Welcome to the Angola Briefing, Zitamar News’ guide to the political, economic and business developments shaping Angola as it heads towards the 2027 elections. Each edition combines the latest reporting with analysis from journalists and specialists who know the country closely.

This week, host and Zitamar editor-at-large Fernando Lima was joined by Paula Cristina Roque, author, researcher and security-sector analyst, and Executive Director of Intelwatch. They discussed the government’s plans for the North-South railway corridor, including the €1.084 billion contract for the section towards Menongue, before turning to the political questions dominating the run-up to 2027: voter registration, recent changes across the armed forces, police and intelligence services, and the unresolved MPLA succession.

From next week, the Angola Briefing moves to twice-weekly publication, with two editions covering the most important political, economic and business developments affecting Angola. We begin with a special edition on the oil and gas industry, featuring analyst Marisa Lourenço and economist Francisco Paulo.

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THE LATEST NEWS

• BNA cuts interest rates and raises 2026 growth forecast to 6.15%
• Government advances €1bn North-South railway contract through direct award
• IN FOCUS: Angola’s succession debate puts the security apparatus under scrutiny

1. BNA cuts interest rates and raises 2026 growth forecast to 6.15%

The Banco Nacional de Angola cut its benchmark policy rate from 15.75% to 14.75% at its September monetary policy meeting and reduced the reserve requirement on local-currency deposits from 17.5% to 16.5%. The central bank said the easing reflected continued progress on inflation and a more favourable short and medium-term outlook. Annual inflation fell to 8.78% in August, while monthly inflation slowed to 0.59%, from 0.75% in July.

The BNA also raised its forecast for 2026 GDP growth to 6.15%. It had previously projected growth of 3.6%. The latest revision follows reported year-on-year GDP growth of 8.74% in the second quarter, with non-oil activity expanding by 9.24% and the oil sector by 5.64%. The bank now expects the non-oil economy to grow by 7.16% this year, supported by agriculture and forestry, fisheries, manufacturing, trade and construction.

Credit to the economy stood at Kz7.31 trillion in August. It was 11.72% higher than a year earlier, although it had contracted by 1.2% since the beginning of 2026. International reserves stood at $15.32 billion, equivalent to 6.59 months of imports.

2. Government advances €1bn North-South railway contract through direct award

The government has invited a consortium of Angola’s Omatapalo and Spain’s Quantum Solutions Emerging Markets to submit the proposal for Lot 4 of the North-South railway corridor, covering the section between Station 5 and Menongue. President João Lourenço approved the project in March through a simplified procurement procedure. The maximum price is €1.084 billion including VAT.

The Transport Ministry’s invitation, published on the Public Procurement Portal, says the simplified procedure was justified by technical and intellectual suitability and by “imperative urgency”. The documentation allows negotiation over price, the construction timetable, financing guarantees and other contractual elements, although the proposed price cannot exceed the €1.084 billion ceiling. The project forms part of the wider Malanje, Kuito and Menongue railway connection, for which Lourenço approved expenditure approaching €5 billion in March.

Roque placed the railway within the political context of the final year before the 2027 election. She argued that large public-works programmes have historically been used for electoral purposes and questioned how much previous infrastructure spending has generated in local employment and associated industries. She also expressed concern about the use of higher oil revenues to finance major projects at this point in the political cycle.

Roque was considerably more critical of the procurement itself. She alleged political connections between Omatapalo and the ruling establishment and questioned the transparency of awarding such a large project without an open competitive tender. Those claims go beyond what is established in the procurement reporting reviewed here and should be treated as her assessment. The published documentation does, however, confirm the use of a simplified procedure and a price ceiling exceeding €1 billion.

The economic test is broader than whether the railway is eventually built. A project of this scale can lower transport costs and connect production centres to markets if freight demand, connecting infrastructure and maintenance are sufficient. Roque’s intervention raises the parallel question of how much of the expenditure remains in the domestic economy through jobs, suppliers and new commercial activity. With close to €5 billion authorised for the wider connection, those outcomes will determine much of the project’s eventual economic return.

IN FOCUS: Angola’s succession debate puts the security apparatus under scrutiny

Angola’s approaching political transition is increasingly difficult to separate from changes inside the institutions that control security and intelligence. President João Lourenço’s latest personnel overhaul reached the armed forces, National Police, Criminal Investigation Service, military justice, intelligence bodies and the Casa Militar. Twenty-six generals and admirals were retired after reaching the age limit, while other officers were moved into posts covering military intelligence, special forces, logistics, provincial police commands and presidential strategic analysis.

The process has continued beyond the initial reshuffle. On 9 September, Lourenço approved changes to the organic regulations of the Serviço de Investigação Criminal, including the revocation of the 2018 decree that created its dedicated anti-corruption directorate. The same day he replaced the Interior Ministry delegate and provincial police commander in Lunda Norte (see the presidential decrees). These changes follow an earlier reorganisation at the centre of presidential security. In April, Lourenço removed Francisco Furtado as Minister of State and Chief of the Casa Militar and transferred Defence Minister João Ernesto dos Santos, known as “Liberdade”, into the role.

Some of this can be explained by institutional renewal. Angola emerged from decades of conflict with a large officer corps, and the formal retirement of generals who have reached the statutory age limit is hardly evidence by itself of political manoeuvring. The September decisions also contain considerable continuity. Officers have been shifted between senior positions rather than simply removed from the system, while the principal chiefs of several security institutions remain in place.

The political context nevertheless gives these decisions greater weight. Lourenço is serving his second presidential term, while separately seeking another mandate as MPLA president. His candidacy for the party leadership was formally submitted in May, and the MPLA’s congress is scheduled for 9 and 10 December. The party says that congress will renew its leadership structures and prepare it for the 2027 general election. The eventual choice of the MPLA’s presidential candidate remains a separate process. Lourenço himself has previously said the candidate for the presidency would be selected through the party’s statutory bodies.

Speaking on this week’s Angola Briefing, Paula Cristina Roque argued that the retirements should be read alongside the continued influence of senior security figures who remain in office. She described the security establishment as top-heavy and suggested further changes could follow as the country approaches the election. She also pointed to economic pressures affecting lower-ranking personnel and questioned how those strains might affect cohesion within the police, armed forces and intelligence services. These are Roque’s assessments rather than established explanations for the personnel changes.

The succession therefore raises two overlapping questions. One concerns the MPLA: who can command sufficient support inside the party to become its candidate in 2027, and what relationship would that person have with Lourenço if he remains party president? The other concerns the state: how will the security institutions behave during a transition in which presidential authority, party leadership and the interests of established security figures may no longer sit as neatly with one individual?

The recent appointments do not establish that Lourenço is reorganising the security apparatus specifically to manage his succession. They do show that important posts are changing hands at the same time as the political succession moves from a distant question to an immediate institutional problem. The composition of the security leadership, the degree of continuity among its most powerful figures, and any further changes before the December MPLA congress will therefore deserve close attention.

Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Angola Briefing.

We’ll be back next week with a discussion of Angola’s oil industry, looking at the latest developments in production, investment and the sector’s wider economic outlook. Fernando will be joined by Marisa Lourenço, strategic risk adviser and political analyst, and Francisco Paulo, economist and specialist in taxation, fiscal reform and African development — who joined us earlier this month for a discussion on Angola’s business environment:

Thanks again for watching, listening and reading.