Filipe Nyusi. So far those overtures have produced little, but the conditions may now be right for a more meaningful partnership — for better or for worse. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/3d184e00-2120-4d14-aaf4-8b0dc705728b/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Cabo Delgado insurgents kill civilians in Ancuabe in southward shift from MacomiaIslamic State-affiliated insurgents in Cabo Delgado moving south from Macomia district reached Ancuabe this week![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-233.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-23-17.48.09.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-civilians-in-ancuabe-in-southward-shift-from-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) One of the first crises that greeted President Daniel Chapo following his inauguration in January was the dismantling of the American overseas aid agency, USAID. Estimates vary on the exact impact, but between USAID and the Millennium Challenge Compact, which has also been shuttered, Mozambique was in line to receive around a billion dollars over the next three years from the US, which was by far the country’s biggest donor. SEE ALSO: [US to slash nearly half its aid to Mozambique, memo revealsFunding for HIV, AIDS and malaria treatment, child literacy, agricultural and environmental protection is to be slashed by the Trump administration![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-234.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Gould![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/481924512_1032289665599515_5196417523181555943_n-2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/us-to-slash-nearly-half-its-aid-to-mozambique-memo-reveals/) Now Russia says it is [building](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-prepares-to-fill-the-usaid-gap?ref=zitamar.com) its own version of USAID. Earlier this month, Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian cooperation agency Rossotrudnichestvo, [said in an interview](https://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/07/2025/686b9ca39a79477adf9a5150?ref=zitamar.com#toc-9a5150-4) that Russia’s foreign ministry is currently drafting a new law “in order to create a format similar to USAID”, to allow his agency “to do at least some useful thing abroad that will somehow affect its influence”. The Russian agency will not replace USAID, he admitted, but “would compete, for example, with Finland, which has its own development agency.” _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Delgado insurgents kill civilians in Ancuabe in southward shift from Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-delgado-insurgents-kill-civilians-in-ancuabe-in-southward-shift-from-macomia/ Last updated: 2025-07-23T16:00:09.000Z Islamic State-affiliated insurgents in Cabo Delgado moving south from Macomia district reached Ancuabe this week, where they split into two groups and attacked villages, killed civilians and destroyed property, and caused widespread panic and displacement. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### “Welcome to Mozambique”, and other jokes URL: https://www.zitamar.com/welcome-to-mozambique-and-other-jokes/ Last updated: 2025-07-22T16:13:19.000Z Good afternoon. “A Brazilian, a Portuguese and an Angolan walk into an airport” sounds like the beginning of a joke, and it may well become one soon, after three such people were turned back at Maputo airport on Sunday, when trying to enter Mozambique. Probably the best-known among them was Gilmário Vemba, the Angolan comedian based in Portugal, whose TV shows are enjoyed in both Portugal and Mozambique. He was accompanied by two other comedians, Portuguese Hugo Sousa and Brazilian Murilo Couto. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1377a826-463c-4a7f-8c78-55624ff8cfb7/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogOpposition politician Venâncio Mondlane is facing five charges from the Public Prosecutor’s Office related to the post-election protests between October and March. The charges include public advocacy of crime, incitement to collective disobedience, public instigation to crime, instigation to terrorism, and incitement to terrorism. Mondlane appeared at the Attorney-General’s Office (PGR) for the third time this morning to receive the formal accusation, which will be forwarded to the Maputo City Judicial Court. Speaking to the media afterwards, Mondlane said that the PGR upheld his existing bail conditions, which require him to stay at a given address and to check in with the authorities on a regular basis. He said he would release the charge sheet publicly within 48 hours. Mondlane accused the PGR of being weaponized for political persecution against him. He also claimed that President Daniel Chapo failed to honour agreements reached during two meetings between the two men.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-82.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.cdn-telegram.org/file/fx1ezlCWk2ISQk1wYUTTotfJsMiMlXm6b4WPIjjyfLUYx3tUu_F8II2UooZKRVr9jkPzvi5kkVyzSh3ZHZLUIqQhoA2AdKtlGOEFNpJvWqcOT_nZrKkPdXJoW_VwWwdDJRXXy51wXpwDuN56xJ3qu_yOfXQu4yZCgXMh6dWZVtZ_V5WcAUA2CjbrIzOKP_f59JbhlZKErmKj-7HsxhwQ644oqcDrCa_Z58X-SifMah0uLhQ5wFyVRWVRZOUVlJzepP6dNgqnSGtYriuFQgcQeHb5_7sf0bGQpktFlZDpt5MqVDewC7gDOjcdemKq2cZuGfbuDCe-85vZyzL0ENs7FA.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4399?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) According to Zainedine Danane, director-general of the National Migration Service, the comedians were denied entry because they were travelling on tourist visas, but were in the country to put on a comedy show and charge money for it, which required a different visa. As this newsletter pointed out yesterday, that is not a convincing explanation, since Portuguese and Brazilian citizens can apply for a visa on arrival, and Angolans do not need a visa at all to enter the country. Vemba has pointed out that he has performed in Mozambique in the past, including last year, without any problem. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The United States of Mozambique? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-united-states-of-mozambique/ Last updated: 2025-07-21T16:52:15.000Z Good afternoon. In all the post-election negotiations, talks, recriminations, and promises of reforms, it was easy to forget that work had already been put in place by the last government to look into alternative ways of distributing power in Mozambique. But last week, a commission set up by the Nyusi government as a sop to the opposition after it reneged on a commitment to hold elections for district administrators, submitted a report on possible new models for decentralisation. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/82ccb717-d008-47b3-a8d2-7cc6e91e7e5c/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The report was submitted to the government and has not been made public, but *O País* has seen at least some of it, and reports that it puts forward four possible models — ranging from elections at the Administrative Post, i.e. village, level, through district and provincial level elections to the possibility of devolution to regional governments, which it reportedly describes as a system of federal states. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Keeping the tractors running URL: https://www.zitamar.com/keeping-the-tractors-running/ Last updated: 2025-07-18T15:10:30.000Z Good afternoon. Public transport in Mozambique is an underfunded and precarious business. Rail transport is limited to a handful of lines in the north, south and centre of the country. Bus services in the greater Maputo area provided by the private company Metrobus are reasonably well run, but depend on government subsidy, which the government could never afford to replicate all over the country. Most people in the cities rely on cheaper minibuses (*chapas*), which run on tight margins. Stolen fuel and tax evasion provide illicit subsidies for the operators. The drivers, whose exploitative bosses demand revenue targets from them, are forced to drive dangerously in an effort to pick up as many passengers as possible. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/0f509d3b-afb3-44fe-bb4d-192fbc4dc46c/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [TotalEnergies’ role in death of British contractor unlikely to be considered in inquestThe coroner investigating the death of Philip Mawer said he would order TotalEnergies to provide information about the insurgent attack o![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-232.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Gould![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-18-16.16.29-3.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-role-in-death-of-british-contractor-unlikely-to-be-considered-in-inquest/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In rural areas, public transport is even less viable. The problem is not limited to Mozambique: even in developed countries, the low density of population in the countryside means that rural bus or train services often cannot operate without subsidy. But the high levels of poverty in rural Mozambique, combined with the lack of government funds for subsidy, makes it a particularly difficult issue. As a result, there are some short- and medium-distance routes along secondary roads that are just not served by any public transport service, or a service that is too infrequent. Pregnant women prefer to give birth at home than risk waiting for a late or cancelled service. The state of some roads can make journeys painfully long. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### TotalEnergies’ role in death of British contractor unlikely to be considered in inquest URL: https://www.zitamar.com/totalenergies-role-in-death-of-british-contractor-unlikely-to-be-considered-in-inquest/ Last updated: 2025-07-18T17:42:54.000Z The coroner leading the inquest into the death of Philip Mawer, a British national killed in the Islamic State-backed assault on the town of Palma in March 2021, told a hearing yesterday that he was not likely to explore the French energy giant TotalEnergies’ liability in Mawer’s death. However, he is set to direct the company to produce a statement explaining its security responsibilities during the attack. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Whitened money, grey lists and red tape URL: https://www.zitamar.com/whitened-money-grey-lists-and-red-tape/ Last updated: 2025-07-17T15:57:06.000Z Good afternoon. Claims that Mozambique is expected to be removed in a few months from the so-called “grey list” of countries with inadequate controls against money laundering (see below) need to be treated with caution. The country was placed on the list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body to counter money laundering and terrorism financing, in October 2022. Luís Cezerilo, deputy head of the Financial Information Office and the official in charge of overseeing efforts to get off the list, has previously suggested that the country was on the brink of leaving, but has been proved wrong. In June last year, he said that the FATF looked set to approve the request later that month; in January this year, he said it was likely to happen in the first quarter. Now we hear, from the FATF’s regional affiliate body in Southern Africa, that it might happen in October. We will have to wait and see. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/19e50990-a1cb-42c1-a1cc-122c7ab2b1cb/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Insurgents intensify roadblocks in Cabo Delgado and begin advancing southInsurgents repeatedly stopped travellers on the N380 highway that connects Cabo Delgado’s north and south last week![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-231.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-17-17.05.49.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-intensify-roadblocks-in-cabo-delgado-and-begin-advancing-south/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is true that the government has created a number of regulations to tighten up how money is transferred and the information that people transferring it need to provide. But where it has been lacking (and this seems to explain why the previous targets for exiting the grey list have been missed) is in enforcing the rules. There is just not enough proof that anyone is facing justice for money laundering or terrorism financing. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Insurgents intensify roadblocks in Cabo Delgado and begin advancing south URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-intensify-roadblocks-in-cabo-delgado-and-begin-advancing-south/ Last updated: 2025-07-17T15:33:36.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents in Cabo Delgado province have shifted their focus to the west of Macomia district and appear to have begun moving towards the south of the province in recent days, increasing the insecurity for locals. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Frelimo looks for a cage for Mondlane URL: https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-looks-for-a-cage-for-mondlane/ Last updated: 2025-07-16T16:20:57.000Z Good afternoon. The latest setback for opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane’s plans to set up a new political party (see below and our blog post yesterday) invites reflection on what the government is planning to do. So far, the proposed Anamalala party has been neither accepted nor rejected. It rather looks like it is playing for time. Until what? The ruling Frelimo party is nothing if not tenacious in holding on to power and to its privileged position in the country. Mondlane’s popularity and charisma mean that he is the first politician in a long time to pose a serious threat to that power. Setting up a political party would increase the threat, since Mondlane’s supporters would be able to campaign under the party banner and win seats in local government and in parliament. Given the moribund and ineffective state of Mozambique’s opposition parties at the moment, Anamalala currently looks like it would be able to unite anti-Frelimo voters at the next elections. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6382b8c4-b916-4631-872e-6158d87d5957/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Cabo Ligado Update 16 July 2025 (30 June-13 July 2025)The Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy branch fired on fishers off the coast of Macomia on at least two occasions![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-230.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/map_-_cabo_delgado_-_30_june_-_13_july_2025_-_en.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-16-july-2025-30-june-13-july-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But there is more than one way to frustrate this. *Zitamar News* understands that the government is looking to deprive Mondlane of his sources of funding, believed to come from abroad, which enable him to travel the world and give interviews to foreign media challenging President Daniel Chapo’s narrative that Frelimo won the elections last year and that the country is being reformed. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Ligado Update 16 July 2025 (30 June-13 July 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-16-july-2025-30-june-13-july-2025/ Last updated: 2025-07-16T16:23:29.000Z ## By the numbers **Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (30 June - 13 July 2025)** - **At least 7 political violence events (2,127 in total since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 7 reported fatalities from political violence (6,122 since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 6 reported civilian fatalities (2,531 since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 5 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,956 since 1 October 2017)** ## Overview The Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique (FADM) navy branch fired on fishers off the coast of Macomia on at least two occasions, killing at least six, bringing civilian killings by FADM at sea to 110 since 2020\. Fatalities may rise as bodies continue to be discovered. The killings occurred as fighting between FADM and Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) continued around nearby Quiterajo. To the west, ISM mounted road blocks on the N380, raising considerable sums in ransom. Further south, disorder involving youth in Mecufi district in Cabo Delgado and Angoche in Nampula reflect the underlying instability in northern Mozambique. ## Situation Summary **Civilians targeted in Macomia’s waters, as ISM remains in Quiterajo area** On the night of 5 July, a FADM marine patrol [opened fire](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-fishermen-off-coastal-macomia/) on three fishing boats off Pangane, killing at least three and injuring at least four, according to multiple local sources. Widely circulated [video clips](https://x.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1941801094440525968?ref=zitamar.com) show two of the wounded being rushed to Mucojo by vehicle, where they were treated at a Rwandan health facility before being transferred to Macomia town. Sources identified the boat as FADM, with one source saying the vessel operates in seas off Ibo and Quissanga, and up to Mucojo and Quiterajo in Macomia district. A spokesperson for the security forces, Colonel Benjamin Chabualo, told Zitamar News that they were aware of the incident but did “not yet have any official information on this concerning matter.” According to multiple sources, FADM continued to target civilian boats in subsequent days. Two sources reported that FADM ordered all fishing to stop, and for people to leave Milamba and Pequeué villages to the south of Quiterajo. Around 7 July, a fishing boat leaving Pequeué was targeted, causing an unknown number of fatalities. The crew is believed to have been from Tanzania. In subsequent days, multiple sources reported bodies coming ashore to the north in Mocímboa da Praia district. One claimed that two came ashore in Nabaje, one in Calugo, and two in Ulo village. Another claimed that four had come ashore in Ulo. According to ACLED data, these are the first actions by FADM at sea this year. They follow FADM’s significant losses in an attack on their Quiterajo base on 27 June, despite counter-insurgency operations that were ongoing around Quiterajo at the time. ISM was able to maintain a presence in the Quiterajo area for at least one week after that attack. Islamic State’s weekly newsletter al-Naba reported on 3 July that ISM killed a survivor of the attack in an area close to Quiterajo town. Two other sources reported continued fighting in the area on 5 and 6 July. **Roadblocks on the N380** Traffic on the N380 highway, particularly between Macomia and Awasse towns, continues to be threatened by ISM activity. The risk to business the extortion at roadblocks presents prompted the Mueda branch of the Confederation of Economic Associations (CTA), in a 14 July letter to Mueda district government, to threaten to shut down all business in Mueda for one week from 21 July. The Mueda CTA claims that in the last three months, there have been up to three extortion incidents per week on the N380 involving ISM. Most recently, on 11 July, multiple sources reported that ISM blocked the road between Mungue, also known as Criação, in Muidumbe and Antadora in Mocímboa da Praia district. A number of vehicles, including a Mocímboa da Praia district health services vehicle, were stopped and held until ransom was paid. According to a widely shared recorded conversation with one person caught up in the event, ransoms ranged from 50,000 to 150,000 meticais (780 to 2,240 US dollars). There were also unconfirmed reports of attempts to stop traffic on the same stretch of road on 4 and 7 July. Further south on the N380, another roadblock was mounted on 12 July at Xitaxi, close to Miangelewa. At least one truck was looted in the incident. According to another source, one of the ISM fighters was a youth from Mocímboa da Praia’s Nacala neighborhood. He reportedly told those in the vehicles, “You keep saying we're suffering, that's not true, you're lying to yourselves, we're here working normally.” Continued ISM activity on the road is not surprising, if the testimony of one ISM fighter is accurate. On 3 July, a man was arrested in Macomia on suspicion of scouting the area for a future attack. In a leaked video he claimed that there were five ISM camps south of the Messalo river and close to the N380, but that food was short, seeming to contradict his colleague on the roadblock. In light of this activity, it is surprising that the National Roads Administration organized a road trip for journalists from Macomia to Mueda on 26 June. The party was detained briefly by security forces at Miangelewa, before being returned to Macomia for further questioning, leading the Media Institute for Southern Africa to write to the minister of defense, saying the journalists had been subjected to “[psychological torture](https://misa.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Carta-Ministerio-da-Defesa-Protocolo.pdf?ref=zitamar.com).” **Crime sparks disorder in Mecufi, and ‘Naparama’ appear in Nampula** On 11 July youth blocked the R760 at Maueia, less than 20 kilometers south of Pemba town in Mecufi district, according to local sources. Youth in Maueia alleged that police were ransacking homes and stealing goods under cover of operations against a criminal group known as Grupo 15\. Violent crime is thought to be on the increase in Pemba, a trend that media has [linked](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MpzTVWqXhU&ref=zitamar.com) to the group. The original Grupo 15 was [active in Nampula](https://www.voaportugues.com/a/nacatanas-aterroziam-nampula/3439864.html?ref=zitamar.com) before the insurgency. It is likely that the term has slipped into general usage to refer to armed criminal gangs, and that criminal activity in Pemba may be attributable to various groups. Further south in Nampula province, police in Angoche [claimed](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story%5Ffbid=pfbid02UV5c11iXTotEgRkeykYoWBiQrEJaK41bHWBT4HTXocRbjoUofnjRho1QZYSB8CHrl&id=100094103064227) that a group that the police identify as Naparama has been trying to usurp the government in the district’s Aube area. On 11 July, police reported clashing with a group of seven of them on Malipone island, south of Angoche town. Three died in the clash, among them one police officer. Whether the youth involved represent an organized threat to the state as Naparama or are just a group of alienated young people is not yet clear. The actual threat presented is likely slight, given how few were involved. Thus far, no evidence is available of the youths’ involvement in a wider organization or movement, with just the police’s word that they are Naparama. The police’s attempt to associate the youths with Venâncio Mondlane may be an effort to frame criminal activity as political. ## Focus: FADM’s naval operations On 27 June, Macomia District Administrator Tomás Badae was[ praising FADM](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mais-de-22-mil-deslocados-regressaram-a-macomia/a-73076471?ref=zitamar.com) for enabling the return of displaced people to the Mucojo area. One week later, FADM was firing on fishing boats at Pangane. Targeting of civilians has been a feature of FADM actions at sea. In around one-third of its maritime actions since 2019 it has targeted civilians, resulting in over 100 reported fatalities, according to ACLED data. These actions have taken place along the 250 km coastline between Pemba and Palma (*see map and graph below*). ![](https://lh7-rt.googleusercontent.com/docsz/AD_4nXffLZbp8XwX2toEovh7eNOFsRtIwwNjKZnfnt94gbjjqYwI2Oit2bGLdy9H-gLRYFsfT45caqRfteyZQoQloAkFjaIDf_x-e6vIlDWJZKojMoNV-R6_CUarX4sdwzdF37CWgjq0?key=Hlx4NBjMRb_VpR9IzL_cWw) Cabo Delgado’s coastal waters have been consistently used by ISM insurgents. One of their earliest[ propaganda](https://www.facebook.com/pinnaclenews79/videos/661998864382015/) videos — before this communications function was taken over by the Islamic State — was shot at sea. The importance of combating the group at sea has long been recognized. A pre-deployment assessment by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2021 recommended “[two surface patrol ships, and a submarine](https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Cabo-Ligado-47.pdf?ref=zitamar.com),” though only one ship was ever[ deployed](https://www.military.africa/2021/08/south-african-navy-warships-arrives-mozambique/?ref=zitamar.com) by SADC’s Mission in Mozambique. ACLED data indicate that insurgents have been consistently more active at sea and on offshore islands than FADM. Last week’s killings are the first actions at sea in 2025 involving FADM recorded by ACLED. In contrast, ACLED records ISM involvement in 13 events thus far this year, all off the coast of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. The group’s activity is at a rate similar to 2024, which saw the greatest level of ISM marine activity by year during the conflict. The killing of the three fishermen may represent frustration at ISM’s apparent freedom of movement at sea. However, FADM would be mistaken to think that ISM’s activity in coastal waters is due to widespread civilian support. In 11 of the 13 ISM actions at sea so far this year, fishers and fishing communities have been the victims of either looting or abduction. FADM’s recent actions at sea around Pangane are a response to continued ISM activity in the area, but they are likely to have a detrimental impact on security in the area. Coastal communities who are victims of ISM’s regular theft and extortion are unlikely to collaborate with security forces in these circumstances. This leaves fishing communities in an impossible position, victims of both the insurgents and the military. FADM’s actions, and their order for people to leave the area, also risk undermining the fragile return that the district administrator celebrated last week. The actions may also have national consequences, given the centrality of security to TotalEnergies’ contemplation of lifting force majeure on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Palma to the north. ## Roundup *Mozambique and Malawi ink defense cooperation agreement* At a 3 July meeting of the Mozambique-Malawi Permanent Joint Commission on Defense and Security in Maputo, Mozambique and Malawi [signed](https://aimnews.org/2025/07/03/mozambique-and-malawi-sign-agreement-on-joint-military-exercises/?ref=zitamar.com) an agreement enabling their armed forces to carry out combined patrols and military exercises. At the meeting, the two governments agreed to step up security cooperation to combat cross-border crime and strengthen security. The two countries had previously [pledged](https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-26-june-2-july-2023?ref=zitamar.com) to cooperate on combating “terrorism” at the commission’s 2023 meeting. *TotalEnergies boss visits Mozambique ahead of expected project restart* Patrick Pouyanné, chief executive of French energy firm TotalEnergies, met with Mozambican President Daniel Chapo in Maputo on 10 July. His visit to Mozambique came amid increasing signs that TotalEnergies was preparing to lift its force majeure declaration that paused work on its LNG project in Cabo Delgado province following the insurgent attack on Palma in March 2021\. The decision could come within a month, Zitamar News [reported](https://www.zitamar.com/gas-is-in-the-air/). *Mozambique ‘restarts payments’ for Rwandan counter-insurgency support* The Mozambican government has restarted payments to support the cost of the Rwandan security forces helping fight the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province, Africa Intelligence[said](https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2025/07/08/maputo-resumes-funding-rwandan-forces-tasked-with-securing-mozambique-lng,110474820-art?ref=zitamar.com), after having stopped payments of $2 million per month in August 2024\. Since mid-June, payments have resumed and some of the arrears have also been paid, but “the situation has yet to be thoroughly resolved,” according to the report, which adds that “it seems unlikely that the Rwandans will be asked to stay in the country much longer” now that President Chapo has taken power. Cabo Ligado understands, however, that Chapo is holding firm against opposition to maintaining the Rwandan military presence in Cabo Delgado, as its departure could be fatal for the gas projects in Palma district. The Rwandan mission, which is partly funded by the European Union, costs over $10 million a month. *Former Mozambican officials questioned over police conduct in post-election protests* Former Mozambican Interior Minister Pascoal Ronda and former Police Commander Bernardino Rafael were [questioned](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-ex-ministro-do-interior-ouvido-na-pgr-sobre-viol%C3%AAncia-p%C3%B3s-eleitoral/a-73223994?ref=zitamar.com) last week by the Attorney General's Office in Maputo regarding a complaint from civil society organizations concerning police actions during post-election protests. Rafael has been accused of being responsible for the deaths of 65 citizens and the injury of more than 1,000 people, in a [complaint filed by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD)](https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Apresentada-denuncia-contra-o-comando-geral-da-PRM-e-SERNIC-pela-morte-de-65-cidadaos-e-ferimento-de-mais-de-mil-no-ambito-das-manifestacoes-pela-justica-eleitoral.pdf?ref=zitamar.com) in November last year. Social activist Wilker Dias also [filed a complaint](https://www.dw.com/pt-002/protestos-pol%C3%ADcia-agiu-assim-porque-teve-instru%C3%A7%C3%A3o/a-70867460?ref=zitamar.com) against Rafael and Ronda, demanding that they be held responsible for the deaths that occurred during the protests. Rafael's nine-hour session was described as an initial hearing, and more individuals are set to be questioned before the Public Prosecutor's Office considers potential charges or coercive measures. ### Cleaning up Sernic URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cleaning-up-sernic/ Last updated: 2025-07-15T16:20:46.000Z Good afternoon. Attorney-general Américo Letela’s comments about the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic; see below) are a sign of the winds of change blowing through the investigative force. Letela may or may not be the first attorney-general to publicly admit that some Sernic officers are involved in organised crime (no surprise there), but he is the first one to be in a position to do anything about it, now that responsibility for Sernic has been transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Attorney-General’s Office. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/c8023082-4e56-494f-b39f-5511e1de2cc9/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican state enjoys better terms as Coral North gas project goes aheadThe state has earned $210m in revenues from the Coral South project so far, mostly from its share of revenues from gas produced![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-229.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-15-17.42.34.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-state-enjoys-better-terms-as-coral-north-gas-project-goes-ahead/) ### From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogThe Constitutional Council, Mozambique’s highest court on constitutional matters, has dismissed an appeal from opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane demanding clarification over the process of registering his new political party, to be called Anamalala. Mondlane appealed to the council complaining that the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional, and Religious Affairs had failed to make a decision on approving the party by the required deadline, despite the fact that Mondlane’s supporters had met ministry officials to discuss queries about the application. However, it ruled that the ministry was still within the deadline to issue a decision. The justice ministry had demanded Mondlane’s party amend its constitution due to irregularities, including the name “Anamalala,” which it ruled was divisive. The ruling is attached.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-81.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.cdn-telegram.org/file/rzPwjqIP2vAUnGIjs-MD4UqmDfe9ipLe9B--g_N1kidW8N9apIMyWV8Vkq1tG5CkLqrjiSbePh3YyxoHfXI2bDdB85UNRrywIVr6lTaS0G-T5UDIxV7rWfShYyTFOyztFHzFSP7Vmcv887gH4Tztd3SVl39cw-IeNpzHr9vUPDBTNNZ69zcRhI10NHpRfzOrgIgpbepMcOxWxhx8fmMoi-AAn_9xPhrS0VhMY6G1VbtKDHq-H1OnFIZEHy2Lj_AN_Y0VFBBgwYVukdMrOBdJrl5Rz_YgGVVhuUugTLbUy8pgG7gE5TF4MDUL4aa_ehWmEniJSxfg1SKfOxmH3HYOaw.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4386?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As we noted [recently](https://www.zitamar.com/sernic-throws-off-the-handcuffs/), under previous arrangements, Sernic was under the effective control of the police command, which exposed Sernic to the influence and interference of corrupt and malicious police officers. The Attorney-General’s Office has its faults, but it has a different culture to the security forces and it will be less tolerant of corruption and wrongdoing. Sernic’s change of management is bad news for gangs engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping and other popular forms of organised crime in Mozambique. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican state enjoys better terms as Coral North gas project goes ahead URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-state-enjoys-better-terms-as-coral-north-gas-project-goes-ahead/ Last updated: 2025-07-23T05:09:43.000Z The Mozambican government was able to extract “last-minute gains” from Italian energy company Eni as the latter prepared to start construction work on a second floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) platform, to extract gas off the coast of Cabo Delgado province. A consultant told *Zitamar News* that the “last-minute gains were only possible because of the excellent historical relations between Mozambique and Italy”. Eni chief executive Claudio Descalzi, flew in his executive jet to the Mozambican capital Maputo last month to clarify several points about the plan of development drawn up by Eni and approved by the government in April for the the $7.2bn floating LNG project, to be known as Coral North and operated by Eni. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Chapo’s election dilemma URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapos-election-dilemma/ Last updated: 2025-07-14T15:19:11.000Z Good afternoon. Two speeches made by President Daniel Chapo at the end of last week illustrate the political dilemma in which he finds himself. Chapo spoke at the national conference of his ruling Frelimo party’s youth organisation, and also in Bobole, Maputo province, during his official visit to the province. On both occasions he referred to the elections held in October last year, where he was declared the winner of the presidential election and Frelimo the winner of the parliamentary election, despite widespread and large-scale fraud in favour of them both. Chapo nevertheless insisted that Frelimo had won the elections, and that his main challenger for the presidency, Venâncio Mondlane, had lost. The nationwide protests that broke out after the elections were, Chapo insisted, orchestrated by “far-right” foreign political movements that threatened not only Frelimo but also other so-called liberation parties in Africa, like the ANC in South Africa and MPLA in Angola (there were protests in the Angolan capital Luanda at the weekend, but they were caused by discontent over a rise in fuel prices rather than a foreign conspiracy). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/41bb9c1c-f78b-4e4a-9569-e517fc855f58/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican coffee moves from fashion trend to large-scale productionCoffee production is finally taking off in Mozambique, after having been non-existent for most of the country’s history. But there is room for more growth and a need for more government support![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-228.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-14-14.43.45.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-coffee-moves-from-fashion-trend-to-large-scale-production/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It is not the first time Chapo has tried to blame unspecified foreign actors for the unpopularity of Frelimo. His speeches may have pleased hardliners in Frelimo, the kind of people who think that the party which fought for Mozambican independence has the right to rule the country permanently. But they might well be provocative to other people. There can hardly be a more inflammatory subject to bring up in Mozambique today than last year’s disputed elections, considering the scale and violence of the protests that they triggered. True, the protests were about Frelimo’s bad government as well as election fraud, but in any case, it is a very sensitive topic. So why raise it now, nine months after the elections and several months after the protests died down? _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican coffee moves from fashion trend to large-scale production URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-coffee-moves-from-fashion-trend-to-large-scale-production/ Last updated: 2025-07-14T13:01:05.000Z Mozambique is expected to produce 90 tonnes of dry coffee this year, but despite this being a record number, there is still a long way to go to secure the industry and its future growth, according to industry players. The jump in production is itself slightly misleading: only 50 tonnes were produced in the last harvest, in 2023-24, but production was heavily affected by the stem borer pest and the antestia bug, mainly in Gorongosa district in the central province of Sofala, where most Mozambican coffee comes from. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Ronda can relax URL: https://www.zitamar.com/ronda-can-relax/ Last updated: 2025-07-11T15:17:19.000Z Good afternoon. Middle-class opponents of the government will have enjoyed the news that former interior minister Pascoal Ronda was summoned to answer questions at the Attorney-General’s Office yesterday (see below). The fact that Ronda spent about six hours there suggests that this was more than just a formality. His interview came three days after that of Bernardino Rafael, the former police commander who served under Ronda. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/6e38fdeb-e3cf-4230-87d1-ac7b821186e2/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Until January, Ronda was in charge of law enforcement agencies, which means that he was responsible for their behaviour for the majority of the period of nationwide anti-government protests triggered by last year’s contested elections. During this time, over 300 people were killed and over 3,000 injured in protests, according to the NGO Plataforma Decide. The majority of deaths were caused when police shot demonstrators, often without warning and indiscriminately, according to a [report](https://www.zitamar.com/amnesty-international-report-on-mozambiques-protests-throws-light-on-trigger-happy-police/) by NGO Amnesty International. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Gas is in the air URL: https://www.zitamar.com/gas-is-in-the-air/ Last updated: 2025-07-10T14:56:57.000Z Good afternoon. The visit of Patrick Pouyanné, chief executive of French energy firm TotalEnergies, to Maputo today and his anticipated meeting with President Daniel Chapo are further signs that the company plans to restart work soon on its liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo Delgado province. Two sources have told *Zitamar News* that they expect an announcement within a month on the lifting of “force majeure”, the legal status governing the suspension of the project’s contracts. That is assuming that TotalEnergies and the government agree to either settle or defer some unresolved issues, on which we hope to report shortly. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/56552389-4e3a-4f33-a9cb-7025fac11a5b/)*.* ### From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live BlogPatrick Pouyanné, chief executive of French energy firm TotalEnergies, is visiting the city of Maputo today, where he is expected to meet Mozambican president Daniel Chapo, sources have told Zitamar News. The visit comes amid increasing signs that TotalEnergies is preparing to restart work on its liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo Delgado province, known as Mozambique LNG, after four years. Some sources recently told Zitamar that work could restart within a month.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-80.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.cdn-telegram.org/file/Q7Gis1cfXak1R3vgi8c0Q8eMjqVw7C6XM0g3kcV1eyG8oIT73DFHNoUgHpMPkOg0wR_OWBDqehBBh6lYqwprq7878z8ynXaLf6Nr7KpFg84BdmZhrkxa-Iv1_DiBBRkfB_IRsQLGTnxEsezCurhIPNkUPHl8DAyebK6yJK-Ebu2sk0jTp-s-QGOU0WvSD4M1KbkJdMV0PN-wJcpN8lZ3_2kyMnXxNSWbFmEHjI_qFGyjgXUG8X_277Z0dTqWfOr0rtAG2Oejz1KewjO4shJvoHFdcCFylxYSawMbws--xAD6M4mC13ClTjZj4xRXcgRYRV3zRR11QUPB1DCjDIFMjA.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4378?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) As well as making sure that the economics of the project, known as Mozambique LNG, still stack up, TotalEnergies will want to ensure that the region is reasonably well-defended against insurgent attacks. The threat of the insurgency is one of the two factors that have kept the project in the freezer for the past four years, following the attack on the nearby town of Palma in March 2021 that led to its suspension. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The young are left to rot URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-young-are-left-to-rot/ Last updated: 2025-07-09T16:44:53.000Z Good afternoon. Another report has come out about Mozambique’s ballooning population (see below). The fact that the country is producing too many children, and that its population looks set to double in the 30 or so years to 2050, is well known. What is missing is a discussion about what the government should be doing to provide for a rising population. Something in the region of two-thirds of Mozambicans are aged under 25\. In 2023, about half the population of roughly 34m people were aged under 15, according to the website Our World In Data. In the coming years, many of those children will reach working age, in a country totally unable to provide enough jobs or educational opportunities for young people. Too many of them end up scratching out a miserable living as informal street sellers. In desperation they stand in the middle of the road to attract custom, and some of them get injured or killed in collisions with passing traffic. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/9cc11142-0699-4e1d-989c-6f2250339561/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The government’s traditional response is that it needs more schools to be built and more teachers to be trained, and that it has to go once again with the begging bowl to donor agencies for money. Certainly more schools and teachers are badly needed. But begging for money and throwing money at the problem is not enough, and it is increasingly unviable in a world where donor countries like the United States are increasingly reducing their aid. What is needed is for the government to foster private sector investment and entrepreneurialism that encourages the creation of education and work opportunities. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The long road to repairing the N1 URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-long-road-to-repairing-the-n1/ Last updated: 2025-07-08T15:45:02.000Z Good afternoon. Two media outlets report today in two quite different ways on the long-running project to repair the N1 highway, Mozambique’s only real north-south tarmac road, spanning almost the whole length of the country (see below). For years, the N1 has been in a terrible condition, placing severe restrictions on people trying to use it to transport goods and passengers and limiting the speed of vehicles. The World Bank has offered $850m of grant funding to repair about 1,050km of the road, of which $400m has been signed off, but even this first instalment of money is taking a long time to spend. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/b8a0adef-5108-4b3d-b746-4efc5734d843/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) While state-controlled newspaper *Notícias* says optimistically on its front page that the “government reassures that it is still preparing the project”, the independent newssheet *Mediafax* leads with the headline “From promise to promise… now they speak of ‘coming months’”. It then notes caustically that the previous government of President Filipe Nyusi made “almost permanent” promises to start work on the project, but that it left office without making real progress on the work, which aims to make the road fully traversable. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### A boot on the neck URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-boot-on-the-neck/ Last updated: 2025-07-07T16:13:48.000Z Good afternoon. More news came in late last week about the journalists recently detained in Cabo Delgado province’s Macomia district (see below). While a previous report of the incident published by broadcaster Zumbo FM last week may contain inaccuracies, it now seems clear that the basic account of journalists trying to report on a road repair project getting held up and challenged by security forces is essentially correct. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/2589f1ce-5c23-4fa4-a079-391908803347/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Mozambican navy accused of killing fishermen off coastal MacomiaThis alleged incident would be the latest in a string of killings of civilians at sea and by the Mozambican navy![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-227.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-07-07-17.50.07.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-fishermen-off-coastal-macomia/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Despite being invited as the guests of the National Roads Administration and having got authorisation from the district administrator, the group were still interrogated, photographed, had their equipment confiscated and were generally treated like suspected insurgents. Having a green light from civilian authorities does not seem to have counted for much, not the fact that some of the journalists in question were from the state-owned broadcaster TVM. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Mozambican navy accused of killing fishermen off coastal Macomia URL: https://www.zitamar.com/mozambican-navy-accused-of-killing-fishermen-off-coastal-macomia/ Last updated: 2025-07-07T15:54:58.000Z At least three fishermen were killed and four others injured in an incident involving alleged Mozambican navy personnel off the coast near the village of Pangane, in Cabo Delgado province’s Macomia district last week. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### More hidden debts? Not really URL: https://www.zitamar.com/more-hidden-debts-not-really/ Last updated: 2025-07-04T15:28:06.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican government has run up $1.8bn worth of “hidden debt” since 2005, weekly newspaper *Savana* reports today, in undeclared borrowing from the Bank of Mozambique. Is Mozambique facing another financial scandal and, perhaps, an economic crash? The auditor’s report on the Bank of Mozambique’s financial results for 2024, published last week, points out that the Mozambican state has not issued debt instruments to the central bank in return for financing over the last 20 years totalling MZN115bn ($1.8bn), plus interest of MZN28bn ($438m). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/fceefe65-f74b-4984-8484-7117a88c0f5d/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The suggestion is that had it done so, the government’s internal debt would by now be MZN143bn ($2.2bn) higher than it currently appears — and even the current figure is causing widespread alarm. Surely the state is now completely bankrupt? Well, no. Somehow, the government has managed to repay or renegotiate its debts without messy defaults, and there has been no economic and financial crisis comparable to that which followed the discovery of $2bn in foreign debt in 2016\. Nor should we expect one. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The police face justice, up to a point URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-police-face-justice-up-to-a-point/ Last updated: 2025-07-03T16:01:06.000Z Good afternoon. The winds of change continue to blow through the Mozambican police force. Yesterday, it emerged that former police chief Bernardino Rafael, who was dismissed in January after overseeing a brutal crackdown on protesters following last year’s disputed elections, had been summoned to appear before prosecutors next week. A criminal complaint against Rafael says that police under his command committed human rights violations. Such complaints are not new, but the fact that they are being taken seriously is. Today it is reported that more police officers are to be investigated for excessive use of force when policing the demonstrations (see below). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/48771d84-b872-4dba-895b-05ca2651cbe4/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Over 300 civilians were killed during the five months of protests, generally shot by police, who often fired on crowds indiscriminately. The police force has a reputation for politically partisan behaviour, having regularly repressed opposition marches in the past. Unlike the army, the guerrillas of then-paramilitary group Renamo were not integrated into the police force after the 1992 peace deal between Renamo and the government to end the civil war. Thus the force has remained a loyal attack dog of the ruling Frelimo party. And indeed, on the occasions during the protests when the army was brought onto the streets, it refrained from joining in the police shootings. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Government keeps a lid on asset declarations URL: https://www.zitamar.com/government-keeps-a-lid-on-asset-declarations/ Last updated: 2025-07-02T15:56:01.000Z Good afternoon. How much transparency does President Daniel Chapo expect from his government? Two months ago, the Attorney-General’s Office announced it was extending the deadline for ministers and senior officials to submit declarations of assets they own, after some 18% of them, or about 17,000 people, failed to submit on time. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/12de3178-705d-45c1-903b-ebf3ae735409/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Cabo Ligado Update: 2 July 2025 (16-29 June 2025)Islamic State (IS) last week claimed the killing of 30 Defence Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) soldiers in an attack in Macomia![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-226.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/header_-_cabo_delgado_-_16-29_-_en_.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-2-july-2025-16-29-june-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) The perception that members of the government and senior officials (many of whom are members of the ruling Frelimo party, and got their jobs through patronage networks) have used their connections to acquire stakes in various businesses is one that inflames public opinion and feeds the perception that much of the state and the economy have been captured by a greedy elite. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Ligado Update: 2 July 2025 (16-29 June 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-2-july-2025-16-29-june-2025/ Last updated: 2025-07-03T08:57:15.000Z ## By the numbers **Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (16 - 29 June 2025)** - **At least 6 political violence events (2,105 in total since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 14 reported fatalities from political violence (6,084 since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 1 reported civilian fatality (2,509 since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 6 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,939 since 1 October 2017)** ## Overview Islamic State (IS) last week claimed the killing of 30 Defence Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) soldiers in an attack in Macomia, though only 13 fatalities could be confirmed. The clash came amid ongoing operations in the Catupa forest area of Quiterajo against Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) by FADM and Rwandan forces. The week before the attack, ISM raised thousands of US dollars by extorting ransoms at roadblocks on the N380 highway west of Quiterajo. ISM’s need to raise funds also helps explain its increasing activity in Meluco district, where it has been particularly active around mining sites. [Cabo Ligado Update: 16 — 29 de Junho de 2025 — Cabo LigadoEm números Principais dados na província de Cabo Delgado (16 - 29 de Junho de 2025) Pelo menos 6 eventos de violência política ( 2.105 no total desde 1 de outubro de 2017) Pelo menos 14 fatalidades relatadas de violência política ( 6.084 desde 1 de outubro de 2017) Pelo menos 1 fa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/favicon-10.ico)Cabo LigadoCabo Ligado![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/Thumbnail---Cabo-Ligado---1629--June.png)](https://www.caboligado.com/portugues/cabo-ligado-16-29-junho-2025?ref=zitamar.com) Click here to read the report in Portuguese ## Situation Summary The Macomia district of Cabo Delgado province was the scene of significant insurgent activity in the last two weeks, especially around the security forces base in the depths of the Catupa forest. IS claimed to have attacked the camp on 14 June, killing one soldier, and on 17 June it firing four mortars, with no reported casualties. Security forces abandoned the camp following this second incident, but Macomia administrator Tomás Badae [said](https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-joint-force-retakes-catupa-base-from-insurgents-285548/?ref=zitamar.com) on 27 June that the base had been recaptured, although it’s unclear if it was ever occupied by insurgents. [Lusa](https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-joint-force-retakes-catupa-base-from-insurgents-285548/?ref=zitamar.com) reported that a joint force of FADM, the Local Force, and Rwandan forces was involved in retaking the camp. Explosions coming from the Catupa forest were heard in the village of Namigure on the evening of 27 June, a local source said, confirming [remarks](https://aimnews.org/2025/06/30/macomia-in-panic-following-clashes-with-terrorists/?ref=zitamar.com) by Badae that fighting was ongoing in the area. The day after Badae spoke to the media, The Islamic State news agency Amaq reported that insurgents killed 30 soldiers on 27 June in an assault on another army base in the village of Quiterajo on the Macomia coast, but this figure has not been substantiated. The report included an image of 13 bodies in military uniform. Local sources confirmed an attack but did not corroborate the claim of 30 deaths. If confirmed, this would be among the highest numbers of security force casualties reported in a single incident. Amaq said fighting continued for an hour and that insurgents seized weapons and burned the base. Though IS often complements its claims with photographic evidence, in this case it offered none. There is also no base visible in the one image it provided. On 17 June, ISM set up roadblocks on the N380 highway for several hours between the villages of Quinto Congresso and Chai in Macomia. Several vehicles were stopped and ordered to pay ransoms in exchange for their release. Two truck drivers on their way to Nampula province to buy goods were among those taken hostage, and they were forced to pay 250,000 meticais, a source told Cabo Ligado. One woman [filmed](https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-village-burned-and-looted-by-insurgents/) herself with a group of around 10 people, including children, walking through the bush back to the N380 after being released by insurgents. In the video, she says they had to pay insurgents between 40,000 and 200,000 meticais. The insurgents abandoned the roadblocks as the Rwanda Defence Force arrived, a local source said. Two days later, insurgents [attacked](https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-village-burned-and-looted-by-insurgents/) the village of Quinto Congresso, burning several homes and stealing goods, including medical supplies from the store of a community health worker. ISM fighters returning from their incursion into Niassa province in April appear to have returned east to Macomia. IS claimed to have killed a civilian on 19 June near the village of Minhanha in Meluco, where insurgents had been seen since 8 June. Insurgents were reported northwest of Minhanha, near the village of Mapate in Muidumbe district, just north of the Messalo river, on 22 June. The next day, the Local Force was sent to the area, but insurgents managed to evade them and were seen again crossing the N380, north of the village of Litamanda, between 25 and 27 June, a local source reported. There were also unconfirmed sightings of ISM insurgents in Quissanga district, near the village of Cagembe on 20 and 23 June. Insurgents have not been active in the district since [February](https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-10-23-february-2025?ref=zitamar.com), when they killed two Mozambican soldiers in Bilibiza. ## Focus: ISM activity in Meluco ISM activity in Meluco district has increased noticeably in 2025\. In the first half of the year, ACLED records 26 events involving ISM, compared to 16 events in all of 2024\. Activity peaked in 2022 with 38 events, a level that will likely be surpassed in 2025 (*see graph below*). ![](https://lh7-rt.googleusercontent.com/docsz/AD_4nXdEG0-9LmQoa3ZBOz63tpOi4xZgMH-PYxm_wckcGbFwsFVwFfAOKRB4KMShVNgBTgCWo72kOctMEXvHtqo5_DGx9yhDLBCHu-MzdoriLoIisVqhVbJ90HpNxNsRk9STn3NC9IJd?key=4pDOwbDBpKR0uTSWntwi0Q) The group’s activity is driven partly by the need for an alternative location due to military operations between the coast and the N380 highway, as well as the district being a route to Ancuabe in the south and Niassa to the west. It may also be driven by funding needs. There are a number of artisanal mines in Meluco, where insurgents have been spotted numerous times this year. As a site that provides refuge and allows elements of ISM to regroup, sparsely populated Meluco is attractive to insurgents. There is just one FADM position in the district headquarters, and consequently, it is deadly for civilians. Out of the 12 violent incidents involving ISM this year, 10 targeted civilians and accounted for 15 of the 18 fatalities recorded. The group has clashed just once with FADM and once with the Local Force. The relationship between informal mining and ISM’s financing is less clear. The group’s increased activity around mine sites suggests it may be of growing importance. ACLED records ISM activity around Minhanha, an area long known for gemstone mining, in the north of the district in January, February, and April, and numerous times in June. On 18 June, ISM invaded a gemstone mine at Matandane near the town. ISM has also been active in the gold mining village of Ravia at least six times this year. Rising activity in Meluco district presents a challenge for counterinsurgency operations. There is a clear need to strengthen FADM and Local Force presence in the district to restrict the movement of fighters and protect civilians. In addressing possible financing, there may be little the authorities can do in the short term to stem downstream trade in gold and gemstones, which is rampant. However, establishing effective intelligence networks in mining communities may help in understanding insurgents’ structures and support operations, and thereby support counter-insurgency efforts. ## Roundup *Investigations into LNG-related human rights violations multiply* Mozambique’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) [announced](https://aimnews.org/2025/06/28/cndh-anuncia-investigacao-de-violacao-de-direitos-humanos-em-cabo-delgado/?ref=zitamar.com) on 26 June that it would conduct an inquiry into the allegations made in [Politico](https://www.politico.eu/article/totalenergies-mozambique-patrick-pouyanne-atrocites-afungi-palma-cabo-delgado-al-shabab-isis/?ref=zitamar.com) and [Le Monde](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/11/24/violences-arrestations-disparitions-totalenergies-savait-que-des-exactions-etaient-commises-sur-son-site-gazier-au-mozambique%5F6412216%5F3212.html?ref=zitamar.com) that Mozambican forces guarding theTotalEnergies-led liquefied natural gas project in Palma district tortured and killed people in the wake of the ISM attack on Palma in March 2021\. CNDH’s inquiry is just the latest of a number of investigations into the 2021 events. In April, the public prosecutor [announced](https://www.pgr.gov.mz/por/Imprensa/Noticias/Aberto-Processo-sobre-violacao-de-Direitos-Humanos?ref=zitamar.com) that its provincial office in Cabo Delgado would conduct an inquiry. The following month, authorities in France [announced](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240504-france-opens-probe-of-totalenergies-over-2021-mozambique-attack?ref=zitamar.com) an investigation. In June, [the Financial Times reported](https://www.ft.com/content/28defb12-a248-493d-8563-5492aeb8b425?ref=zitamar.com) that UK Export Finance, the British government’s export credit agency, has commissioned legal consultancy firm Beyond Human Rights Compliance to investigate the events. *Insurgents increasing child kidnappings, says human rights report* ISM has ramped up child kidnappings in Mozambique of late, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a [statement](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/24/mozambique-armed-groups-child-abductions-surge-in-north?ref=zitamar.com) released on 24 June. Children are mostly taken for forced labor, forced marriage, and fighting, HRW says. HRW called on “Al-Shabab,” as it referred to the insurgents, “to spare children from the conflict and immediately release those who have been abducted.” One source told HRW that at least 120 children had been recently abducted in Cabo Delgado province. The source gave no other details. UNICEF recently [noted](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-mozambique-statement-increasing-violence-against-and-abduction-children-cabo?ref=zitamar.com) that child kidnappings were on the rise, though it referred to just one incident of eight being abducted. ACLED data show two incidents in May in which 13 children were abducted by insurgents. *Chapo opens up on negotiation with insurgents, and relations with Rwanda* President Daniel Chapo has opened up the possibility of negotiations with insurgents in Cabo Delgado. Speaking with the press on 22 June, he was firm that counter-insurgency operations must continue, but also that the authorities must “[find ways to communicate](https://cartamz.com/carta-do-fim-do-mundo/43942/chapo-desfaz-tabu-e-admite-dialogo-com-os-terroristas/?ref=zitamar.com).” Expanding on the issue, he stressed the need to understand the insurgency and its structures, similar to how the state approached Renamo during the civil war. The president also alluded to strains in the relationship with Rwanda. He denied the Africa Intelligence report that Mozambique had suspended payments to Rwanda to support the intervention. However, he alluded to strains in the relationship, saying that “there was a misunderstanding and this misunderstanding has been clarified, both on our part (Mozambique) and on Rwanda’s part.” However, he did not make clear the nature of the misunderstanding or its significance. *Chapo commits to supporting Local Force in Mueda* On a visit to Mueda to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Mueda Massacre, Chapo visited the headquarters of the Local Force, [saluted](https://youtu.be/LGNx8eQyyp4?si=DgVoWJoZIXG9LVdt&ref=zitamar.com) them, and stated that supporting the Local Reforms is of the “greatest priority” and has been covered in the most recent budget. He also committed to addressing their “[major concerns](https://presidencia.gov.mz/?p=2903&ref=zitamar.com),” though he did not specify what they were. In recent weeks, Mueda town, where the Local Force [manages most security functions](http://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Analysis-of-the-security.pdf?ref=zitamar.com), has been under an unofficial but strict curfew. The curfew was ordered by the local authorities and imposed by the Local Force, reflecting the power it wields on the Makonde plateau. The Local Force’s strategic value in counter-insurgency is reflected in ACLED data. In the first six months of 2025, Local Force activity across Cabo Delgado almost equals that for all of 2024\. This has been concentrated in Macomia and Muidumbe, reflecting the locus of the insurgency. The location of the Local Force headquarters, Mueda, reflects the historical importance of the Makonde community to the independence movement. Chapo’s commitment to continuing to support this force, which also has roots in the Frelimo party, signifies its rising importance in northern Mozambique. ### A new IMF deal will bring old problems URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-new-imf-deal-will-bring-old-problems/ Last updated: 2025-07-01T15:29:23.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo has expressed optimism about Mozambique agreeing a new loan programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF; see below). He met officials from the IMF in Seville yesterday during a United Nations conference. The Mozambican government has sorely missed the IMF’s lending since the last loan programme was abruptly ended in April this year. Not only would the interest-free loans be very welcome to a government struggling to pay its bills, but having an IMF programme in place would encourage other financiers and donors to provide support to the country. It would in particular be a precondition of the European Union resuming the provision of subsidy for the state budget. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/20de32cf-c1f0-4a85-98c2-33ffea6b20aa/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Azura Power moves ahead with Nacala gas-fired power plansThe project would be Azura’s second power station in Mozambique, and is one of two new power projects it is developing in the country![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-225.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/ctrg.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/azura-power-moves-ahead-with-nacala-gas-fired-power-plans/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Although the IMF and the government said they had agreed to halt the previous programme, it is fairly clear that it ended because the latter was unable to meet the targets attached to the loan, for example controlling the size of the public sector wage bill. It is quite possible that a new loan will be agreed before the end of the year, as Chapo hopes. But a new loan will bring with it more targets and old problems. Can the cost of the public sector be reduced, can growing public sector debt be controlled, can tax collection be made more effective and can loss-making state-owned businesses be reformed or privatised? Undoubtedly Chapo and his ministers will want to make a start on tackling these issues now, in order to look as good as possible in front of the IMF executives when the government submits its application (something that, as at May, it had not done). _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Azura Power moves ahead with Nacala gas-fired power plans URL: https://www.zitamar.com/azura-power-moves-ahead-with-nacala-gas-fired-power-plans/ Last updated: 2025-07-01T14:52:27.000Z A company backed by the private power projects developer Azura Power has published the pre-feasibility environmental study for its proposed 200MW gas-fired power plant to be located in the city of Nacala-Porto, in Mozambique’s Nampula province. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Chapo tests Mondlane’s patience URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-tests-mondlanes-patience/ Last updated: 2025-06-30T15:15:27.000Z Good afternoon. Opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane has complained about President Daniel Chapo’s comments rejecting the possibility of an amnesty for people arrested during the protests sparked by last year’s disputed elections (see below). The issue was discussed by Chapo and Mondlane at a [meeting](https://www.zitamar.com/dialogue-is-in-the-air/) earlier this year, and, as *Zitamar News* understands, they both agreed at least in principle that there should be an amnesty. Chapo has said that there is no legal basis for one, but all that means is that parliament would need to pass a law granting the amnesty, and there is no reason why it cannot, as it has done in the past. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/45a50ae7-7b49-4d92-9726-ba531ad7ef16/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Mondlane had other grounds for grievance against Chapo as he left the prosecutor’s office in Maputo on Friday, where he was grilled yet again about his conduct. Last week, in his speech marking 50 years of Mozambique’s independence, Chapo was relating the country’s history when he rather suddenly made a reference to the “violent, criminal and illegal demonstrations of recent months”. He compared them to the Mozambican civil war of 1977-1992, saying that both events caused the destruction of infrastructure and held back the creation of prosperity and the fight against poverty. It was the only real topical reference in a speech that was otherwise bland, uncontroversial and full of platitudes. The occasion did not force Chapo to address the subject of the protests, but he chose to anyway, and in a rather provocative way, comparing them to the guerrilla fighters of then paramilitary force Renamo with whom the government fought a cruel and bloody war. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Who guards the guardians? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-guards-the-guardians/ Last updated: 2025-06-27T16:02:26.000Z Good afternoon. In a country with as much petty crime as Mozambique, valuables must be guarded. Security guards are used to protect all manner of assets, from the townhouses of the better-off to fleets of lorries parked up in the countryside, which are liable to have their fuel siphoned off and their batteries removed if left unattended. Small wonder that the private security industry has mushroomed in Mozambique. In the absence of official figures, it is estimated to employ about 100,000 people across some 600 companies, according to a senior industry source speaking to *Zitamar News.* One in every 350 or so people works in it. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article, here.* [Subscribe from just £9 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This sector operates with very little state oversight. The fact that many of them do not pay social security contributions (see below) is only one of the problems. A significant number of security firms are not even licensed, do not operate within the law, are not necessarily properly insured and, outside the capital Maputo, do not pay the minimum wage, thanks to a lack of scrutiny from the authorities in the provinces. Even multinational companies are happy to employ unlicensed security firms. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Looking for friends across the sea URL: https://www.zitamar.com/looking-for-friends-across-the-sea/ Last updated: 2025-06-26T15:19:03.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo is expected to tour Europe next week, meeting foreign dignitaries and showing his face in the continent’s capitals. At the time of writing, it is not clear how much of the trip is going ahead; *Zitamar News* has learned that Chapo will no longer visit the United Kingdom tomorrow, where he was scheduled to speak at an event marking the 50th anniversary of Mozambique’s independence. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/39f69ec3-5f24-4bcf-8d8e-65336d449c58/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Much of the purpose of these visits is for domestic consumption. Five months on from when Chapo was inaugurated — during a time of national disorder, surrounded by a tight security cordon and with most invited foreign heads of state staying away — his aides are still anxious about his status as a legitimate president. It is only a few months since protesters who insisted that opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane, and not Chapo, was their rightful president, were burning offices of ruling party Frelimo and smashing up toll gates to dispute the election results and vent their anger at Frelimo. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Give the localities their independence too URL: https://www.zitamar.com/give-the-localities-their-independence-too/ Last updated: 2025-06-24T15:49:41.000Z Good afternoon. The absence of the state is a constant condition of life in rural Mozambique. Outside the cities, there is little sign that local government is acting to look after the interests of ordinary people. Very often, the responsibility for paying for public services like community healthcare, or public works projects like building a road, is assigned either to donor-funded NGOs or to a local business, typically working in mining or other natural resources. It reinforces the sense that, despite 50 years of independence (the anniversary is tomorrow), Mozambique remains dependent on wealthier countries and corporate interests in some ways. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/49548848-4fb0-4cff-a6b0-f03eeb41ddf3/)*.* ## From the [*Zitamar Live Blog*](https://t.me/zitamarlive?ref=zitamar.com): [Zitamar Mozambique Live Blog💥 Islamic State last night claimed to have captured and killed a civilian near the village of Minhanha in the Meluco district of Cabo Delgado province on Thursday. The incident has not yet been confirmed, but local sources told Zitamar News that insurgents returning from their recent incursion into Niassa province have been based there since early June.![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/apple-touch-icon-79.png)Telegram![](https://cdn4.cdn-telegram.org/file/tpr7cECSwJZy5CiEaLd9hZlFqwtYMCvCER0qh1H1CStmNxu01vbGP2CHYW1dsQvtDb1onw4kgBpFuKAmh6sofejhVk9rrc12EEVkn3YZpDxQ0LO5u0BTA250xJINU-ULGctNZBk7DGtSKnzxiA4qO9KY7bDNDWBYlUqc_8o1Cv2Sp0ZM6TvX_BBnU3RHNfkENqLXene4IvgBhh7JnH_jDVpLhLNC3Me7SmN5VLnSWAAU37ypRBd-9xu19sH_VB0zmp1EW5pm_EetonpH8Ljj2ty00t6WdkFxkRhFSK6JFUtlufvtyrpd0HJFydTbX0GYSDsqRMqlhTpEzK3CJXHB6w.jpg)](https://t.me/zitamarlive/4355?ref=zitamar.com) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Fifty years on, Mozambique continues to struggle with stubbornly high poverty (the poverty rate has been rising in recent years, not falling), high inequality and poor provision of infrastructure and public services. Of course, much of that is due to lack of resources, but it is also arguable that resources are not always allocated in the most helpful way. Mozambique still bears many hallmarks of a highly centralised and authoritarian socialist state: district administrators lack the funds to undertake even modest public works projects in their area, like repairing a road or the roof of a school. Too often, they are reduced to merely making impotent statements to the media, weakly urging or pleading for money. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### The profits of making a loss URL: https://www.zitamar.com/the-profits-of-making-a-loss/ Last updated: 2025-06-23T15:33:27.000Z Good afternoon. The film and musical *The Producers* tells the story of two men who come up with an idea to cheat theatre investors out of their money. The plan is to take money from people investing in a new play, far more money than is needed to finance it, and then make sure that the play fails, so that no investor can ask for their money back. The producers will get to pocket all the remaining money. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/d7b2e49b-b372-476c-9870-c960b4b3ed32/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Macomia village burned and looted by insurgentsSources said that the attacks of the village were the same people who extorted money from travellers on the N380 highway earlier in the week![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-220.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-23-17.09.24.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-village-burned-and-looted-by-insurgents/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Some Mozambican state-owned companies operate on quite similar lines. Only three companies in the state sector currently report a profit: hydropower company Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric, insurance firm Emose and rail and ports operator CFM. But that does not mean that the other firms are unprofitable. Several of them are capable of making a profit, but it is not in their interests to report profits, because that would mean having to hand them over to the state treasury. Instead, they report a loss, which leaves more money to be embezzled and allows them to claim state subsidies so they can keep going. These firms have been captured by corrupt people in the ruling Frelimo party, whose senior figures are regularly given jobs there. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Macomia village burned and looted by insurgents URL: https://www.zitamar.com/macomia-village-burned-and-looted-by-insurgents/ Last updated: 2025-06-24T15:06:37.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents attacked, burned and looted the village of Quinto Congresso in the Macomia district of Cabo Delgado province on Thursday 19 June, local sources told *Zitamar News*. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Concessions to transparency URL: https://www.zitamar.com/concessions-to-transparency/ Last updated: 2025-06-20T15:36:44.000Z Good afternoon. Plans by the transport ministry to publish concession contracts (see below) are a welcome step in the direction of greater transparency and ethics in government contracting. It is not a coincidence that they come while the government is conducting a consultation process on changes to laws regulating mining, oil and gas, electricity concessions and other areas. It all forms part of President Daniel Chapo’s agenda to ensure that concessions and other profitable contracts are awarded through fair competition and that corrupt practices around them, which to date have essentially benefited senior people in his ruling Frelimo party, are eliminated. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/aff00b0d-0fc9-483f-8d93-2f5a442ba488/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Miner Kenmare definitively rejects takeover bidThe rejection comes as Kenmare is trying to reach an agreement with the Mozambican government on the terms to extend its production agreement![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-218.jpg)Zitamar NewsAlexandre Nhampossa![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-20-16.48.21.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/miner-kenmare-definitively-rejects-takeover-bid/) [Insurgents kill civilian in Muidumbe districtThe village of Miangalewa has already been attacked several times this year, with civilians and security forces both targeted![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-219.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-20-16.58.48.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-civilian-in-muidumbe-district/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Chapo’s agenda is driven by the need to restore Frelimo’s reputation, after the protests sparked by last year’s disputed elections revealed the depth and breadth of anger with the ruling party. So it is very likely that the decision to publish concession contracts is linked to the widespread suspicion that leading figures in Frelimo are earning money improperly from some of these contracts. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Miner Kenmare definitively rejects takeover bid URL: https://www.zitamar.com/miner-kenmare-definitively-rejects-takeover-bid/ Last updated: 2025-06-20T15:13:47.000Z Kenmare Resources, the Irish-registered company that mines heavy mineral sands in Mozambique, has definitively rejected the takeover bid by a consortium formed by investment firm Oryx Global Partners Limited and former Kenmare head Michael Carvill, claiming the offer was too low. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Insurgents kill civilian in Muidumbe district URL: https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-kill-civilian-in-muidumbe-district/ Last updated: 2025-06-20T15:06:28.000Z Islamic State-backed insurgents killed a civilian on Thursday 12 June during an attack on the village of Miangalewa in the Muidumbe district of Cabo Delgado province. A local source told *Zitamar News* that insurgents appeared unexpectedly in the evening and killed a local man. Another source reported heavy gunfire in the area during the attack, which took place near a position of the Mozambican armed forces. _This post is for subscribers only._ ### A begging bowl is not enough URL: https://www.zitamar.com/a-begging-bowl-is-not-enough/ Last updated: 2025-06-19T15:52:26.000Z Good afternoon. What are the chances of Mozambique receiving funding once more from the European Union (EU) to support the state budget, as the government is asking for (see below)? In some ways, ministers can be optimistic. The EU has sounded positive about cooperating with the government, and *Zitamar News* understands that it has decided to accept President Daniel Chapo’s administration as the legitimate government, despite the evidence for widespread fraud in last year’s elections (as described in great detail in a report by the EU’s own election observer mission). *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/00505e44-4ea8-42bd-83ca-9fc4b729eecb/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Cabo Ligado Update 18 June 2025 (2-15 June 2025)The Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) killed at least 12 Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters returning from Niassa province![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-217.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/cabo_delgado_-_header_image_-_2-15_june_2025_-_en.png)](https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-18-june-2025-2-15-june-2025/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) EU funding would be extremely welcome to the government, not only because of its acute cash shortage but also to alleviate the lack of foreign currency in the country that is making it so hard for many businesses to operate. But it is not going to materialise soon, for at least two basic reasons. One is simply that EU funding takes a long time to be agreed. Once a funding package was designed, it would need to be voted on by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and the whole process would probably take 18-24 months. It is not, therefore, going to alleviate the immediate problems in the public finances and the wider economy. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Cabo Ligado Update 18 June 2025 (2-15 June 2025) URL: https://www.zitamar.com/cabo-ligado-update-18-june-2025-2-15-june-2025/ Last updated: 2025-06-19T04:43:32.000Z ## By the numbers **Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (2-15 June 2025)** - **At least 8 political violence events (2,096 in total since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 18 reported fatalities from political violence (6,038 since 1 October 2017)** - **0 reported civilian fatalities (2,509 since 1 October 2017)** - **At least 8 political violence events involving ISM across Mozambique (1,928 since 1 October 2017)** ## Overview The Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) killed at least 12 Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) fighters returning from Niassa province in a clash in Montepuez district at the start of the month. The survivors continued their trek, arriving in Meluco district in the following days. Elsewhere, ISM was involved in clashes with the Local Force in Muidumbe district and FADM in Macomia district. Despite ISM losses, the group’s targeting of civilians remains persistent, with up to six abducted in northern Muidumbe district, while at least one Local Force soldier was killed in an attack in the south of the district. ## Situation summary ISM fighters returning from Niassa province suffered a significant blow on 3 June, losing at least 12 fighters in a FADM ambush. According to a local source, the group had crossed the R698 road between Nairoto and Ntele, and stopped for food near the Messalo river when FADM attacked. The ambush took place not far from Gemfields’ Nairoto gold project. Despite the attack, ISM fighters managed to escape. According to the same local source, the surviving fighters, some of whom were foreigners, suffered some injuries but made their way eastward to Minhanha in Meluco district, where Cabo Ligado understands they remain. Insurgents have been seen frequently in this area, and in particular around the [Ravia gold mine](https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-24-march-6-april-2025?ref=zitamar.com), since the start of the year, prompting speculation that this is the site of a new base. In northern Muidumbe district, ISM targeted Magaia village between 6 and 8 June, abducting civilians for ransom, destroying property, and clashing with the Local Force. On 6 June, insurgents captured up to six people in fields near the village and forced them to call their families for ransom payments, leading to the release of at least five. On 7 June, the insurgents entered the village, burning houses and looting military equipment, but were repelled by the Local Force. Fighting continued the following day, which resulted in at least one member of the Local Force being killed. Through its propaganda channels, the Islamic State (IS) claimed it killed two, while local sources suggested that insurgents also suffered casualties, but could not confirm a number. On 4 June, farmers in the village of Novo Cabo Delgado near the south bank of the Messalo river abandoned their fields after seeing insurgents in the area, news agency [Lusa](https://observador.pt/2025/06/04/agricultores-deixam-campos-por-receio-de-grupos-terroristas-no-norte-de-mocambique/?ref=zitamar.com) reported. On the evening of 12 June, insurgents attacked the village of Miangalewa in Muidumbe, just north of the Messalo river and less than 6 kilometers from Novo Cabo Delgado, killing one person and, according to IS social media, stealing two motorbikes. Heavy gunfire was reported in the area that night. IS also claimed it killed a soldier in an attack on an army camp in Catupa village in Macomia district on 14 June, but Cabo Ligado could not identify the exact location. Another source in the province reported two clashes in the area the previous week, which could not be confirmed, suggesting that clashes are ongoing in the area. ## Focus: Return to Mucojo One of the more striking findings of the International Organisation for Migration’s[ most recent survey](https://dtm.iom.int/datasets/mozambique-mobility-tracking-assessment-round-22-public-dataset-april-2025?ref=zitamar.com) of displacement and return in Cabo Delgado is the considerable fall in the number of displaced people in Macomia district headquarters. The survey, conducted over February and March this year, showed 45,686 displaced people were living in the town. This is down by over one-third from the 71,664[ recorded](https://dtm.iom.int/datasets/mozambique-multi-sectorial-location-assessment-dataset-round-14-july-2024?ref=zitamar.com) in May and June 2024\. Many of those who left have gone to Mucojo on Macomia’s coast. In early May, a [multisectoral humanitarian assessment](https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-cabo-delgado-nampula-niassa-humanitarian-snapshot-may-2025-enpt?ref=zitamar.com) found 16,600 returnees in Mucojo. Most cited lack of food and public services as the reason for return. Yet things are not much better in Mucojo. Health and education services are not operating, while there is just one shop in the village. The stark conditions facing returnees suggest that return may not be wholly voluntary in all cases. In late 2022, when people began returning to Mocímboa da Praia, there was[ some evidence of incentives](https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-december-2022?ref=zitamar.com) driving this, as well as the poor living conditions in displacement camps. In late 2024, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Paula Gaviria Betancur[noted](https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/visit-mozambique-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-internally-displaced-persons-paula-gaviria-betancur-ahrc5647add1-advance-unedited-version?ref=zitamar.com) that local authorities at times pressured people to return through the promise of assistance or misrepresenting conditions in their place of origin. In contrast to the lack of public services, security conditions on the coast, and in Mucojo in particular are, on the face of it, conducive to return. There is now a permanent presence and regular patrolling of FADM and Rwandan forces in the Mucojo and Quiterajo Administrative Posts. Both political violence and other actions by ISM have been declining in both areas in recent months, likely in response to their deployment. ACLED records no ISM attacks in the Mucojo Administrative Post since the hijacking of four fishing boats at Pangane on 21 March. However, one local source reports continued ISM presence in the area, particularly around Pangane, where the group was [most recently seen](https://cartamz.com/sociedade/43782/ataques-terroristas-insurgentes-assaltam-residencias-e-roubam-pescado-em-pangane/?ref=zitamar.com) on 14 June. Returnees will therefore face difficulty not only in reestablishing livelihoods in the absence of basic services, but also in navigating a complex security environment. They will need to maintain relations with state forces while insurgents, many with roots in the area, seek to maintain some freedom of movement. **Round up** *TotalEnergies suspends road access to its LNG site* According to Africa Intelligence, TotalEnergies has significantly increased security at the Afungi liquefied natural gas site. The publication [reports](https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2025/06/09/totalenergies-introduces-drastic-security-measures-on-mozambique-lng,110462908-art?ref=zitamar.com) that contractors were informed at a 27 May meeting that access to the site by road was suspended, and that future access would be by air and sea only. TotalEnergies' suspension of road access had previously been [reported](https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-19-may-1-june-2025?ref=zitamar.com) by Maputo newspaper Savana on 30 May. The introduction of heightened security measures came soon after TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné [expressed satisfaction](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/wgc-totalenergies-ceo-will-propose-lifting-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project-2025-05-20/?ref=zitamar.com) with security in northern Mozambique. Speaking on 20 May, he said that the security situation had improved, and that force majeure would be lifted by the middle of the year. Since these latest measures were introduced, the Financial Times [reports](https://www.ft.com/content/28defb12-a248-493d-8563-5492aeb8b425?ref=zitamar.com) that the UK’s export credit agency, UK Export Finance, is assessing past human rights abuses associated with project security, and measures in place to prevent a recurrence. *FADM expels 31 soldiers for disciplinary offences* The General Staff of FADM has ordered the expulsion of 31 military personnel, including sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers, for disciplinary offences including unauthorised absence, disobeying orders, and indiscipline, according to the news site [Integrity Magazine](https://integritymagazine.co.mz/arquivos/43804?amp=1&ref=zitamar.com). Integrity Magazine quotes an order dated 23 May and signed by the new chief of staff of FADM, Júlio dos Santos Jane. The expulsions are in line with [concerns about corruption](https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-7-20-april-2025?ref=zitamar.com) in the Defense and Security Forces that President Daniel Chapo laid out at the swearing-in of General Jane in April. *UIR reconnaissance chief shot dead in Maputo* The head of reconnaissance for the police rapid intervention unit (UIR) was [shot dead](https://cartamz.com/destaque/43727/cidadao-morto-a-tiro-em-nkobe-no-municipio-da-matola/?ref=zitamar.com) in his vehicle in the Nkobe area of Maputo province on the night of 11 June by unidentified gunmen. He was driving in a Mahindra vehicle used by security forces when around 30 shots were fired at him at point-blank range, a police spokesperson said. ### José Pacheco: a safe pair of hands URL: https://www.zitamar.com/jose-pacheco-a-safe-pair-of-hands/ Last updated: 2025-06-18T16:05:49.000Z Good afternoon. Mozambican social media is abuzz with discussions about the appointment of former government minister José Pacheco as director-general of the intelligence agency SISE (see below). Many of the comments are unfavourable, arguing that Pacheco was an unimpressive minister and that President Daniel Chapo is largely resurrecting old figures from the past to work for him. The implication is that, if they did not manage to fix Mozambique’s problems before, they will not be able to now. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/23b4f910-def2-473c-8333-8072a882eea1/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) This is rather unfair, however. Pacheco served as a minister mostly under then-president Armando Guebuza. In these roles he was closely instructed by, and followed the orders of Guebuza: if he did not do more, it is because the president prevented him. In fact, as interior minister Pacheco sought to crack down on the drugs trade, hiring outside expertise to carry out communications surveillance on drugs gangs and looking to arrest senior people in the gangs. But he was told to stop, presumably because he was getting too close to those people in the ruling Frelimo party with a stake in the drugs trade. The same reason may or may not explain why smuggling of illegally cut timber reached a peak during his time as agriculture minister. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Welcome investment to end the currency crisis URL: https://www.zitamar.com/welcome-investment-to-end-the-currency-crisis/ Last updated: 2025-06-17T15:29:51.000Z Good afternoon. Yesterday we reported that the government has found another short-term fix to ease the foreign currency shortage, in the form of a deal with commodity trader Vitol that will see it providing $600m of credit to pay for fuel imports for 12 months. Now the government is insisting that it is dealing with airlines’ inability to withdraw funds from Mozambique due to the currency crunch (see below). But a more lasting solution to the crisis is still awaited. How has Mozambique got into this situation? Several things have happened in the last year to trigger a foreign currency shortage. The most obvious is the fall in exports caused by the nationwide post-election protests, which caused a slump in foreign currency entering the country. The protests also deterred foreign direct investment, and encouraged companies and savers to keep more of their money in US dollars for fear of a collapse in the value of the metical. The prices of some of Mozambique’s most valuable commodity exports, such as rubies, coal and cotton, have fallen recently. The end of the government’s loan programme with the International Monetary Fund, which has yet to be replaced, deprived it of an important source of dollars. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/66c9af8d-e8e7-4d9b-a275-169581f14f30/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [“Where are you?” - Wildlife Conservation Society accused of neglecting Niassa reserve following insurgent attackThe abrupt withdrawal of the co-manager of the reserve comes amid an apparent breakdown in relations between many senior people working there![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-216.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Gould![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-05-14-16.25.07-2.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/where-are-you-wildlife-conservation-society-accused-of-neglecting-niassa-reserve-following-insurgent-attack/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) However, those events would not have had such a big impact, had Mozambique not been in such a vulnerable situation to begin with. The country is heavily reliant on imports, including goods like food that could be produced domestically, and equally reliant on commodities to generate most of its export revenues, whose price can fluctuate considerably. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### “Where are you?” - Wildlife Conservation Society accused of neglecting Niassa reserve following insurgent attack URL: https://www.zitamar.com/where-are-you-wildlife-conservation-society-accused-of-neglecting-niassa-reserve-following-insurgent-attack/ Last updated: 2025-06-17T15:16:01.000Z The American conservation NGO the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) abruptly pulled out of a 20-year agreement to manage northern Mozambique’s Niassa Special Reserve alongside government conservation agency ANAC in February this year, after years of dysfunctional relations between the two, sources have told *Zitamar News*. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Who killed Carlos Zandamela? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/who-killed-carlos-zandamela/ Last updated: 2025-06-16T15:17:11.000Z Good afternoon. The Mozambican police have belatedly confirmed that it was Carlos Zandamela, the head of reconnaissance for the UIR riot police, who was shot dead on Wednesday night last week (see below), three days after media reports of the shooting which named him as the victim. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,*[ *here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/d7b515c7-cc1f-44d2-8f46-49758366830e/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) It remains a matter of speculation why he was killed, but the manner of his death offers some clues. Zandamela’s car was blocked and then assassins opened fire at point-blank range with multiple weapons. It has the signs of a professional job of the kind associated with organised crime or with the so-called “death squads” that have killed political opponents of ruling party Frelimo. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Chapo cannot afford to fail URL: https://www.zitamar.com/chapo-cannot-afford-to-fail/ Last updated: 2025-06-13T16:04:54.000Z Good afternoon. “We are prohibited from failing”, President Daniel Chapo said yesterday at a conference to mark 50 years since Mozambique gained independence from Portugal. He was talking about the so-called “inclusive national dialogue”, the talks between himself and opposition parties on political and constitutional reforms. But the anniversary, and the speeches given about it this week by Chapo and one of his predecessors, offer an opportunity to reflect more broadly on the government of the country, and on just why Chapo thinks that failure is not allowed. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/e2954ebd-f738-4b72-8fa6-b169b8a40002/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) In another speech yesterday (see below), Joaquim Chissano, president of Mozambique from 1986 to 2005, namechecked some of modern Mozambique’s most obvious problems, such as poverty, corruption and violent extremism, but offered no explanation for how those problems had come about or why they have not been addressed more effectively. His claim that Mozambique currently enjoys democratic institutions and freedom of expression rings hollow after the extensive fraud in last year’s elections and the killing shortly afterwards of opposition activists Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe. Fast-forward to today, and Chapo has found it necessary to carry out something of a revolution in the machinery of the state. The replacement of the police leadership seems to have coincided with a more effective response to kidnappings, as we [noted](https://www.zitamar.com/have-kidnappers-met-their-match-in-chapo/) yesterday. The heads of the tax and customs services have also been replaced, in what could be the start of a wide-ranging crackdown on corruption in public officials. Corrupt judges have also started to fall. A new approach to rescuing the loss-making state-owned airline LAM is underway, and the scrapping of its international routes looks set to save money. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Have kidnappers met their match in Chapo? URL: https://www.zitamar.com/have-kidnappers-met-their-match-in-chapo/ Last updated: 2025-06-12T15:47:58.000Z Good afternoon. As we report today, the scourge of kidnappings in Mozambique, which have terrorised business owners for over a decade, is under threat. Although the actual number of kidnappings recorded in the capital Maputo so far this year is not much less than the same period last year (contrary to an official statement: see below), police are continuing to prosecute kidnappings more energetically and efficiently. Whereas in the past there was often little or no police reaction to a kidnapping, now the police are responding quickly and chasing after kidnappers, which seems to have led to victims being released more promptly, with or without a ransom being paid. Thus out of nine people kidnapped in the eight cases of 2025, eight have been released. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/ccf0828c-3c49-4c8a-80a7-9f5d3cc9400a/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Kidnapping gangs show signs of disorder, as police get toughRecent kidnappings have been marked by a decrease in professionalism, and a stronger response from law enforcement at the direction of President Daniel Chapo![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-215.jpg)Zitamar NewsFernando Lima![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-12-17.08.19.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/kidnapping-gangs-show-signs-of-disorder-as-police-get-tough/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) Not all of the improved results can be attributed to police work: as we report, recent kidnappings have been less professional than in the past. However, as we report, the change in the police approach has been enough to get some business people living in self-imposed exile to consider moving back to Mozambique. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Kidnapping gangs show signs of disorder, as police get tough URL: https://www.zitamar.com/kidnapping-gangs-show-signs-of-disorder-as-police-get-tough/ Last updated: 2025-06-12T15:30:12.000Z When Adolfo Muholove, chief executive of development finance company Gapi, was snatched from his car along with his son in the city of Maputo on 12 May this year, events did not follow the normal pattern of kidnappings in Mozambique. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar News, Zitamar Pro, Institutional Mozambique and Zitamar Insider tiers only._ ### Anamalala? Not for the government URL: https://www.zitamar.com/anamalala-not-for-the-government/ Last updated: 2025-06-11T15:55:57.000Z Good afternoon. Today brings more news about the saga of opposition politician Venâncio Mondlane’s plans to set up a new political party, to be called Anamalala. At the end of last month, it was reported that the justice ministry had found that there were problems with the party’s application for registration. Newspaper *Canal de Moçambique* says it has now found out what those reasons were. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/28c4f95d-8152-4c45-ad12-ecc4af712f59/)*.* [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) According to the paper, the ministry decided that the name “Anamalala” is unacceptable for a party, because it is a word from the Macua language, one of Mozambique’s local languages, which can be translated as “that’s enough”. The ministry’s argument is that using a word from a traditional language is sectarian and divisive, and goes against the ideal of national unity expressed in the constitution. It is ironic to use such an argument against Mondlane, who grew up in southern Mozambique but who nevertheless has overcome traditional ethnic divisions to attract support from all over the country, including the far north. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Not everyone wants to welcome Chapo URL: https://www.zitamar.com/not-everyone-wants-to-welcome-chapo/ Last updated: 2025-06-10T15:40:08.000Z Good afternoon. President Daniel Chapo is in Eswatini this week, adding it to the list of countries he has visited since his inauguration in January. Previously he has paid a visit to South Africa, Angola, Malawi and Tanzania. Although Chapo has kept airports reasonably busy, he would no doubt be grateful for a few more official invitations, for example from Western European countries and from the European Union (EU). Both have traditionally been visited by Mozambican presidents, especially Portugal. *The full Daily Briefing continues below for Pro subscribers. Subscribers to the* Zitamar News *tier can read the top half, including the full leader article,* [*here*](https://www.zitamar.com/email/1afce536-a0eb-4b94-83ca-5bdfe2a15c5a/)*.* ## The latest from [*Zitamar News*](https://zitamar.com/?ref=zitamar.com): [Local Force in Muidumbe sustains losses in fight for Magaia villageThis is the second time in two months that the village of Magaia has been targeted by insurgents, after months of peace![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-213.jpg)Zitamar NewsZitamar News![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-10-16.59.42.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/local-force-in-muidumbe-sustains-losses-in-fight-for-magaia-village/) [Mozambique sees decline in number of displaced people, says migration bodyAlthough more people are returning to their home districts in Cabo Delgado, humanitarian agencies warn that uprooted Mozambicans still face severe problems including food shortages![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/icon/Zitamar-logo-1400x1400-1-214.jpg)Zitamar NewsTom Gould![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f8/24/f824d293-9bb2-4c56-8f85-7a9e686fb0d9/content/images/thumbnail/2025-06-10-16.02.01.jpg)](https://www.zitamar.com/mozambique-sees-decline-in-number-of-displaced-people-says-migration-body/) [Subscribe from just $12 a month](https://www.zitamar.com/#/portal/signup) But the word from diplomatic missions in Maputo is that many foreign countries are still hesitant to embrace Chapo as the legitimate president of Mozambique, which an invitation would imply. They have not forgotten the extensive vote-rigging surrounding his election last year, which was comprehensively detailed in the final report of the EU’s monitoring mission (not that the EU took any action in response), or the bloody police crackdown on protesters that left over 300 of them dead. So reluctant were foreign governments, even in Africa, to recognise Chapo afterwards that only two foreign heads of state, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa and Guinea-Bissau’s Umaro Sissoco Embaló, attended his heavily guarded inauguration. _This post is for subscribers on the Zitamar Pro tier only._ ### Local Force in Muidumbe sustains losses in fight for Magaia village URL: https://www.zitamar.com/local-force-in-muidumbe-sustains-losses-in-fight-for-magaia-village/ Last updated: 2025-06-10T15:06:08.000Z Islamic State-linked insurgents in Cabo Delgado province yesterday claimed to have killed two members of the Local Force militia in the village of Magaia, in Muidumbe district on Sunday. The deaths came in a battle that followed the kidnap for ransom of local villagers and the looting of food. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ _Includes the latest 500 public posts. Use `/sitemap.xml` for the complete archive of public content._